In an action for injuries received in boarding a boat, on the ground of negligence in requiring passengers to pass over a deck which was waxed and polished for dancing purposes and not provided with a rubber mat or antislipping device, evidence of the nonoccurrence of a similar accident is admissile for the purpose of sowing defendant not guilty of negligence in not apprehending the accident, where the danger was not obvious. Cleveland & Buffalo Transit Co. v. Roderick, 10 Ohio App. 119.

In action for injuries sustained while traveling as a passenger on a steamIship in which defendant denied being the owner or operator of such vessel at the time of the accident, plaintiff's evidence held insufficient for submission of case to 'jury. Deniff v. Charles R. McCormick & Co. (Or.) 210 P. 703.

23. Limitation of liability.-Act Feb. 28, 1871, passed to provide for the better security of life on board steam vessels, and embracing this section makes exceptions in favor of passengers to the general rule of limitation of liability contained in sections 4282 and 4283 (Comp. St. §§ 8020, 8021), and the owner is not entitled to a limitation of liability for damages sustained by passengers from fire, when due to his negligence. Hines v. Butler (C. C. A. Md.) 278 F. 877, affirming decree (D. C.) The Virginia, 264 F. 986, certiorari denied Hines、 v. Butler, 42 S. Ct. 185, 257 U. S. 659, 66 L. Ed. 421.

Owner of a steamship, which burned, causing loss of cargo, loss of life, injuries to passengers, and loss of their property, which was contributed to by neglect of the owner and its representatives to keep the fire-fighting equip-ment and boats of the vessel in effective condition and to maintain the fire drills, all of which were required by statute or regulation, and also by default of the officers and crew in failing to use the means available and to efficiently handle the boats, held entitled to limit its liability as to cargo loss, but not as to death and injuries and loss of property of passengers. The Virginia (D. C. Md.) 264 F. 986.

The operation of this section is not restricted by anything in section 4283 (Comp. St. § 8021) limiting liability. Id.

This section is supplementary to section 4283 (Comp. St. § 8021), which declares the basic law of liability, and liability for damage coming within the provisions of section 4493 cannot be limited either by owners of domestic vessels or of foreign vessels invoking limitation of liability under section 4283. Petition of Canadian Pac. Ry. Co. (D. C. Wash.) 278 F. 180.

Failure to comply with International Navigation Rules (Comp. St. § 7834

et seq.) does not subject the shipowner to unlimited liability for damage to passengers or their effects, under this section, which deprives such owner of the right to limit liability for such damage only when "it happens through any neglect or failure to comply with the provisions of this title," of which the navigation rules are not a part. Id.

Where the attention of a steamship passenger was not called to language of her baggage check and the company's tariff schedule limiting damages for failure to make due delivery of a trunk, the value of which was not declared to be more than $100, such limitation was not a part of the contract of carriage under the federal statute, in the absence of evidence that the company had adopted such regulation, though it would be presumed it had complied with the statute by filing a tariff schedule. Vanderberg v. Detroit & C. Nav. Co. (Mich.) 186 N. W. 477.

A steamship passenger will not be deemed to have consented to conditions printed on his ticket exempting the carrier from liability for injuries caused by the latter's negligence, where it is not shown that the ticket was sold at a reduced rate, or that there was a higher rate the passenger could have paid to secure full protection. Murray v. Cunard S. S. Co. (Sup.) 193 N. Y. S. 220.

A statement in a steamship ticket, that "the price of passage hereunder has been fixed partly with reference to the liability assumed by the company as defined by this contract," held insufficient to show any consideration for an exemption from liability for negligence. Id.

A steamship company may limit its liability for injuries to a passenger by contract, but may not exempt itself from such liability. Id.

Though a carrier may contract with a shipper that notice of a claim for loss or damage to goods shall be given within a reasonable time, a condition in a steamship passenger ticket that no action can be maintained for an injury to the passenger unless "written notice of the claim" be delivered to the company within 40 days after debarkation was unreasonable, where the company had knowledge of the accident immediately on the happening thereof, and the passenger was not discharged from a hospital until after the time limit had expired. Id.

The rule that a carrier may contract with a shipper that notice of a claim for loss or damage to goods be given within a reasonable time is inapplicable to a condition in a steamship passenger ticket that the passenger give written notice of a claim for damages for personal injuries within 40 days after debarkation; such requirement not being

means the port of destination, not a port of distress; so that the seamen are bound to serve until the voyage ends in the port of destination, if it is extended beyond the time mentioned in the contract, not by the intention or negligence of the master, which would be a breach of the contract releasing the seamen, but by perils of the sea. Hamilton v. U. S. (C. C. A. Va.) 268 F. 15, certiorari denied 41 S. Ct. 15, 254 U. S. 645, 65, L. Ed. 454.

