Mr. LENNON. I believe, Doctor, in your testimony yesterday you indicated that you had had rather recently some discussion of this matter with the new Director of the National Science Foundation. I believe you were the witness who made that statement.

Dr. HERSEY. By virtue of attending an Amsoc meeting in which he outlined the processes by which he was trying to make up his mind what to do. From that I gathered what I stated in my prepared state

ment.

Mr. LENNON. Thank you, Doctor. Any other questions before the doctor leaves the witness stand? Thank you very much. We appreciate your being here and your contribution to this matter.

Dr. HERSEY. Mr. Chairman

Mr. LENNON. If you wish to proceed further, we will be glad to hear from you.

Dr. HERSEY. In response to questions to Dr. Hedberg and to me yesterday about the request from the Amsoc Committee and their recommendations that the intermediate approach be adopted, we have gathered together documentation of those formal requests. With your permission, I would like to have this included in the record.

Mr. LENNON. Can you summarize by saying how many specific documented requests you have made to the National Science Foundation, giving your counsel and advice with respect to what you believe is necessary for the intermediate step, how many times and the dates. Then you can put the whole statement in the record.

Dr. HERSEY. There are 24 documents or occasions cited in our list. Mr. LENNON. Does each of those represent a different or separate request for consideration of the intermediate stages and the intermediate vessel?

Dr. HERSEY. Yes, and they include such items as Dr. Hedberg's article in Geotimes as evidence of detailed description of the justification for the intermediate stage recommendation.

Mr. LENNON. Thank you, Doctor. Without objection, that will go in the record. I hope the committee members will have an opportunity to read it.

(The information referred to follows:)

REFERENCES TO THE INTERMEDIATE APPROACH AND SCOPE OF THE MOHOLE PROJECT

As stated earlier by Chairman Hedberg, the Amsoc Committee from the first recognized that much experimental work must be done before attainment of the ultimate objective and that the scientific returns from a sound intermediate program would be of equal or perhaps greater value than that sample of the mantle. In an article, published in the Scientific American of April 1959, Amsoc's Technical Director stated (p. 49): "The first attempt at deep-sea drilling cannot be expected to solve all the drilling problems; we will have to feel our way along. First, thorough engineering studies must be made that will essentially modify the best existing techniques so that they will work in this new environment of waves, currents, and high corrosion ***. When the results of the first tests are in, modifications will have to be made in the drilling methods; this in turn may require a practical readjustment of scientific requirements. Then the first major hole will be attempted. This will be mainly a sediment-coring job, but it will penetrate the second layer. Its depth from the surface will be of the order of 16,000 feet. Such a hole may be so rewarding that a series of similar holes will be the most reasonable next step. After the first hole is finished, however, we will have definite knowledge of how difficult and how rewarding it is to drill in the deep rocks. At that time it will be possible to make a sound reappraisal of the kind of equipment needed to go on to the Moho."

A report prepared by the Amsoc Committee on September 1, 1959, and published as NAS-NRC publication 717 includes the following statements: "The Amsoc Committee believes that it is desirable to drill a series of holes into the strata beneath the ocean culminating in one that pierces the Moho and samples the mantle." "There are no physical reasons why these problems cannot be solved by imaginative engineers armed with design data obtained by drilling a number of shallow experimental holes with presently available equipment." “If undisturbed oriented cores are obtained by this test drilling and if instruments lowered into the holes return the information that is expected, a large part of the objectives of the Amsoc Committee will have been obtained."

