up with every other bluecoat that came in here. Here is what he says (see p. 10):

We are faced with a critical obsolescence problem. Scores of new ships must be laid down each year if we are to keep up the strength we now have. Most of them do not need nuclear power-that is, the advantages so obtained for other than our major combatant ships would not be significant enough to warrant the expense until the price can be brought down further. But it would be nothing short of tragic if the surface striking forces of the U.S. Navy in the seventies and beyond continue to receive new ships with old engines.

Mind you, the Secretary of the Navy makes that statement for the benefit of the people of the United States.

Then he ends up with this statement (see p. 14):

We

We must use the sea to its fullest advantage; we must keep it free. must have ships that are capable of rapid movement to any segment of the watery face of our earth, unhampered by their logistic tail and untrammeled by prepositioned bases. We must convince others of the worth of the nuclear propulsion program, for our country cannot afford to be without it.

The Secretary of the Navy says that, and he was backed up by the whole Navy.

Yet you confront us with the argument here, "I am not convinced that this is so.”

I wonder what the American people must be saying to themselves.

NEED FOR NUMBERS OF SHIPS

Dr. BROWN. I would call your attention, Mr. Chairman, to one statement that Admiral McDonald made. He said that numbers count. I think that he is worried, as I am worried, he, on the basis of very much more experience than I can possibly claim to or that I will ever have in this area, that the Navy as it projects its future will be going to smaller and smaller numbers of larger and larger ships.

I think that could be a disastrous evolution. I am afraid that unless a very clear look is taken of that problem, of which nuclear propulsion is only a part but an important part, that the trend will continue to the point where the overall effectiveness of the Navy to meet the obligations which national security place on it in many parts of this globe will be severely compromised.

It may well be that more escort carriers are very important if the carrier is to be protected, and protecting the carrier is important.

I am not sure what the effectiveness, I am not sure what the ratio of effectiveness of a nuclear carrier is to that of a nonnuclear carrier. It may be quite large. (See pp. 103–129 for estimates.)

But I know this, that a sunken nuclear carrier is no more effective than a sunken nonnuclear carrier.

The vulnerability of these ships worries me.

FUTURE ROLE OF CARRIERS

Representative HOLIFIELD. May I interrupt you?

This now gets us into the field which so far has not been advanced, which is the value of the carrier as against other types of weapons systems.

Now if that presentation had been made here, then this hearing could have gone along the lines of studying that particular part of the problem. But that has not been advanced to us.

Now, is it in the background? Is it really in the background, & lack of confidence in the value of a carrier as against submarines, aircraft, missiles, or some other system?

Dr. BROWN. I think it is, Mr. Holifield, but I was addressing myself to only a part of it and the part which has to do with the relative vulnerability of nuclear and nonnuclear carriers for two reasons: One, that the nuclear carrier finding it necessary to replenish less often, about half as often as, in fact under most conditions since it has to replenish aviation gas and stores but not black oil, will by virtue of that not have to stop so often. (See pp. 58, 90.)

I think that makes it less vulnerable, although there are Navy studies that assert that a carrier that is going as fast as it can is more vulnerable and one stopped in the war is less vulnerable. I don't believe that.

Representative BATES. Where did you get that one?

Dr. BROWN. I have seen such studies.

Representative MORRIS. Dr. Brown, are those studies made by the Navy?

Dr. BROWN. The one I saw was made by an analysis group which works for the Navy.

So that I think the nuclear carrier has an advantage there.

However, I think that the vulnerability is connected with the size and number of the carriers and its escorts and all the rest of these things. I think that as carriers get bigger and fewer they tend to get more vulnerable because there are fewer targets for the enemy to seek out, whether he is using bombers or missiles, or whatever.

That is why I am concerned about the evolution to bigger, fancier, more expensive, fewer ships, surface ships, whether they be carriers or carrier escorts

Representative HOSMER. Is this an argument for the PT boat? Dr. BROWN. No, it is an argument against one big, big, big carrier, Mr. Hosmer.

