at a high temperature was published by Réaumur so long ago as 1722. The invention of this process is, however, generally ascribed to Mr. Samuel Lucas, to whom a patent was granted in 1804 for a method of softening cast-iron by cementation with "iron-stone ore, or some of the metallic oxides, lime, or any combination of these." The castings to be softened are packed in cast-iron crucibles containing finely-powdered red hematite, and arranged in rows one above another in a furnace somewhat resembling the ordinary cementation-chamber. When the furnace has been charged all the openings are carefully closed and the fire is lighted, the temperature being gradually raised so as to reach a red heat in about twenty-four hours. The firing is subsequently continued during from three to five days, according to the thickness of the layer of malleable metal required. Heath applies the term "cementation" to the process by which he obtains his pure iron or sponge. In their additions of February 21, 1866, the Martins say: "Ce mineral avait été grillé au gaz, concassé, et partiellement cémenté dans des creusets en fonte." Slade understands this statement to mean that "this ore had been roasted with gas, pulverized, and partly cemented into cast-iron in crucibles." But I think the meaning is that the ore, after roasting and pulverization, had been partially cemented in cast-iron crucibles. The use of the word "en," to denote the materials of which things are made, if not elegant, is common. Arago applies the expressions "en fer," "en bois," to articles made of iron or of wood. Voltaire makes the same use of the words "en metal." Montaigne uses in the same way the expres sion "en marbre." Again, the position of the words "en fonte" points to the same construction. The words "en fonte" certainly may be used to indicate a conversion from one condition to another, but if they had been so used in this case they would, I think, have preceded "dans des creusets." But then the use to which this product was to be put-viz, the dilution of the carbon in the molten cast-iron-would seem to imply that decarburized iron, and not cast-iron, was sought. And, finally, the employment of this process for the production of cast-iron (fonte) would be too extraordinary to give probability to Slade's construction. I now recur to the question whether the subject-matter of the issue is embraced in the record claims of both of these parties. Slade claims the subject-matter of the issue. His claim is, in terms, generic, covering sponge of every grade of purity. He makes no specific claim. Blair's formal claim is also, in terms, generic. But he insists upon a specific claim to the use of sponge superior in purity to any ever before used. The use of that sponge, while it is embraced in the subject-matter of the issue, does not cover its whole breadth. The subject of the issue includes this claim, as the genus includes the species. Neither of these parties could hold the broad or generic claim without rendering a specific claim by his competitor subordinate thereto. But either might hold the specific claim, as for an improvement, without any title whatever to the generic claim. I conclude, therefore, that the subject-matter of the issue is found in the completed specification of Charles W. Siemens, dated February 21, 1868, in the patent of Josiah M. Heath, granted in 1845, and also in the American patent of Emile and Pierre E. Martin, No. 72,061, December 10, 1867; that Slade's claim is anticipated by those patents, and that any broad claim by Blair to the subject-matter of the issue must be anticipated by those patents. What right Blair may or may not have under his patent to a monopoly of the use of sponge of the precise standard of purity which he claims to have attained, it is not material to inquire in this proceeding. Neither party is the first and original inventor of the subject-matter of the issue. The decision of the Examiners-in-Chief, awarding priority of invention to Blair, is reversed. The interference is dissolved. WARNANT v. WARNANT et al. Decided January 27, 1880. 17 O. G., 265. 1. An applicant's oath, which is presumptive proof that he is the first inventor and that his invention has never before been known or used, is practically, in most cases, conclusive proof of originality of invention, and, having such virtue, must be made strictly according to law. 2. An applicant's oath cannot be taken before a burgomaster of the Kingdom of Belgium, unless such burgomaster is a notary public. The presumption is that the office of notary public, which exists in all European states, is different from the office of a Belgian burgomaster. 3. A Belgian burgomaster's official seal and signature, coupled with a United States consul's certification of the genuineness of such seal and signature, cannot furnish presumptive proof that that officer was a notary public as well as a burgomaster. 4. An affidavit made in support of a preliminary statement before a consul of the United States in a foreign country cannot be used as evidence in favor of the affiant against another party to an interference; for the express provision of the rule authorizing such preliminary statement is that it can in no case be used as evidence in behalf of the party making it. 5. An applicant's oath before a Belgian burgomaster is not presumptively sufficient to sustain an interference as against other partics or to secure a patent to the applicant in an ex parte case; but such oath is sufficient to estop one of two joint applicants who made it from denying its truth in an interference between the joint application and his subsequent separate application; as against him it will suffice to maintain an interference until an award of priority shall have been made to one or the other of the parties, the question whether the patent shall be granted to the successful party being a subject for ex parte adjudication. APPEAL from Examiner of Interferences. MOTION to dissolve interference. FIRE-ARMS. APPLICATION of Jean and Julien Warnant filed September 10, 1878, Application of Jean Warnant filed January 21, 1879. Mr. R. D. Williams for Jean and Julien Warnant. PAINE, Commissioner : Jean Warnant moved to dissolve the interference on the ground that the affidavit annexed to the application of Jean and Julien Warnant was not made before an officer authorized by law. The affidavit was made before N. Warnant, a burgomaster in the Kingdom of Belgium. It is provided in section 4892 Revised Statutes that the applicant shall make oath, first, that he believes himself to be the original inventor; second, that he believes himself to be the first inventor; and, third, that he does not know and does not believe that the invention was ever before known or used; and that he shall also "state of what country he is a citizen." Except in comparatively few cases, this affidavit furnishes all the proof which is ever presented to the Office or to the public that the applicant himself made the invention that he did not buy or steal it. In effect the affidavit is almost always not merely prima facie but conclusive proof on this point; for, from the nature of the case, while it may be easy to disprove the allegation that the applicant is the first inventor, it is rarely possible to disprove the assertion that he is an original inventor. The truth on that point is