the general state of technology in the naval environment 10 years from today rather than the technological developments in the next 2 or 3 years. There are two aspects to this program: (1) Lightweight nuclear powerplants; and (2) lightweight conventional powerplants. With regard to the former, NRAC's views are that if the Navy adopts the policy that all new major combatant ships be propelled with the currently developed nuclear powerplants or their improvement only then does it make sense to start a major development program for the lightweight nuclear plants. Our best estimate is that an improved nuclear powerplant will not appear in the first prototype ship for about 10 to 12 years. This long-range program can only be attained in this time period with vigorous prosecution. The cost of this development program may run as high as a billion dollars over this period of years.

NRAC believes that, in addition, a vigorous development program for lightweight conventional powerplants is required. This requirement is independent of the nuclear powerplant decisions. A lightweight conventional powerplant will contribute to the development of nuclear technology, may provide a significant operational capability much sooner, and give the Navy an opportunity for testing and proving the lightweight propulsion machinery. The more conventional fossil fuel type of powerplant, we are sure, will be a continuing requirement.

The views expressed here represent the consensus of the members of the Naval Research Advisory Committee at the last meeting. We feel that there has been sufficient analysis to indicate the direction of future work. Detailed analysis will modify the details of the program but not the main ideas expressed.

I do hope that, from time to time, we may write to you on these technical matters.

This was signed by D. E. R. Piore, Chairman, Naval Research Advisory Committee.

Representative HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, at this point may I ask a question to clarify a term used in the letter?

Would you explain to us the difference between a lightweight conventional powerplant and, I suppose, a lightweight nuclear powerplant and a heavyweight nuclear powerplant?

Secretary KORTH. A lightweight plant would be used on lighter escort ships, below 8,000 tons in effect, as a par cutoff point.

Representative HOLIFIELD. So this reference to lightweight plants would be to support vessels rather than major carriers?

Secretary KORTH. That is correct, sir. That is my understanding. Chairman PASTORE. Are there any further questions on that point? Representative PRICE. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we could have identification of Dr. Piore at this point.

Secretary WAKELIN. Dr. Piore, sir, is vice president of International Business Machines Corp., for research and development.

Secretary KORTH. All of these people, and I know that all of us here in this room, are honestly and sincerely concerned over our ability to retain our position of strength so as to insure the freedom of the seas. To this end, significant changes in weapons systems and in propulsion systems have been made and will continue to be made in the future.

I am firmly convinced that nuclear propulsion strongly contributes to the greatest possible efficiency of our naval forces, and that it does offer outstanding proven advantages and revolutionary potential which far outweigh any possible disadvantages set down by those who may differ in the premise.

The use of nuclear power will add significantly to the versatility and effectiveness of our naval task forces. The increased range, the responsiveness, the staying power and the reduced vulnerability will make these forces much stronger and much more useful as instruments of national policy and power.

It is true that this newest form of propulsion is more expensive than the older, but this is a phenomenon experienced by a new product

in any field of endeavor. Until recently, the cost of a nuclear carrier was half again that of a conventionally powered carrier. Today, that difference has been slashed in half, making a nuclear carrier only 25 percent more expensive than a conventional carrier. At the same time, the life of a reactor core has been more than doubled from 3 to 7 years and the day is in sight when a core will last the lifetime of the ship.

During this same evolutionary period, the power of the reactors has risen to the point where more than four times as much energy is available from a single reactor for a new carrier than is available from each of the first Enterprise reactors. We know from our studies that a nuclear-powered carrier and its air group costs only 3 percent more to operate than the conventionally powered carrier plus its air group. This small increase, coupled with the far more significant operational increases, makes the nuclear carrier far superior in operational cost effectiveness evaluations. These are not merely promises, they are in being or will be attainable soon, provided we continue to build nuclearpowered ships and continue our present development efforts. But we must build more nuclear ships, and we must continue with our aggressive development programs, or this spectacular rate of progress will surely grind to a halt.

We have had exceptional operational experience with our present nuclear-powered ships-carrier, cruiser, and frigate because of engineering plant performance reliability and maintainability. Perhaps the most outstanding characteristic and greatest advantage is the virtually unlimited endurance at sustained high speeds. This leads quite readily to increased tactical flexibility and greater freedom for independent action. The perimeter of attack is vastly expanded, while the vulnerability to submarine attack is correspondingly reduced. With nuclear propulsion each major combatant ship represents a substantial segment of seapower in itself. Each ship is able to cover over 750 miles a day and is capable of being dispatched to any distant part of the globe without concern for its fuel supply ships.