Representative HOSMER. It does not go very far when you are talking about in connection with five or six carriers. It is unimpressive in an ocean that covers nine-tenths of the world.

Dr. BROWN. It is one step on a long, long road which taken together I think is impressive.

Representative BATES. Would that not be the same with conventional or nuclear, the size?

NUCLEAR POWER AND SHIP SIZE INCREASE

Dr. BROWN. Yes, Mr. Bates. But the nuclear carrier has contributed to the growth, the nuclear propulsion has contributed to the growth and the size of ships. That is one of the reasons why I have always been strongly in favor of additional development work to make propulsion systems, nuclear propulsion systems with more horsepower per pound so that they can be put into smaller ships without making them grow in weight. (See footnote on p. 192 and app. 2, pp. 201-229.)

I believe this was a very strong motivation behind the letter which you heard read yesterday by the Secretary of the Navy from the Naval Research Advisory Committee, recommending along with the all-nuclear Navy concept a strong effort toward development along those lines. (See p. 11 for NRAC letter.)

Representative HOSMER. Really, the difference in these two conventional, nonconventional carriers is not great in tonnage. Sixty feet; is it?

Dr. BROWN. It is true for carriers.

Representative HOSMER. Your carriers have to be the size they are in order to handle the size aircraft.

Dr. BROWN. That is a long story, Mr. Hosmer.
Representative HOSMER. It is a fact, though.

Dr. BROWN. It is true the larger the ship is the less difference it makes as to its cost.

Representative HOSMER. The reason we went to larger carriers is because we went to jet airplanes and we went to heavier and heavier jets, you needed an angle deck, you needed the runways, you needed the strength to handle that kind of equipment off the decks.

Dr. BROWN. That is half the story. It is much less than half the story for destroyers.

Representative HOSMER. You were talking about this magnificent difference between a conventional and a nuclear carrier in terms of size; I don't see it.

Dr. BROWN. I am again trying to direct my attention to the nuclear versus nonnuclear concept for all surface ships.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

Chairman PASTORE. In view of what you have said, Dr. Brown, what would you recommend that we do about these appropriations and authorizations for research and development in this area? Would you discourage us from going any further with it?

Dr. BROWN. No; I would encourage you to go further.
Chairman PASTORE. Why?

When you talk about this vulnerability. Vulnerability is vulnerability. We don't have to spend $50 million to know we have it. Why do we keep spending this money if that is the way the Defense Department feels?

Why don't they come before the committee of Congress and say, "Look, gentlemen, we have to take another look at this vulnerability business. It is about time we began to save money on this and stop wasting this money, if we are not going to go anywhere with it.”

It seems to me we are talking through both sides of our mouth. We don't have the courage to come forward and say let us cut this out if this is not what we are going to do.

EVENTUAL USE OF NUCLEAR POWER

Dr. BROWN. I think in the end we will come to nuclear, use of nuclear power in larger numbers of ships.

Representative HOSMER. They will be putting it in the big capital

ships.

Dr. BROWN. Probably, but I think only part of the investment is in that. I am speaking about cruisers, frigates, destroyers as well because I think it may be possible to make a better argument for those being nuclear. They are the ones that are the most fuel limited.

Representative HOSMER. If this is what we are coming to, Dr. Brown, and you think we are, why shy away from it at a point where

we are making a decision on a piece of hardware that will have a 20- to 30-year life?

Do you mean we are not coming to it until the year 2000?

CONGRESSIONAL DELAYS IN TAKING ACTION

Dr. BROWN. There are a number of other factors that entered in this decision of having to do with the availability of funds in

Representative HOSMER. Using that example you are going to have much trouble getting money from us.

Dr. BROWN. Also, I think that the length of time and the Secretary really has to speak to this, himself, and the difficulty he may have foreseen getting this through four committees of Congress may have persuaded him that to wait any longer would be to throw doubt on the whole carrier question.