9. Voyage and term of service.Shipping articles are mercantile documents, and entitled to a liberal construction to accomplish the purpose the parties had in mind; but under this section they must, to be valid, inform the seaman, in general terms at least, what kind of voyage is then planned, reserving on their face, if need be, sufficient latitude for changes to meet subsequent exigencies. U. S. v. Westwood (C. C. A. Va.) 266 F. 696, affirming decree (D. C.) The Quoque, 261 F. 414.

Under shipping articles for a voyage from New York "to a final port of discharge in the United States north of Cape Hatteras," held, that such port was one on the Atlantic coast. Jenkins v. U. S. Emergency Fleet Corporation (D. C. Wash.) 268 F. 870.

Where seamen signed for a voyage from New York to "one or more ports in South America * ** and such other ports or places in any parts of the world as the master may direct and back to a final port of discharge in the United States north of Cape Hatteras," and the ship fully discharged her cargo and reloaded at Tacoma and Seattle, and on refusal of the seamen to sign for a new voyage to Cuba discharged them, held that they were entitled to transportation to New York. Id.

Extension of the voyage beyond the time mentioned in the contract, due to perils of the sea, which the master or owner could not reasonably be expected to guard against, is not a breach of the contract as to time, and does not warrant seamen in leaving the vessel or demanding wages in full before reaching the port of destination, but, if the voyage cannot be completed, or is ended by mutual agreement, the former articles are of no effect upon the future status of the crew, who are free to make a new agreement with the captain if he has the authority to make it. Shanley v. U. S. (D. C. N. Y.) 274 F. 691.

Libelants signed for a voyage to African ports and return to a port of the United States, the term to expire in six months. At the end of the six months the vessel, owing to delays caused by breaking down of machinery, was at a West African port where there was no consul, and another crew could not be obtained. The master proposed to extend the articles, but libelauts refused, demanding a new

contract at higher wages, which the master signed under protest, claiming duress. Gibraltar was the nearest port where the questions at issue could fairly have been considered by a consul, but the vessel continued her voyage and returned to the United States, and no further contract was made. Held, that libelants were not entitled to demand the contract at the time they did, and that it was invalid, but that libelants were entitled to pay at the new contract rate from the time the vessel might have reached Gibraltar, when such demand would have been within their rights. Id.

13. Wages and payment thereof.The action of the court in c.mputing the daily wage of the seamen as onethirtieth of their monthly wage was proper. Gerber v. Spencer (C. C. A. Cal.) 278 F. 886.

On a libel by seamen for reasonable compensation for extra work while the crew was short, evidence held insufficient to show that the seamen who filed the libel were compelled to do extra work. The Silver Shell (D. C. N. Y.) 255 F. 340.

Where a foreign seaman, after signing up, but before leaving port, contracted a loathsome disease, and on arrival at a port of the United States was detained for treatment in hospital at expense of the ship, under Immigration Act Feb. 5, 1917, § 35 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 42891⁄4ss), and regulations thereunder, the ship held entitled to deduct from his wages the amount so paid for his treatment. The Alector (D. C. Va.) 263 F. 1007.

Where a seaman has been injured, so as to prevent his working on a voyage, his wages cannot be allowed for a longer term than the voyage agreed on, nor at a rate different from that agreed on. The Cliftwood (D. C. Ala.) 280 F. 726.

Provision of shipping articles, providing that a "general change in wages" while vessel is away is to take effect from date of change, held applicable to the shortening of working hours with provision for overtime payment beyond the regular hours work; such change being in effect a "general change in wages." Jensen v. Barber S. S. Lines (Mun. Ct.) 180 N. Y. S. 754.

of

Where an eight-hour day at sea is provided for, a seaman working beyond the eight-hour period at sea would be entitled to extra compensation, unless the work was done for the safety of the vessel, cargo, passengers, and crew within working rule 1. Id.

Working rule 1, providing that seamen are not to receive extra compensation for work done for the safety of the vessel, cargo, passengers, and crew, contemplates work of an unusual and extraordinary character, and not the ordinary routine work. Id.

