allowed him to take it in advance. This was held no excuse and he was convicted.(7)

7. A. is indicted for suffering gaming in his house. It appears that A. did not know it was unlawful to permit gaming in his house. His ignorance of the law does not excuse A.(8)

8. A statute required attorney's bills to inform their clients on their face of the matters transacted and the courts in which the things charged for had been done. A bill delivered to a client contained charges for "perusing decrees and reports at the report office." "Six clerks office searching for a record." Held, that the client would not be presumed to know in what courts these offices were.(9)

9. At an election, a number of notes were polled for one B., who was acting at the time as returning officer. By the law a returning officer was not eligible as a candidate, and all the voters know that B. was acting in this capacity. Held, that there was no presumption that they knew that he was disqualified.(10)

erroneous.

In case 1 the trial court has charged the jury that if the admissions were made with a full knowledge of all the facts, and his rights growing out of the facts, they were evidence against B. On appeal this was held "Until the contrary appears," said Lumpkin, J., “every man is taken to be cognizant of the law. The doubt and difficulty has been not whether the burden of proof is not cast upon him who seeks to screen himself from the effect of his acts by showing that they were done in ignorance of his legal rights; that has never been disputed. And the only question is whether the party will be allowed this excuse. Whereas in this case it was held that the solemn admissions of fact by B., that the title to this property was not in him but A. did not make even a prima facie case as to proof unless it was shown that he made these admissions with not only a full knowledge of all the facts but of his legal rights growing out of those facts. Such a doctrine, we apprehend, is not only unsupported by authority, but manifestly against principle." case 2 it was said: "That representation cannot affect the plaintiff's right to recover. It was a representation made to the defendants respecting a question of law, and cannot be considered as having misled them. They must be presumed to have known the legal effect of their contract."(11) In case 3 it was said: "According to B.'s own showing he was only under a mistake in point of law; and that mistake not being produced by any fraud in A. is not sufficient of itself to affect the former lien or the validity of the sale. * ** In such a case the general doctrine which we find established must prevail that every man is to be charged with a knowledge of the law." In case 4 Lord Ellenborough ruled that the defendant could not defend himself upon the ground of his ignorance of the law when he

In

(7) Com. v. Bagley, 7 Peck. 279 (1828), But see Cutler v. State, 36 N. J. (L) 125 (1873,) where in a similar case, the conviction was set aside on the ground that the intent was wanting.

(8) Winehart v. State, 6 Ind. 30 (1854).

(9) Martindale v. Falkner, 2 C. 715 (1846).

(10) Queen v. Mayor of Tewksbury, L. R., 32 B. 629 (1868). (11) In Stow v. Baker, 6 Johns. Ch. 166 (1822), it was said by the chancellor: "The presumption is that every person is ac. quainted withh his own rights provided he has had reasonable opportunity to know them, and nothing can be more liable to abuse than to permit a person to reclaim his property in opposition to all the equitable circumstances which have been stated, upon the mere pretense that he was at the time ignorant of his title." The courts do not undertake to relieve parties from their acts and deeds fairly done on a full knowledge of facts, though under a mistake of law. Every man is to be charged at his peril with a knowledge of the law. There is no other principle which is safe and practicable in the common intercourse of mankind." Lyon v. Richmond, 2 Johns. Ch. 51 (1816).

made the promise. In case 5 it was said: "As he is bound to know the law, he is held to the consequences of a willful violation of it whether he knew of its existence or not. Otherwise it would be difficult to punish any man for a violation of law, because it might be impossible to prove that he had knowledge of the law. Hence the legal presumption that every man knows the law, and that his violations of it are willful." In case 7 it was said: "This is the case of an honest and meritorious public officer who by misapprehension of his rights has demanded a lawful fee for a service not yet performed, but which almost necessarily must be performed at some future time. If we had authority to interfere and relieve from the penalty, we certainly should be inclined to do so but we are only to administer the law."