The need for an intermediate program was emphasized before this committee in hearings on May 22, 1961, immediately following Amsoc's successful drilling near Guadalupe Island. During these hearings Willard Bascom, Amsoc Technical Director, testified that "A great many problems remain to be solved before we can design a ship capable of drilling to the Moho. We will need better sonar, radar, pipe-handling equipment, steering controls, bits, buoys, coring tools, drilling equipment-virtually everything. We need to work out means of reentering a hole and recirculating the drilling fluid. We need practice on logistics problems. This means we must have an experimental ship to try out ideas and develop equipment." In addition, Dr. W. E. Benson of the National Science Foundation stated that, "We haven't gone into any details about the plan yet, and we are still talking about which is the better way of proceeding. Mr. Bascom is now quite convinced that we need to go to an intermediate stage drilling vessel. There are some other people who think that we might go directly to the large hull. I personally am inclined to agree with Mr. Bascom on the intermediate size drilling vessel because it will have other uses than testing for the final ship for the Mohole itself. It will be a very useful vessel for doing other exploratory work in the ocean once the bugs are worked out of it. I am sure many of the oceanographic institutions can put it to good use after it is built and tested. But it depends on just what the decision is. It is not quite clear enough yet. It will be within a month to 6 weeks, I think."

While recognizing the exciting importance of a purely sediment drilling program using the technique developed at Guadalupe Island, the Amsoc Committee recommended by letter of June 14, 1961, that "our immediate objectives are: (a) To sample through the second layer and determine its thickness and characteristics; and (b) to sample the characteristics of the top of the third layer" and added that "We agree that an intermediate drilling program is required and should be initiated during 1962." This letter also presented a proposed budget which specifically included an intermediate vessel for construction in fiscal year 1962.

Following the successful drilling at Guadalupe, the Amsoc Committee directed its staff to develop the design of an intermediate drilling vessel. This culminated in the publication in 1962 by Amsoc of NAS-NRC 984, a volume of 173 pages, presenting the fundamental engineering for a specific intermediate vessel as developed by Amsoc's staff.

By letter of March 9, 1962, the Amsoc Chairman transmitted to NSF pertinent data and documents, regarding the past developments and future plans for the project, and stated that "the Amsoc Committee agrees that delays should be avoided, but it is also concerned that the scientific objectives of the Mohole project are not overlooked or downgraded. It is important for the prime contractor to recognize that the Mohole project is a scientific research undertaking rather than merely an engineering project, and to emphasize this point, I ask that you forward the enclosed documents to the prime contractor as soon as possible."

On March 26-27, 1962, the Amsoc Committee reviewed in considerable detail the matter of an intermediate vessel and intermediate Mohole program and voted to forward these affirmative recommendations promptly again to NSF before a definitive contract had been signed with the newly selected prime contractor. This contract was not signed until June 20, 1962.

The Amsoc Committee has received no definitive decisions regarding these long-standing recommendations, which do not conflict with published statements by NSF. The much publicized NSF "Advance Announcement of Briefing Session for Prospective Prime Contractors on the Mohole Project" of July 1961, stated: "The Mohole project will include: (1) The conduct of deep ocean surveys, (2) the design and construction of deep-drilling equipment, (3) the drilling of a series of holes in the deep ocean floor, one of which will completely penetrate the earth's crust."

Probably the most authoritative version of how the project has been submitted to Congress by NSF is that contained in the NSF budget request in 1962 where the project was defined in broad terms as "a program of research in the geology and geophysics of the deeper layers of the earth by drilling in the ocean floor." And it was further stated that "the ultimate objective of this program is to obtain samples of actual materials from the deeper layers of the earth's crust and from the mantle which lies beneath the crust and constitutes the bulk of the earth. Cores from such depths would provide invaluable information on a number of critical questions in geology and geophysics."

