what course we are to pursue with regard to future authorizations in our appropriations that have to do with research and development in the whole area of nuclear ship propulsion.

Without further ado, Mr. Secretary, I think you can take it from there.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT S. MCNAMARA, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Secretary MCNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, I have no statement to present to you. I felt that you have already heard from representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Navy and from others in the Defense Department and of, I believe, all of the facts that are available with respect to this decision.

As to the question you put to me, what course for the future, I really think that is the issue. I would be very happy to answer that question and any others you choose to put to me today rather than present a statement or a restatement of matters that have already been discussed before you.

FUTURE SHIP CONSTRUCTION PLAN UNCERTAIN

I don't know exactly what course we should follow for the future with respect to ship construction. It is very clear in my mind, however, the course we should follow with respect to research and development. We should follow all promising leads. I can't speak much more definitively than that because I am not intimately acquainted with the Atomic Energy Commission research and development program.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT RECOMMENDED

But we should follow all promising channels for further increasing the effectiveness of atomic powerplants suitable for installation in naval vessels. I feel so strongly on that issue I would be quite happy to consider the possibility of channeling Defense Department funds into the development projects for that purpose.

As you know better than I, those are presently financed almost entirely by the Atomic Energy Commission. But the development projects of the Atomic Energy Commission relating to shipborne powerplants have received the enthusiastic endorsement of myself and others associated with me in the Defense Department. I would hope that the Commission would continue its development work.

BASIS FOR DECISION AGAINST NUCLEAR POWERED CVA-67

Chairman PASTORE. Now to be a little more specific about it and I am just going to lead off with this because I think we can accomplish more with questions and answers. We have had before us Admiral McDonald who is very, very enthusiastic about nuclear propulsion of surface ships and who felt strongly that even this new carrier that we are talking about now should have nuclear propulsion. He took a very, very positive position with regard to that. We also had the testimony here of Admiral Connolly who told us that on the long run that the cost would not be more than 3 percent per year increment. We also had the testimony of Admiral Hayward who was

commander of the task force at the time of the Cuban crisis, who said without any equivocation that he was sold on this idea of nuclear propulsion and that he would accept a nuclear carrier even if the whole remainder of the contingent of the task force were conventional. We heard from Captain Wilkinson, who was the first skipper of the Nautilus, who said there is nothing to compare between nuclear propulsion and conventional propulsion. We also heard from Captain de Poix, who was the commander of the Enterprise.

We also heard from the skipper of the Bainbridge, Captain Peet. What surprises us, in the face of this heavy testimony, how do we come to make the decision that we ought to stay conventional?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I don't know that we made a decision to stay conventional, Mr. Chairman. I think this is the question for the future. There are perhaps two questions actually that the committee has addressed itself to. One is, should future naval vessels of any particular type or size for which authorizations and appropriations will be required from the Congress be authorized for nuclear power or conventional power?

That is the basic question, the basic issue. It seems to me the important one that we in the Department should address ourselves to. The other question which has been merged into that is the question of the vessel known as CVA-67 or CVAŇ-67.

CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION OF CONVENTIONAL CARRIER

The question there is quite a different one. The question there is simply shall I carry out the program authorized by Congress and for which funds were appropriated by Congress, or shall I seek to change it? (See pp. 26, 28-32, footnotes pp. 179–181, and app. 3, p. 229, app. 7, p. 244, app. 8, p. 245.)

I think on that score that Senator Cannon phrased it very well a week ago. I was reviewing for another reason the hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee last night. Those were hearings associated with the confirmation of Mr. Nitze as Secretary of the Navy, but in the course of them, Senator Cannon said this:

I have read a great number of articles in the press recently about a supposed fight over this issue

Of nuclear versus conventional power for the fiscal 1963 carrier— But I see that you—

Meaning Mr. Nitze

are aware of the fact that this committee has not authorized a nuclear carrier, and a nuclear carrier has not been appropriated for. So under the present state of the authorization and appropriation, the Secretary of Defense could not order a nuclear carrier if he wanted to; is that correct?

Mr. NITZE. That is correct.

