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combat. Therefore, by definition the development work has been finished. That is all I am trying to say.

Chairman PASTORE. It would have served both purposes, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes.

Representative HOLIFIELD. It is a step so well known that we can't call it experimental.

NUCLEAR POWER FOR ESCORTS

Secretary MCNAMARA. The amount of money for 1965, which is a problem you face in the future, is certainly unrelated to this carrier. It would not have developed the four-reactor system for it. What it would do, I hope, and what I strongly hope you will use the funds for, is to continue development of oceangoing reactors, ship powerplants, because I think we badly need continued development effort on those.

We need smaller plants. We need cheaper plants. If we are ever to have a nuclear-powered Navy we will have to have the powerplants that are satisfactory not just for the carriers, but for the escort and smaller vessels. (See footnote, p. 192, and app. 2, pp. 201-229.)

Development work must proceed on those before we will ever construct large numbers of nuclear-powered ships. The problem we face in the Navy is the one I have mentioned to you in part, and I, perhaps, should enlarge on it slightly. It is the problem of pricing the Navy out of the market. There are other ways of doing most of these jobs. Not all of them. The Navy has absolutely unique capabilities in certain areas. In other areas it is in competition with other forms of power. The best illustration is the Polaris. The Polaris is not unique. The Polaris is a substitute for other forms of strategic nuclear power.

Every year we build the strategic nuclear system, we examine the number of Polaris submarines vis-a-vis alternatives-Minuteman or what have you.

To illustrate what is happening to the Navy, the last DDG we built, which is a destroyer with guided missiles, I believe, cost $38 million. The DDG, which the Navy included in the cost figures for the conventional carrier task force that they have presented to this committee, was estimated to cost, with conventional power, $93 million-with nuclear power, $126 million.

Representative BATES. Is that the Typhon?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think in this case it is a modified Tartar. I am not absolutely certain. This DDG, which was in the Navy's conventional force figures at $93 million, versus the last one at $38 million that we are actually building, and versus nuclear power at $126 million.

We have gone from $38 to $126 million. What kind of a Navy can you have? Do you say we should have the same number of ships when they cost $126 million as when they cost $38 million? This is the old question again.

The DLG, if I remember the figures, we can build conventionally for $70 million. The Navy included in their conventional force figures, $154 million for a conventionally powered and $187 million, plus $12 million for cores, or $199 million for the DLGN.

The question is, Should we go from $70 to $199 million? It is not nuclear power that is making all this difference. Don't misunder

stand me. I am not saying that. It is the combination of characteristics that are being packaged in these ships.

The question is, Is that the way to defend this country, with a $199 million DLGN, or is there some other way to defend this country better for $199 million? This gets back to Senator Anderson's point, and I think it is an extremely important one.

And I think it is one that the Congress must ask me, what is the best way to defend the Nation for $199 million, with a DLGN or some other combination of forces.1

NEED FOR AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

Chairman PASTORE. Of course, you are still putting a ceiling on it, Mr. McNamara. Let me ask you this question: Don't answer it if you think it is impertinent because I don't think it is and I don't intend it to be. Did you decide to go along with the authorization, Mr. McNamara, because you felt that if you were compelled to come back to Congress with the controversy that is impending on whether or not you should or should not have an aircraft carrier whether it be nuclear or conventional that you might have been out of luck on both?

Secretary MCNAMARA. No, sir, I didn't. It might be easier if I said I did, but I didn't.

Chairman PASTORE. If you were going before the Armed Services Committee for authorization today, what would you ask for, the conventional that you are building or would you ask for the nuclear? Secretary MCNAMARA. I would ask for the conventional.

DOD ADVISERS ON NUCLEAR PROPULSION

Chairman PASTORE. May I ask you another question? With whom do you enjoy this view in the Defense Department? The Navy seems to be all against you.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I enjoy it with General [name deleted on request of Defense Department] for one.

Chairman PASTORE. He is of the Air Force. I can understand

that.

Secretary MCNAMARA. He also happens to be a very experienced military leader in connection with many of these matters we are talking about. I apparently enjoy it with the authors of the Center for Naval Analyses Study paid for by the Navy who say unequivocally that is the case. (See footnote on p. 173.)

There are two authorities in the field.

Chairman PASTORE. We had a reading here by Secretary Korth by some naval advisory committee that had recommended unanimously for a nuclear-propelled surface fleet. (See p. 11.)

Secretary MCNAMARA. I read some of the excerpts from that and they certainly had not made any thorough study of it at all. Their arguments wouldn't stand up before either my interrogation or Congress. I am sure of that.

Chairman PASTORE. What study is that that you are referring to

now?

Secretary MCNAMARA. It is labeled "Center for Naval Analyses, Naval Warfare Analysis Group Study No. 28, Nuclear Propulsion for Surface Ships."

Representative Price. What is the conclusion?

The DLGN price referred to includes the Typhon missile system. See footnote p. 31 concerning can. cellation of the Typhon development.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I haven't read it all because I just got it. Chairman PASTORE. You had it when you made your decision. Secretary MCNAMARA. No. I didn't.

