an injunction." Judge Story lays down the rule thus: in order to give the jurisdiction, he says, "there must be such an injury as from its nature is not susceptible of being adequately compensated by damages at law, or such as, from its continuance or permanent mischief, must occasion a constantly recurring grievance, which cannot be otherwise prevented but by an injunction." 2 Story Eq. Jur. § 925.

These principles fully justify the relief sought in this case. The inundations occasioned by the erection of the dam, the injuries thereby caused to the complainant's lands, and the periodical destruction of his timber, did not constitute a single trespass, but, from their nature, must have been "constantly recurring grievances." It would have been unreasonable and oppressive to force the complainant into a court of law to redress each repetition of the injury as it might recur from time to time; and therefore, on the very principle of "suppressing interminable litigation," and of "preventing multiplicity of suits," courts of equity alone can give just and adequate relief in such cases.

2. The appellant urges that the complainant was not entitled to an injunction on the ground of a public nuisance, because a private individual cannot come into a Court of Equity for relief from a public nuisance, unless he avers and proves some special injury; and that there is no such averment in this case. He contends, that the proper mode of proceeding is by indictment at law, or by information in equity, at the suit of the Attorney-General or the State. We do not think these positions well founded.

An indictment could only result in an abatement of the nuisance after it had been committed. It could not prevent the mischief arising from it before the indictment could be tried and the judgment carried into execution. That remedy would, therefore, be inadequate.

As to the right of the complainant to seek the relief, the bill states, that the health of the neighborhood would be greatly injured by the stagnation of water produced by the dam, and it shows that the complainant's lands lay within a short distance of it, and would be affected by it. His property, therefore, as a place of residence,

or as a plantation and abode of slaves, must necessarily have been injured; and this must strike the mind almost as forcibly as if it had been distinctly alleged in the bill, that this cause of disease would extend to him or his family or slaves, or would diminish the market value of his lands. But it appears, by the proof, that he resides upon the lands; so that it sufficiently appears he was subject to the evil complained of. It is well settled, that a private individual may obtain an injunction to prevent a public mischief, by which he is affected in common with others. Eden on Inj. 267. Judge Story says, a Court of Equity will interfere in such cases, "upon the application of private parties directly affected by the nuisance." 2 Story, Eq. Jur., § 924; 12 Peters, 98.

But here the matter is not only presented as a public nuisance, but it is also alleged that a special injury, apart from the mischief to the public health, would be sustained by the complainant, in the damage to his lands and timber. This will justify a private indi vidual in seeking relief for a public nuisance producing special injury to himself. Crowder vs. Tinkler, 19 Ves., 622; 12 Peters, 98.

No objection is made to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict, and it must be taken as correct and to support the allegations of the bill.

We are therefore of opinion that there is no error in the decree, and it must be affirmed.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

In the District Court of the United States, in and for the District of

Maryland.

HENRY KENDEPT vs. BARQUE THEODORE KORNER.

Libel in rem for seaman's wages.

The libellant was a citizen of Bremen, to which place the barque belonged. The libellant came to this port in another vessel belonging to Bremen, and was transferred from said vessel in this port, to the barque

Theodore Korner, to go a voyage to the Chincha Islands and elsewhere. On the return of the barque to this port, the libellant left her, and filed this libel to recover his wages. The District Court (Judge Giles) decided that by the terms of the treaty between our government and the Free Hanseatic Towns, this Court had no jurisdiction of the case; that the libellant must apply to the Consul for Bremen at this port, who is clothed with jurisdiction in all cases of dispute between masters of vessels and seamen, where the parties are citizens of Bremen.

The Circuit Court (Chief Justice Taney) affirmed this decree.

In the Circuit Court of the United States, in and for the District of Maryland.

THE UNITED STATES vs. THE BRIG NEPTUNE AND OWNERS.

This was a libel in rem filed against the vessel, and in personam against the captain and owners, to enforce the penaltics of the Act of 1848, passed in reference to passenger vessels.

The District Court (Judge Giles) decided that the said penalties could only be recovered by an action of debt on the common law side of the Court, and not by libel; and that the penaltics were personal; and there was no lien on the vessel, and no remedy in rem, to enforce them.

Decree affirmed on both points on appeal, by the Circuit Court, (Chief Justice Taney.)

In the Superior Court of Chancery of Mississippi. June Sessions. Jackson, 1854.

JAMES L. CALCOTE vs. FREDERICK STANTON AND HENRY S. BUCKNER.