Senator CANNON. And it would not make any difference what his views were, or what the Secretary of the Navy's views were. It would require additional authorization and additional appropriation from the Congress before any action could be taken to commence construction or to order a nuclear carrier.

That I think is the situation we face today and my position simply is I am not prepared to go back to the Congress and ask it to change the action which it took after full consideration of the issues in connection with the fiscal 1963 carrier.

Chairman PASTORE. Because you think that you don't have the authority or because you think it is wiser to go conventional?

26–152—64—————11

Secretary MCNAMARA. Because I believe that the Congress considered the matter fully and properly at the time it authorized and appropriated the vessel known as CVA-67, and I am not in a position today to ask authorization and appropriation of the additional funds necessary to change that vessel from a conventionally powered to a nuclear powered. (See pp. 80, 81, and footnote pp. 180-181.) Chairman PASTORE. Why?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Perhaps we should go back and view the record as the Congress would.

Chairman PASTORE. I am getting into another area. First of all I want to say, Mr. McNamara, that all of us have the highest respect and regard for your competence. You have not even hesitated for a moment to tell Congress at times when you disagreed with them even when they made appropriations, that you didn't think it was wise to go on with a certain project for which I have applauded you and stood behind you because I thought in my mind you were the Secretary of Defense and you were on solid ground.

Even though the Congress disagreed with you, you had a perfect right to take a contrary position and state it openly and publicly. That was your position and you remained steadfast. I realize that it was authorized as a conventional aircraft carrier. No one disputes that. But if the Secretary of Defense came before the Congress of the United States and said: "Gentlemen, I think we could accomplish a lot more for our security if we made this nuclear in view of what has transpired since this was authorized, and I am not going to build this conventional carrier, I want you to take another look.

"I need more money to do it. But after you have given me more money, you will have more for defense," I think, myself, that would have been a very valid position even with Mr. Cannon. Nobody questions the fact that you are abiding by the authorization. No one is raising that question.

You are doing precisely what Congress authorized you to do. But, on the other hand, if you felt for one moment it would have been better for you to go nuclear I know that the Congress would have taken a second look at it and would have listened to you.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, I think you phrased my views quite properly when you said I have never hesitated to state to the Congress that I believe that they should act differently from the manner in which they were planning to act or had acted. I certainly will never hestitate to do so in the future.

But in this particular instance I don't have new information or new evidence that was not, I think, properly considered at the time the Congress considered this carrier. (See footnote, pp. 180-181, for additional information on nuclear propulsion.)

As a matter of fact, several events that have occurred since the time the Congress considered it would, if anything, throw doubt on the issue of whether we should have such a carrier, either conventional or nuclear.

Perhaps in order for you best to understand the basis for my position I should go back in the record. It won't take long and I think you will find it useful.

Chairman PASTORE. All right, sir.

CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDE TOWARD CARRIERS

Secretary MCNAMARA. I won't exhaust you with a complete examination of the record. One point that is of importance here is the congressional attitude toward carriers. While what I will state doesn't relate specifically or solely to the fiscal 1963 carrier, it does bear on the possible action of Congress in the event I were to ask for additional funds for that vessel. After expressing my view of Congress' attitude toward carriers I will get specifically into the 1963 carrier.

The congressional committees, as you know perhaps better than I, have frequently rejected the Navy's requests for funds for carriers. For example, the funds for long-lead components for a nuclear-powered carrier were deleted from the fiscal year 1959 appropriations bill by the House Appropriations Committee. The next year a request for funds for a conventionally powered carrier were similarly deleted. In the fiscal year 1961 appropriations bill funds for a carrier were again deleted by the House Appropriations Committee.

The care with which the Appropriations Cominittees have always scrutinized requests for funds for carriers is illustrated by the fact that in the 1961 budget hearings the printed record of the House Appropriations Committee's consideration of the carrier request exceeded 70 pages in length.

Similarly, considerable controversy developed within that committee during its review of the fiscal 1963 carrier. While I don't know firsthand the results of the vote on that carrier I have heard that it passed the Appropriations Committee by only one vote.