These significant wartime military advantages cannot and should not be assigned a bargain basement price tag for peacetime cost effectiveness study purposes.

Other less spectacular advantages are just as real to the captain of the ship and to the task force commander better foul weather operations, easing of logistic replenishment problems, especially in areas of high threat of enemy action, the elimination of the effect of stack gases on equipment, and the increase in shipboard electrical power without reducing range are but a few.

These unique characteristics surely open the door to the future for exploiting the potential in development, design, and operating practices for both ships and weapons systems.

There is no longer any valid technical or military argument as to whether nuclear power is better than conventional power. It has become a matter of convincing others that the degree of superiority fully justifies the temporary additional costs, and that today's additional costs will be more than offset by the advantages which will accrue to our ships during their expected 30-year lifetime. We must look far beyond the budgets of the sixties. We must look to the eighties and to the 21st century.

We must use the sea to its fullest advantage; we must keep it free. We must have ships that are capable of rapid movement to any segment of the watery face of our earth, unhampered by their logistic tail, and untrammeled by pre-positioned bases. We must convince others of the worth of the nuclear propulsion program, for our country cannot afford to be without it.

The nuclear propulsion plant thus far has met with widely recognized success. However, we have already delayed the new carrier 9 months while studying the implications associated with the change of propulsion systems and there will not be another opportunity to build a nuclear surface ship for several years. The decision not to put nuclear power in the fiscal year 1963 carrier cannot help but have an important effect on the Navy's future. But the importance of that future transcends the issue of any individual major combatant ship. However, the Secretary of Defense has made his decision. The Navy is a military organization sworn to uphold his decisions. I have issued the necessary orders to commence construction of a conventional carrier immediately. Any delay in laying down the new carrier in order to conduct further studies would be unacceptable to me and to the Navy. Above all, I would certainly be distressed if the ship were lost or further delayed because of anything said before this committee.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

Recognizing that the decision on the fiscal year 1963 carrier has been made, our actions must be concentrated on obtaining approval and endorsement of the Navy's policy of nuclear propulsion for all new major combatant surface ships. Furthermore, we must emphasize the need for continued support of the AEC and Navy research and development programs to obtain reductions in cost and other improvements in naval nuclear propulsion plants to enable nuclear power to be introduced on a wider scale in surface warships.

Anyone who has reviewed the history of revolutionary changes in our country's defense posture must be impressed by the influence and position of Congress. The awareness of the Congress is evident of the recognition of the importance of the sea as a highway of commerce and as the outer defense of our mainland, and of the fact that our position as a world power is synonymous with our position as a seapower. That position must not be measured solely in terms of the dollar sign, for we must have the best. The best is ours only when our ships are powered by a nuclear reactor rather than by other means.. Each of us has a share in insuring the continuation of our healthy posture, of understanding its relation to maintaining the freedom of the seas, and in understanding the full impact of nuclear power on these concepts.

Historically, a situation similar to that currently in being for nuclear propulsion for surface ships prevailed over 8 years ago on the issue of nuclear submarines. No one can deny that the pressures from the Congress were basic with respect to replacing the conventional submarines with our modern high speed nuclear fleet. It is also well to recall the record of the Congress with regard to nuclear power for surface ships. As recently as 3 years ago, it was the Congress that insisted on a second nuclear frigate in place of a conven

tional frigate in the fiscal year 1962 shipbuilding program and appropriated additional funds to permit its construction. This is the only nuclear surface ship currently under construction; no others have been approved. I am sure that the arguments regarding the relative worth of nuclear propulsion are more clear at this time than they have ever been because of the outstanding success of our first three nuclear surface ships. For these reasons, I am convinced that the deliberations of this committee will bring into clear focus those important relationships resulting from this new technology.

