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period, manning scales, job descriptions, and wage scales have been developed to satisfy every interested regulatory agency, labor org nization, and sponsor, both in the United States and, in some instan abroad.

New, rigid standards of safety for nuclear merchant ships have been established and achieved as mandatory operating conditions. Much has been learned about manning of nuclear-powered merchant ships, including selection of prospective officer candidates, tra Ling, licensing, disposition, capability, and habitability questions associated with complex environs.

A new and vigorous approach to ship mechanization was behg developed by counterparts involved in the construction and operatin of conventional fossil-fired vessels at the same time that the Saranth manning was being worked out.

Although there are many areas that will require definition on the part of the regulatory agencies, there is adequate precedent for the development of an acceptable manning scale consistent with the required objectives.

The ability to train licensed officers in the disciplines that will be required has been demonstrated on both the mechanized and nucleartype vessels currently in service.

There remains the unresolved and potential utilization problems of seagoing personnel that are affiliated with labor unions under contract to the majority of American-flag shipowners. This question quires immediate attention and resolution in order that all major US steamship companies will be free to consider adding high-speed, mclear-powered, commercially competitive vessels to their fleet.

It would be premature to positively identify the specific manning requirements of a nuclear vessel or to assign a specific dollar value to the wages that might be involved; however, it is justifiable to assure that the numbers involved should be competitive with present-day and future manning requirements as they apply to new mechanized fossil-fueled ships.

Prior to entering into a contract to construct any near-term nuclearpowered ship, it will be necessary for labor, management, and the Government to consolidate efforts and develop the precedents and procedures to properly staff such a ship.

CHAPTER VII.—SAFETY, LICENSING, AND

INDEMNIFICATION

INTRODUCTION

the construction and operation of any ship, due cognizance must ken of the considerations of safety, licensing, and indemnificaWith nuclear ships some not-so-familiar requirements must be 1. Any nuclear powerplant, if improperly designed or operated, d result in the accidental release of radioactive fission products h could cause hazards to living organisms in the vicinity of the t. Widespread use of nuclear power to generate electricity, in this try and abroad, is testimony, however, to the general belief that, gh proper design and operating practices, any hazards associated nuclear powerplant operation can be reduced to acceptable levels. o this time, there has not been a single radiation accident resulting ost-time injury in a licensed U.S. power reactor facility. Further, scussed in greater detail below, the nuclear ship Savannah has operated in and out of some of the busiest ports of the world and ained widespread acceptance by the host governments.

following paragraphs delineate the safety, licensing, and inification problems that will be encountered in the construction peration of a nuclear merchant fleet. These problems are signfiIn their technical difficulty and in their economic impact.

SUMMARY

Derience with the NS Savannah has proved that nuclear ships can erated safely and the required licenses can be obtained. No memthe public or the Savannah's crew has received any exposure to ion sufficient to cause a measurable health detriment as a result 3 Savannah operations. Advances in the design technology and nt-prevention control can be expected to keep abreast of larger and growth in number of ships.

prospects for, and the need of extending some form of Governsponsored indemnification to nuclear ships should be further red.

SAVANNAH" EXPERIENCE-HIGHLIGHTS RELATED TO SAFETY AND LICENSING

rtly after the NS Savannah program was initiated, in 1956, the k & Wilcox Co. was selected as the supplier of the nuclear powt. Reactors in operation at that time were either small, located mote site, or were in the military program-the Shippingport esden reactors were still under construction.

ore the Savannah's containment vessel was built it was assumed sleak rate at 30 pounds per square inch gage would be less than

0.2 percent of the contained volume per day. Early tests, at least on one occasion, showed leak rates over 10 percent per day. After considerable modification of penetrations, a leak rate of about 0.7 percent per day at 60 pounds per square inch gage can be demonstrated at any time today. This is substantially lower than the approved technics! specifications of 1.2 percent per day at 60 pounds per square inch gage. Today when the reactor is operating, the compartment is always maintained at a negative pressure and all air exhausted from the conpartment is filtered through a sophisticated six-stage filter designed to remove particulate matter and radioactive halogen gases that could leak from the containment vessel after a major accident. A dual-fa. dual-filter system which can be powered by the emergency power system guarantees system dependability.

Originally, the only propulsion equipment other than main plant permanently installed was a nonreversible, low-starting torque, tak home motor. Its only intended purpose was for return of the ship to port in case of a loss of power. That take-home motor has been upgraded and now has a high-starting torque, is reversible, and has been demonstrated to be capable of moving the ship clear of its pier.

System modifications and operating principles of the Savannah are rigidly controlled by documents approved by the AEC regulatory staf. These are the technical specifications and the port operation criteria. The technical specifications serve to assure that plant equipment is maintained and operated in a safe manner. The port operation criteria specify the procedures that must be followed in bringing the ship into densely populated port areas.

Prior to August 1965, the NS Savannah was operated under the demonstration program by the AEC-Maritime Administration Joitt Group. Such operation was authorized, from the safety viewpoint, by various AEC memorandums and authorizations, the U.S. Coast Guard. the American Bureau of Shipping, and the U.S. Public Heath Service. Since August 1965, the Savannah has been operated com mercially under Bareboat Charter by First Atomic Ship Transport Inc. (FAST), under AEC operating license NS-1 and appropriate authorizations by other regulatory bodies.

