existing ships, nuclear or conventional, etc., will be considered in the next section.) In the column marked "Conventional force," identify the elements in an optimum conventional attack carrier force, and summarize the costs, element by element. As you point out in your memorandum, the benefits of nuclear power may be taken either in the form of less expensive forces for equivalent effectiveness, or in the form of increased effectiveness for equivalent cost. In the next column, therefore, I would like you to detail the size, composition, and total cost of a nuclear force whose effectiveness is equivalent to the conventional force in the first column. (I realize that exact equivalence of effectiveness in every possible contingency is unlikely. However, I would like to call upon the expert judgment available to you in establishing approximately equivalent effectiveness.) In the last column, please detail in similar fashion the nuclear force which, though costing no more, would have increased effectiveness in comparison with the conventional force in the first column. In order to test the sensitivity of the results to the number of escort ships required per carrier, I would like you to complete this table for the case of four escorts per carrier, as assumed in your memorandum, and again for the case of eight escorts per carrier. In this connection, I would like to stress that I am not prejudging the results of the studies you currently have underway regarding the proper number of escort ships. Rather, I am interested in knowing whether or not a recommended increase in the number could alter the choices between nuclear and conventional power. As a second test for sensitivity (to conventional escort ship displacement), I would like you to restrict the conventionally powered escorts to approximately 5,000 tons, and compare this force, as before, with two nuclear forces with four escorts per carrier; one having equal effectiveness; the other having an equal 25-year cost. In the event that the restriction to 5,000 tons' displacement requires force in excess of four escorts per carrier, you may assume whatever number of escorts you feel to be proper. However, in such a case, please justify the increase in a quantitative fashion, and detail carrier losses in both the fourand more-than-four escort cases. As a final test for sensitivity, I would like you to consider the combined effects of number and size of escort. In this case, again restrict the conventional escort ship displacement to approximately 5,000 tons, and compare this force with two nuclear forces with eight escorts per carrier; one having equal effectiveness; the other having an equal 25-year cost. Once again, if you view the 5,000-ton displacement restriction as requiring an increase in the number of escorts above the eight required in the case of the nuclear force, you may use whatever number you feel more appropriate, provided you furnish me with a quantitative justification which includes comparative carrier losses. Thus, your analysis should present me with the following eight comparisons: (1) A conventional 15-carrier force having 4 escorts of selected displacement per carrier, compared with a nuclear force having 4 escorts per carrier, on an equal-effectiveness basis. (2) Same as (1), but on an equal-25-year-cost basis. (3) A conventional 15-carrier force having 8 escorts of selected displacement per carrier, compared with a nuclear force having 8 escorts per carrier, on an equal-effectiveness basis. (4) Same as (3), but on an equal-25-year-cost basis. (5) A conventional 15-carrier force having a selected number of escorts of approximately 5,000 tons' displacement, compared with a nuclear force having 4 escorts per carrier, on an equal-effectiveness basis. (6) Same as (5), but on an equal-25-year-cost basis. (7) A conventional 15-carrier force having a selected number of escorts of approximately 5,000 tons' displacement; compared with a nuclear force having & escorts per carrier, on an equal-effectiveness basis. (8) Same as (7), but on an equal-25-year-cost basis. The above eight comparisons will, I feel, furnish valuable information on the comparative desirabilities of the conventional and nuclear power alternatives. However, I do not mean to be unduly restrictive, and if there are other comparisons you feel would be useful, I will, of course, be glad to have you include them in addition to the eight above. I would caution, however, that the additional assumptions should be fully detailed and quantitatively justified in each case. II. SHORT-RUN PROBLEMS Next, I would like to have your views concerning some of the difficult budgetary problems we would face in the transitional period if we elected to adopt nuclear power for our surface warships. I would like you to do this for two cases, as follows: First, using the 5-year force structure and financial program as a basis, detail the amount of TOA, year by year (extrapolating as necessary), required to maintain our current capability with conventionally powered forces. The sums should include R. & D., investment, and operation for all the elements associated with the carrier-based striking forces (carriers, their air groups, their escorts, logistic ships and their escorts, etc.). Then, maintaining the same annual amount of TOA, detail the shipbuilding program and force structure, year by year, that you would recommend if we were to elect to build all future carrier force combat ships with nuclear power. Second, should the above case result in serious deficiencies in effectiveness during the transition, detail, year by year, the rates of TOA necessary to maintain our effectiveness at its present level. III. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTIVENESS Enclosure 1 of your memorandum details a number of advantages of the nuclear-powered task force. However, these advantages are treated in qualitative terms. I am sure that the majority of them could satisfactorily be subjected to quantitative analysis. Therefore, I would like you, through the use of appropriate scenarios, to compare the effectiveness of equal-cost conventional and nuclear forces. I think you will agree that a comparative account of the number of attack aircraft sorties delivered as a function of time, day by day, week by week, or month by month would be a useful comparison of effectiveness. Perhaps there will be other quantitative measures of effectiveness you will wish to include. [Classified matter deleted.] This use of scenarios should also enable you to demonstrate the points made in enclosure 1 of your memorandum. For example, you note the higher speeds of nuclear ships and their freedom to engage the enemy immediately upon reaching the combat area as an advantage. The scenarios should allow you to calculate, assuming given initial dispositions and given launch points, just how much sooner the first strikes could be delivered. Of course, you will also have to calculate differences in the buildup of sorties conducted as a function of time, accounting for any differences in total number of embarked attack aircraft. You note that the nuclear force will force enemy submarines into tactics that favor and aid our own anti-submarine-warfare capabilities. The use of scenarios will allow you to calculate the effect of this advantage on the delivery of attack aircraft strikes. In this instance, please detail the number of carrier losses to enemy submarines in both the conventional and nuclear-powered cases, and adjust the total carrier striking power accordingly. You note that the necessity of refueling the conventional force will reduce the tempo of any offensive or defensive effort. This effect can be evaluated through the use of scenarios, and I would like you to detail carefully the additional reduction in tempo caused by the necessity of having to transfer black oil in addition to aviation fuel and ordnance, reflecting this in the tabulation of attack aircraft strikes as a function of time. In addition to these points, there are others which you mention in your memorandum. As a general rule, I would like you to quantify, through the device of the scenario, as many as you can in order that I may fully appreciate your position. Of course, the relative effectiveness of the two forces will depend on the assumptions made. I want to know how the assumptions affect the conclusion and I want to know what assumptions are required to show that nuclear-powered forces are superior to conventional forces of equal cost. I might mention that earlier endeavors of this nature have made good use of opposing analytical teams-one devoted to finding the best use of one alternative-the other to the opposing alternative. As I stated in my memorandum of February 22, I am interested in achieving the most efficient possible naval forces; if nuclear propulsion contributes to this end, then we must take advantage of it. I am grateful to you for raising this important question. Please designate a point of contact for my staff. I would like your study group to work with my Office of Systems Analysis, especially on questions of criteria, method, and appropriateness of assumptions. APPENDIX 7 ROBERT S. MCNAMARA, THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy. program. I have received your memorandum of September 26, 1963, subject as above, in which you urge me to reach a decision to construct the fiscal year 1963 carrier with nuclear power. I note that the Navy's study of the relative effectiveness of nuclear and conventional carrier task forces is still under review and will be forwarded later. My original intent in requesting a comprehensive study of nuclear propulsion was to expand the particular issue of the fiscal year 1963 carrier to a general policy issue. Although I shared your concern about thus delaying the start of the fiscal year 1963 carrier, I felt this to be preferable to building a conventionally powered carrier if nuclear propulsion could really offer outstanding advantages. However, on the basis of the analysis available to date, I am not convinced that a net advantage is in prospect. While it is clear that nuclear propulsion would result in some desirable characteristics, the increased cost (particularly in ship construction) remains a serious disadvantage. As a minimum, I am confident that construction of the fiscal year 1963 carrier with conventional rather than nuclear power would not result in any serious loss in effectiveness. In addition, I find objections, not the least of which are further delay and uncertainty, to all of the three methods you suggest for financing the additional $125.8 million required for nuclear propulsion of the fiscal year 1963 carrier. Considering the state of the legislative calendar and the previously expressed attitudes on the subject of certain key congressional leaders, it is doubtful, to say the least, that congressional approval of a shift to nuclear propulsion for the fiscal year 1963 carrier would be either swift or sure. As a result, I believe that the fiscal year 1963 carrier should proceed on the conventionally powered basis as authorized by the Congress. I would like you to take the proper steps to proceed with the construction as soon as possible. Though I had hoped to be able to include the fiscal year 1963 carrier in a general policy decision regarding nuclear propulsion, I would like to stress that this decision is motivated by concern over further delay, and does not represent a general policy decision. When the results of your current study have been received, we should review again the possible application of nuclear propulsion to future carriers and escort ships. ROBERT S. MCNAMARA. APPENDIX No. 8 DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, Washington, D.C., October 10, 1963. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense. program. I was surprised to receive your memorandum of October 9 in which you asked me to take the proper steps to proceed with construction of the fiscal year 1963 aircraft carrier with conventional power rather than nuclear power. Your memorandum included the following points: (a) Your decision is motivated by concern over further delay in the start of construction of this carrier and does not represent a general policy decision. (b) When you receive the current Navy study of nuclear propulsion in surface warships we should review again the application of nuclear propulsion to future carriers and escort ships. (c) On the basis of the analysis available to you to date you are not convinced that a net advantage is in prospect for nuclear power in this carrier. (d) You find objections to all three methods I have suggested for financing the additional money required for nuclear power in the fiscal year 1963 carrier. (e) Considering the state of the legislative calendar and the previously expressed attitude of certain key congressional leaders it is doubtful that congressional approval of a shift to nuclear propulsion would be either swift or sure. The outstanding performance of our nuclear surface ships to date and the result of the Navy's detailed analytical studies in the past year have made me increasingly aware of the importance of applying nuclear propulsion as rapidly as possible to the surface fleet. For example, as indicated to you in my memorandum of September 26, our most recent study shows that five new nuclearpowered carrier task groups will provide more combat capability than six new conventional task groups for significantly less overall cost. In your February 22 memorandum to me on this subject you stated that: "As a general guide, I am interested in achieving the most efficient possible naval forces, defining efficiency as achieving the most beneficial military results for a given expenditure. If nuclear propulsion permits an increase in this efficiency then advantage should be taken of it." In your memorandum of April 20, 1963, you reiterated this point and stated "if nuclear propulsion contributes to this end, then we must take advantage of it." The Chief of Naval Operations and I believe that nuclear propulsion does contribute to achieving the most efficient possible naval forces and that it offers outstanding advantages. In view of the widely recognized success of the naval nuclear propulsion program, the fact that we have already delayed the start of construction of the new carrier 9 months while studying the implications of nuclear propulsion, and the fact that based on the shipbuilding program you have proposed there will not be another opportunity to build a nuclear surface ship for several years, a decision not to put nuclear power in the fiscal year 1963 carrier cannot help but have widespread and important effects. I earnestly request that you reconsider the decision on the method of propulsion for the fiscal year 1963 carrier and I assure you that we in the Navy stand ready to assist you in this reconsideration by discussing with you, forthwith, the following: (a) The important military advantages nuclear propulsion provides. (b) Your views on the relative effectiveness of nuclear and conventional warships. (c) Your objections to my suggested methods for financing the additional funds required to apply nuclear propulsion to the fiscal year 1963 carrier in order to try to find a method satisfactory to you. (d) How we may assist you in discussions with key congressional leaders regarding the advantages of nuclear propulsion in surface ships in the hope that a way may be found to gain swift congressional approval of the shift to nuclear propulsion. FRED KORTH. APPENDIX No. 9 CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING CONSTRUCTION COSTS OF THE "ENTERPRISE," "LONG BEACH," AND THE "BAINBRIDGE" Rear Adm. CARLTON B. JONES, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, Chief of Legislative Affairs, Department of the Navy, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C. DEAR ADMIRAL JONES: The committee would appreciate knowing what the construction costs of the nuclear-propelled ships Enterprise, Long Beach, and the Bainbridge were. The committee would also appreciate knowing how much of the cost of each of these ships is attributable to the nuclear fuel costs. In addition, the committee would like to know how much more the nuclear propulsion plants in each of these ships cost than conventional propulsion plants. Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated. Mr. JOHN T. CONWAY, JOHN T. CONWAY, Executive Director. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, Executive Director, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, DEAR MR. CONWAY: In response to the questions contained in your letter of December 2, 1963, the Chief, Bureau of Ships, has furnished the enclosed information. It is assumed that in requesting the differential between nuclear and conventional plants, the total differential is desired between the ships named and the estimated cost of the same basic ships if they had been designed and constructed with identical weapons and electronics but having conventional propulsion equipment. If I can be of further assistance to you in this matter, please do not hesitate to call on me. Sincerely yours, C. B. JONES, Costs of nuclear propulsion in the “Enterprise,” “Long Beach," and "Bainbridge” 1 It should be noted that the Enterprise, Long Beach, and Bainbridge were not only the first surface nuclearpowered warships in the world but also incorporated novel features in nonpropulsion areas. Therefore, substantial first-design costs were required in both the nuclear propulsion and nonpropulsion areas. |