The recommendations of the Amsoc Committee have repeatedly been reconsidered by the Committee and repeatedly forwarded to NSF by meeting and in writing on at least the following dates:

By memorandum of February 13, 1962, from Amsoc Committee to the National Science Foundation describing the initial intermediate program;

By a meeting of the Amsoc executive group with Messrs. Benson and Woodward of NSF and Mr. Bowman Thomas of Brown & Root on May 14, 1962;

By report of the Chairman of the Amsoc Site Selection Panel, Dr. H. H. Hess, dated May 16, 1962;

By detailed letter to Dr. W. E. Benson of NSF of May 21, 1962;

By letter to Mr. Paul Scherer of NSF on July 1, 1962, which discussed again the reasons of these recommendations in considerable detail;

By publication of a summary in Geotimes of July-August 1962 following review of the article with the National Science Foundation;

By letter to NSF Director Waterman of August 16, 1962, strongly urging prompt action;

By meeting of August 17, 1962, of Amsoc Chairman Hedberg with Mr. Scherer of NSF ;

By meeting of October 1, 1962, of Dr. Hedberg of Amsoc, President Seitz and Dr. Cornell of NAS, and Director Waterman and Dr. Benson of NSF;

By meeting of the Amsoc executive group with Messrs. Scherer, Benson, and Woodward of NSF on October 5, 1962;

By meeting of October 29, 1962, of Amsoc Chairman Hedberg with NSF Director Waterman;

By meeting of November 7, 1962, of Amsoc Chairman Hedberg with NSF Director Waterman;

By letter of January 28, 1963, from NAS-NRC President Seitz to NSF Director Waterman stating that: "From my acquaintance with the extensive discussions of the scope and execution of the Mohole project I am convinced that the recommendations of the executive group of our Committee are sound and I am glad to transmit them to you herewith";

By meeting of February 27, 1963, of the Amsoc Committee with NSF, Brown & Root, and NAS President Seitz in Houston;

By letter of April 11, 1963, to NSF Director Waterman, also enclosing report of American Association of Petroleum Geologists Research Committee regarding Amsoc's recommendations;

By letters of May 11, 1963, from the Amsoc Committee to NSF Director Waterman;

By meeting of May 27, 1963, of Amsoc Chairman Hedberg, NSF Director Waterman, and Dr. Cornell of NAS-NRC;

By letter to Mr. Scherer of NSF of May 27, 1963, reporting renewed recommendations following meeting of Amsoc executive group;

By memorandum of May 27, 1963, to NSF defining further a tentative, but specific intermediate program;

By letter of June 28, 1963, from Acting Amsoc Chairman Ladd to Mr. Scherer of NSF, reviewing the tentative intermediate program;

By meeting of August 8, 1963, of Amsoc Chairman Hedberg, President Seitz, and Dr. Cornell of NAS-NRC and NSF Director Haworth;

By letter to NSF Director Haworth reporting a renewed assessment by Amsoc of its recommendations, August 31, 1963;

By meeting of the Amsoc Committee with NSF Director Haworth and staff, and NAS President Seitz, September 28, 1963;

By many frequent informal discussions with NSF personnel.

Mr. CASEY. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LENNON. Mr. Casey.

Mr. CASEY. You say these were requests?

25-984-636

Dr. HERSEY. They are recommendations or else substantial discussions of the need for the intermediate stage.

Mr. CASEY. In other words, you do not want to leave the impression that the Amsoc committee is supposed to request the National Science Foundation to do something?

Dr. HERSEY. I thank you for giving me the opportunity to make that correction.

Mr. CASEY. You are in an advisory capacity?

Dr. HERSEY. That is quite correct.

Mr. CASEY. The National Science Foundation can take your advice or leave it; is that correct?

Dr. HERSEY. That is right.

Mr. CASEY. Thank you.

Mr. LENNON. Thank you, Doctor.

Capt. Lewis Rupp. You have a prepared statement, which already furnished the Committee. You may proceed.

you have

STATEMENT OF LEWIS A. RUPP, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, IONICS, INC., CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

Mr. Rupp. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, and guests, my name is Lewis A. Rupp, captain, USN (retired). I am speaking as a member of the Amsoc Committee and Chairman of the Naval Architecture Panel. I am a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and Massachusetts Institute of Technology, with a master of science degree in naval construction and engineering from the latter. During my naval career, I was the engineering planning officer for construction of the aircraft carriers Shangri La, Lake Champlain, Tarawa, and numerous escort destroyers and tank landing ships, head of the Hydromechanics Department at David Taylor Model Basin, head of Propellers and Shafting Design Branch, Bureau of Ships, Assistant Naval Attaché for Ships in London, and Design Superintendent in charge of the design of several classes of attack submarines, including a modern nuclear-powered class.

