FOREWORD In the 88th Congress, second session, the Committee on Commerce issued a committee print entitled "The Growing Strength of the Soviet Merchant Fleet." That study was prepared at my request by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress, under the direction of Mr. Leon M. Herman, Senior Specialist in Soviet Economics. It disclosed a rapid and systematic strengthening of the U.S.S.R. fleet, and clearly demonstrated the great disparity between the Soviet Union and the United States with respect to the priority placed upon development of a strong merchant marine. There is no question that the U.S. merchant marine has continued to deteriorate since publication of the earlier committee print and that revitalization of our fleet has become of even greater necessity. Because of the vital importance of upgrading our fleet and the evidence of a greatly expanded Soviet marine effort disclosed in the earlier report, I requested the Library of Congress to prepare an updated study on the Soviet merchant marine. This new report, entitled "The Soviet Drive for Maritime Power," well documents the current extensive Soviet maritime effort and most dramatically adds a new dimension to the arguments for revitalizing the U.S. merchant marine. Foreword.. CONTENTS 1. The situation on the eve of the current expansion campaign. III. Economic pressures behind the Soviet maritime boom_ B. The petroleum export boom... C. Two-way grain shipments.. D. Sugar trade.. IV. The political pressures for greater maritime strength_ 2. Increased movement of Soviet armament shipments. B. The role of the fleet in the Defense Establishment_ 4. The quest for national prestige. V. New ships on the horizon. A. Russian shipyards.. B. Foreign shipyards. 1. Orders placed with Japan 2. From East Germany. 3. From Poland.. 4. From Yugoslav yards. 5. From Finland....... C. The Soviet Union as a ship exporter. VI. The economic cost of the Soviet drive to the sea_ A. A high-investment industry. B. A high-wage industry. C. A highly cost-conscious industry. II. The maritime policy of the U.S.S.R II. Shape of future Soviet maritime growth. A. In the forefront of maritime powers. B. Toward greater earnings, prestige, and power nclusion.... (V) Page III 1 3 5 5 7 10 10 11 12 12 14 15 17 18 19 19 20 22 22 23 23 23 24 25 25 25 26 27 31 31 32 33 THE SOVIET DRIVE FOR MARITIME POWER (By Leon M. Herman, Senior Specialist in Soviet Economics, Senior Specialists Division) The U.S.S.R. has emerged as one of the fastest growing major maritime nations in the world today. The merchant fleet sailing under the Soviet flag has doubled in tonnage during the 5-year period 1961-65. By the end of the current decade, moreover, this fleet is scheduled to expand by another 50 percent; namely, from 9.5 to 14 million deadweight tons. In the meantime, new additions to the Soviet merchant navy are proceeding at the rate of over 1 million deadweight tons a year. Thus, within a matter of a single decade of sustained growth at a forced pace, the Soviet Union has projected itself dramatically from a position of obscurity in the realm of ocean shipping to take its place as the sixth leading maritime nation in the world. Known ships on order for the U.S.S.R. today stand at 4.7 million deadweight tons, roughly on par with Japan. In regard to outstanding orders for dry-cargo vessels, the Soviet Union is now leading all competitors, with an aggregate figure of 2.5 million deadweight tons, or 28 percent of all world ships on order in this category. I. THE SITUATION ON THE EVE OF THE CURRENT EXPANSION CAMPAIGN During the years immediately following World War II, the U.S.S.R. evinced little interest in developing its maritime shipping capabilities, preferring instead to seek an outlet for its ambitions as a leading nation-state through the more familiar channels of military and industrial strength. As late as 1955, the U.S.S.R. still appeared to cope with its complex transportation problems primarily in the characteristic manner of a huge land power. The transport system of the country continued to be dependent upon the railways, which carried 80 to 85 percent of all freight. By contrast, maritime transport still accounted for only 5.1 percent of the total freight burden generated in the national economy as recently as a decade ago. As far as the outside world was concerned, the Soviet merchant marine was a wholly unknown quantity in maritime shipping during the first decade following World War II. Its merchant fleet was engaged chiefly in coastwise transport operations. Domestic cargoes accounted for two-thirds of the freight burden carried by sea transport. The fleet itself was a patchwork affair, made up of antiquated vessels of both domestic and foreign origin, partly of ships acquired from the United States under the wartime lend-lease program, and partly of tonnage expropriated from various sources as war "reparations.' As new ships began to be acquired after the end of the war, the domestic shipyards could make only a minor contribution, supplying only 29.6 percent of total new tonnage during the years 1946-50. |