That is not surprising because there are a number of members of that committee who are strongly opposed to carriers of any kind, conventional or nuclear. The chairman of the House Appropriations Committee is along with them. He had this to say in one of his comments on the floor of the House about carriers. This particular comment happened to be from the Congressional Record of September 26, 1961. It is only from that one because I didn't have time last night to dig up any more, but he has made similar comments upon other occasions. He had this to say:

The admirals of the U.S. Navy stubbornly refused to consider aircraft as anything more than toys until a small Japanese plane sank two of the finest and newest warships in the British Navy and airplanes hardly larger than kites sank decommissioned American warships in Hampton Roads. But being finally convinced against their will, that 2 and 2 were 4, they leaped into the front seat of the bandwagon and grabbed the lines and devised the aircraft carrier. the most elaborate, the most expensive, and the most vulnerable ship that ever sailed the

seas.

Still insisting fatuously that the Navy was the first line of defense they starved other branches of the service in order to pour into the carriers every resource at their command. Engineers, technicians, artisans, skilled mechanics were monopolized, the choicest materials and all the attention and emphasis that the service could bring to bear, were concentrated on the carrier program.

Year after year the admirals appeared before the House and Senate committees on the Hill, and the committees promptly and docilely recommended the authorizations ard appropriations requested. A task force of carriers with auxiliaries, tenders, destroyers and service ships cost in excess of a billion dollars.

They travel at the rate of 36 miles an hour in this supersonic age and are as fragile as an eggshell.

I read that not because it defines in advance the response of Congress to a potential request I might make for additional funds, but I

think it does indicate the attitude of certain Members of the Congress with respect to the carrier problem.

Senator ANDERSON. Was he talking about nuclear or conventional? Secretary MCNAMARA. He was talking about carriers of any kind. Senator ANDERSON. What was under issue, nuclear or conventional? Secretary MCNAMARA. Both had been discussed prior to the time he made this statement in September 1961.

Senator ANDERSON. What was involved in the appropriation, nuclear or conventional?

Secretary MCNAMARA. The appropriation in fiscal 1963 budget was conventional, but both were discussed at the time, as you will see when I read some further comments.

Senator ANDERSON. But his comments were directed at conventional?

Secretary MCNAMARA. He doesn't state whether he was referring specifically to conventional or nuclear. It was a diatribe against carriers in general.

Representative HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, I think we ought to stipulate that there is an argument and some opposition in Congress to carriers in general which might have had some influence on the Secretary's decision whether or not to come back, but not on his feelings about the merits of the carrier per se.

Chairman PASTORE. He is explaining the background. I think we ought to allow the Secretary to finish.

Representative HOSMER. I know, but this doesn't go to the merits of the case at all.

Chairman PASTORE. We don't know that at this juncture.
Representative HOSMER. We will never get to the merits.
Chairman PASTORE. We will.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I can spend as much time as you can.
Chairman PASTORE. You may continue, Mr. Secretary.

PRIORITY OF AIRCRAFT CARRIER

Secretary MCNAMARA. Specifically with respect to the fiscal 1963 carrier-whether we should have one and, if so, whether it should be conventional or nuclear and whether the issue of conventional versus nuclear was discussed at the time; let me read first an extract from the House Appropriations Committee hearings started January 31, 1962 on the specific issue of the fiscal 1963 budget.

I am reading from pages 166 and 167 and first the comment of Mr. Mahon, the chairman of the subcommittee:

I would like first to talk about the aircraft carrier which is in the budget this

year.

This is CVA-67, the carrier at issue.

Mr. Secretary, you made quite a statement in regard to the carrier. I do not care for you to repeat that statement, for it is available to us. You made no reference to the carrier yourself, General Lemnitzer.

I believe it would be well first to have your statement on that question. As you know, the carrier has been controversial for a number of years. There is a feeling, widely supported, that the carrier is becoming less important to our military effort than it had been during World War II days.

Will you tell us whether or not the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered the question of the placing of a carrier in the budget. Did you discuss it in any way?

General LEMNITZER. Yes, sir, we did. There was not complete unanimity within the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but the majority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported the inclusion of an attack carrier in the ship construction program for fiscal year 1963 ***