Representative HOSMER. You don't know the assumptions which they were given?

Secretary MCNAMARA. It was listed in here and I glanced through it very quickly last Saturday when I first received this. I had heard about this from a third party. I asked the Secretary of the Navy if I might examine a copy of it and this is the copy I have.

I am not in a position to endorse it. I don't think the Navy endorses it. It is a rather thick volume. It seems to be current. It comes out with some conclusions that are quite contrary to those that have been previously presented to the committee. (See footnote, p. 173.)

Representative PRICE. Mr. Secretary, when the Navy came to the Defense Department for the first time on this, you said that, basically, they requested nuclear propulsion. What is it, a unanimous position on the part of the Navy or were there some dissenting views?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I understand there were dissenting views, Mr. Price, but I don't want to speak to that. I didn't probe too deeply as to who held what view. I discussed the matter myself with Admiral Anderson and Secretary Connally and we concluded after examining it in some detail that we could all join together in recommending a conventional carrier which they did.

Admiral Anderson's testimony and subsequently Secretary Korth's testimony recommended a conventional carrier for fiscal 1963. 5

Representative PRICE. I think one of the reasons for the concern of the members of this committee-you can see we are pretty unanimous for nuclear propulsion-is the fact that this is not the first conventional carrier since the Enterprise but the second one.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, I realize that.

Representative PRICE. This would seem to us to be more or less setting a pattern or maybe even a policy discounting the advantages of nuclear propulsion, particularly since you are going to have a very limited aircraft carrier force.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I don't believe so. I will tell you what I hope we can accomplish. It is only a hope. I cannot produce at the moment. I hope within 2 years, that is to say, between now and the fiscal year 1966 budget, we will be able to develop a Navy ship construction program which will provide the number of ships we need, and I believe the numbers in many respects are more important than the powerplants for them, and yet will be able to produce those numbers with nuclear powerplants in all major ships, and for the minute I will assume those are 8,000 tons and over, and yet do it at a reasonable cost.

I don't consider the cost figures I gave you earlier reasonable. I don't think we can afford $199 million for a DLGN or $138 million for a DDGN. I don't think we can afford it in the sense that there are better alternatives for providing the necessary national defense at those expenditures.

The record shows (see excerpts in app. 11, p. 250) that in early 1962 both Secretary Korth and Admiral Anderson testified to congressional committees that the fiscal year 1963 aircraft carrier should have conventional propulsion since at that time it was estimated that a nuclear carrier would cost one-third to one-half more than a conventional carrier and that more time was needed to evaluate the performance of the first nuclear surface ships and to continue efforts to reduce size and cost of nuclear powerplants. However, as noted in the footnote on pp. 180-181, by January 1963, the situation had changed. As a result of these changes, both Secretary Korth and Admiral Anderson, in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, dated January 23, 1983 (see app. 3, p. 229), recommended that the CVA-67 be changed to nuclear propulsion and in a memorandum dated Apr. 4, 1963 (see app. 5, p. 231), recommended that all future major combatant surface ships be nuclear powered.

Representative PRICE. I know there is great concern on the part of many who have followed the Navy very closely about the deterioration of the ships in the Navy.

Mr. Bates served on the subcommittee. I am sure the Secretary knows of some of the recommendations of the Armed Services Committee. What would be the picture in trying to meet some of those recommendations relative to the use of conventional power and nuclear power?

FUTURE LARGE SHIPS MAY ALL BE NUCLEAR

Secretary MCNAMARA. I hope, for the larger ships we would have to build to replace the obsolete vessels in the Navy, that we would be able to build them all nuclear. [Classified matter deleted] have any of those ships in the fiscal 1965 budget, the budget [classified matter deleted].

Representative PRICE. Do you have any nuclear ships at all? [Classified matter deleted.]

You said earlier in some of your remarks, and I don't think it was further developed, that your decision was based on your study of the relative position of nuclear power against conventional.

In talking about some of the testimony we had in support of the nuclear propulsion you made reference to the fact that there were some things that were not considered that had developed since the previous contacts. What were you referring to?

Secretary MCNAMARA. The matters we had discussed in connection with the 1963 budget.

Representative PRICE. I have not heard anything here that was discussed with respect to the 1963 budget. I thought you left the inference of some developments recently.

VULNERABILITY OF CARRIERS

Secretary MCNAMARA. I beg your pardon. I think I may have. I think since that time the views of some of the other Chiefs have changed materially away from carriers. [Classified matter deleted.] I think the vulnerability of carriers, perhaps, has increased, because of the possible use against them of long-range Soviet aircraft with standoff missiles that they could launch from outside the range. I am not sure it has increased since the fiscal 1963 budget hearing. (Discussion off the record.)

