creditor shall enter his appearance," etc., but were entitled to join in the same specification. 3. SAME-AFFIDAVITS-SUFFICIENCY. Affidavits to specifications of objection to a bankrupt's discharge, sworn to "to the best of affiant's knowledge, information, and belief," were sufficiently verified. 4. SAME-FAILURE TO KEEP BOOKS OF ACCOUNT. A specification of objection to bankrupts' discharge, that such bankrupts, with intent to conceal their financial condition, destroyed, concealed, or failed to keep books of account or records from which such condition might be ascertained, was not sufficiently specific. 5. SAME CONCEALMENT OF MERCHANDISE. A specification of objection to bankrupts' discharge alleging that, within four months immediately preceding the filing of the petition, the bankrupts transferred, removed, destroyed, or concealed their property, with intent to defraud their creditors, in that, about a week prior to the filing of the petition, and at other times, they concealed large quantities of merchandise in a certain house, with intent to hinder, delay, and defraud their creditors, and thereafter, on a day specified, removed and concealed other large quantities of merchandise from their place of business with like intent, was sufficient. In Bankruptcy. Motion to Dismiss Specifications of Objection to Discharge. Henry N. Wessel, for bankrupts. Keator & Johnson and Reber & Downs, for objecting creditors. J. B. MCPHERSON, District Judge. One ground of complaint against these specifications of objection to the bankrupts' discharge is that they are signed and sworn to by attorneys in fact and in law, and not by the creditors themselves. I cordially agree to the proposition that affidavits of agents and attorneys are usually objectionable, and should be discouraged. The practice of this court forbids them ordinarily, and I have no intention of relaxing the rule on this subject; but exceptional circumstances occur when they seem to be necessary, and I think this is such a case. Clause 9 of section 1 (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 544 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3419]) recognizes the possibility of such a situation by providing that "creditor' shall include anyone who owns a demand or claim provable in bankruptcy, and may include his duly authorized agent, attorney or proxy." The specifications are also attacked because they are signed by four creditors, acting by their attorneys; the argument being that objections to a discharge can only be made by a creditor acting singly. This contention rests largely on the grammar of order No. 32-"A creditor *** shall enter his appearance," etc. It seem needless to take up much time over this argument. If two or more creditors see fit to adopt the same objections, I can see no reason why they may not reach that result by signing the same paper, for they could certainly do so by signing separate copies of the original. Their action is equivalent to the execution of as many copies of the specifications as there are signers, and each signer is individually liable for his own act. There is nothing joint about the paper. It is simply a device to avoid the multiplication of copies. 14 See Bankruptcy, vol. 6, Cent. Dig. § 714. Neither do I see any force in the objection to the affidavits because they declare that the facts are true "to the best of [affiants'] knowledge, information, and belief." This phrase is objected to as vague and uncertain, and in some connections it may perhaps deserve these epithets. Usually, however, it is as far as any man should be asked to go in taking an oath-the instances are infrequent, I think, when an assertion that facts are true can be properly made without qualification of any kind-and the Supreme Court of the United States has thought the phrase to be unobjectionable, as may be seen by examining the affidavit to form No. 2. No doubt, it was expected that this affidavit would ordinarily be taken by a principal; but, if the principal is permitted to be thus cautious, I think that his agent, who is only allowed to take his place under exceptional circumstances, ought not to be obliged to assume a heavier burden. The first specification, however, is plainly insufficient. It is merely a general statement, following the language of the act (chapter 541, § 14b, 30 Stat. 550 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3427]), "that said bankrupts have, with intent to conceal their financial condition, destroyed, concealed, or failed to keep books of account, or records from which such condition might be ascertained." This has been so often decided to be bad, that nothing more need be said upon the subject. But the second specification, in my opinion, is sufficiently specific. It declares: "That said bankrupts have, within a time subsequent to the first day of the four months immediately preceding the filing of the petition against them, transferred, removed, destroyed, or concealed, or permitted to be removed, destroyed, or concealed, their property, with intent to hinder, delay, and defraud their creditors, in this: that said bankrupts did on or about December 1, 1903, or about one week prior to the filing