In case 8 it was said: ""There comes a charge for perusing decrees and reports at the report office," which it is said the client must know could only be in chancery. I do not agree that the client is to be presumed to know any thing of the kind. Then there is a charge for attending at the six clerks' office, searching for a record.' This, it is said, must be in a court of chancery. I really am unable at the present moment to say whether there is or is not such an office now existing as the six clerks' office; and I do not see why Miss Mary Falkner is bound to know it. The bill * * presupposes the client to possess a considerable knowledge of the law. There is no presumption in this country that every person knows the law; it would be contrary to common sense and reason if it were so."

*

"Every elector," said Blackburn, J., in case 9 "must have known that B. was the mayor, and every elector who saw him presiding at the election must have known as a fact that he was the returning officer, and every elector who was a lawyer and who had read the case of Reg. v. Owens(13) would know that he was disqualified. From the knowledge of the fact that B. was mayor and returning officer, was every elector bound to know as matter of law that he was disqualified? agree that ignorance of the law does not excuse. But I think that in Martindale v. Falkner (Case 7), Maule, J. correctly explains the law." And Lush, J. added: "A maxim has been cited which it has been argued imputes to every person a knowledge of the law. The maxim is ignorantia legis neminem excusat, but there is no maxim which says that for all intents and purposes a person must be taken to know the legal consequences of his acts." (14)

So a suitor in court is presumed to know all the proceedings which take place in his case. (15) And the terms of the Supreme Court of a State being fixed by statute, parties to a cause in the courts of such State are presumed to know the terms of the Supreme Court. (16) So parties are presumed to know the contents of the public records. (17) But the officers of a municipal corporation are not presumed to be acquainted with the contents of all the official records. ILLUSTRATION.

L. brings an action against the mayor and clerk of the city of B. for a libel. The libel consists in a statement in their annual report that there is due from L. as tax collector a certain sum. The statement is incorrect, as shown by the municipal records. There is no presumption that the defendants knew this to be so. (18) The presumption of knowledge of law may be (12) 2 E. & E. 86.

(13) And see Black v. Ward, 27 Mich. 191 (1873)
(14) Watrous v. Rogers, 16 Tex. 410 (1856).
(15) Gauldin v. Shebee, 20 Ga. 531 (1856).
(16) Loomis v. Riley, 24 I. 307 (1860).
(17) Lancey v Bryant 30 Me. 466 (1849).
(18) Hart v. Roper, 6 Ired. (Eq.) 349 (1849).

missed for want of prosecution. Inasmuch therefore as we would not hear the cross-appeal if it should be entered at this time, we deny the motion of Dev!in to have the appearance of counsel entered on that appeal, and of our own motion dismiss it for want of prosecution.

It is a matter of no importance that the motion to dismiss the appeal of Hilton is made by Dickinsou after he has parted with his interest in the decree, for if on looking into a record we find we have no jurisdiction, it is our duty to dismiss on our own motion without waiting the action of the parties. The question is then presented whether upon the face of this record it appears that the value of the matter in dispute, for the purpose of our jurisdiction, exceeds twenty-five hundred dollars, and that depends on whether the "matter in dispute" is the whole amount claimed by Hilton below, or only the difference between what he has recovered and what he sued for. So far as we have been able to discover, this precise point has never before been passed upon in any reported case. There are expressions in the opinious of the court in some cases which may be, and probably are, broad enough to sustain the jurisdiction, but these expressions are found where the facts did not require a decision of the question now formally presented.

