of eliminating the requirement for NSFO, requirements for replenishment of aviation fuel and ordnance will become the controlling factors, varying directly with the level of aircraft activity and/or combat operations. [Classified matter deleted.] (c) For combatant situations, nuclear propulsion will influence replenishment of aviation fuel and ordnance significantly, the degree of influence primarily depending upon the tempo of air operations and the distance of the carrier strike task force from the replenishment force. Paragraphs (a) (2)– (6) and (b) of enclosure (1) of the basic memorandum discuss the many factors that contribute to the implications of nuclear propulsion on replenishment activities and to the ways that the Navy can make fuller use of nuclear propulsion in the future. [Classified matter deleted.] (g) Studies have been conducted on the application of nuclear propulsion to replenishment ships, AF, AFS, AE, and AOE types, in the range of about 20,000 to 52,000 tons displacement, with propulsion plant installations ranging from 20,000 to 100,000 shaft horsepower. These studies indicate that, for the foreseeable future, the cost increase of between 30 and 60 percent for the application of nuclear propulsion to current design replenishment ships does not appear justified on a cost effectiveness basis. Design and operational evaluations will continue to be directed toward (a) minimizing dependence of nuclearpowered ships upon logistic support by increasing consumables storage, such as was done in the case of the CVAN-67 design for aviation fuel and ordnance and as is indicated in section 7 (a) for the DLGN (August) and DDGN (August), and (b) modification of future replenishment ship plans to facilitate the most efficient adaptation of replenishment resources for the evolving mix of nuclear and conventional ships. SECTION 5. FUTURE SHIPBUILDING PROGRAMS Questions: Realizing that we will have a large number of conventionally powered surface vessels in the inventory for some time to come, how should we approach the ultimate design? Is it feasible to take advantage of nuclear propulsion in the near future, or must we consider this a long-range objective, whose benefits will not be available for some time? Should there be a priority among the various types of ships for application of nuclear propulsion, or would a uniform application be preferable? Answer (a) The numbers of surface ships in future shipbuilding programs through fiscal year 1968 which could be considered as logical candidates for nuclear propulsion are relatively small. Therefore, in terms of major combatant ships, there will be a relatively large inventory of conventional-powered ships compared with nuclear-powered ships, remaining in the mid-seventies. Because the numbers of nuclear ships being considered are small and due to other factors, primarily development status of weapons systems for major combatant ships, there is little difficulty in establishing the approach for the ultimate design, or in applying a priority among the various types of surface ships for application of nuclear propulsion. (b) Primarily as a result of developments in reactor technology, we are now able to construct an improved nuclear-powered aircraft carrier with a significant increase in military effectiveness in relation to cost. This matter was brought to OSD attention in the Secretary of Navy memorandum of January 23, 1963, which summarized the considerations leading to the Navy's recommendation to provide nuclear propulsion for the CVA-67 in the fiscal year 1963 shipbuilding program. The timing of constructing additional nuclear-powered surface warship types is related directly to the availability of weapons suits rather than to the availability of their nuclear propulsion plants. As a result, the next surface-ship type after CVAN-67 which can be nuclear powered is the proposed new design DLGN (Typhon) which is approved in the fiscal year 1965 shipbuilding program. Also, a specific proposal is being prepared for a new nuclearpowered guided-missile destroyer DDGN to be funded in fiscal year 1966. This DDGN will be suitable both for carrier task force support and independent types of operations. (c) As influenced by the above considerations, the best approach to the ultimate design of the fleet with respect to the application of nuclear propulsion is toward a goal of all-nuclear attack carrier task groups. Extension of this goal 26–152—64- -17 should follow to heavy screen ships, DLGN and DDGN, for other assignments, primarily to the conventional CVA groups but not excluding independent tasks. Specific programs directed toward achieving these goals have been studied and an estimate of their impact on numbers of ships and costs are discussed in the following paragraphs. Discussion (a) The greatest advantages of nuclear power, as discussed in enclosure (1) of the basic memorandum, accrue when the entire task group is so equipped. However, the advantages of nuclear power in the screen ships themselves are significant and such an approach is being considered as an additional step toward achieving the long-range goals. An alternative would be to use the CVAN with a conventional