of the petition against them, and at other times, remove and conceal large quantities of their merchandise to the house of Leon Wiesen, No. 529 N. Sixth street, in the city of Philadelphia, with the intent to hinder, delay, and defraud their creditors; and in this: that said bankrupts did further, on the 19th day of November, 1903, and at other times, remove and conceal, or permit to be removed and concealed, large quantities of merchandise, consisting of toys, notions, and pens, from their place of business, at 303 Market street, Philadelphia, with the intent to hinder, delay, and defraud their creditors." This is definite enough to advise the bankrupts clearly what they may expect to meet, and, if they receive information of that quality, they are treated as fairly as the bankrupt act requires. As it seems to me, to compel nicety of pleading in specifications of objections to a discharge is more likely to lead to the escape of dishonest men from their liabilities, than to protect honest debtors from the spiteful attack of disappointed creditors. The clerk is directed to send the second specification to the referee for investigation and report. KELLY v. GRAND CIRCLE, WOMEN OF WOODCRAFT. (Circuit Court, D. Washington, E. D. May 2, 1904.) 1. FEDERAL COURTS-REMOVAL OF CAUSE-SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS-MANDAMUS. A proceeding for mandamus under 2 Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. § 5765, authorizing such proceedings to be commenced by the filing of a motion supported by affidavits, and authorizing the assessment of damages and costs when a judgment is given in favor of the applicant, together with the issuance of a peremptory writ, is a special proceeding, and not a suit "of a civil nature at common law or in equity," and, not being ancillary to any other case of which the federal court had acquired jurisdiction, was not removable to such court. Special proceeding, by motion and affidavit for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent, a fraternal society, to restore the applicant to membership in the society, and to her alleged rights as holder of a certificate of life insurance, and to pay damages for her wrongful expulsion. Heard on a motion to remand the case to the state court in which it was commenced. Motion granted. S. S. Bassett, for applicant. Denton M. Crow and A. D. Stillman, for respondent. HANFORD, District Judge. This case was commenced in the superior court of the state of Washington for Spokane county by filing a motion, supported by an affidavit, for a writ of mandate, to redress alleged wrongs by compelling the respondent, which is a fraternal society, to restore the relator to her rights as a member of the society and holder of a certificate of life insurance, and to pay her $11,000 as compensation for injuries alleged to have been suffered in consequence of an illegal and unjustifiable attempt to exclude her from the society, and forfeit her rights as holder of said certificate. The procedure by which the case was initiated is the procedure provided by the Code of Washington for mandamus cases, and the relief prayed for, including the recovery of damages, is sought through and by means of a writ of mandate. The respondent caused the case to be removed from the state court in which it was commenced into this court, and now resists a motion to remand on the ground that there is included in the case an action to recover damages. The case is not an action for damages in any form of action known to the common law, and it lacks the requisites as to pleadings and jurisdictional process prescribed by the Code for the commencement of a civil action. Provision is made in the chapter of the Code relating to mandamus proceedings for assessing damages and costs when a judgment is given in favor of the applicant, and in such cases a peremptory writ must issue without delay. 2 Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. § 5765; Pierce's Code, § 1419. Under this statute the right to recover damages is made dependent upon a right to have a peremptory writ of mandamus; hence a case commenced as a special proceeding cannot be converted into an ordinary civil action to recover 11. See Removal of Causes, vol. 42, Cent. Dig. § 16. damages by repleading, and severance of the demand for damages from the application for a writ of mandamus. The case is not ancillary to any other case of which this court has acquired jurisdiction, but is an original independent case, not cognizable in this court, because it is not a suit of a civil nature at common law or in equity, and a writ of mandamus is not necessary to the exercise of the jurisdiction of this court. 18 Encyc. Pl. & Pr. 171; Bath County v. Amy, 13 Wall. 244-251, 20 L. Ed. 539; In re Vintschger (C. C.) 50 Fed. 459; Gares v. Building Association (C. C.)_55_Fed. 209; Indiana ex rel. City of Muncie v. Railway Company (C. C.) 85 Fed. 1; Hair v. Burnell (C. C.) 106 Fed. 280. Motion to remand granted MASON v. CONNORS et al. (Circuit Court, D. Vermont. April 21, 1904.) 1. PROCESS-SERVICE ON NONRESIDENT-VERMONT STATUTE. The statutes of Vermont do not authorize service of summons on nonresident defendants by leaving copies thereof with a codefendant who is served within the state, where there is no attachment of property or credits. 