Secretary MCNAMARA. These are the points I had. None of these three have been discussed by this committee up to this point. But the points that have been discussed by this committee prior to today I believe were generally discussed and understood by the Congress at the time the fiscal 1963 carrier was considered.1

1 The Joint Committee report on "Nuclear Propulsion for Naval Surface Vessels” on pp. 6-7 summarized the changes that have taken place since the CVA-67 was authorized with conventional propulsion in 1962, as follows:

"Early in 1962 the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees held hearings on the fiscal year 1963 shipbuilding program. The program proposed by the Department of Defense included a nuclear-powered destroyer leader with the TYPHON missile system and a conventional aircraft carrier, CVA-67.

"At the time the Congress accepted this program recommended by the Department of Defense, there was a lack of operating experience with nuclear-powered surface warships. The Long Beach and the Enterprise had just commenced operations and the Bainbridge was still under construction.

"In addition, at that time, the four-reactor propulsion plant being designed for an aircraft carrier could produce only a fraction of the power which can now be guaranteed because of technical advances which have been made in the past 2 years. Thus, the four-reactor carrier which can now be built far exceeds the capability of any four-reactor carrier that could have been considered 2 years ago; in fact, the four-reactor plant can now provide as much power as the eight-reactor plant in the Enterprise.

"Finally, it should be noted that in accepting the Navy's fiscal year 1963 shipbuilding program, the Congress did include an additional nuclear-powered surface ship (a nuclear-powered destroyer leader), thus continuing the nuclear surface warship program.

"In order to obtain firsthand knowledge of the impact of nuclear propulsion on the Navy's surface fleet, the Joint Committee flew to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to spend 2 days at sea aboard the Enterprise on March 31 and April 1, 1962, during her shakedown cruise. Thus, the Joint Committee continued its tradi

Chairman PASTORE. May I make an observation on the point, if the Congressman would yield to me? At the time you were discussing the 1963 budget, that was in 1962?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes.

Chairman PASTORE. In 1962 we had not much experience with the Enterprise. As a matter of fact, you so indicated on page 173 when you said, "I have not had too much experience. From all the reports I heard, it has performed admirably. I think that is the word you used?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes.

CHANGES SINCE CVA-67 AUTHORIZATION

Chairman PASTORE. The fact is that we were on board on the shakedown trip of the Enterprise on March 31, 1962, and that was our first experience and at the time they were very enthusiastic about its performance.

The fact of the matter is that a lot of water has gone over the dam since then. I would assume that the picture today as to our understanding of the performance and the flexibility and maneuverability of the Enterprise is much better understood today than it was in 1962 when we were talking about this authorization?

Secretary MCNAMARA. No, sir. I think at that time we conceded that the Enterprise would fully meet the performance standards set for it. As I stated on page 173, I am told by Admiral Anderson and others that it exceeds their expectations. (See footnote, p. 179.) Chairman PASTORE. That is right.

Secretary MCNAMARA. So, I think it was clearly recognized that the Enterprise had advantages vis-a-vis a conventionally powered carrier. I think it was recognized by many of those in Congress that that was the case.

Chairman PASTORE. Captain Peet, if I remember correctly, talked about an incident that happened around [classified matter deleted] and he said that they called upon him and if he had not had nuclear power he would not have gotten there on time. It was Captain de Poix. I would like to have pointed out on the record where they proved definitely in a situation that was quite critical the fact that they had nuclear power they were able to respond because they could make the full run. (See pp. 90-92, 96.)

Secretary MCNAMARA. It was not in the record that was available to me. I read the record which I could obtain which were the hearings

tion of reviewing, on the spot, the accomplishments made in the naval nuclear program. Previous executive hearings had been held at the Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory and at sea on the first atomic submarine, Nautilus; the first fast-attack submarine, Skipjack; and the first Polaris submarine, George Washington. As a result of its review in 1962, the committee concluded that:

""The United States must prosecute vigorously the conversion of the Navy to nuclear propulsion in the surface fleet as well as in the submarine fleet.'

"Changes since 1962

"Although the Congress had, in 1962, accepted the proposed 1963 shipbuilding program, which designated a conventional aircraft carrier for construction, by January 1963 the situation had changed markedly. "(a) Operations of the nuclear surface ships, Enterprise, Long Beach, and Bainbridge were outstanding successes. The nuclear plants met or exceeded all specifications.

"(b) The design of the new four-reactor plant was significantly improved. In effect, the improved four-reactor plant could now power a ship of the size of the eight-reactor Enterprise. Moreover, initial nuclear reactor fuel cores were developed with twice the life and half the cost of the initial Enterprise

cores.

"(c) Estimates of overall cost on an annual basis over the life of the four-reactor ship had dropped from 50 to 25 percent more than a conventional carrier. Including the air group costs, the overall cost of the nuclear carrier with its planes was estimated to be about 3 percent more than a conventional carrier with its planes over the life of the ship.

(d) In the fall of 1962, Secretary McNamara canceled plans for the construction of the nuclear-powered destroyer authorized by Congress in the fiscal year 1963 shipbuilding program because the missile system was not ready. Moreover, the Department of Defense requested further nuclear surface ships in its fiscal year 1964 shipbuilding program. Thus, by January 1963, except for the destroyer Truxtun (authorized in 1961), no nuclear surface warships were under construction or definitely programed for the future—the surface nuclear warship construction program was ended.”