Ch. 1)

vessel for the fuel. The Portland (C. C. A. Cal.) 273 F. 401.

A claim to a lien on a ship for stevedoring services rendered in loading the ship, which was under a charter requiring the charterer to pay for such services, held not sustained by the evidence, where it rested on the testimony of limaster belant's president, that the

agreed that the vessel would be responsible, which was positively denied by the master, who was corroborated by the fact that he had been previously advised by the ship's agent that the charterer was not financially responsible and to be cautious. The Sjurso (C. C. A. N. Y.) 279 F. 553.

Where a vessel was safe in port, over the objections of cargo owner, master was without power to create a maritime lien on the cargo for repairs. The Astoria (C. C. A. Canal Zone) 281 F. 618.

One furnishing gasoline to a motor boat on orders of the captain, pursuant to an established course of business,

under which the bills had been paid periodically by the owner, held entitled to a maritime lien under this act. The Norsman (D. C. N. Y.) 271 F. 15.

A fishing schooner held subject to a lien for food supplies furnished on order of her master in a port where she was not known, though he was operating her on a lay and had no authority to bind her, where it did not appear that it was customary to let vessels on the lay on that part of the coast, and libelant relied on the master's apparent authority. The Angie B. Watson (D. C. Mass.) 274 F. 218.

As to their claims for moneys advanced to pay the crew of an American vessel in an English port and repairs and supplies there furnished at the master's request, the libelants could in enforcing their rights under the general maritime law, invoke the law of the forum, Comp. St. §§ 7783, 7784, where the law of England was not pleaded or proven, for, by sending his vessel into an English port, the American owner is deemed to give the master authority to bind the vessel, not under the English law, but under the American law, or, in other words. the law of the flag which floats over The Snetind (D. C. Me.) the vessel.

276 F. 139.

Libelant, who on request of the mas-
ter and on the credit of the vessel made
advances to pay the necessary expenses
to enable a vessel, which had secured
a cargo in a foreign port, to clear
and proceed on his voyage, held entitled
to a lien therefor, and acceptance of a
draft drawn by the master on the own-
ers for the amount, which was dis-
honored, held not a payment, in the
absence of evidence that it accepted as
such. The Nisseqogue (D. C. N. C.)
280 F. 174.

Where, in a suit in rem against a

schooner then undergoing repairs at a
way port in the course of a voyage, the
marshal took only nominal possession,
leaving the master and crew in charge,
in the expectation that the owner would
furnish bond and continue the voyage,
until notified to the contrary, libelant,
who furnished supplies for the crew
in the meantime on orders of the mas-
ter and without knowledge of the at-
tachment, held entitled to a lien there-
for with the same rank as to priority
as that for wages of the crew. Id.

At the time a vessel was seized under a libel she was undergoing repairs at a way port in the course of a voyage, made necessary by damages caused primarily by leakage through a split sea suction pipe. The repairs were contracted for by the master with approval of the owner, and were continued and completed after the seizure, which was only nominal, without objection by the marshal or libelant; the crew remaining on board and the intention being to resume the voyage when they Other libels were were completed.

filed, however, and the vessel was sold. Held, that the repairer was entitled to a lien, and that, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it would be presumed that the repairs, which were necessary, enhanced the value of the vessel to the extent of their reasonable cost. Id.

and

A schooner captain has implied power to make contracts necessary proper in navigation, including towage, and thus bind the ship's owner; the "owner" being the person for whose benefit the ship is operated on the particular voyage, and who directs and controls it, its officers and crew, rather than the possessor of legal title. Potter v. American Union Line (Sup.) 185 N. Y. S. 842, 114 Misc. Rep. 101.

2. Authority of agent.-Act June 23, 1910, § 5 (Comp. St. § 7787), re-enacted by Merchant Marine Act June 5, 1920, supersedes all provisions of the state statutes so far as they purport to create rights of action enforceable in rem against vessels for repairs, supplies, and other necessaries, and, if a subcontractor ever had a right to a lien therefor on a vessel, it was based upon the contractor's agency for the owner, and cannot now exist, in view of this section, which enumerates the persons presumed to have authority from the owner to procure repairs, supplies, and other necessaries, but does not mention the contractor. The Juniata (D. C. Md.) 277 F. 438.

34. Managing officer of corporation. -Under a charter party providing that "the working of this charter party" might be assigned by the charterer to a corporation, which was done, the managing officer of such corporation held to be a "person to whom the manage* * is intrustment of the vessel ed," within this section, and one fur

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nishing necessaries to the vessel on his order in another port in good faith, in reliance on his statement that the corporation owned the vessel, it having in fact an option to purchase, held entitled to a lien therefor under the act. The Penn (C. C. A. Pa.) 273 F. 990.