In Wilson v. Daniel, decided in 1798, and reported in 3 Dallas, 401, upon a writ of error brought by a defendant below from a judgment against him for less than two thousand dollars, it was held that the jurisdiction of this court depended not on the amount of the judgment, but " on the matter in dispute when the action was instituted." Chief Justice Ellsworth, in his opinion, said: "If the sum or value, found by a verdict, was considered as the rule to ascertain the magnitude of the matter in dispute, then whenever less that 2,000 dollars was found, a defendant could have no relief against the most erroneous and injurious judgment, though the plaintiff would have a right of removal and revision of the cause, his demand (which is alone to govern him) being for more than 2,000 dollars. It is not to be presumed that the Legislature intended to give any party such an advantage over his antagonist; and it ought to be avoided, as it may be avoided, by the fair and reasonable interpretation, which has been pronounced." Mr. Justice Iredell, in a dissenting opinion, thus states the argument on the other side: "The true motive for introducing the provision, which is under consideration, into the judicial act, is evident. When the Legislature allowed a writ of error to the Supreme Court, it was considered that the court was held permanently at the seat of the National Government, remote from many parts of the Union; and that it would be inconvenient and oppressive to bring suitors hither for objects of small importance. Hence, it was provided that unless the matter in dispute exceeded the sum or value of 2,000 dollars, a writ of error should not be issued. But the matter in dis pute here meant, is the matter in dispute on the writ of error."

In Cooke v. Woodrow, 5 Cranch, 13, decided in 1809, trover had been brought in the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia for sundry household goods, and the judgment was in favor of the defendants. Upon a writ of error by the plaintiff below, a question arose as to the way in which the value of the matter in dispute should be ascertained, and Chief Justice Marshall, in announcing the decision, said: "If the judgment below be for the plaintiff, that judgment ascertains the value of the matter in dispute; but when the judgment below is rendered for the defendant, this court has not, by any rule or practice, fixed the mode of ascertaining that value."

Three years afterward the case of Wise & Lynn v. The Columbian Turnpike Co. was before the court,

which is very imperfectly reported in 7 Cranch, 276. Ou referring to the original record we find that under a provision of the charter of the turnpike company (2 Stat., 572, ch. 26, sec. 6) commissioners were to be appointed by the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia to decide upon the compensation to be paid the owners of land for damages growing out of the appropriation of their property to the use of the company. All awards of the commissioners were to be filed in the Circuit Court, and unless set aside by the court were to be final and conclusive between the parties, and recorded by the clerk. Wise & Lynn presented a claim to the commissioners and were awarded forty. five dollars. On the return of the award to the court they filed exceptions, and amongst other things, claimed that they should have been allowed at least three hundred dollars, but the court coufirmed the award. They then brought the case to this court by writ of error, and the turnpike company moved to dismiss because the value of the matter in dispute did not exceed one hundred dollars, that being then the jurisdictional limit on appeals and writs of error from the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia. The decision of the case is reported as follows: "It appearing that the sum awarded was only forty-five dollars, the court, all the judges being present, decided that they had no jurisdiction, although the sum claimed by Wise & Lynn, before the commissioners of the road, was more than one hundred dollars."

In Peyton v. Randolph, 9 Wheat. 527, replevin had beeu brought for the recovery of personal property distrained for rent. The defendant in the action acknowledged the taking of the goods as charged in the declaration, but justified it as a distress for the sum of $591 due for rent in arrear, and recovered a judgment against the plaintiff for that amount. The plaintiff then brought the case to this court by writ of error, and insisted that as the damages laid in the declaration exceeded the jurisdictional limit his writ ought not to be dismissed; but the court said, through Chief Justice Marshall: "If the replevin be, as in this case, of property, distrained for rent, the amount for which the avowry is made is the real matter in dispute. The damages are merely nominal. If the writ be issued as a means of trying the title to property, it is in the nature of detinue and the value of the article replevied is the matter in dispute." The writ of error was accordingly dismissed.