The Naval Architecture Panel of the Amsoc Committee was formed in August 1961 to provide advice to the Amsoc Committee concerning the naval architecture and marine engineering problems associated with deep drilling from a floating vessel at sea. The Panel members comprise a group of the most eminently qualified naval architects and engineers in the country today.

Initially, and prior to the selection of a prime contractor for the Mohole project, the Panel met several times to review the state of the art in deep ocean drilling and to discuss vessel specifications and characteristics for carrying out a logical and necessary development program, leading ultimately to uncovering the mysteries of the earth's crustal layers and penetration of the mantle. From these studies came a unanimous recommendation for a two-ship program. We believed that this approach not only would minimize the risk of scientific failure but also would be less costly overall. An intermediate-size ship, with capabilities of drilling 20,000 to 25,000 feet, with low initial and operating costs, was considered the most satisfactory solution to carrying out the experimental drilling program for determining suitable site selection for the ultimate Mohole drilling, for developing untried

drilling methods, techniques, and equipment, for evaluating ship positioning equipment and control instrumentation, for developing buoyancy methods for the riser casing and methods of attachment to the ship, for developing hole reentry techniques, for evaluating downhole scientific measuring instruments, and a host of other problems. Such a vessel would be an ideal tool for continued investigations of ocean sediments and intermediate crustal layers after completion of the pre-Mohole development and exploration phase.

The alternative was to design an ultimate vessel and equipment at once, with capability of penetrating to the mantle. The prime contractor for the project has followed the latter course, which, I believe, entails the route of highest cost and risk. When solution of a magnitude of new design problems for development of tools, techniques, and procedures is required, it is not feasible, in my opinion, to attempt to solve all of them at one time by paper studies. Certainly, some of the problems to be encountered will be satisfactorily solved by such an approach, other so-called problems, for which great effort and cost has been expended, will not turn out to be problems at all, and many new problems and changes in developments, which were not perceived in advance, will be encountered when we finally get on with the job. There is no substitute for an orderly experience-gathering approach to such a complex system development.

Our Naval Architecture Panel has met with the Mohole prime contractor a number of times in the past year and a half. The advice provided by this group on the design of a floating vehicle for carrying out the ultimate Mohole drilling has had a marked influence on the direction of a feasible design approach. Principal design effort during the period has successively changed in emphasis from a new large ship-type drilling vessel (inferior in most characteristics to a less costly converted T-2 tanker), a four-column floating drilling platform (which was incapable of adequate position keeping, inadequate in mobility, maintainability, and questionable as regards damage stability and seaworthiness) and finally a six-column supported self-propelled submarine catamaran type platform, which holds promise of development into an adequate final Mohole drilling vehicle. There still remain many studies of motion, mobility, structural strength, and maintainability to be carried through before such a ressel can be safely constructed. It is an extremely costly vehicle both in first cost and operating cost, and lacks the mobility for economically carrying out a thorough exploratory and site selection program.

In the meantime a year and a half has gone by without any actual drilling experience to assist the design effort. Even at this date, I firmly believe that the public and the scientific community would be best served by carrying out a two-ship program. Immediate investment in a modest intermediate vessel, with deferral of construction of the ultimate vehicle until some of the development problems are better defined, would not only save the public considerable dollars, serve the scientific community more fully with earlier concrete results, but also minimize the risk of a major fiasco.

Mr. LENNON. Mr. Tupper.

Mr. TUPPER. Captain Rupp, would you tell the committee how soon an intermediate vessel could be operational if it were started tomorrow?