32. Knowledge of authority.-The putative lienor under the Maritime Lien Act of 1910 (Comp. St. §§ 7783-7787), is not bound, whenever he gets an order to supply or serve the ship, to institute an inquiry as to the authority of the person by whom the supplies or services are ordered to bind the ship. The Muskegon (D.C.N.Y.) 275 F. 117, decree affirmed (C. C. A.) 275 F. 348. Testimony by the seller of fuel oil to a vessel that he made no effort to ascertain the ownership of the vessel, because he knew from previous sales that the vessels of that line had been transferred back and forth between several corporations, among which, however, the company ordering the oil was not included, held to show knowledge of facts which imposed on him the duty to inquire into the authority of the latter company to order oil on behalf of the vessel, which inquiry would have revealed that it was a charterer, without authority to bind the vessel, so that the seller had, under Act June 23, 1910, § 3 (Comp. St. § 7785), no lien on the vessel. The Admiral Goodrich (D. C. Wash.) 279 F. 126.

Cited without definite application, The Susquehanna (C. C. A. N. Y.) 267 F. 811; The St. Johns (C. C. A. Va.) 273 F. 1005: The Flush (C. C. A. N. Y.) 277 F. 25; The Kalfarli (C. C. A. N. Y.) 277 F. 391; The Eastern (D. C. Mass.) 257 F. 874; The Castor (D. C. N. Y.) 267 F. 608; The Coaster (D, C. Wash.) 273 F. 609; The Angie B. Watson (D. C. Mass.) 274 F. 218; The Oconee (D. C. Va.) 280 F. 927; South Atlantic Dry Dock Co. v. U. S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation (D. C. Fla.) 284 F. 723.

DECISIONS APPLICABLE TO § 7785 Construction.-The fact that in Act June 23. 1910, c. 373, §§ 1, 3 (Comp. St. §§ 7783, 7785), the word "order," or "ordering," is used with reference to the supplies for which a maritime lien is given, while in section 2 (Comp. St. § 7784), specifying the persons presumed to have authority from the owner to bind the vessel, the word "procure" is used, does not indicate an intention to give different significance in those sections. The Portland (C. C. A. Cal.) 273 F. 401.

The words "other necessaries," used in this act, under the rule of ejusdem generis, must be limited in their meaning to such things of the general nature of repairs and supplies as are fit and proper for the use of the ship. The Penn (D. C. Pa.) 266 F. 933.

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Charter party provisions.-Where a charter party required the charterer to save the owner harmless from liens, and authorized the owner to retake the vessel if liens were not discharged within 30 days, thus recognizing that liens might be imposed by the charterer, one furnishing supplies in a domestic port was entitled to a lien, though warned by representatives of the owner not to furnish the supplies on the vessel's credit. South Coast S. S. Co. v. Rudbach, 40 S. Ct. 233, 251 U. S. 519, 64 L. Ed. 386, affirming decree (C. C. A. Cal.) The South Coast, 247 F. 84, which affirms (D. C.) 233 F. 327.

A provision in a charter party giving the charterer a lien on the vessel for advances made, but not determined, does not impliedly deny the authority of the master to bind the vessel for fuel furnished to it, since it refers to a lien given by the owner to the charterer, and not one given by the charterer to third persons. The Portland (C. C. A. Cal.) 273 F. 401.

Libelant, appointed agent for a ship's business while in port on a particular voyage, by a charterer under a charter which recognized that liens might be created and required the charterer to pay them within a specified time. held entitled to a lien for money advanced on request of the master to pay the ship's bills; the greater part being for charges imposed by law, such as pilotage, tonnage tax, fumigation, etc., and also for his attendance fee. The Ascutney (D. C. Md.) 278 F. 991.

Notice of charter party.-The mere fact that one furnishing coal to a vessel is informed that she is under charter is not enough to charge him with notice of the terms of the charter party. W. G. Coyle & Co. v. North America Steamship Corporation (C. C. A. La.) 262 F. 250.

Libelant, who furnished coal in New Orleans to a foreign steamship under charter made in New York, and new in the port, on an order given at the request of a business associate of the charterer who was absent, but pursuant to a requisition of the chief engineer, and which coal was received and receipted for by the master, held entitled to a lien under the act, where it did not appear that libelant could by the exercise of reasonable diligence have ascertained that by the terms of the charter the charterer was to furnish coal. Id.

A furnisher of supplies to a vessel on orders of the authorized local agent of the charterer, nothing appearing to give notice that because of the terms of the charter party he was without authority to bind the vessel, held entitled to a lien therefor under Act June 23. 1910. §§ 1-3 (Comp. St. §§ 77837785). The Penn (C. C. A. Penn.) 276 F. 118.

