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Representative HOSMER. I know what you are asking for. However, we are being asked to authorize it in the face of a decision like this. I don't know whether we would be very wise to even authorize you to go ahead.

Admiral RICKOVER. If I were in your place, I think you definitely need assurance that the Department of Defense is not throwing over nuclear power for surface ships because if there is a definite decision on that, obviously there is no use of keeping on forever doing research and development.

Chairman PASTORE. I am very happy to hear you say that. That is precisely our responsibility.

Admiral RICKOVER. If I said something else, you wouldn't believe me anyhow.

Representative HOSMER. If it was decided that a situation of parity in military power between the United States and the other half of the world would be more stabilizing and advantageous than a position of military superiority on our side, would putting a conventional powerplant in this new carrier be a step toward parity?

Admiral RICKOVER. I could not answer that question. You see in my opinion you would achieve parity only in Heaven. But this is really not an appropriate question to address to me.

STATUS OF TECHNOLOGY FOR APPLICATION OF NUCLEAR POWER

Senator JACKSON. Is there any question now about the state of the technology being sufficient to undertake this second carrier?

Admiral RICKOVER. No, sir, there is not. Perhaps the Chairman may want to answer that question. There is no question about it. Senator JACKSON. As I understand it, Admiral Rickover, the Naval Research Advisory Committee, chaired by Dr. Piore, who is chief scientist for IBM, I believe

Dr. SEABORG. Vice president.

Senator JACKSON. Vice president and head of research and development. There is a long list of distinguished scientists on this committee along with other people. I know one who is a Nobel Prize winner as is the Chairman of the AEC. I think it would be well and I would like to suggest we have that list of names. (See p. 11.) Representative HOLIFIELD. We have asked for it.

Senator JACKSON. There are difficulties, as I understand it, but there is no need for delay with respect to proving out the state of the art from a technological point of view.

Admiral RICKOVER. Their recommendation was quoted and included in the record this morning.

Senator JACKSON. I have it before me—the letter of December 19, 1962.

Do I understand the Secretary of Defense has made no contention in regard to whether there is adequate and sufficient information from a technological point of view?

Admiral RICKOVER. No, sir. The reasons given have been more operational and budgetary—not technical.

Senator JACKSON. So it comes down to the application of a weapons system.

Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. From a military point of view and, in turn, from a possible budgetary point of view. It is isolated to those two

areas.

Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir; that is correct.

NEED FOR OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE

Senator JACKSON. I don't know how you are going to get your operational experience without getting the weapons system into operation and using it.

I must say that a second carrier is not going to make it impossible to stop as far as nuclear construction is concerned. On the contrary, it would give you more accurate information, it seems to me, than you would get from all the boys with computers and other devices in trying to predict something for which there is no basic experience available. The way you learn is by doing. I don't see how there is any rational basis of objection.

COST ARGUMENTS AGAINST NUCLEAR SUBMARINES

Admiral RICKOVER. I don't know if you remember the reasons given by the Navy for not building nuclear submarines.

Senator JACKSON. Yes, I was present at that meeting.

The reason was the Navy was being given enough money to build one conventional submarine a year. Since nuclear-powered submarines at that time cost 11⁄2 times as much, it was figured if we went to nuclear power the Navy would only get two submarines every 3 years. That was the rationale for not going to nuclear power. Admiral RICKOVER. I remember.

Senator JACKSON. Admiral Carney came up. He couldn't help it. He was given so much money. He was trying to get the most in submarines. One happened to be a true submarine and the other one wasn't. So they had to get a number of nontrue submarines in order to carry out the current responsibility.

The same situation applied to the Polaris. We didn't get more Polaris until Sputnik went up. Let's face it. We were the ones who were pleading with the Navy to go ahead. The answer was, "We are sorry. We would like to, but if we go ahead with more Polaris, it would mean we would have to take funds away from our ship replacement program."

Then Sputnik went up. Sputnik came along and we got more Polaris submarines. Then we came up with a plan for 41. Prior to that it was hopeless.

Admiral RICKOVER. We can build nuclear submarines just as fast as you can build a conventional one.

Chairman PASTORE. Now?

Admiral RICKOVER. Now.

