(2) the provision of illegal goods and services, (3) (4) corruption in private (corporate and union) various forms of criminal fraud. (18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)). The statute itself imposes criminal sanctions on violations of its substantive prohibitions: (1) imprisonment and fine (20 years and $25,000), and (2) criminal forfeiture of: (a) proceeds of transactions, (b) bases of power. (18 U.S.C. § 1963). In light of the Criminal Fine Enforcement Act of 1984, the fine may also be: (1) $250,000, if an individual is convicted, (2) $500,000, if other than an individual is (3), twice the loss or twice the gain. (18 U.S.C. § 3623(a)(3), (b)(3), or (c)(1)). The rights of innocent parties, i.e., those without knowledge, and victims are explicitly protected. The statute authorizes civil injunctive suits against those who engage in racketeering; it also authorizes treble damages in civil suits against those who engage in racketeering. (18 U.S.C. § 1964). Since 1970, similar legislation has been enacted in 27 states. Attached to this statement as Exhibit "C" is a comprehensive analysis of federal RICO and the state statutes. Currently, RICO-type legislation is also pending in a number of other states. The federal statute and its state counterparts have been successfully employed in a variety of organized crime prosecutions (United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208, 1213 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983), "members of La Costa Nostra, a secret national organization engaged in a wide range of racketeering activities, including murder, extortion, gambling and loansharking"), and white-collar crime prosecutions (United States v. Marubeni American Corp., 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980), Japanese corporation: fraud and bribery). The statutes also have been employed successfully against violent groups generally, including outlaw motorcycle gangs, United States v. Watchmaker, 761 F.2d 1459, 1463 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 879 (1986) ("Outlaw Motorcycle Club"); United States v. Rubio, 727 F.2d 786, 790 (9th Cir. 1983) ("Hells Angels Motorcycle Club"), and terrorist groups, United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir., cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 283 (1983), (Croatian nationalist terrorists). A study by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith concluded that the hate movement neo-Nazi, Ku Klux Klan, and other - violent racist and anti-Jewish groups - is suffering serious setbacks in part as a result of RICO prosecution and various civil suits. See generally, The Hate Movement Today (ADL Special Study 1987). Congress must do nothing that would undermine RICO's promise in this crucial area. See also N.Y. Times. Dec. 30, 1985, p. 1, col. 1 (conviction under RICO of nine men and one woman, members of the "Order," a racist and anti-semitic group, accused of multiple murders, armed robberies, counterfeiting, weapons offenses, and arson); id., Sep. 6, 1985, p. 17a, col. 3 (conviction under RICO of leader of "Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord," a militant white supremacist group). Increasingly, RICO civil provisions are being used successfully at the federal and state level by the federal government and state and local governmental units victimized by conduct prohibited by the statute. See, e.g., State of Okla. ex rel. Department of Human Services v. Children's Shelter, Inc., 604 F.Supp. 867, 870-71 (W.D. Okla. 1985) (medicaid fraud); Comm'n v. Cianfrani, 600 F.Supp. 1364, 1368-69 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (treble damage award against state senator for "ghost" workers); Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable Ltd., 547 F.Supp. 633 (D. Alaska 1982) (bribery of purchasing agent). At the state level, RICO has been most successfully implemented in Arizona, Florida, Oregon, New Jersey, New Mexico The Florida RICO Act, for example, has been and Pennsylvania. used most often in the areas of controlled substances, but has also been used successfully against the economic bases of pornography, prostitution, gambling, theft, and fraud enterprises. Similarly, the office of the Arizona Attorney General has used the Arizona RICO statute in the areas of traditional organized crime, fraud, prostitution, automobile "chop shops," gambling and pornography as well as narcotics. New York, too, is expected to make vigorous use of its new criminal RICO statute. For criminal prosecutions, see, e.g., Carlson v. State, 405 So.2d 173, 174 (Fla. 1981) (house of ill fame); Dorsey v. State, 402 So.2d 1178, 1180 (Fla. 1981) (drugs); State v. Whiddon, 384 So.2d 1269, 1270 (Fla. 1980) (theft, burglary, arson, and arson to defraud); Moorehead v. State, 383 So.2d 629, 630-31 (Fla. 1980) (auto theft); State v. Tocco, 750 P.2d 874 (Ariz. 1988) (traditional organized crime). For civil actions, see, e.g., Arizona ex rel. Corbin v. Pickrell, 136 Ariz. 589, 591, 667 P.2d 1304, 1306 (1983) (securities fraud); Banderas v. Banco Central del Ecuador, 461 So.2d 265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (foreign exchange fraud); Acolla v. Peralta, 721 P.2d 1162 (Ariz. App. 1986) (fraud) Exhibit "D" digests the state decisions under state RICO statutes. The federal RICO statute has played a major role in the interpretation of state legislation. See e.g., Baines v. Superior Court, 688 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) ("[i]n the absence of any Arizona cases, we will look to federal decisional law for guidance"); Roush v. State, 413 So.2d 15, 20-21 (Fla. 1982) (constitutionality of RICO-type civil remedies upheld relying on federal decisions); Moorehead v. State, 383 So.2d at 630-31 (constitutionality of "pattern" in Fla. RICO statute upheld relying on federal decisions.) This approach is consistent with general principles of statutory interpretation. See, e.g., People v. Wahl, 716 P.2d 123, 128 (Colo. 1986) (Colorado wiretap law read like federal wiretap law). There has been, however, a disturbing tendency on the part of some federal judges to give to state RICO legislation an unduly narrow interpretation, despite substantial differences in the language of state statutes and crucially different policy considerations. Compare Arizona ex rel Corbin, supra, (Arizona RICO not necessarily to be circumscribed like Federal RICO, since federalism concerns inapplicable), with Behunin v. Dow Chemical, 650 F.Supp. 1387, 1390 (D. Colo. 1987) (Colorado "pattern" narrowly construed like federal RICO). This approach is not consistent with general principles of statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 904-05 (Utah 1984) (adopted provisions must be "harmonize[d]" with "additional sections"; presumption of similar intent gives way when "material" changes are made; decisions of sister jurisdiction after date of adoption not "binding"). As Exhibit D demonstrates, the states have developed a parallel RICO jurisprudence under state statutes that deserves consideration by Congress. Since the 99th Congress, new legislation has been introduced in the House. The principal item of legislation concerning this Committee is H.R. 4920, introduced by Representative Conyers. |