Since initial sea trials in March 1962, the Savannah has visited 55 ports in 14 countries. The only port that has denied entrance to the Savannah is Istanbul, Turkey. That denial is considered the result of political and not technical considerations.

Today the ship operates commercially in and out of many ports in the world. On the basis of Savannah experience, it appears that future nuclear ships can operate safely and receive the required licenses.

ACCIDENT CONSEQUENCE CONTROL ON FUTURE SHIPS

It appears likely that future nuclear ships may have higher horsepower plants than does the NS Savannah. Strides made in the technology of accident prevention and contro since the Savannah was designed and built are expected to offset any associated increase in potential hazards. Pressure-reduction systems integral to containment

vessel designs may prevent high pressures in the containment vessel after a major primary system rupture. This concept is now in use at the Humboldt Bay electric powerplant. Seals now are used in electrical containment penetrations which permit virtually zero leakage.

On a future ship design, the designer would have a full appreciation for the value of the reactor compartment and exhaust system as an engineered safeguard. The compartment and its exhaust system can be designed to afford maximum integrity and reliability.

Experience with the Savannah has shown the value of including an auxiliary propulsion system. It is desirable for ultimate safety of the ship and possible port operations to have an adequate auxiliary

power source.

AEC LICENSING OF FUTURE SHIPS

At present in addition to a construction permit, an operating license is required by the AEC for all reactors. The nature of this license and requirements therefore are described in part 50, title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Briefly, the major requirements for such a license are the submittal and acceptance of a thorough analysis of the plant features and the plant operating procedures. The analysis must show that the plant can be operated as proposed without undue hazard to the health and safety of the public. Such licenses have been issued to the Savannah, to about 20 nuclear electric powerplants, and to several score of small reactor facilities.

SOLAS CONVENTION REQUIREMENTS

In May and June of 1960, an International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) met in London, England. At that convention representatives of the United States and 39 other governments agreed upon certain regulations related to safety of life at sea. The regulations adopted were transmitted to the Senate in the President's message to the Senate dated April 27, 1961. The resulting treaty was ratified by the U.S. Senate on April 12, 1962, and became effective May 26, 1965. Chapter VIII of those regulations applies specifically to nuclear ships. All other chapters apply to both nuclear and conventional ships. The regulations prescribe a ship safety certificate for nuclear ships. A 1960 SOLAS Convention safety certificate was issued to the Savannah on July 1, 1965.

Generally, the regulations of chapter VIII of the SOLAS Convention do not result in requirements over and above those already made by the U.S. Coast Guard and the Atomic Energy Commission. Chapter VIII of the SOLAS Convention requires that a document entitled "Safety Assessment" be prepared and submitted to those countries where the ship is engaged in international commerce.

REGULATIONS AFFECTING MANNING

Manning of future nuclear ships will be determined by economic considerations, labor union policies, U.S. Coast Guard regulations, and AEC regulations. All but the latter are common to both nuclear and conventional ships and therefore will not be discussed here. Pertinent AEC regulations include the following:

AEC regulations contained in 10 CFR 50.54 (i), (j), (k), (1), and (m) require that

(1) Reactors must be operated only by licensed

operators.

(2) Individuals designated to direct the licensed activities of licensed reactor operators must be licensed as senior reactor operators.

(3) A licensed operator or senior operator must be present ai the controls of the reactor at all times during operation of the facility. AEC regulations contained in 10 CFR 20 set forth standards for protection against radiation exposure. While these standards do not include specific manning requirements, they make i: necessary that personnel with health physics training be available. These personnel assume responsibility for preventing the occurrence of radiation exposures, managing activities subsequent to any inadvertent releases of radioactive materials and maintaining records.

REFUELING SAFETY AND LICENSING CONSIDERATIONS

The NS Savannah has not yet been refueled. A number of naval reactors and a number of electric-power-producing reactors have been refueled. Therefore, the technology is understood; it is believed that refueling can be performed safely; and electric power nuclear plants have been licensed for such activities. Equipment and facilities have been provided at Galveston, Tex., for refueling the Savannah and it is planned that this facility will be licensed to conduct refueling activities many years before any future ships will be ready for refueling.

It is foreseeable that future nuclear ships can be refueled at the same Galveston facility with only minor modifications to the facility being required.

NUCLEAR INDEMNIFICATION-THIRD PARTY LIABILITY

Essential to any program for construction and operation of nuclear ships will be adequate financial protection against nuclear incidents in the form of insurance or governmental protection or both. New legis lation would be required to provide governmental indemnification. In considering new legislation, it would be important to give thought to the terms and conditions which might be imposed by ports outside the United States for the entry of foreign nuclear ships.

Nuclear indemnity protection against liability incident to the design, development, construction, operation, repair, and maintenance or use of the NS Savannah was authorized under special amendment to the Price-Anderson Act (sec. 170(1) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (72 Stat. 525)). The application to the Savannah of the Price-Anderson indemnity concept (originally designed for landbased reactors in the United States) was not considered a precedent for future nuclear ships. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy indicated in its report that they were recommending the extension of Price-Anderson to cover the Savannah because of possible roadblocks in the ship's operation and to provide adequate protection to the public.

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