3. A railway-ticket anticipated by an internal-revenue stamp where the system and the manner in which it is carried out is substantially the same. 4. Duplication of checks or coupons as a matter of expediency, obviously suggested by the necessity of the case, does not require invention. APPEAL from the Examiners-in-Chief. COUPON-TICKET. APPLICATION of Theodore H. Lee filed November 20, 1878. Mr. William Kemble Hall for the applicant. MARBLE, Commissioner : This appeal is taken from the decision of the Board of Examiners-inChief affirming the action of the Primary Examiner in refusing the following claims: 1. The combination of two stubs, or counterparts with the contract-ticket, substantially as described. 2. The arrangement of the two stubs relatively to the coupons and the list of terminal stations in the manner and for the purpose specified. The references upon which applicant's claims stand rejected are a description on page 441 of "Kirkman's Railway Revenue," New York, 1877; Patent No. 200,264, to W. E. Davis, February 12, 1878; Patent No. 193,167, to E. A. Locke, July 17, 1877, and Patent No. 84,372, to E. H. Paine, November 24, 1868. The ticket designed to be covered by the first of applicant's claims consists of a contract portion, which constitutes the ticket proper, to be delivered to the passenger, and two attached checks or stubs, one of which serves as a memorandum or check for the agent and the other as a check to be forwarded to the auditor. The first of the above-cited references shows an illustration of a ticket containing two of the elements of applicant's first claim-viz, the contract-ticket and the auditor's stub or check. The description accompanying the illustration furnishes the third element. It reads as follows: It has a stub attached which is filled up when the ticket is sold, and is preserved as a record for the agent in writing up his account. That such is the proposed construction of the ticket also appears from the instructions on page 244 of the same work, where it is stated— That the destination on all blank tickets must be filled in plainly with ink on both ticket and stub,. also on auditor's check when attached. This reference, in my judgment, is a complete anticipation of appli cant's first claim. The same, also, may be said with regard to the patent to Locke. This patent shows a revenue-stamp provided with a central portion, which is to be attached to a vessel containing spirits, and two stubs, one of which is to be retained by the gager and the other is to be forwarded by him to the department. Applicant has merely applied this system of checks adopted by Locke in the issuance of revenue-stamps to the issuance of railway-tickets. The central portion of the stamp, which passes out of the hands of the gager upon payment of the revenue-tax, corresponds with the central or contract portion of the ticket, which is given by the agent to the passenger upon payment of his fare. The stub or counterpart of the stamp retained by the gager corresponds with the stub of the ticket retained by the agent, and the stub forwarded by the gager to the auditor of the department answers for the check forwarded by the ticket-agent to the auditor of the railroad. The printed matter upon the ticket differs, it is true, from that upon the stamp, but this cannot affect the pertinency of the reference. The patentable features of a ticket, like those of any other substantive thing, must depend upon peculiarities of mechanical construction. The printed matter upon the ticket is nothing more than an arbitrary direction as to how such ticket is to be used, and can have no more bearing upon the patentability of the ticket itself than can printed directions for use upon any other article of manufacture affect the ques tion of its patentable novelty. The system, however, and the manner in which it is carried out is substantially the same in both cases. Were there no other references in this case than the patent of Davis, I should feel but little hesitancy in refusing applicant's first claim, since the only point of difference is the employment of an additional check or stub. The addition of a detachable stub or coupon is a well-recognized way of furnishing a ready memorandum or check for the persons through whose hands the ticket may pass. Thus, for example, a detachable coupon may be added for the baggage-master, or another for the gatekeeper, or as many others, in fact, as the business of the road may render advisable. In my judgment the duplication of these checks is a mere matter of expediency, which is obviously suggested by the necessities of the case, and which cannot require the exercise of invention. The purpose of