murrer was sustained, and appellant having declined to plead further, judgment was entered against it for $500. From that judgment this appeal is prosecuted.

Appellees have moved to dismiss the appeal. Appellant has not asked for a reformation of the supplemental contract. Nor is there a question of title involved. Appellant's liability for royalties is a money liability, pure and simple. Where defendant admits owing part of an amount sued for, the difference between the admitted liability and the amount sued for and recovered is the amount in controversy on appeal by him, and if this be less than two hundred dollars, exclusive of interest and costs, no appeal lies. (K. & P. Lumber Co. v. Sledge, 143 Ky., 137.) Here appellees sued for $500 and appellant admitted a liability of $400. Judgment was rendered for $500. Manifestly there is only the sum of $100 in controversy. The fact that appellant is under a continuing liability, if its contention be not sustained, that may ultimately involve a much larger sum than is necessary to confer jurisdiction on this court, will not confer jurisdiction where the amount actually in controversy is only $100. (Town of Beaver Dam v. Stevens, 118 S. W., 320.)

However, the judgment below will not be conclusive of appellant's right in an action brought for that purpose to have the supplemental contract providing for a royalty of two and a half cents per ton reformed on the ground of mutual mistake of the parties.

For the reasons given, the appeal is dismissed.

Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Williams.

(Decided February 21, 1912.)

Appeal from Ohio Circuit Court.

Railroads Obligation of Agents to Passengers-Failure to Validate Return Tickets-Liability.-Appellee purchased from the I. C. R. R. Co. at Central City, Ky., at a reduced rate, a round trip excursion ticket to Knoxville, Tenn., via the L. & N. R. R. line. Returning he was denied passage from Louisville to his home in Central City, and brought this suit to recover for his expense, a days loss of time and for his mortification and humiliation and recovered a verdict for $250.00. From this verdict the railroad company appeals. Held, There is an affirmative obligation upon a railroad passenger laid upon him by the contract into which

he enters to take his ticket to the agent at the turning point, in order that it may be validated for the return journey, but when once he has presented it to the agent and given him to understand that he is entering upon his return journey the duty devolves upon the agent to see that the validating is done properly. At this point the passenger has discharged his full duty and is not to suffer because of the carelessness, inattention or ignorance of the agent placed in charge of the other side of the contract.

H. P. TAYLOR, C. L. SIVLEY and TRABUE, DOOLAN & COX for appellant.

BARNETT & SMITH for appellee.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUDGE WINN-Affirming.

In September, 1910, appellee, J. C. Williams, at Central City, Kentucky, purchased from appellant, Illinois Central Railroad Company, a round trip ticket to Knoxville, Tennessee. It was routed via the Illinois Central lines to Louisville; and from that point to Knoxville via the Louisville & Nashville Railroad's line. It was a reduced rate excursion ticket. Returning, Williams traveled on the ticket without objection to Louisville; but was denied passage from that point on home by the Illinois Central Company. He was delayed a few hours in Louisville, at a few dollars expense, and brought this action to recover for his expense, a day's loss of time, and his mortification and humiliation. The jury returned a verdict of $250 in his favor, and the Illinois Central Company appeals. Section 4 of the ticket contract provides as follows:

"It is not good for RETURN passage unless the Original Purchaser identifies himself or herself to the authorized Validating Agent of Line at

DESTINATION

Over which Ticket reads therefrom, and when this Ticket is officially executed by such Agent by being signed and dated, in ink, and stamped, it shall then be good only for CONTINUOUS RETURN PASSAGE of the Original Purchaser to starting point, leaving destination only on date so stamped on back (except it is subject to the stopover regulations of the lines over which it reads), and further provided such extreme RETURN limit shall not extend beyond date punched under head of 'FINAL LIMIT,' after which Ticket is void."

Section 5 of the ticket contract provides as follows: "I, the Original Purchaser, agree to sign my name and otherwise satisfactorily identify myself as such whenever called upon to do so by any Conductor or Agent of any of the lines over which this Ticket reads.' The original ticket is in the record. On its back appears this printed matter:

"In compliance with my contract with the Illinois Central Railroad Co. and lines over which this ticket reads, I hereby subscribe my name as the original purchaser of this ticket.

"Signature*

"Witness

"Dated

Validating Agent.

-190-."

At the left of this endorsement appeared a space surrounded by a scroll, above which was printed "Validating Agent at Destination of Ticket will stamp in space below." Within the scroll, printed by rubber stamp, appears "L. & N. R. R. Sep. 23, '10, Depot-B, Knoxville, Tenn." Neither the name of Williams, nor the name of the agent, however, was written upon the back of the ticket. For this reason, because of the provisions above quoted as sections 4 and 5 of the ticket, Williams was refused passage. We must consider, therefore, the relative rights of the parties under the contract.

