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APPENDIX 10

[Excerpt from U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1963]

A LESSON FROM THE Royal NavY

(See p. 157, March 1963 Proceedings)

James Strong, Commander, U.S. Navy-Today we lay down oil-fired ships instead of nuclear-powered ships, because we can get them cheaper by a ratio of 3 to 2. One well-known admiral has pointed out that this makes about as much sense as it would to lay down sailing ships again for an even better cost ratio. Although many of the Proceeding's readers may have read and considered this well-publicized comparison, I wonder how many readers are aware of a parallel situation and the attendant public storm that blew when navies changed from coal to oil.

In 1912, the Royal Navy faced this issue. Although some smaller ships were oil fired, all the heavier ships being laid down were coal fired. Liquid fuel offered several advantages: several knots' increased speed, rapid maneuvering, 40 percent greater radius of action for the same weight of coal, easier and less frequent refueling, and reduced engineroom manning. Balanced against this were two considerations which, at the time, seemed almost overriding. Oil-fired ships cost a great deal more money—you could get three coal-fired dreadnoughts for the price of two oil-fired dreadnoughts. Even more important, there were no oil supplies within the British Isles. Beside the strategic disadvantages of tying a fleet to foreign sources of fuel were the tremendous costs of creating a fleet oil reserve with the attendant tanks and tankers.

But in 1912 the Royal Navy took the plunge, spent the money, built the ships, established the oil reserves, and the rest of the world's navies followed close behind. The performance of the oil-fired H.M.S. Queen Elizabeth class at Jutland justified the decision, and there has been little consideration given to coal since that time.

But was it really an expensive step to take? In 1922, Winston Churchill computed that the Government's necessary investment of 2,200,000 pounds sterling in the Anglo-Persian Oil Co, alone had already resulted in an estimated financial profit of 1,800 percent. In his words, this was sufficient to pay "for all the program of ships, great and small of that year (1912) and for the whole prewar oil fuel installations; ** * we may not unreasonably expect that ultimately the mighty fleets laid down in 1912, 1913, and 1914, the greatest ever built by any power in an equal period, were added to the British Navy without costing a single penny to the taxpayer.”

What is the lesson we can learn from this today? A complete change to nuclear power offers the Navy an increased capability at least as valuable as that which was offered by the change to fuel oil in 1912. Although it may be more expensive to build nuclear ships, this additional expense is a very economical method of developing nuclear power. Future dividends from the accelerated development of nuclear power can repay manyfold today's expenditure for nuclear ships.

There may be another lesson in this yarn. The British Admiralty had built oil-burning destroyers as early as 1908, but, as Churchill relates it:

"Shocked at the expense [they had] reverted for 2 years to 27-knot coal-burning flotillas. I was too late to stop the last bevy of these inferior vessels, but I gave directions to design the new flotilla to realize 35 knots' speed without giving up anything in gunpower, torpedoes, or seaworthiness. I proposed to the board that if money ran short, we should take 16 of these rather than 20 of the others. Building slow destroyers. One might as well breed slow race horses.”

The end of the oil-coal vacillation in the Royal Navy ended the day that Winston Churchill assumed responsibility for the Admiralty. The naval profession had been unable to make the break—it had to be imposed from above. Must we wait for a Churchill to impose on us the benefits of nuclear power? Cannot we see them ourselves and seek them ourselves, whatever the cost?

APPENDIX 11

EXTRACT FROM PREPARED STATEMENT OF SECRETARY KORTH BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, FEBRUARY 28, 1962, U.S. SENATE, 87TH CONGRESS, 2D SESSION, ON H.R. 11289, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1963 (pp. 205–206)1

The attack carrier in the shipbuilding program is one of the most important elements of the Navy's budget. This powerful ship personifies the versatility and mobility which is characteristic of modern naval striking power and which is essential to the support of U.S. policy around the globe. The attack carrier is now, and for the foreseeable future, the core of our modern strike power. It provides the backbone and spearhead of any offensive movement overseas.

