the contract is in writing. But the rule that an unnamed and unknown principal shall stand liable for the contract of his agent, does not apply to a demise under seal. The relation between the owner of land and those who occupy it is of a purely legal character; and the fact that a lessee takes a lease for an unnamed principal, but in his own name, will not render the unnamed, principal liable for the rent. Borcheling v. Katz. Opinion by Van Fleet, V. C.

CHATTEL MORTGAGE--ASSIGNEE FOR CREDITORS CANNOT ATTACK-DESCRIPTION.-(1) An assignee for the benefit of creditors can take no exception to the validity of a chattel mortgage given by his assignor, on the ground that it was not filed in the county where the mortgagor actually resided. He is bound by the equity to which the property was subject when it came to his hands from the assignor. Mitford v. Mitford, 9 Ves. 87; Windsor v. McLellan, 2 Story, 492; Re Gregg, 3 B. R. 131. And this rule has been repeatedly applied in mortgage cases like the present. Re Griffiths, 3 B. R. 179; Potter v. Coggleshall, 4 id. 19; Stewart v. Platt, 101 U. S. 731. (2) A description of "all the stock, fixtures, goods and chattels of every name and kind" in a designated store, is specific enough to identify the property intended to be covered. Shaw v. Glen. Opinion by Runyon, Ch.

In a

DIVORCE-EVIDENCE-INMATE OF BROTHEL. suit for divorce, evidence of defendant's adultery, committed in a brothel, is not to be rejected because given by witnesses who are keepers of or employed in such resorts, if their testimony appears credible otherwise. Paul v. Paul. Opinion by Runyon, Ch.

WILL-LIFE ESTATE WITH POWER OF DISPOSITION NOT FEE. Where all of decedent's estate was given to his wife (who was also an executrix) for life, with power of disposition during her life-time, and with an absolute gift over of most of the estate after her death, held, that the power of disposition did not enlarge her estate to a fee. Cory v. Cory. Opinion by Bird, V. C.

RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.

BANK NOTE-ALTERATION OF NUMBER ON MATERIAL -ONE RECEIVING BY MISTAKE CAN RECOVER FROM ONE

PAYING FOR MONEY HAD.-A Bank of England note, which had been materially altered in number and date, was paid to the plaintiff's bank for value by the defendant, both parties believing the note to be good. The plaintiffs paid away the note, which was afterward presented at the Bank of England, where the alteration was perceived and payment was refused. The note was returned to the plaintiffs as a bad one, and after a fortnight spent in tracing the note to the defendant, the plaintiffs demanded payment of it from him, and on the 21st of July, 1882, sued him for the amount. On the 18th of August, 1882, the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, 45 and 46 Vict.. ch. 61, received the royal assent. By section 64, where a bill or acceptance is materially altered, without the assent of all parties liable on the bill, the bill is avoided except as against a party who has himself made the alteration, and subse. quent indorsers. Provided that where a bill has been materially altered, but the alteration is "not appar ent," and the bill is in the hands of a holder in due course, such holder may avail himself of the bill as if it had not been altered, and may enforce payment of it according to its original tenor. By section 89 the provisions of this act relating to bills of exchange apply, "with the necessary modifications," to promissory notes. Held, that the doctrine as to notice of infirmity in bills and notes was inapplicable to a forged Bank

of England note, and that the delay in giving notice of the alteration to the defendant was no ground of defense; that before the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, the Bank of England was not liable on the altered note, (Suffell v. Bank of England, 9 Q. B. D. 555), which was therefore worthless; that section 64 was not retrospective, and that even if it were so, the "necessary modifications" referred to in section 89 would exclude Bank of England notes altogether from the operation of section 64, and that even if the proviso of section 64 would otherwise have affected the altered bank note, the alteration was "apparent," as the Bank of England could at once discern and point out to the holder of the note that it had been materially altered, although the alteration was not obvious to everybody; and consequently, that the plaintiffs having received from the defendant a worthless note on which no one could be sued, were entitled to recover in the action for money had and received. Q. B. D., March 17, 1883. Leeds and County Bank v. Walker. Opinion by Dinman, J. (11 Q. B. D. 85.)