2. SAME-NONRESIDENT TEMPORARILY IN STATE. Under the laws of Vermont, personal service of summons on a defendant within the state gives the court jurisdiction to render a personal judgment against him, although he is a nonresident, and was only temporarily within the state, unless his presence there was for a purpose which rendered him privileged. 3. PARTIES ACTION AGAINST PARTNERS-SERVICE ON SINGLE DEFENDANT. The fact that a summons describes the defendants named therein as "partners" will not prevent the action from proceeding against one, who alone was served, where the declaration does not show a joint cause of action. At Law. On plea to jurisdiction. Rufus E. Brown and R. W. Taft, for plaintiff. Edmund C. Mower and Cassius R. Peck, for defendants. WHEELER, District Judge. The plaintiff, of Burlington, Vt., took out a writ of summons and attachment in an action of assumpsit against "E. F. Connors, D. E. Connors, and T. H. Connors, doing business, under the firm name and style of Connors Bros., at Newport," Vt., demanding damages in $5,000, summoning the Pauly Jail Building Company, a corporation of Missouri, trustee, and returnable to Chittenden county court of the state. The sheriff served the writ at Newport on the second vice president and general eastern manager of the trustee, and by "giving J. H. Connors one of the defendants. within named, a true and attested copy of the original writ with my return thereon endorsed," and by leaving with John H. Connors, "for E. F. Connors and D. E. Connors each who reside without this State and have no known agent or attorney within this State upon whom to 2. See Process, vol. 40, Cent. Dig. § 70. make service thereon, true and attested copies of this original writ with my return hereon thereon endorsed for said defendants."' The defendants, citizens of Massachusetts, appeared specially to plead to the jurisdiction, removed the cause to this court, and here. John H. Connors specially pleads to the jurisdiction of the state court, and says that he is not and never has been resident of the state of Vermont, and has no authorized agent resident there; that the trustee never had a place of business, or office, or agent resident there, but is now, and has for more than five years been, in Boston, in the state of Massachusetts; that no attachment was made of the defendants' property there, nor any service of copies made on the trustee for either of the defendants; and "that said John H. Connors was in the said state of Vermont temporarily, and for the special purpose of superintending the building of a courthouse, customhouse, and postoffice for the United States at said Newport, with the intention of returning to his domicile and residence in said Boston, in said state of Massachusetts, as soon as said superintendence was ended"; wherefore he moves the court to abate the writ, dismiss the action, allow the defendants their costs, and "make such other orders and judgments as the circumstances require." The trustee has been discharged by the plaintiff, and no service has, according to the face of the proceedings, been made, otherwise than as stated, and the question of jurisdiction has been heard upon them. The John H. Connors appearing and filing this plea submits himself as, and is taken to be, the J. H. Connors mentioned in the sheriff's return, and the same person named as D. H. Connors in the writ, and he is to be so considered. The difference in initials may be a clerical mistake in making the copies entered in this court. In this state, when suit is commenced against a nonresident defendant by trustee process, constructive service may be made upon the defendant by copy left with the trustee for the defendant (V. Š. 1319), and if the trustee is discharged such service fails (Id. 1321). In this case, there having been no service of copies on the trustee for the defendants, and, if there had been, the trustee being discharged, there is nothing in that behalf to affect the defendants as parties. When personal property of a nonresident is attached, substituted service may be made by copy left with a known agent or attorney, and, for want thereof, at the place of the attachment. Id. 1109. But here was no such attachment or service, and there was no service upon Edward F. or Dennis E. Connors but by leaving a copy for each with John H. Such leaving of a copy with one defendant for another, without any attachment of property, or credits as a basis for it, is not any mode of service provided for by the laws of the state, or known to exist under them. There was nothing resembling legal service upon those defendants, and they had nothing to do to avoid becoming parties but to keep away. As their appearance was limited to objecting to the jurisdiction, it did not make them parties for any other purpose. They cannot be held, and the suit must be dismissed as to them. The writ required the sheriff to attach the goods, chattels, or estate of the defendants to the value of $5,000, and then notify thereof according to law, and also to notify them to appear before the court, |