screen; however, in this case, the operational and logistic gains will be less if the CVAN must function as a part-time oiler, and is still tied to the logistics of her escorts. [Classified matter deleted.] SECTION 6. FORCE REDUCTIONS Questions: What are the implications on force size? Would nuclear propulsion allow us to reduce the total number of carriers and/or carrier task forces? Answer (a) As noted in paragraphs 1(b) and 3, above, numerical force objectives for CVA/CVAN and their associated screen ships are being developed in other studies. However, general conclusions concerning the implications of nuclear propulsion in these types can be drawn. Further, estimates have been made of the effects on force levels for logistic support ships and their escorts. (b) As discussed in enclosure (1) of the basic memorandum, nuclear powered task groups will provide improved efficiency of coverage of potential trouble areas. The benefits gained thereby can be capitalized on, in part, by a reduction in carrier task groups or by increased effectiveness. The size of the reduction in relation to conventional CVA force levels will depend on the total number of carrier groups in the active fleet, on the percentage of the number which are nuclear powered, on the prescribed operational regime and on the threat in the time period in question. (c) It is accepted that less than 15 nuclear task groups would provide capabilities equivalent to 15 oil-fueled task groups supported at the logistic level of the long-range objectives. It is probable that the provision of 6 nuclear task groups would under some circumstance permit a reduction of the total below 15. However, the calculable reduction may prove to be fractional as applied to each ocean, under the criteria to be developed by the sea-based strike forces study, and thus not productive, of realizable reductions in one or both fleets. (d) Eliminating one conventional carrier task group from the fleet, as a result of applying nuclear propulsion to the others, would cover the cost of nuclear power for about five similar task groups. Any reductions in air groups, missiles, ordnance, and aviation fuel replenishment ships and their escorts would yield additional large savings. (e) The direct implications on force size with respect to logistic ships has been discussed in section 4. The reductions in first line support ships and their escorts which could be effected as a result of substituting six nuclear powered aircraft carrier task groups for six conventional groups was presented in paragraph 4 of section 4. (f) As discussed in enclosure (1) of the basic memorandum, the advantages of nuclear propulsion for escorts are significant. Studies conducted previously, including those in connection with Project White Oak, have concluded that advantage such as higher sustained speeds, and reduced exposure at slow speed and less frequent replenishment activities can result in significantly less vulnerability and reduced ship losses. Therefore, if the planning factors which establish total escort requirements can be predicated upon nuclear propulsion for those escorts, a measurable reduction in these total requirements can be achieved. [Classified matter deleted.] [ENCLOSURE 3] MARCH 28, 1963. From: Chief of Naval Operations To: Distribution. Subject: Policy on nuclear power for surface warships. Reference: (a) CNO letter serial 02P03B1 of January 14, 1961 (p. U-1, CNO Policy Reference Book). 1. Reference (a) states that it is the policy of the Chief of Naval Operations that the Navy enlarge its nuclear combatant surface ship fleet in an orderly manner in order to take advantage of the enhanced military capabilities of almost unlimited high power endurance. Priority was to be given to nuclear propulsion in destroyer types, since this is where the greatest military advantages accrue. Reference (a) further states that the installation of nuclear power in surface ships will be continued and will accelerate as developments decrease the costs. 2. The successful operations of Enterprise, Long Beach, and Bainbridge have demonstrated the military advantages of nuclear-powered surface ships, and have confirmed our ability to build effective and reliable nuclear-powered ships of these types. Reactor core improvements now attainable will permit substantial increases in endurance and reductions in future nuclear fuel costs. However, the investment and operating costs of nuclear propulsion will still remain above those of conventional propulsion for a considerable time. 3. The building of nuclear-powered warships is essential and is justified for two basic reasons. First, nuclear power gives significant direct military advantages. The military effectiveness of nuclear warships in relation to cost exceeds that of their oil-fueled counterparts despite the fact that individual nuclear surface ships cost more to build and to operate than their conventional counterparts with the same armament. Second, a scale of construction sufficient to promote healthy development of nuclear technology must be supported or the Navy will be deprived of the option to effect a general transition to nuclear propulsion eventually including selected noncombatant ships. Such a general transition to nuclear propulsion should permit some reduction in total numbers of ships required to meet the Navy's widespread, worldwide commitments. 