BANKRUPTCY-DEALINGS OF INSOLVENT WITH INNOCENT PARTY.-A bankrupt, having disposed of his goods in fraud of his creditors, opened an account in a bank with the proceeds, and having entered into a contract for the purchase of land in an assumed name, paid a deposit to the defendant, the auctioneer, by a check drawn upon the bank. The vendor and the defendant acted bona fide and without notice of the bankruptcy or of the fraudulent conduct of the bankrupt. Held, that the bankrupt's trustee was not entitled to recover the deposit from the defendant so as to prevent it from being forfeited to the vendor upon the non-completion of the contract. Q. B. Div.. May 22, 1883. Collins v. Stimson. Opinions by Pollock, B., and Lopes, J. (L. R., 11 Q. B. Div. 142.)

MORTGAGE-DEMAND BY AGENT WHEN NOT SUFFI CIENT TO MAKE NON-PAYMENT DEFAULT. Where by the terms of a mortgage deed the plaintiffs were to remain in possession on their own account, and manage the mortgaged property until they should make default in payment of the mortgage money upon demand in writing in manner specified, and such demand was made on the wife of one of the plaintiffs during the plaintiff's absence by a person who represented himself as the defendant's agent, and upon non-payment the defendant forthwith entered upon possession and seized the mortgaged property, held, in an action of trespass against the mortgagee, that such non-payment before the plaintiffs had had any opportunity to inquire into the truth of the alleged agency did .ot constitute default, and that the defendant was liable to the mortgagors in substantial damages. Privy Council, Feb. 13, 1883. Moore v. Shelby. Opinion by Sir Barues Peacock. (L. R., 8 App. Cas. 285.)

PENALTY-WHEN CROWN ENTITLED TO ACTION BY INFORMER. Where a penalty is created by statute and nothing is said as to who may recover it, and it is not created for the benefit of a party grieved, and the offense is not against an individual, it belongs to the crown, and the crown alone can maintain a suit for it. To enable a common informer to maintain an action for a penalty created by statute, an interest in the penalty must be given to him by express words or by sufficient implication. House of Lords, April 9, 1883. Bradlaugh v. Clark. Opinions by Lord Chan cellor Selborne, Lords Blackburn, Watson and Fitz gerald. (L. R., 8 App. Cas. 354.)

TRADE-MARK-NAME OF MACHINE.-A trader has a right to make and sell machines similar in form and construction to those made and sold by a rival trader, and in describing and advertising his own machines to

refer to his rival's machines and his rival's name, provided he does this in such a way as to obviate any reasonable possibility of misunderstanding or deception. House of Lords, December 13, 1882. Singer Manufacturing Co. v Loog. Opinions by Lord Chancellor Selborne, and Lords Blackburn, Watson and Bramwell. (L. R., 8 App. Cas. 15.)

CRIMINAL LAW.

ARSON-HOUSE NOT CONNECTED WITH DWELLING NOT OUT-HOUSE.-The indictment was for burning an out-house used as a store-house, the proof being that it was an old building located at a cross-roads and occupied as a store-house, but not inclosed or used in any way as a dwelling-house; held a fatal variance. An out-house is one that belongs to a dwelling-house, and is in some respect parcel of such dwelling-house and situated within the curtilage. Such was the meaning of the term at common law, and under the English statutes, similar to ours, in relation to the burning of houses. Russell Crimes, 1038. North Carolina Supreme Court, February Term, 1883. State of North Carolina v. Roper. Opinion by Ashe, J. (88 N. C. 656.)

RIGHT TO BREAK DOOR TO ARREST-ESCAPE.-The law is well settled that an officer who arrested a criminal, when he escapes, may if it becomes necessary break open the doors of his house to re-arrest him. In Foster's Crown Law, 319, § 22, in the discussion of the doctrine that every man's house is his castle, it is said: "The rule is likewise confined to the case of arrests in the first instance, for if a man, being legally arrested, escapeth from the officer, the officer may, in fresh pursuit, break open the door in order to retake him." In 2 Hawkins, P. C. 137 (Bk. 2, ch. 14, § 9), in the discussion of the question, "When doors may be broken open in order to make an arrest," it is said: "Whenever a person is lawfully arrested, for any cause, and afterward es capes and shelters him in a house." To the same effect is Commonwealth v. McGahey, 11 Gray, 194. Illinois Supreme Court, May 10, 1883. People of Illinois. Opinion by Craig, J.

Cahill v.