Where charter party required the

to pay the same, held not to entitle libelant, which had knowledge that the company had no authority to bind the boats, to a lien. The Coaster (D. C. Wash.) 273 F. 609.

Subrogation.-Where shipping company, by payment of bills for coal, etc., furnished a vessel, and approved by its master, acquired no lien on the vessel or claim against the owner, under this section, because of the failure to exercise reasonable diligence to ascertain the terms of the charter party, which required the charterer to provide and pay for such supplies, such payments did not give the shipping company the right by subrogation to eniorce the liens in favor of the actual furnishers, who were not shown to have been chargeable with notice of the terms of the charter party, for, so far as the vessel and its owner were concerned, the shipping company was a mere volunteer in making the payments, and subrogation does not arise in favor of a volunteer paying another's debt, but the debt is thereby extinguished. Pensacola Shipping Co. v. U. S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation (C. C. A. Fla.) 277 F. 889.

Where one, at the request of the master of a vessel, advances money to pay the crew and to pay accounts

against the vessel for labor and supplies, when, if the money had not been advanced, the parties paid would have enforced liens on the vessel, and the one advancing the money is only partly repaid by the vessel, he becomes subrogated to the rights of the lienors, and is in the same position as the party actually furnishing the labor, materials, or supplies. The Snetind (D. C. Me.) 276 F. 139.

Cited without definite application, The Susquehanna (C. C. A. N. Y.) 267 F. 811; The Penn (C. C. A. Pa.) 273 F. 990; The Flush (C. C. A. N. Y.) 277 F. 25; The Kalfarli (C. C. A. N. Y.) 277 F. 391; The Eastern (D. C. Mass.) 257 F. 874; The Castor (D. C. N. Y.) 267 F. 608; The Norsman (D. C. N. Y.) 271 F. 15; The Angie B. Watson (D. C. Mass.) 274 F. 218; The Oconee (D. C. Va.) 280 F. 927; South Atlantic Dry Dock Co. v. U. S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation (D. C. Fla.) 284 F. 723.

DECISIONS APPLICABLE TO § 7786 I. Waiver of lien.-In a proceeding against a ship to recover for coal delivered on board, court held justified in holding that any lien against the ship had been waived by libelants' attempt to collect from a third person, who was a party to a charter party on the vessel, before seeking payment elsewhere. The Millinocket (D. C. N. Y.) 266 F. 392.

The builder of a vessel is not deprived of his property therein by pay

ments made as the work progresses, unless it be so agreed in the contract. Obrecht v. Vinyard (Del. Ch.) 114 A. 168.

2. Making charge against builder, owner, etc.-Where repairs were made on vessels at the request of the owner, so as to create a maritime lien under this act, the maritime liens were not lost by rendering bills to the owner, nor by relying on the retention of such bills without objection as accounts stated. The Hattie Thomas (C. C. A. N. Y.) 262 F. 943.

A libelant, who furnished coal to a tug on orders of her engineer, and was then told by him to charge the coal to her charterer, which he did, and attempted to collect from it until it became insolvent, held to have waived his lien on the tug. The Eastern (D. C. Mass.) 257 F. 874.

4.

Giving credit.-Where contract for towage was made with charterer's undisclosed principal, and onehalf thereof was paid by such principal within 30 days after rendition of services and the principal was granted an extension of time for the payment of the other one-half, but payment thereof was not made because of the principal's insolvency, and where the charter provided for the payment of towage by charterer, there was no maritime lien for the unpaid one-half of the towage, even if a claim for towage · could be maintained as a necessary, within this act. The Mona (C. C. A. Va.) 282 F. 468.

8. Taking negotiable paper for claim.-Where an agreement for settlement of a pending suit to enforce a maritime lien expressly provided that the settlement should not be effective unless the sum agreed on was paid and notes given for a part of the sum were not paid, libelant held to have the right to return the notes and bring suit on his original claim. Olympia Shipping Corporation v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Corporation (C. C. A. Va.) 275 F. 199.

II. Pleading and proving waiver.One making repairs on a vessel should not be deprived of his lien on the ground of waiver, unless there is clear affirmative testimony establishing waiver. The Charles A. Day (D. C. Me.) 265 F. 422.

13. Estoppel and forfeiture.-A court of admiralty, though administering justice on equitable principles, cannot refuse to enforce a maritime lien for repairs or supplies because the lienor has fraudulently claimed to have done more work than he did, or fraudulently charged for the labor or supplies in fact furnished; such fraudulent conduct not extinguishing his right to proceed in a common-law court in personThe Kalfarli (C. C. A. N. Y.)

am.