The continued introduction of new carriers into the fleet is a vital step in the maintenance and improvement of our offensive strike capability. We can expect that our sea forces will be opposed by the best land-based aircraft an enemy can muster. This means that we must be able to operate aircraft with better performance characteristics than those of our opposition. This capability is inherent in the new attack carriers and the high-performance aircraft which operate from their decks.

The increase in fighting punch provided by the new attack carrier is not confined solely to the attack carrier striking force When the new carrier reports to the fleet, we will be able to improve our antisubmarine carrier forces by phasing one of our older attack carriers into antisubmarine work. By following the systematic program requested we will provide for a progressive replacement of the older carriers and a continuous updating of our entire carrier force.

We fully recognize the operational benefits to be derived from a nuclearpowered carrier. The principal advantage to be gained is prolonged endurance at high speed, which would provide a fleet commander significant flexibility with which to respond to strategic or tactical situations. However, the conventional carrier possesses the same aircraft operating characteristics as the nuclear carrier, and its aircraft operating efficiency is the same.

We will soon have the making of a wholly nuclear-powered task force. We intend to exploit its potential to the fullest for both general and limited war exigencies. However, I consider it prudent that we limit our present nuclearpowered carriers to one, to afford ourselves time to evaluate this force thoroughly while continuing our effort to reduce the size and cost of our nuclear powerplants. Therefore, in light of the urgent need for other ships, and in consideration of the factors mentioned, I do not believe that the additional cost of about one-third to one-half more to provide nuclear power can be sustained at this time.

EXTRACT FROM PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL ANDERSON, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, FEBRUARY 8, 1962, ON MILITARY POSTURE, AND H.R. 9751, BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 87TH CONGRESS, 2D SESSION (PP. 3630–3631) I wish to turn now to a subject to which much attention will be devoted by those within the Navy and those committees of Congress charged with the responsibility of insuring that our country's military needs are adequately provided for, that of nuclear power versus conventional power. I am sure we all agree wholeheartedly that perhaps the greatest single achievement in the history of the Navy has been the application of nuclear power first to our submarines and now to surface ships. Many of you have sailed beneath the seas in our nuclear submarines; some have been aboard the two surface ships now in commission. You know what they can do.

For obvious reasons I would much prefer to have more nuclear ships in this year's budget. They have greater range and endurance. They require less reliance on support ships, and, because of the elimination of fuel tanks, they make available additional spaces which can be used for equipment and aviation fuels. Too, their performance to date has been most impressive and gives great promise of a fascinating new fleet of the future. One cannot help but be awed by the fact that Enterprise generated more horsepower than has any ship that has ever sailed the seas, and, even though her throttles were not wide open, did 35 knots in her trials-more than 35 knots. Indeed, these are remarkable achievements.

[graphic]

1 See footnote, p. 179.

There are, however, two primary reasons why we do not desire at this time to proceed too rapidly with the construction of nuclear surface ships. One of these is a lack of money. If we had more money, we would seek a nuclear-powered carrier. Since we do not, and since we have countless demands for funds to meet so many urgent requirements, it is my judgment that we should seek in this year's budget a conventionally powered carrier and other ships needed to carry out our worldwide commitments. If we bought a nuclear-powered carrier we could not buy all the ships we need without more funds.

The second reason is a desire to observe the performance of the nuclear surface ships we now have in commission and at the same time to afford sufficient time for ultimate reduction in the cost and weight of nuclear reactors and an increase in their unit power. Despite all the advances which have been made since Nautilus first put to sea, it still costs approximately 30 to 50 percent more to build and operate for 20 years a nuclear ship than a conventional one. I have no doubt that in the future we will be able to reduce this differential to a marked degree. When that day comes, you may rest assured all possible emphasis will be given to the building of surface ships.

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