ROBBERY AND MURDER-DUPLICITY IN INDICT. MENT-ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSION.-(1) A count in an indictment in which the defendant is charged with robbery and with murder while in the commission of the robbery, and in which it is alleged that the blows which caused death were struck by the defendant with a piece of iron, a sledge and a shovel, is not bad for duplicity; the State cannot be required to elect upon a trial on such count, and evidence of the robbery and the use of each of the implements in producing death is admissible. People v. McDonald, 67 Mo. 13; People v. Casey, 72 N. Y. 393; Bemis' Trial of Webster, 471; 1 Bishop's Cr. Pro., § 432 et seq. (2) Where evidence of a confession is excluded because induced by promises made by an officer having custody of the prisoner, but the prisoner, on a subsequent day, voluntarily goes on the stand and is sworn and examined as a witness in his own behalf, under the statute (R. S., § 7286), on his examination before a magistrate on such charge, and he is cautioned by the magistrate, before testifying, that he need not say any thing to criminate himself, and that what he may say may be used against him, a confession made in such testimony may be proved by the State on the subsequent trial of such person charged with the crime. Ohio Supreme Court, January Term, 1883. Jackson v. State of Ohio. Opinion by Okey, J. (39 Ohio St. 37.)

FINANCIAL LAW.

NATIONAL BANK-TRANSFER OF STOCK— ATTACHMENT.-The rules which regulate the transfer of the stock of National banks are to be found in the statutes of the United States. The National banking act prescribes no exclusive method of transfer, but authorizes every association to do so. The decisions of the courts of the State in which the bank may be located do not control it. Precedence should be given to unrecorded transfers of shares of stock of a National bank, which had passed no by-law on the subject, located in a State whose courts leaned strongly against such transfers, but whose statutes gave the attaching creditor no peculiar rights, by delivery of certificates and a written assignment with power to transfer, both executed in blank, over subsequent attachment of a creditor of the original vendor in whose name the shares still stood on the books of the bank. U. S. Cir. Ct., S. D. New York, Jan. 15, 1883. Scott v. Pignounock National Bank. Opinion by Shipman, J. (15 F. R. 497.)

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-NOVATION-JOINT NOTE -SURETYSHIP.—(1) The giving of a new note for an old one which has become due, the amount and makers of the two notes being the same, will not be treated as a payment or extinguishment of the old note or the pre-existing debt, unless the parties so expressly agree, but it will be regarded merely as an extension of credit. In such case the surrender of the old note will not of itself raise a presumption of such agreement to extinguish the old note by the giving of the new one, it being considered as a conditional surrender, and that its obligation is restored and revived if the new note is not paid. And the new note will not be regarded as a payment of the old, even when it is so expressly agreed, if such agreement was procured by the concealment of any material fact affecting the security of the debt. Nor will the presumption apply where the creditor abandons some security which he held when he takes the new note. (2) Where one of two or more makers of a joint and several promissory note is surety, he is liable to the payee as principal, and except in special cases provided by statute, the holder of such note has the same legal rights against such surety that he has against the principal maker. West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, April 14, 1883. Merchants' National Bank v. Good. Opinion by Sneider, J. (21 W. Va.)

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-WAIVER OF DEMAND AND NOTICE. The words "Protest and notice waived," indorsed on a bill, whether applied to foreign bills or to inland bills and promissory notes, dispense with the necessity of the steps which must precede protest, and therefore are a waiver of demand, as well as of protest and notice. Coddington v. Davis 1 Comst. 186; 3 Denio, 16; Porter v. Kemball, 53 Barb. 646; Fisher v. Price, 37 Ala. 407; Jackard v. Anderson, 37 Mo. 91; Carpenter v. Reynolds, 42 Miss. 807. Kansas Supreme Court, January Term, 1883. Baker v. Scott. Opinion by Horton, C. J. (29 Kan. 136.)

be elected after the adoption of this article shall be fourteen years from and including the first day of January next after their election.'

"The Utica Herald, referring to this blunder, says: 'The earlier provision of the Constitution was not repealed or changed, and the conflict between the two on the matter of time when these twelve justices shall enter on their duties is positive. The earlier provision prescribes the length of term of all justices of the Supreme Court elected subsequent to its adoption. The official term shall be fourteen years,' dating from the first of January next following their election. The latter amendment says nothing of the length of term, but says the justices elected in pursuance of it shall be invested with their offices' on the first of next June. Does the official term' begin before the date fixed for the induction of the justices into office? If not, will the term of these twelve end with December, 1897, or on the first of June, 1898?'"'—Amsterdam Democrat,

There may be enough in this subject to invite discussion. The matter being of grave import, slight uncertainties deserve some attention; any person elected under the amendment to the judiciary article will prefer to feel quite sure where he stands, and what he ought to do. From the time when these men become de jure judicial officers, they are prohibited from continuing their law practice; so that if they shall be held to be in office from and after January 1st, they must lay aside the practice of the law, no matter whether they perform any official duty or not. It was a strange provision, indeed; to provide for the election of additional justices in the fall of the year with a direction that their terms of office should commence the next summer when the work of the courts is sub-. stantially over for the year, and when the summer vacation is about to commence.