Per GLENN, Special Chancellor.

1. Choses in Action-Assignment.-The fact that a claim is disputed, will not forbid its transfer or assignment, nor will public policy avoid such a sale because it may become necessary in the assignee to set aside the fraud of the debtor, in order to effectuate his purchase.

The points decided in this case are here presented. The opinion was so long that we have been compelled to give the points only, carefully prepared by the Special Chancellor, Hon. D. C. Glenn, to whom our readers are indebted for this and other valuable contributions.-EDS. LAW REG.

1

2. Champerty-Maintenance.-The doctrine of Champerty and Maintenance is now only applied to the purchase of controverted titles, productive of naked litigation among persons claiming the same thing by differ ent titles, and is only enforced in cases where there is an adverse right claimed under an independent title, not in privity with the assignor or seller, and not under a disputed right claimed in privity or under a trust for the assignor or seller.

3. Estoppel.-Where A publicly and on record admits himself indebted to B in a sum certain, and B in the same manner states the same fact, and upon such statement C parts with his money or other valuable thing in purchase of the debt, upon settled principles of justice A and B are estopped from denying the existence of this debt in the hands of C or his assignee.

4. Partnerships-Bankruptcy-Creditors.-When the same parties composed three distinct firms, at different places and under different names, the three firms were entirely separate and distinct from each other, and kept their business, books and accounts accordingly, upon the bankruptcy of all the firms, held, that the social creditors of one firm, in a Court of Equity, could enforce payment of a stated amount or balance due it from the other firms.

5. Rule in Equity as to Partnerships.-In Equity, all contracts and dealings between such firms of a moral and legal nature are deemed obligatory, though void at law; and in all such cases, Equity looks behind the form of transactions to their substance, and treats the different firms for purposes of substantial justice exactly as if they were composed of strangers or were in fact corporate companies.

6. Equity-Jurisdiction-Assignment.-(1.) Wherever a remedy is more full and complete in Equity than at Law, or from the subject-matter: of a suit or the circumstances surrounding it, more full and perfect relief: can be had in Equity than at Law, Equity will take Jurisdiction.

(2.) Where an equitable interest in a chose in action is vested in the holder by assignment, his rights will be enforced in Equity if there is no legal remedy, or the remedy at law is a doubtful or a difficult one.

(3.) Courts of Equity are not ousted of an original jurisdiction. because the same has been answered by Courts of Law, or has been conferred upon the latter by statute.

7. Certificate of Bankruptcy-Fraud.-Bankruptcy is pleadable in bar to all actions and in all Courts, and this bar may be avoided wherever it is interposed, by showing fraud in the procurement of the discharge.

8. Bankrupt Law of 1841-Fraud.-A creditor of any class, whether he has or has not proved his claim against the bankrupt, whether he has or has not participated in the bankrupt proceedings, is not barred from suit or recovery on his claim when he can show that the discharge was fraudulently obtained, and that the bar is a nullity; Provided, he was ignorant of the fraud, and there were no circumstances which would justly put him upon inquiry, and he has not delayed action too long after coming to a knowledge of the fraud.

9. Fifth Section-No Bar in case of Fraud.-The 5th Section of the Act of 1841 did not intend that the proving of claims by creditors should effect an absolute abandonment of all claims against the future acquisitions of the debtor, but simply a waiver of all right of such creditor in Law or Equity, inconsistent with the bankrupt proceedings, in case the bankrupt should obtain a discharge which was not "impeachable for some fraud or wilful concealment of his property."

10. Law of 1841-Effect on Creditors.-The Bankrupt Law of 1841 was a legislative confiscation of existing rights for the benefit of the debtor, with the privilege to the creditor to avoid the same for fraud on the part of the bankrupt when it became known to him.

11. Statute of Limitations-Law and Equity.-Courts of law are bound by the statute of limitations, and Equity also regards it, except in cases of fraud and pure trust, yet Courts of Equity are not within the statute, and never permit a plea thereof when conscience would be violated.

12. Fraud-Concealment-Equity-Limitations.-In cases where the party by fraud has kept concealed the rights of complainant, and has thereby delayed him in the assertion of those rights, lapse of time ought not upon principles of justice be admitted to repel relief. On the contrary, it would seem that the length of time during which the fraud has been successfully concealed and practised, is rather an aggravation of the offence, and calls more loudly upon a Court of Equity to grant ample and decisive relief.