applicant's second claim, the form of which is somewhat misleading, is, as appears from his reasons of appeal, to cover "the arrangement of the parts of the ticket so that, in effect, this may all be read in one way." It is a common expedient of printers, in making up the forms, to arrange the printed matter in any desired manner, and, in my judgment, the arrangement of the printed matter in the present case in such a manner as to avoid the necessity of reversing the ticket in reading certain portions thereof does not indicate the exercise of invention. Moreover, the patent to Paine, cited by the Examiner, shows a ticket in which the agent's stub and succeeding coupons can all be read the same way, and is, hence, a full anticipation of applicant's ticket in this regard. It is immaterial what the printed matter upon the coupon is, or whether these coupons be called stubs or checks. If the desideratum is to have them all so arranged as to allow them to be read in the same way, this is attained by the reference. The decision of the Board of Examiners-in-Chief is affirmed. GARDNER v. DUDLEY. Decided August 10, 1880. 18 O. G., 683. On a motion for rehearing the question of fact to be inquired into is whether the findings of fact in the former decision are either wholly unsupported by or clearly in conflict with the evidence. MOTION for rehearing. VEHICLE-SPRING. APPLICATION of Myron L. Gardner filed May 3, 1878. Application of Richard Dudley filed May 25, 1878. Mr. T. F. Welch for Gardner. MARBLE, Commissioner: On March 20, 1880, this interference was decided by the then Acting Commissioner, Mr. Doolittle, and now comes before me upon a motion for a rehearing. The grounds of this motion are (1) that the Assistant Commissioner erred in deciding that Gardner reduced the invention to practice before Dudley; (2) that he made a mistake in his application and construction of the testimony in behalf of Dudley, and (3) that he erred in holding that the first set of springs made by Dudley, as well as the second set made by him, were not a full reduction of the invention to practice. The proper practice relative to cases of the character of the present has been fully stated by my predecessor in the well-considered and closely-analogous case of Packard v. Sandford (16 O. G., 1182). In that case the following language occurs: Whether, if this case were before me on appeal, I should on this question of fact agree with the Examiner of Interferences, or with the Examiners-in-Chief, or with the Acting Commissioner, it is not material now to inquire, for this is a motion for a rehear. ing of a decision of the Commissioner, and not an original hearing of an appeal. The question of fact on this motion always is, whether the findings of fact in the former decision are either wholly unsupported by or clearly in conflict with the evidence. That this has been the prevailing practice of the Office is evidenced by the case of Huttner et al. v. Knox et al. (16 O. G., 1046); Lee v. Welch et al. (15 O. G., 563); Dod v. Cobb (C. D. 1876, p. 196); Pattee v. Russell (C. D. 1852, p. 255), and others. It appears from the record in this case that the Examiner of Interferences decided priority of invention in favor of Gardner, holding, as did the Acting Commissioner, that the testimony on behalf of Dudley failed to show a sufficient reduction to practice by him. Both the examiner of Interferences and the Board of Examiners-in-Chief are agreed to the reduction to practice of the invention by Gardner. The Board, however, without directly finding that Dudley reduced the invention to practice, awarded priority in his favor, stating that he was the first to conceive and was proceeding to reduce it to practice when Gardner conceived. The fact of this disagreement of the lower tribunals would of itself argue ample room for doubt, and from a careful consideration of the testimony in the case I am clearly of the opinion that the finding of the Acting Commissioner forming the basis of the present motion cannot be said to be "either wholly unsupported by or in conflict with the evidence." The motion for rehearing is accordingly denied. YOUNG v. ROGERS. Decided August 11, 1880. 18 O. G., 733. The rule of law that the proof and pleadings of a cause must correspond in all essentials is as applicable to contested cases in the Patent Office as in the courts. APPEAL from the Examiners-in-Chief. IRON-GATE HINGE. APPLICATION of Young filed May 29, 1879. Application of Rogers filed October 5, 1878; patent granted December 10, 1878, No. 210,805, Messrs. Leggett & Leggett for Young. Mr. J. C. Smith for Rogers. MARBLE, Commissioner: The subject matter involved in this interference is as follows: 1. A combined gate-hinge and corner-iron composed of two section-plates, each having corresponding vertical and horizontal half-sockets with an arm or arms projecting from one or both plates and bearing the whole or half of an eye or socket. 