We

Nevertheless the provisions of the Constitution cannot very well be made to yield to a construction based upon the unreasonableness of the enactment. must deal with it, in its letter and spirit, just as it is made, as it is; can it be said there is any reasonable doubt as to what is intended? By the amendment an additional section was added to the sixth, or judiciary article of the Constitution, so that it now stands as a whole, and the article as amended must be read together. It must be recollected that the section describes itself as an amendment.

"The Legislature at the first session after the adoption of this amendment, etc., shall provide, etc., for the election of additional justices," etc.

As it now stands, section 13 of the Judiciary Article provides among other things as follows:

"The official terms of the said justices and judges who shall be elected after the adoption of this article shall be fourteen years from and including the first day of January next after their election."

Then comes the amendment adding section 28, which by its language calling itself " an amendment," providing for the election of "additional justices," concludes with this language:

"The justices so elected shall be invested with their offices on the first Monday of June next after their election."

The amendment does not in terms undertake to say when the official term shall commence or when it shall end.

But may we not get at the intention by reading the sections 13 and 28 together?

There need then be no conflict or inconsistency. From such a reading it might be held that the official terms of all justices of the Supreme Court including those newly elected, shall be fourteen years, from the first January next after their election; but as to those elected in persuance of the newly added section, their

official term not to commence until the first Monday in June next after their election. The only effect of this construction is to shorten the term of those last elected by five months. F.

NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS.

COPP'S PUBLIC LAND LAWS. Public Land Laws, passed by Congress from March 4, 1875, to April 1, 1882, with the important decisions of the secretary of the interior and commissioner of the general land office, the land opinions of the attorney-general and the circular instructions issued from the general land office to the surveyors-general and registers and receivers during the same period. By Henry N. Copp, attorney and counsellor at law. Published by the editor: Washington, D. C. 1883. Pp. xxx and 155.

The design of this work is stated to be to show the development of the public land system from 1875, where the first volume of Copp's Public Land Laws leaves the subject, to 1882, where volume 9 of Copp's Land Owner resumed it. To those possessing those volumes the work will prove acceptable as exhibiting the progress of the law upon the subject mentioned, during an important period not before covered by the series, which is we believe recognized as the leading, if not the only collection of statutes and decisions relating to an important and growing branch of Ameri can law.

NOTES.

THE American Law Register for November contains an article by Judge Cooley on Remedies for collection of judgment against debtors who are residents or property-holders in another State or in the British Dominions. Also the following cases: Westmore v. Mellinger (Iowa), on malicious continuance of a prosecu tion commenced without malice, with note by Marshall D. Ewell; Canavan v. Gray (Cal.), on actions for forcible entry where there is a statutory remedy, with note by W. Drayton; McCloy v. Cincinnati, etc, R. Co. (U. S. Circ.), on unjust discrimination in railroad facilities, with note by Adelbert Hamilton; Cooper v. Louanstein (N. J.), on reservation of easement, in deed not signed by grantee, of lands not conveyed by such deed, with note by John H. Stewart.

In a paper read at the late convention of the Tenuessee Bar Association, by Mr. M. B. McFarland, of Memphis, on the French Bar, the writer said: In Athens "the judges, in order to regulate the speeches of advocates, limited each party to the time it would take a certain quantity of water to run through a clepsydra, or kind of hour glass. And when the water was out the lawyer had to quit. This is doubtless the origin of the modern slang, 'dry up.'" We like this better than the following from the same essay: "The whole resembled a patch-work quilt, and reminded one of what Tickler, in Noctes, said of some one, he had been at a great feast of languages and stolen the scraps. -A mixed metaphor-" open a door into a sea of trouble," Cook v. City of Burlington 59 Iowa, 251.- -A Canada Barrister," writing to the Canada Law Journal, pronounces Lord Coleridge's declaration that he is a "Radical" to be "mischievous," and declares that "he should keep his views to himself." Will these northern gentlemen never "let up" on Lord Coleridge?