a secret locked up in his own breast, which it is ordinarily impossible to uncover against his will. His affidavit, therefore, which is presumptive proof that he is the first inventor and that his invention has never before been known or used, is practically, in most cases, conclusive proof of originality of invention. To have such virtue the affidavit must, of course, be made strictly according to law. The law requires that this oath, when made in a foreign country, shall be made before a "minister, chargé d'affaires, consul, or commercial agent, holding commission under the Government of the United States, or before any notary public of the foreign country in which the applicant may be." In this case the affidavit was made by Jean and Julien Warnant before the burgomaster of Cheratte, one of the communes of the province of Liege, in the Kingdom of Belgium. If this burgomaster was a notary public of Belgium, the affidavit was lawful, but not otherwise. The office of notary public, which exists in all European stat es, is very different from the office of a Belgian burgomaster. Still it might be that both offices were administered by one officer, or that to the ordinary functions of the burgomaster were superadded those of the notary public. It is insisted that the burgomaster's seal and signature, coupled with the United States consul's certification of the genuineness of such seal and signature, furnished presumptive proof, not only that the officer was a burgomaster, but also that he was a notary public. I do not think so. The presumption, when it arises in such a case, is that the officer is what he represents himself to be, and not what he does not represent himself to be. The presumption which, under certain circumstances, arises in favor of the official character of a de facto officer is that he is what he purports to be, and not that he is something else. I conclude that this affidavit was presumptively not executed before either of the officers designated by the statute, and is not sufficient to warrant the grant of a patent to the applicants by whom it was made. But it is insisted that the affidavit made by Jean and Julien Warnant in support of their preliminary statement was made before a consul of the United States in Belgium, and therefore meets the requirements of the statute. If this oath embraced the substantive statements prescribed by the statute for the oath annexed to the application, it could be no evidence in favor of the affiants as against other parties to an interference, because the express provision of (old) Rule 53, which authorized this preliminary statement, is that it "can in no case be used as evidence in behalf of the party making it." Whether this sworn preliminary statement would or would not warrant the issue of a patent to these applicants if the interference should be decided in their favor and their case should become an ex parte one, it is unnecessary now to determine. But there is another difficulty with this preliminary statement. It does not cover the ground marked out by the law for the applicants' affidavit. It does not show that they believe themselves to be the original inventors or the first inventors, or that they did not know and did not believe that the invention was ever before known or used. If this were the whole case, it would be necessary to dissolve this interference; for the application of Jean and Julien Warnant could have no lawful place in an interference with the other party, nor could they receive a patent in an ex parte case. But while the oath of the applicants is insufficient to support their application in an ex parte case, or to secure them a patent if successful in an interference proceeding, it is sufficient to estop the parties who made and subscribed that oath from denying the truth of its statements in this controversy. This estoppel will not suffice to secure the grant of a patent to either party. It will suffice to maintain this interference until an award of priority shall have been made to one or the other of the parties. The question whether a patent shall afterward be granted to the successful party will be left for future determination. Inasmuch as the application of Jean and Julien Warnant has been admitted to examination, notwithstanding the defect under consideration, the examination will not now be suspended; but no patent can be issued in any event on their application until an affidavit shall be furnished substantially in compliance with the requirements of the statute. FOWLER ET AL. v. BENTON. Decided January 28, 1880. 17 O. G., 266. I. If the Primary Examiner, overruling a motion to dissolve an interference, affirms his previous decision in favor of the patentability of the invention, the party who makes the motion is not precluded from protesting against the grant of the patent on the ground of the non-patentability of the invention; but such protest will be entertained by the Commissioner, subject to the restrictions of Rule 12, either forthwith, or after the determination of the interference, or at such time as justice may seem to require in the particular case. 2. If the application of the new rules to a case which was in process of adjudication on the 1st of January, 1880, will not place either party to an interference in a worse attitude than he would have occupied under those rules if both applications had been filed after that date, the operation of the old rules will not be extended to such case. MOTION to apply old rules to adjudication of the case. APPLICATION of John B. Benton filed January 3, 1878. Application of John W. Fowler and Daniel F. Lewis filed April 2, 1879. Messrs. Baldwin, Hopkins & Peyton for Benton. Mr. James L. Ewin for Fowler & Lewis. PAINE, Commissioner: This interference was pending January 1, 1880. The following stipulation was signed by the parties November 20, 1879: It is hereby stipulated between counsel for the respective parties that all the affidavits and evidence now adduced on behalf of Fowler & Lewis may be used on behalf of said Fowler & Lewis at any future motion to dissolve the interference as redeclared upon the amended issue asked for by Benton under date of November 20, 1879; said affidavits and evidence to be subject to all objections that may be now urged against them or it, save the objection that they are not sufficient for the award of a new trial, which Benton now maintains. Fowler & Lewis ask that the operation of the rules in force December 31, 1879, be extended to this case, so that, if a pending motion to dis solve the interference on the ground of want of novelty in the invention shall be overruled by the Examiner of Interferences, an appeal may be taken from his decision. Under (old) Rule 59, the question of novelty, if decided in favor of an application on a motion to dissolve an interference, could be removed from the ordinary ex parte course of official action and carried by appeal as a contested question to the appellate tribunal. This presented the contestant in the dual character of a claimant and an assailant of the invention in the same proceeding. He was allowed to claim the invention for his own benefit, but at the same time to combat it to the injury of his opponent. Under the rules as they now stand, if, on a motion to dissolve an interference based on the ground of want of novelty of the invention, |