that they must become familiar with the principles of the law; and they will reply that they have no time for that, they are so occupied with their cases. They have learned their A B C's, and have got over into the pictures.
Now, the study of cases, as they arise in practice, is not to be neglected. But he who does no more will never manage his cases well, nor advise well in them-never. He may think he does. He may think, when he pockets his client's money, that he gets it by no false pretences; and his client may never learn the cheat. To be sure, if, in a particular case, he succeeds, that is all that is necessary. But if he loses, the difficulty may, and often does, lie in a mistake of which he never becomes conscious. So, if he he wins, it may be by another's folly, not his own wisdom.
The "short" way to become eminent in legal knowledge, is to study perseveringly legal principles. He who will not employ this means, need never hope to see this end.
intended for the use of Students in Second American from the Second
Principles of the Law of Personal Property, Conveyancing. By Joshua Williams, Esq. English edition. With Notes and References to the latest American Decisions, by Benjamin Gerhard and Samuel Wetherill. Philadelphia: T. & J. W. Johnson. 1855. 8vo, pp. 484.
Mr. Williams' two treatises on personal and real property have been regarded, both in England and this country, with very great favor. The author has a most satisfactory style of composition. Clear and concise, and at the same time accurate and full, he gives in a reasonable space all the doctrines and decisions of the subject of which he treats.
The present edition of the work on Personal Property is enriched by the very learned and able notes of Messrs. Gerhard and Wetherill. These notes show the greatest thoroughness in research, and the most conscientious care in the citation of authorities. The learned editors seem to have spared no pains to render their labors as complete and useful as possible. They have made the book, indeed, most valuable "to the American profession, both as an elementary composition for the student, and as a book of reference to the practitioner." The character of the notes may be
judged of, by the statement of the editors that "more than thirty-five hundred cases have been referred to in them; and in almost every instance where a citation has been made, the original book has been consulted, and, when practicable, the opinions of the judges have been quoted, rather than the syllabus of the reporter of their decisions, or any abstracts of such judgments." Edited in such a manner, Williams on Personal Property cannot fail to become a standard work in this country.
Independently, however, of its merits as a text book, it has peculiar claims to attention, as a very successful attempt to supply a want which has begun to be seriously felt. While there are many admirable treatises upon separate branches of the law of personal property, there have been hitherto none of substantial value which, treating the subject as a whole, have brought its general doctrines into relation, and presented them in a systematic and logical form. The result of this has been, that lawyers, compelled in most cases to study each branch in an independent manner, have come to lose sight of many important analogies; and a painful want of unity in the various parts, has been produced. No one who will turn over the pages of any general work on the common law, can fail to be struck with this. Within the boundaries of real estate, all is connected and logical enough, but when he passes to the province of personal property, he finds only a series of treatises on topics whose relation seems scarcely more than that of arbitrary juxtaposition. Mr. Williams' book must be regarded as an important step towards a more scientific development of the subject.
A Treatise on the Law of Executors and Administrators. By Edward Vaughan Williams. Fourth American, from the last London edition. With Notes and References to American Authorities, by Asa I. Fish. Two vols. Philadelphia: R. H. Small. 1855.
Williams on Executors is a book which it is unnecessary to praise. It has already become a legal classic. Admirable in its thoroughness and accuracy, it occupies the field without a rival. A fourth American edition shows that its merits are fully appreciated on this side of the Atlantic. Mr. Fish's notes are full and careful, and adapt this work to the necessities of the profession in the United States. The book is well printed and got up, and presents a handsome exterior.
1. The County Courts of this State (Texas) may grant letters of limited
administration upon the estates of deceased persons. This power existed
under the Act of 1794, ch. 1, 47, and is clearly created and defined as to
the estates of non-resident decedents, by the Acts of 1842, chs 69 and 165.
But such special administration does not prevent a grant of the general
administration in a proper case to a different person; and the two adminis-
trations may well subsist together. Jordan vs. Polk,
2. A limited administration, as contemplated by the laws of this State,
is not within the letter or spirit of the law prescribing to whom the general
administration shall be granted. The next of kin or creditors cannot claim
a right to special administration, if occupying an antagonistic relation to
those who represent the deceased So, where the deceased, a non-resident,
had no estate in the limits of this State, except the subject of a suit which
he was prosecuting at the time of his death against his brother, it was no
error in the County Court to refuse the general or special administration
to such brother, and confer the special administration upon an indifferent
person. Ibid.
ADMIRALTY.
See Collision-Lien.
Passenger Act, Ship, 1-4.
Coal barges, being large rough trunks or boxes, made merely for trans-
porting coals, and usually sold for lumber at the end of the voyage, and
not having any coasting license, are not the subject of admiralty juris-
diction. Jones vs. Cincinnati Coal Company,
1. Where stock sold by an avowed owner, dealing as owner, turns out
afterwards to be spurious and void, by reason of its having been illegally
issued, the purchaser may recover back the price paid, though the seller
was ignorant of his want of title. Ketchum vs. Bank of Commerce of New
York.
2. A pledgee of stock on collateral security, with power to sell at public
or private sale without notice, and to assign coupled with a blank power
for that purpose, who has actually transferred the stock into his own name,
stands as to third persons in the light of owner, though himself still subject,
it seems, to the pledgor's right to redeem; and is therefore liable to an
action by a purchaser from him for the price paid, in case the stock turns
out spurious. Ibid.