Chairman PASTORE. I wrote to the Secretary on March 1 and urged him to consider very seriously nuclear propulsion. (See p. 3.) If he had written back and said, "Of course, I will take nuclear as against conventional but it is going to cost $125 million. You are on the Appropriations Committee. You get Congress to give the money

and we will have a nuclear carrier." If he had said that, I could understand it. But he didn't say that.

When you read the reasons he has given for his decision you get the strong impression he is not too sure that all these advantages are worth the price. There it is.

DOD RESPONSE TO AEC RECOMMENDATIONS

Representative HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask Dr. Seaborg if he received an answer to the letter of January 7 that he wrote to the Secretary. You wrote this letter on January 7 in which you asked the Secretary of Defense to consider nuclear propulsion for this aircraft carrier and you furnished us a copy of it. I just wondered if you got an answer to that.

it.

Dr. SEABORG. I don't recall.

Admiral RICKOVER. I don't think so. I believe I would have seen

Dr. SEABORG. We can certainly check.

Mr. LEIGHTON. In February you received a reply acknowledging your letter, stating it was under study and they would keep you informed. (Comment addressed to Chairman Seaborg.) (See p. 81.)

Representative HOLIFIELD. I have written letters myself occasionally in which I said that I had something under consideration. I don't consider that much of a response though.

INTEREST OF OTHER NATIONS IN NUCLEAR PROPULSION

Senator AIKEN. Do you have any information as to whether Russia is abandoning efforts to construct nuclear-powered surface ships?

Dr. SEABORG. I don't have any information on that and I did not get any information on that in the course of our recent trip.

Senator AIKEN. Is the United Kingdom doing anything about it? Dr. SEABORG. Yes.

Admiral RICKOVER. They are just planning now.

Dr. SEABORG. The United Kingdom is interested in a certain reactor type.

Going back to your question, Congressman Holifield, as to whether we received an answer to our letter of January 7, I do know that letter played a role in the decision to reconsider this conventional aircraft carrier with respect to the possibility of converting it to nuclear power. I do know, as that developed, that this letter played a role and that these studies were going on in the Department of Defense. So in that sense I got an answer.

Chairman PASTORE. Would you have any objection to your letter being placed in our record?

Dr. SEABORG. No, sir.

Chairman PASTORE. Without objection, so ordered.
Representative MORRIS. And the answer-

Chairman PASTORE. If there is an answer to it, we would like to

have a copy of that.

(Copies of AEC letter of January 7, 1963, and DOD reply February 2, 1963, follow:)

Hon. ROBERT S. MCNAMARA,
The Secretary of Defense.

U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION,
Washington, D.C., January 7, 1963.

DEAR BOB: I am writing to report to you on a recent review by the Commission of its development program in reactor technology applicable to surface warships which, as you know, has been underway for the past 8 years in response to Department of Defense and Navy requests.

During the last 18 months the three prototype nuclear powered surface shipsthe attack aircraft carrier Enterprise, the guided-missile cruiser Long Beach, and the destroyer leader Bainbridge have joined the fleet. These ships have already demonstrated the capabilities and reliability of their propulsion plants by steaming a total of more than 115,000 miles. The Commission understands that these nuclear propulsion plants have been successful in meeting the design objectives specified by the Navy.

As part of its current naval reactor program, the Commission has been working for more than 3 years on the design and development of a reactor suitable for powering a four-reactor carrier. This development has now reached the stage where we can be sure that the plant can provide at least [classified matter deleted] shaft horsepower in this application. The proposed reactor represents a significant advance in technology. Each of the new reactor cores will operate at almost the same power as the combined power of two Enterprise reactors and will have more than twice the operating life; this means that each of the new cores wil! make available more than four times the energy of one of the reactor cores now installed in Enterprise. A core of this type is already being fabricated.

While the initial fuel loading of Enterprise cost $64 million, the initial fuel loading of the four-reactor carrier is expected to cost $32 million and would last more than twice as long. Based on the fuel used during the first year of Enterprise operations, the initial fuel load of the four-reactor carrier could be expected to last at least 7 years. Further, our studies indicate that the cost of buying and installing four of the higher powered reactor plants is expected to be about onethird less than the cost of the eight reactor plants on Enterprise.