4. Improved characteristics of nuclear propulsion plants to achieve lighter weight, less space, and lower cost remain continuing goals. The Atomic Energy Commission is pursuing a broad program with the objective of developing all facets of reactor technology including lighter, smaller, and cheaper plants. As part of its program to improve nuclear propulsion plants, the Navy will continue to work in cooperation with the AEC to identify those advanced reactor developments that offer sufficient promise of enhancing naval nuclear propulsion plants, including development of plants for smaller warships. At present, and considering the probable results of existing research and development programs, nuclear propulsion plants are well suited to relatively large warships. Studies of the application of nuclear propulsion to warships smaller than about 8,000 tons displacement have shown that a nuclear propulsion plant currently requires a disproportionate fraction of the total cost, size, and displacement of the ship relative to the limited military characteristics that can be included in the smaller ships. 5. It is, therefore, the policy of the Chief of Naval Operations to support nuclear propulsion of surface warships larger than 8,000 tons, and to support research and development aimed at making reductions in the cost and other improvements in naval nuclear propulsion plants to enable nuclear power to be introduced on a wider scale in surface warships. Specifically, the orderly introduction of nuclear propulsion in surface ships will be continued by programing future construction of all aircraft carriers and frigates with nuclear power, recognizing potential fiscal and personnel limitations. Nuclear propulsion of other surface warships will be programed as may be indicated by future approved requirements studies, or to reflect significant technological advances. 6. This policy statement supersedes reference (a). GEORGE W. ANDERSON. APPENDIX 6 Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, I have received and reviewed your memorandum of April 4, 1963. In my memorandum of February 22 I explained that nuclear propulsion for surface warships had not been explored sufficiently to permit an informed decision. I therefore asked you to undertake a comprehensive, quantitative study of this matter, and provided you with a number of questions which had to be answered before the arguments for nuclear power could be evaluated. The questions, of course, were illustrative of a broader range of relevant issues that have to be addressed. Your memorandum does not provide me with the information I need in order to reach a decision in this important matter. Specifically, my question concerning the implications of nuclear power for force size has not been answered. You state that nuclear propulsion permits a significant increase in beneficial military results for a given expenditure and you note that the benefits may be taken in the form of either reductions in carrier task forces or increased effectiveness, but you have failed to identify the magnitude of the increase in effectiveness or the possible reduction in force. Thus, I am asked to consider a course of action which would, among other things, add at least $600 million to the 5-year shipbuilding program without knowledge of the ultimate effect of these outlays. I realize that it is difficult to quantify exactly the increase in effectiveness associated with nuclear propulsion, but I would like you and the Chief of Naval Operations to indicate to me the nuclearpowered force which, in your judgment, would be equivalent in effectiveness to a conventional force. Similarly, my question on the implications of nuclear power for the composition of task forces has not been answered. You state, in answer to my question on the number of escort vessels to be included in a task force, that all CVAN escorts should be nuclear powered. A four-ship screen is used for “comparative purposes,” but you do not state that this number will be adequate. Given the high cost of nuclear-powered escorts, it would be imprudent to accept the suggested program for surface warships before this matter has been explored. Without unambiguous answers to these two questions, the approximate impact of the nuclear-power program you recommend on other naval programs and the defense budget cannot be determined. In addition to these two major points, I feel that some additional clarification of your analysis should be possible. While I realize that there are many issues involved here which are not subject to rigorous quantitative analysis, a systemmatic exposition of those issues which are quantifiable is necessary if I am to appreciate fully your position. Let me cite two issues raised in my mind by your memorandum. First, I have been concerned for some time that the steadily increasing size of escort ships may be adding a disproportionate share to the cost of each attack aircraft sortie delivered from our carriers, in comparison with