The case of Gordon v. Ogden, 3 Pet. 33, was decided in 1830. There the action was instituted for the violation of a patent, and the amount of the recovery in damages was four hundred dollars by the verdict of a jury. The damages laid in the declaration were twenty-six hundred dollars. The defendant brought the writ of error, and on a motion to dismiss because the value of the matter in dispute was not enough to give jurisdiction, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the court, said: "The jurisdiction of the court has been supposed to depend on the sum or value of the matter in dispute in this court, not on that which was in dispute in the Circuit Court. If the writ of error be brought by the plaintiff below, then the sum which his declaration shows to be due may be still recovered, should the judgment for a smaller sum be reversed; and consequently the whole sum claimed is still in dispute. But if the writ of error be brought by the defendant in the original action, the judgment of this court can only affirm that of the Circuit Court, aud consequently the matter in dispute cannot exceed the amount of the judgment. Nothing but that judgment is in dispute between the parties." Then, referring to Wilson v. Daniel, supra, he said: "Although that case was decided by a divided court, and although we think, that upon the true construction of the twentysecond section of the judicial act, the jurisdiction de

pends upon the sum in dispute between the parties as the case stands upon the writ of error, we should be much inclined to adhere to the decision in Wilson v. Daniel, had not a contrary practice since prevailed. * * * The case of Wise & Lynn v. The Columbian Turnpike Co., 7 Cranch, 276, was dismissed because the sum for which judgment was rendered in the Circuit Court was not sufficient to give jurisdiction, although the claim before the commissioners of the road, which was the cause of action and the matter in dispute in the Circuit Court, was sufficient. * * * Since this decision we do not recollect that the question has ever been made. The silent practice of the court has conformed to it. The reason of the limitation is that the expense of litigation in this court ought not to be incurred unless the matter in dispute exceeds two thousand dollars. This reason applies only to the matter in dispute between the parties in this court." The writ of error was consequently dismissed, all the judges agreeing that there was no jurisdiction. This case was followed at the same term in Smith v. Honey, 3 Pet. 469.

Nothing further of importance connected with the particular question we are now considering appears in the reported case until 1844, when, in Knapp v. Banks, 2 How. 73, which was a writ of error brought by the defendant against whom a judgment had been rendered for less than two thousand dollars, Mr. Justice Story said for the court: "The distinction constantly maintained is this: Where the plaintiff sues for an amount exceeding $2,000, and the ad damnum exceeds $2,000, if by reason of any erroneous ruling of the court below, the plaintiff recovers nothing, or less than $2,000, there the sum claimed by the plaintiff is the sum in controversy for which a writ of error will lie. But if a verdict is given against the defendant for a less sum than $2,000 and judgment passes against him accordingly, there it is obvious that there is, on the part of the defendant, nothing in controversy beyond the sum for which the judgment is given; and consequently he is not entitled to any writ of error. We cannot look beyond the time of the judgment in order to ascertain whether a writ of error lies or not."

The rule, as thus stated by Mr. Justice Story, was cited in Walker v. The United States, 4 Wall. 163, and in Merrill v. Petty, 16 id. 345. But these were cases in which the question was as to the right of a defendant to bring up for review a judgment against himself for less than $2,000.

In Ryan v. Bindley, 1 Wall. 66, the plaintiff below sued for two thousand dollars, and the defendant pleaded set-off to the amount of four thousand dollars. Under such a plea, if the set-off had been sustained, the defendant would have been entitled to a judgment for the difference between the amount of his claim and that established by the plaintiff. The plaintiff recovered a judgment for $575.85, and the defendant brought a writ of error, upon which jurisdiction was sustained because the defendant sought to defeat the judgment against him altogether, and to recover a judgment in his own favor and against the plaintiff for at least two thousand dollars, and possibly four thousand. Thus the matter in dispute in this court exceeded two thousand dollars.

In Pierce v. Wade, 100 U. S. 444, the action was replevin for cattle. A judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs for the most of the cattle taken on the writ, but against them for $1,400, the value of some that were taken which did not belong to them. They brought the case here by writ of error, but the writ was dismissed on the ground that the matter in dispute was only the part of the cattle for which judgment had been rendered against the plaintiffs, the court remarking that "the plaintiffs recovered every

thing else which they claimed, and the judgment against them is less than $5,000.”