2. A gate-hinge rod bent upon itself so that the ends enter the upper and lower hinge-sockets in different vertical planes, in combination with a gate and gate-support. It appears from the uncontroverted testimony in this case that the Champion Fence Company, of which James Young is an officer, was in 1876 engaged in the manufacture of fences at the town of Kenton, Ohio, and that in the spring of that year Samuel Rogers entered its employ. In the spring of 1877 this company moved to Pittsburg, Rogers going there with them, and in January or February, 1878, moved back from Pittsburg to Kenton. Since the 1st of April 1878, the company has manufactured the two-part gate-hinge here at issue, and from the beginning of such manufacture, in April, 1878, until his discharge, in September following, Rogers assisted in constructing the same. Young, in his preliminary statement, claims to have conceived and disclosed to others the invention at issue about the middle of April, 1877; to have ordered patterns made from castings in May, 1877; to have again ordered patterns made about the 10th of February, 1878, which were completed in the early part of March, 1878, and to have made a full-size operative machine about the 1st of April, 1878, since which time the invention has been extensively manufactured. As a witness in his own behalf, Young swears to the facts as above stated, giving the names of several of the parties to whom he disclosed the invention, and says that it was G. R. Mease to whom he suggested, in the spring of 1877, the making of the patterns, he being at that time the pattern-maker of the company. As to the disclosure of the invention in April, 1877, the testimony of Young is corroborated by that of Henry Price, the secretary of the company. Mease, when called as a witness on behalf of Rogers, contradicts Young as to the suggestion by him relative to patterns at Pittsburg in 1877; but several witnesses are produced in rebuttal, who swear positively that Young did instruct Mease with regard to the patterns, thus destroying the value of the latter's testimony. The testimony of Young as to the making of the patterns by his directions in February, 1878, and its subsequent completion is fully corroborated by the patternmaker and others. Young must be held, therefore, to have conceived the invention in the spring of 1877, and to have reduced the same to practice in the spring of 1878. The preliminary statement of Rogers gives the history of invention as follows, viz: Samuel Rogers says that he invented the hinge herein described during the month of May, 1875; that at said time he manufactured one gate with hinge attached as therein described, except that said hinge, made in 1875, was not made in two pieces, as described in his letters patent, but was made solid, and attached to the gate by means of screws cut and screwed into what is called a "gas-pipe cross," attached to said gate. Said hinge was made by affiant in order to see how the same would work. He was unable to get patterns made at that time to cast the hinge in two parts, so made said hinge as above described. Affiant says that said gate and hinge made by him in 1875 was never sold or used in public. The same has since then been taken apart and destroyed by this affiant. Affiant further says that he never manufactured, or sold, or used, in public any of said gate-hinges, except as herein stated and set forth. Affiant says that in 1876, in the latter part of November or first of December, he had one Tim. Rogers, of Mount Vernon, Knox County, Ohio, to manufacture eight or ten of said hinges, as described in his letters patent, for him. Affiant says that in August, 1877, he had patterns for the construction of said hinge made in the works of the Champion Fence Company, of Pittsburg, Pa. Since said date of August, 1877, said Champion Fence Company have been manufacturing and selling the same and not prior thereto, and further this affiant saith not. Rogers, when testifying as a witness in his own behalf, swears that he conceived the invention at issue in the early part of the year 1875, and at that time had patterns thereof made by his brother, Tim. Rogers, and a casting (Exhibit A) is produced, which, it is alleged, was made at that time from such patterns. This testimony is corroborated by Tim. Rogers, but is clearly repugnant to Rogers's preliminary statement, wherein he says that he was unable to procure the patterns made for |