alternative means. The justification for increases in the displacement of the escort ships, as I understand it, lies in better sea-keeping qualities, as well as a better compatibility with complex equipment. However, it seems obvious that these larger ships must add to the cost of the force. While it might be that such cost increases could be absorbed by a reduction in the number of escorts, I would think that some lower boundary on that number would be established by the problems of defending against multiple simultaneous submarine attacks, and of providing adequate contiguous coverage against attack by aircraft at low altitude. In light of Admiral Anderson's comment on the difficulty of applying nuclear propulsion to surface warships of less than about 8,000 tons displacement, as well as your statement that all escorts for the nuclear aircraft carrier should be nuclear powered, I can understand why the DDG (N) and DLG (N) mentioned in your memorandum are so large. However, I do not understand why the escorts for the alternative conventional force must be similarly restricted. I should like to know the circumstances (including the probability of occurrence as well as the consequences of various sea states, submarine threats, and air attacks) which justify the increases in displacement of conventionally powered escorts from ships of the DLG-2, DL-2, and DLG–9 classes to those noted in your memorandum. The second issue also involves your comparisons of nuclear-powered and conventional task force costs. You very correctly include the difference in replenishment ships as a factor. However, I note that [classified matter deleted] DE's are judged sufficient for the [classified matter deleted] AO's required by the nuclear-powered force, while an additional [classified matter deleted] DE's and [classified matter deleted] DDG's are deemed necessary to escort the additional [classified matter deleted] required by the conventional force. Thus, while the number of replenishment ships is greater in the case of the conventional force by a factor of somewhat more than [classified matter deleted] the initial construction cost of their escorts is greater by a factor of somewhat more than seven. I should like to know the basis for this assumption, and the reason why only the replenishment ships associated with the conventional force require the expensive protection of DDG's. Ways in which your analysis might be supplemented are described below. My intent is to point out procedures which will be helpful in making maximum use of the limited data available. The suggestions fall into three categories: long-run comparisons of conventional and nuclear-powered forces; short-run problems which would be encountered in initiating a nuclear propulsion program for surface warships; and, last, measurements of the effectiveness of nuclear-powered and conventional task forces. While you are developing answers to the questions I have raised in this memorandum, I feel that I could improve my understanding of the important issues involved if you would send me the "more recent analyses" mentioned in your memorandum as having led you to conclude that all new major warships should be nuclear-powered. 1. LONG-RUN COMPARISONS In section 5 of enclosure 2 you outline three alternative approaches to the introduction of nuclear propulsion for surface warships. While I have no doubt that each of these would result in increased effectiveness, additional costs are also involved. Thus, I find it difficult to compare the presently approved force with any of these alternatives, since both cost and effectiveness are different. A second reason why I find it difficult to compare forces is that you have not provided data on the sensitivity of the results to changes in the number of escorts. To overcome the first and fundamental difficulty, conventional and nuclear-powered forces of equal effectiveness and/or equal cost must be identified. In suggesting equal-cost forces, let me reassure you that the intent is not to force an arbitrary budget ceiling on the Navy. Rather the problem is this: Of course nuclear-powered ships are better than conventional ships, cost not considered. But cost has to be considered because it is a measure of what is being given up elsewhere elsewhere in the Navy, the Department of Defense, the Federal Government, and the economy as a whole. The absence of arbitrary budget ceilings does not mean that resources are unlimited. I need to know whether nuclear power for surface warships is a sensible expenditure as part of any budget, or whether your proposal merely makes sense if the implied reductions in other capabilities are neglected. As an aid in conducting this first part of your supplementary analysis (the long-run aspects of nuclear propulsion), I have outlined a table below which I would like you to complete. I am interested here in developing sideby-side comparisons of nuclear and conventional forces in their final form without, for the moment, consideration of how the transition from our present forces to the ones detailed in the table might be accomplished. (Questions of the rate of expenditure, the time phasing of new forces, the influence of our |