Chairman PASTORE. Why didn't he write that to me? He could have answered that letter by saying, "Look, Pastore, you give me the money and I will do it."

BUDGET RESTRICTIONS DICTATE CHOICE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Dr. Brown, on October 25, the Secretary of Defense wrote a memorandum apparently to the Secretary of the Navy in connection with his decision. I am quoting from what the Secretary of Defense said (see p. 25):

I understand that nuclear powered task forces have very desirable characteristics. However, the real choice we face is not between a given number of conventional ships for one sum of money and the same number of nuclear ships for a larger sum. The choice is between a given number of conventional ships and smaller number of nuclear ships at the same total cost.

The dollars and cents entered into that. If this is applied to weapons, the present aircraft which we use on carriers probably cost 20 or 25 times what the older aircraft used to cost. So if we followed that philosophy it seems to me we ought to be putting about five fighters on a carrier now instead of the full complement that they carry, because they cost more money and we can only get so many for the dollars spent. I think we are getting down on the financial end of this thing rather than the security consideration.

Dr. BROWN. If 50 propeller-driven aircraft could do a better job than five jets, which cost the same amount altogether, I think that there would be a strong argument for buying the 50 propeller-driven aircraft. There are some places, by the way, where that is true right

now.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I would not dispute that argument. If they could do a better job for the security of the country but we are talking about research, too. This committee has authorized hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars for building experimental reactors to learn something. We have learned a great deal as a result of this. Here is a second carrier in which it would seem to me a very powerful argument could be made that we can spend some extra money to find out more if we want information rather than paper studies and theory, we have an opportunity to spend some money here to find out.

We have the old saying which I guess is still good, that you can't learn to swim if you don't go near the water.

Aren't we just sort of saying, well, we are going to keep on studying this thing and we can spend some more money, rather discard the difference in the arguments here, spend some more money and find out a lot of things about this carrier? I think there are some pretty strong arguments that probably the cost will be less than they think it will be if you consider all the factors.

Dr. BROWN. I think that that is an argument with considerable merit, Mr. Hickenlooper. It does imply to me that you are willing to regard two things, first, that you feel that one carrier is not enough to learn this on, you need another nuclear carrier to learn it better. Senator HICKENLOOPER. A better reactor.

TECHNICAL ADVANTAGES OF BUILDING NUCLEAR CARRIERS

Dr. BROWN. You can build a reactor without building a carrier. You won't learn as many things.

The second thing is that this should be regarded, then, as some kind of research development test and evaluation money.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I would not so regard it. I am only saying that you do get that advantage as well as the mobility and the utility of the carrier at the same time, but you also get the research from a practical standpoint and the study from a practical standpoint if that is a factor.

Dr. BROWN. It certainly is an additional advantage. I think even though the research in Defense Department is $7 billion a year, this is pretty rich for my blood.

Chairman PASTORE. The argument that is being made by Hickenlooper, isn't that the argument made by Dr. Seaborg, essentially?

Dr. BROWN. Not quite. I think he was thinking in terms of advancing the technology. I would find it hard to believe that you have to build an aircraft carrier and man it and fly airplanes off it to advance nuclear technology. I think that to the extent that this gives you experience in tactics, and I think new tactics may be the heart of this question, that I support very strongly.

Chairman PASTORE. Don't you think it would be important at this time to determine whether we could get the same efficiency, the same maneuverability, the same flexibility with our four reactors as against eight, with the same power? Don't you think that is important.?

Dr. BROWN. I am not sure that you have to build a carrier to find that out.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Just a minute, Doctor. There is an automobile made, a new model, a radical change, there is not one made that is perfect on the drawing board or in the theory. The only way they prove them is put them on the road and road-test them and let the public test them.

Dr. BROWN. They don't do it with one and I hope we never have to build as many carriers as we do automobiles to find the answer to that question.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think there is a little thimblerigging in that argument.

Dr. BROWN. Which one, sir?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, perhaps mine, perhaps yours, but certainly in yours, I will admit.