In the first place, some misapprehension seems present as to what was necessary in the process of validation at Knoxville. There was nothing in the contract providing that Williams should sign there; per contra, he had to sign his name only when "called upon by any conductor or agent of any of the lines over which this ticket reads." If the agent there had called upon him to sign, it was his duty to do so; but he was not asked to sign. Nor does the fact that a blank space was left for his signature even imply that he should sign at Knoxville. The place was provided for his signature in case the signature should be asked. Doubtless the custom was to have the passenger sign at the time of validation, and doubtless agents were instructed to demand the signature. But the contract, not the custom, must govern. The agent, however, was required to sign, but failed to do so. This is the plain intent of section 4 of the contract. Practically the same ticket provision was so construed in Boylan v. Hot Springs Railroad Company, post.

In investigating generally the right of holders of like or similar ticket contracts, we present the following authorities, quotations and comment:

In Hutchinson on Carriers, section 1054, it is said: "Where in consideration of a reduced rate, a 'roundtrip' ticket is sold by which the passenger is to be conveyed to the point of destination and back, and the terms of the contract are that the ticket shall be good for the return trip only upon condition that the passenger will present himself as the original purchaser and procure the ticket to be there stamped, or shall comply with other similar requirements, the validity of the ticket for the return depends upon his compliance with the contract, and in case he fails to comply he may be refused carriage and ejected from the car."

In Bowers v. Pittsburg, Fort Wayne & Chicago Railroad Company, 158 Pa. St., 302, Bowers had presented his ticket at the Pullman office and purchased his sleeping car berth for the return trip. The agent was only the Pullman agent and had nothing to do with the validation of the ticket. The passenger got upon the train and rode some distance; when the conductor came around, observed that his ticket was not validated, and ejected him. Said the court in speaking of the paragraph of the contract which demanded validation:

*

"The condition * is not unreasonable; and it was clearly plaintiff's duty to have informed himself of its existence. Having failed to comply with the terms of the condition he had no right to use the ticket for the return trip."

In Moses v. East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia Railroad Company, 73 Ga., 356, the ticket was a round-trip excursion rate ticket to Jacksonville, Florida. One of its provisions was that it should not be good for return passage, unless "the holder should identify himself to the agent before starting back" and that "when officially signed and dated in ink, and duly witnessed and stamped by said agent" the ticket should be good for the return journey. The purchaser made no effort at all to have his ticket validated. He was ejected, and the court held him without remedy. The court said that an instruction in substance that the purchaser must comply with his part of the contract, and that his failure to do so gave the railroad the right to put him off, was correct.

In this case it is notable that the ticket read over two lines and the court held that the fact that the first line

accepted the ticket and carried the passenger upon it would not have the effect of waiving the right of the second line to act otherwise.

In Rawitz v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, 40 L. Ann., 47, it was held that a written provision of a contract, like the one under discussion here, is not subject to modification by parol testimony, and that such a provision in a contract, though entailing considerable annoyance upon the purchaser, is not liable to the objection that it is unfair and unreasonable, in view of the reduced rate obtained by the passenger.

In Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Railway Company v. Wright, 18 Ind. App., 125, s. c., 47 N. E., 491, a passenger, under a ticket similar to the one exhibited in the case at bar in an effort to have his ticket validated, presented himself at the station after it had closed for the night. The court held that in consideration of the reduced fare the railway company had the right to attach the condition as to its validation and that this condition was a condition precedent, a compliance with which or excuse for non-compliance with which must be shown, before the ticket gave the right to a return passage; and that the appearance at the ticket office in the village in the night time was not a sufficient effort to comply with this precedent condition, because the railway company, under a reasonable operation of its business, had the right to keep the small station closed at night.

In Watson v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, 104 Tenn., 194, s. c., 49 L. R. A., 454, it was held that a condition that the ticket must be stamped by the agent at the turning point of the round trip before it would be good for return passage, was a reasonable regulation by the carrier. It was further held that the sale at the reduced rate was sufficient to put the purchaser upon inquiry and to affect him with notice of unusual terms and conditions attached to the ticket; and the fact that he could not read or write and was not specially notified of this requirement did not relieve him from the necessity of complying with the condition named.

In Edwards v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Company, 81 Mich., 364, s. c., 21 Am. St. Rep., 527, it was held that a condition in a round-trip excursion ticket, sold by the railroad at less than a regular rate, that same should be good for return passage only after signature by the purchaser and stamping and dating by the agent, was reasonable and valid; and that the pas