3. The principles which govern a common law partnership, are in general
applicable to a Joint Stock Company, whether incorporated or not, except
so far as modified by statute, or special rules of law. The introduction of
new members into such association can, hence, be only authorized by joint
consent; but this consent may be exercised either on each special occasion,
or may be delegated to a particular, without power to redelegate it to an
individual. The issue of certificates of stock in such association, being the
introduction thereinto, of new partners, falls within this principle. Ibid.
4. Held on the construction of the charter of the New York and New
Haven Rail Road Company, that a resolution of the Board of Directors of
that company, by which Robert Schuyler was appointed "transfer agent"
of its certificates of stock, was a valid delegation of power, and that cer-
tificates of stock issued by Schuyler as such agent were binding on the
Company. Ibid.
5. The limitation of the amount of capital stock of the Company, in its
charter, held not to prohibit the Board of Directors, nor their agent thus
appointed, as regards third persons, from increasing the number of shares
of stock, beyond the proportion between their par value and the capital
stock. Ibid.
6. The registration of certificates of stock in the books of the Company,
though made a pre-requisite to the right of voting or of exercising any
control in the management of the Company, is not necessary to a valid
title in the stock itself: and so the absence of a power to transfer will not
affect the rights of a bona fide purchaser of a certificate of stock; he would
thereby only become the equitable instead of the legal holder, but with the
right to procure a transfer on the books of the Company. Ibid.
7. Where a transfer agent appointed by the Directors of an Incorporated
Joint Stock Company, has fraudulently over issued stock, a director taking
such stock directly from the agent is chargeable with constructive notice,
especially where the fraud would have been discoverable by an inspection
of the books of the Company. But this does not apply, where he purchases
from a bona fide holder; and query, whether such constructive notice would
affect a firm of which the director was a member. Ibid.
See Equity. 2.
ATTACHMENT.
1. Our foreign attachment is a procedure in rem, and a sale of chattels
under it passes the title clear of all liens, and the claims of the lien holders
attaches to the proceeds, which will be distributed according to the rights
of all. Carryl vs. Taylor,
2. Where chattels are sold as perishable, under a foreign attachment,
the whole title is transferred, and all claimants and lien holders must come
in and claim against the proceeds before distribution. Ibid.
3. Practice where property attached is claimed by a third person. Ibid.
BILL OF EXCHANGE.
1. The vendor of a bill of exchange, though not a party to the bill, is
responsible for the genuineness of the instrument; and if the name of one
of the parties is a forgery, and the bill becomes valueless, the vendee is
entitled to recover the price. Gurney vs. Womersley,
502
2. The defendants, who were bill brokers, having received from A. a bill
of exchange drawn and endorsed by him, for the purpose of being dis-
counted took it to the plaintiffs, who were money lenders, with whom the
defendants had previously had dealings: they declined to endorse or guar-
antee it, and the plaintiffs, upon the credit of the acceptance, discounted it.
There were separate notes between A. and the defendants, and the defend-
ants and the plaintiffs; and the rate of discount charged by the defendants
to A. was higher than that charged by the plaintiffs to the defendants.
The acceptance was forged by A., and the bill was valueless. Held, that
the defendants having been found by the jury to have dealt with the bill as
principals, the plaintiffs were entitled to recover the sum paid to the de-
fendants upon the discount of the bill. I bid.
The bona fide holder of railroad bonds, having no notice of any defect in
the title of the seller, has a perfect title to them, clear of all equities between
the company and seller. The Morris Canal and Banking Co., Appellants,
and Fisher, Appellee,
See Lien. 1-4.
CALIFORNIA.
See Land Law. 1-4.
1. A common carrier, or other bailee for the transportation of property,
must permit the consignee, if he requests it, to examine the cargo at the
place of delivery, before he can demand his freight. Ishames. Greenham. 498
2. The duties of the carrier, and consignee, are correlative: the one to
deliver, and the other to pay the freight; both are mutual acts. Ibid.
3. Where the carrier demands a larger sum than that which is stipulated
by contract, and refuses to deliver the property at the place of its destina-
tion until such additional sum is paid, he may be sued in tort for the con-
version. Ibid.
4. Where the carrier refuses to receive any sum less than the whole
amount he thus claims, and the consignee offers to pay the sum stipulated
in the contract, no formal tender of that sum is required from the con-
signee: the law in such a case will not ask him to do a vain thing. Ibid.
5. A railway company, as common carriers of passengers and their lug-
gage, are bound, on the arrival of a train at the terminus of the journey,
to deliver a passenger's luggage into a carriage to be conveyed from their
station, if required so to do, and if such is their usual practice. Affirm-
ing Richards vs. The London and South Coast Railway Company. Butch-
er vs. The London and South-Western Railway Company.
6. Therefore, where a passenger on the arrival of the train got out of
the railway carriage on to the platform with a part of his luggage, a small
hand-bag, in his hand, which he gave to one of the company's porters to
take to a cab, and the porter lost it, the company were held liable as for a
non-delivery of the bag; it not being found by the jury that the passenger,
by taking the bag into his own possession on the platform, had accepted
that as a performance of the company's contract to deliver, according to
their usual practice, into a cab. Ibid.
7. A declaration, setting out nothing but a general or ordinary engage-
ment by the defendants as common carriers, is not supported by proof of a
contract, containing a special exception of the liability of the defendants
for any loss which may arise from "the damage of the river, fire, and un-
avoidable accident." In such case, the plaintiff must be nonsuited on
the ground of variance between pleadings and proofs. Davidson vs.
Graham.
291
8. Such special exception to the defendant's liability may be lawfully
created by special contract between the parties, though it cannot be made
by general notice, known or unknown to the party engaging the services
|