Implicit in the constitutional provision that "the Congress shall have the power to provide and maintain a Navy" is the clear duty of the Congress to participate with the executive branch in the determination of the general level of overall military capability that force shall have. These hearings you are holding here today are in pursuit of that duty and are a classic exercise of that constitutional power so wisely and specifically conferred upon you. I say "wisely" because decisions of this magnitude should be based only upon the deliberations of the highest authority in the land, both legislative and executive. It is not purely a military decision, dependent solely upon the advice of those officers who, understandably, may be reluctant to embrace a new concept of such economic impact that other programs equally vital to them may have to suffer. Nor is it solely an economic decision, or a foreign policy decision. It is all of these, and therefore well within the scope and authority of proper congressional participation.

What you decide here will therefore go far toward determining the size and scope of American seapower for decades to come. I am convinced that you will not equivocate. Your duty to make a definite determination and recommendation is as crystal clear as your constitutional authority to do so. My confidence in your ability, your dedication to duty and your judgment is complete. I have no doubt that future generations of Americans—particularly the future Navy men who may have to fight and die at sea-will be equally proud of your courage and farsightedness.

Mr. Chairman, thank you and the committee for your attention and for inviting me to make these remarks. As you know, this is my last official appearance before the Congress on behalf of our beloved Navy. I can think of no more urgent and important plea I could make for them, and therefore for our country, than the one I now conclude.

Chairman PASTORE. Thank you for a very strong and powerful

statement.

May I suggest there is a sincere but slight incongruity that I would like to clear up. You say that you would hope we would do nothing here to delay the going forward with the decision that has been made already by the Secretary of Defense.

Secretary KORTH. Yes, sir.

Chairman PASTORE. In the next breath you say that it is our responsibility to see that we have the best in the Navy.

What would you expect us to do? Let's be very frank in the secrecy of this room and come right to the point. What is it that we can do that will carry out both of your ideas?

NEED FOR AIRCRAFT CARRIER

Secretary Korth. I reconcile it on this basis, Mr. Chairman. I consider the necessity for a carrier of such importance that it transcends the importance which I place on nuclear power for this carrier. In other words, I believe and I think Admiral McDonald supports this belief that the importance of having this carrier transcends the importance of nuclear power for this carrier.

At the same time I believe quite firmly that this committee should make a strong statement, if it so believes, of the necessity for nuclear power for our combatant surface ships for the future and certainly of the development of nuclear propulsion in the lighter weight ships.

I would like to ask Admiral McDonald what his view is on this particular question which has been asked by the chairman.

Admiral McDONALD. I prefer this carrier to no carrier.

Chairman PASTORE. We realize that.

Admiral McDONALD. That is the point.

Chairman PASTORE. You are saying that you need a deck and that you need it quickly. What is underneath is open to debate, but what you need on that deck and above is of immediate urgency.

Admiral McDONALD. That is right.

Chairman PASTORE. I realize that.

Still, as the Secretary has so well developed, we have only one aircraft carrier that is nuclear propelled―

Secretary KORTH. That is right.

Chairman PASTORE. And we are looking toward a future which holds a great deal of promise and more economy as we develop.

The big question here is, If we don't get on with a development program and don't keep building nuclear-propelled vessels, how are we ever going to get experience in this improvement?

Secretary KORTH. This is the problem. This is a blow.

Chairman PASTORE. I think myself this is a blow to the impetus the committee has been trying to put forward in this whole program. It is a blow to the impetus I believe the Commission has been trying to put into this program. Unless you keep doing this over and over again, you will never experience the development we must have to make this more efficient and more economical. This is a damper on the whole program, as I look at it.

Let me ask you this question: When will this become operational? Secretary KORTH. It will be at least 3 years.

Admiral McDONALD. Oh, yes; more than that.

DECISION AGAINST NUCLEAR POWER FOR CVA-67

Secretary KORTH. Mr. Chairman, may I add something at this point and say that certainly Admiral McDonald, I, and the Navy presented as forcefully as we could the arguments which we felt supported our position with reference to nuclear power for the CVA-67. A decision was made by Mr. McNamara, the Secretary of Defense, I promptly filed a reclama, as the chairman and the committee are aware. (See app. 7 and 8, pp. 244 and 245.)

Subsequently Admiral McDonald and I, again as forcefully as we could, presented our arguments to Mr. McNamara. We took with us Captain DePoix to give Mr. McNamara some of the operational aspects of nuclear propulsion in a carrier. He certainly listened