In Lamar v. Micou, 104 U. S. 465, where the appeal was taken by a defendant from a decree against him for less than $5,000, it was held that if the set-off or counter-claim relied on would only have the effect of reducing the amount of the recovery, without entitling the defendant to a decree in his own favor, there was no jurisdiction.

66

We understand that Wilson v. Daniel is overruled by Gordon v. Ogden, in which Chief Justice Marshall states the opinion of the court to be that "the jurisdiction of the court depends upon the sum in dispute between the parties as the case stands upon the writ of error," and that Wilson v. Daniel was not followed because a contrary practice had since prevailed." It is undoubtedly true that until it is in some way shown by the record that the sum demanded is not the matter in dispute, that sum will govern in all questions of jurisdiction, but it is equally true that when it is shown that the sum demanded is not the real matter in dispute, the sum shown, and not the sum demanded, will prevail. Lee v. Watson, 1 Wall. 337; Schacker v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company, 93 U. S. 241; Gray v. Blanchard, 97 id. 565; Tintsman v. National Bank, 100 id. 6; Banking Association v. Insurance Association, 102 id. 121. Under this rule it has always been assumed, since Cooke v. Woodrow, supra, that when a defendant brought a case here, the judgment or decree against him governed our jurisdiction, unless he had asked affirmative relief, which was denied; and this because as to him jurisdiction depended on the matter in dispute here. As the original demand against him was for more than our jurisdictional limit, and the recovery for less, the record shows that he was successful below as to a part of his defense, and that his object in bringing the case here was not to secure what he had already got, but to get more. As to him therefore, the established rule is that unless the additional amount asked for is as much as our jurisdiction requires, we cannot review the case.

We are unable to see any difference in principle between the position of a plaintiff and that of a defendant as to such a case. The plaintiff sues for as much as, or more than the sum required to give us jurisdiction, and recovers less. He does not, any more than a defendant, bring a case here to secure what he has already got, but to get more. If we take a case for him when the additional amount he asks to recover is less than we can consider, he has "an advantage over his antagonist," such as in the language of Chief Justice Ellsworth, supra, "it is not to be presumed it was the intention of the Legislature to give." Such a result ought to be avoided, and it may be by holding, as we do, that as to both parties, the matter in dispute, on which our jurisdiction depends, is the matter in dis pute "between the parties as the case stands upon the writ of error" or appeal, that is to say, as it stands in this court. That was the question in Wilson v. Daniel, where it was held, that to avoid giving one party an advantage over another, it was necessary to make jurisdiction depend “on the matter in dispute when the action was instituted." When therefore that case was overruled in Gordon v. Ogden, and it was held as to a defendant, that his rights depended on the matter in dispute in this court, we entertain no doubt it was the intention of the court to adopt as an entirety the position of Mr. Justice Iredell in his dissenting opinion and to put both sides upon an equal footing. Certainly it could not have been intended to give a plaintiff any advantage over a defendant, when there is nothing in the law to show any such superiority in position.

Under this rule we have jurisdiction of a writ of

error or appeal by a plaintiff below when he sues for as much as or more than our jurisdiction requires and recovers nothing, or recovers only a sum which, being deducted from the amount or value sued for, leaves a sum equal to or more than our jurisdictional limit, for which he failed to get a judgment or decree. And we have jurisdiction of a writ of error or appeal by a defendant when the recovery against him is as much in amount or value as is required to bring a case here, and when having pleaded a set-off or counter-claim for enough to give us jurisdiction, he is defeated upon his plea altogether, or recovers only an amount or value which being deducted from his claim as pleaded, leaves enough to give us jurisdiction, which has not been allowed. In this connection, it is to be remarked that the "amount as stated in the body of the declaration, and not merely the damages alleged, or the prayer for judgment, at its conclusion, must be considered in determining whether this court can take jurisdiction." Lee v. Watson, and the other cases cited in connection therewith, supra. The same is true of the counterclaim or set-off. It is the actual matter in dispute as shown by the record, and not the ad damnum alone, which must be looked to.