15. Advance and allotment of wages or other matter not contrary to law.Where a crew signed shipping articles in New York for a voyage to the Western Hemisphere and back to a port of discharge in the United States, the questions of wages, transportation, and work conditions being left for the de. termination of a designated conference of shipowners, and at Baltimore, to prevent the crew from abandoning the voyage the master indorsed on the articles an agreement entitling crew to transportation back to New York and $5 a day subsistence, if discharged on the Pacific Coast, the Baltimore agreement was valid as against objections that it was without consideration and was made under compulsion. The Florence Olson (C. C. A. Cal.) 283 F 11.

a

Where deck officers executed shipping articles, leaving the question of transportation to be determined by a designated shipowners' conference, ruling made by that conference, entitling them to transportation and $3 a day subsistence, is binding on all concerned. Id.

16. Articles not conforming to law as affecting rights of seamen as to wages and care. A provision in shipping articles, providing that the wages named, were subject to change in accordance with a new scale to be adopted by shipowners, held invalid, as not complying with the statute requiring the articles to state the wages to be paid, notwithstanding this section, providing that the articles may contain stipulations in reference to advance and allotment of wages, or other matters not contrary to law. Jones v. U. S. (D. C. Md.) 284 F. 721.

19. Seaworthiness of ship.-A ship held not unseaworthy, because of the temporary absence of a handrail while she was lying alongside a wharf discharging cargo, so as to entitle a seaman injured thereby to recover damages. Hanrahan v. Pacific Transport Co. (C. C. A. N. Y.) 262 F. 951. certiorari denied 40 S. Ct. 345, 252 U. S. 579, 64 L. Ed. 726.

Inherent in the shipping articles of seamen is the absolute obligation of the owners and operator to see that the vessel was seaworthy; that is, she must be tight, staunch, and strong, and so equipped and the cargo so stored as to resist all ordinary action of the sea. But it is not necessary that she be in perfect condition or equipped with the most improved appliances. Hamilton v. U. S. (C. C. A. Va.) 268 F. 15, certiorari denied 41 S. Ct. 15, 254 U. S. 645, 65 L. Ed. 454.

20. Liability for personal injuries to crew. The general rules of the maritime law apply to the liability of the owner of a vessel for injuries to a seaman, whether the proceeding be instituted in an admiralty or common-law

I court, and in a common-law action for such injuries it was error to refuse to instruct the jury under the maritime law. Carlisle Packing Co. v., Sandanger 42 S. Ct. 475, 259 U. S. 255, 66 L Ed. 927, affirming judgment (Wash.) Sandanger v. Carlisle Packing Co., 192 P. 1005.

Interest is not allowable in admiralty on a tort claim for death of a seaman prior to liquidation of the claim, although a number of other claims, similar, except for amount of damages, were liquidated at a prior date. Union Steamboat Co. v. Fitzgibbons (C. C. A. Ill.) 261 F. 768.

Where the owner of a small harbor tug, unseaworthy for ocean navigation, and whose master had only a coastwise license, procured a license for her to proceed to a Mexican port in tow, without use of her own power, or necessity of a crew, but kept master and crew on board, with orders to keep up steam, both such owner and the towing company held liable for death of master and crew, who were drowned when the tug capsized in a storm, where they were given no orders to cut loose, and were not taken off, although there was ample time before the gale struck. D. W. Ryan Towboat Co. v. Draper (C. C. A. Tex.) 263 F. 31, certiorari denied 40 S. Ct. 483, 253 U. S. 486, 64 L. Ed. 1026; Bowers Southern Dredging Co. v. Same (C. C. A. Tex.) 263 F. 31, certiorari denied 40 S. Ct. 483, 253 U. S. 486, 64 L. Ed. 1026.

Where the work which a seaman was ordered to do was not unsuitable to his strength, but of his own volition he overtaxed his strength and fell, the vessel is not liable for damages for the resulting injuries. The Santa Barbara (C. C. A. N. Y.) 263 F. 369, reversing decree (D. C.) 255 F. 231.

Where an injured seaman was placed in a marine hospital by the vessel's master, but left immediately because he was unsatisfied with the first meal served, the vessel is not liable for his maintenance and care thereafter at home and in other hospitals. Id.

It is improper to require an ordinary seaman, who was a minor, to climb a guy rope hand over hand, and hold fast thereto, while working a rope through a block. The Santa Barbara (D. C. N. Y.) 255 F. 231.

Where an ordinary seaman was directed to do the work of an able seaman in climbing a guy rope and passing a rope through a pulley, and the pulley and chain were not in good working order, held, that the owner was liable for an injury received by such seaman when, becoming exhausted, he dropped to the deck.-Id.

On libel by an ordinary seaman, who was ordered to rig a boatswain's chair to paint a smokestack, and who, being unable to pass a rope through a pulley sheave, became exhausted while climbing down a guy rope and fell, evidence