I report these developments to you, because we believe the Commission's development program has reached a point where an overall appraisal of the future of nuclear propulsion plants for surface warships is needed for us to be able to determine the level and scale of effort of the Commission's program in the next few years.

To date the Commission has given high priority to this program. Planning ahead, however, we note that following authorization of the Bainbridge, the Department of Defense is planning construction of only one additional nuclear surface ship, the destroyer leader which was added to the 1962 fiscal year program. We understand that consideration was given to a four-reactor propulsion plant for another carrier in the 1963 shipbuilding program but that a conventional carrier was decided upon at that time; we would like to raise the question whether it is too late to reconsider this decision. We would also like to have the opportunity of discussing with you the current evaluation by the Department of this and other potential applications of nuclear propulsion plants for surface warships in the coming years.

Our own experience in this field indicates that the program has reached a stage of maturity and of promise that would justify consideration by the Department of a significant increase in the application of nuclear power to the surface fleet in its shipbuilding program in the years immediately ahead.

Our views were reinforced by a recent visit by members of the Commission and staff to the Enterprise on December 18, 1962, to observe the ship during operations at sea. In addition to our inspection of the ship and its nuclear powerplant, we heard Rear Adm. J. T. Hayward, Capt. V. P.`dePoix and other ship's officers comment on the operation of the nuclear propulsion plant as seen by the operational commander and the officers responsible for operating the ship. We were impressed by their reports on the improved military capability of the ship and its reduced vulnerability to submarine attack resulting from the ship's sustained high speed, rapid maneuverability, plant reliability and maintainability, and absence of corrosive stack gases. Also the absence of boiler air intakes reduces vulnerability to atomic, biological, and chemical warfare.

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This review of our reactor program for naval warships has therefore emphasized for us the importance of reviewing with you in the very near future the current status and prospects of this technology in the light of national defense requirements. Sincerely yours,

Hon. GLENN T. SEABORG,

Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission.

GLENN T. SEABORG, Chairman.

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, February 2, 1963.

DEAR GLENN: This is to advise you that we are reconsidering our decision to build CVA-67 as a conventionally fueled ship. There have been, as you say, several important developments during the past year that warrant this review, and I do appreciate the views and information presented in your letter of January 7, 1963.

I will certainly inform you of the results of our review at the earliest possible time. It is being pursued as a matter of urgency.

Sincerely yours,

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES

Вов.

Representative HOLIFIELD. We have had some figures given us indicating that approximately $400 million has been expended in research and development in nuclear propulsion.

Dr. SEABORG. For surface ships.

The figures, as I have them, are about-rounding out figures—$380 million spent through the AEC operating budget.

Admiral RICKOVER. That is correct, sir.

Dr. SEABORG. And about $80 million through the Navy.

Chairman PASTORE. Over what period of time?

Dr. SEABORG. Over a period of 8 years. This would be a total of about $460 million.

Admiral RICKOVER. It is even longer than 8 years. It is about 10 years.

Dr. SEABORG. I am speaking of surface ships.

Representative HOLIFIELD. That does not include the development of submarines?

Dr. SEABORG. No, this is for surface ships.

Representative HOLIFIELD. We have approximately $460 million that has already been expended in this field. As the chairman brought out, if we are not going to use the results of this investment, we wash that out and let it go down the drain.

Dr. SEABORG. We have three operating.
Admiral RICKOVER. One more building.
Dr. SEABORG. As you know.

Admiral RICKOVER. And a great deal of this technology is going into other parts of the reactor game. I wouldn't say it is all lost. But it is a terrific investment on which I believe we should capitalize.

Chairman PASTORE. That is true. On the other hand, a cloud has been cast on the three we already have if we are not going to pursue this further. It implies that these three may not have been such a wise decision. We built the Bainbridge, the Long Beach, and the Enterprise. Now we seem to be saying: "I am not sure there is that much advantage." So that may be money wasted, too.

Admiral RICKOVER. I don't think the money was wasted. When an enemy declares war on you, you might think he can't win, but he thinks he has a chance or he wouldn't declare war.

The

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