Applying this rule to the present case, it is apparent we have no jurisdiction. The original matter in dispute was three thousand dollars. On appeals from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia we have jurisdiction only when the matter in dispute exceeds two thousand five hundred dollars. Hilton recovered below one-half of the three thousand dollars. It follows that as to him the matter in dispute in this court is only fifteen hundred dollars.

The appeal of Hilton is dismissed for want of jurisdiction, and that of Devlin for want of prosecution.

and valid to support such proceedings. The Constitution of the United States provides that "the Congress shall have power" "to regulate commerce among the several States," and that "the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States." Article 1, §8; art. 4, § 2.

The natural state of mankind is that of freedom to trade with one another, whether in the same or different communities; and as Congress, which alone, under the Constitution, has the power to change this freedom of trade among the States, has not done so, the freedom still exists. Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418. This would require that the commodities of one State should be sold in another as freely as the commodities of the other. Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275; Webber v. Virginia, 103 id. 344. These statutes discriminate against the sale of the manufactures of other States, except plated or gilded wares, jewelry, clocks, and watches, and as to the sale of such manufactures not excepted could not be upheld; but as to those which are excepted, the manufacures of other States are left upon the same footing as the manufactures of this. The relator is prosecuted for selling excepted articles only, and there is no discrimination against that. This part of the statutes might be separated from the part which does discriminate against the origin of goods, and be upheld, although the rest could not be, if there was no discrimination against the citizenship of the relator. But as to that, these statutes, if upheld, would effectually exclude him from that class of trade, which would come within the definition of peddling, as made by the statute within this State. The residents of the State would have the privilege of peddling within the State by paying the required license fee. The relator not being a resident, would be prohibited from obtaining a license, and from

WHEELER, J. The Revised Laws of the State of Vermont define who shall be deemed a peddler, and provide that “no person shall be deemed a peddler by reason of selling articles of goods, wares, or merchandise, which are the manufacture of the State, except plated or gilded wares, jewelry, clocks, and watches;" that no person shall be licensed as a peddler who has not resided in the State one year next preceding the application for a license; what the license fees shall be; and that a person who becomes a peddler without a license in force shall forfeit not more than $300, nor less than $50. Revised Laws, §§ 3951, 3952, 3954, 3955. The relator is a citizen of Massachusetts, and has not resided in this State, and is prosecuted for becoming a peddler by selling plated wares, jewelry, and watches, manufactures of Massachusetts, without a license, and is restrained of his liberty under those proceedings. The only question made upon the hearing is whether these statutes of the State are sufficiently constitutional

other than plated or gilded wares, jewelry, clocks, and watches without a license. He would be wholly cut off from selling the articles he was selling in this State. The citizens of the State have the privilege of peddling those articles by obtaining a license therefor. He could not have that privilege, and would be denied the privilege in this State of a citizen of this State, although he is a citizen of another State. This is a privilege within the meaning of this clause of the Constitution. Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418.

The only material difference between this case and that of Ward v. Maryland is that there the discrimination consisted only in an increase of license fees for persons not residents of Maryland, and the prohibition of selling without a license extended only to the city of Baltimore; while here the prohibition is absolute to non-residents as to the whole State. In that case Mr. Justice Clifford, in delivering the opinion of the court, said that "inasmuch as the Constution provides that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States, it follows that the defendant might lawfully sell, or offer or expose for sale, within the district described in the indictment, any goods which the permanent residents of the State might sell, or offer or expose for sale in that district, without being subjected to any higher tax or excise than that exacted by law of such permanent residents." According to these principles the relator is protected by this provision of the Constitution of the United States from prosecution for exercising the privilege of peddling within the State, as the citizens of the State might exercise it.

The relator is not prosecuted for peddling within the State when not a resident, but for peddling within the State without a license; and as a resident of the State so peddling like wares would be liable to similar prosecution, it is argued that there is no discrimina