agents foresee a year, or perhaps years, of litigation. In the meantime, the Title 18, U.S.C., offense has been referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is soon ready for the grand jury. The alternatives, then, are: (1) to proceed with the Title 18 offense without the Title 26 offense, or (2) to investigate the Title 26 offense by grand jury. The result of the first choice is to weaken the case and to divide offenses which should be joined; the second choice bypasses the careful review process which is essential to uniform enforcement of the revenue laws. Often it is not a simple process to determine whether an item is or is not on a return: considerable investigation and expertise in tax law may be required. In summary and in conclusion: This proposal would ham string the investigative procedures of the Internal Revenue Service. It would require large manpower resources in the Internal Revenue Service, in the Tax Division, and in the Offices of the United States Attorneys. It would further overburden the Federal court system. And, most importantly, it would afford procedures whereby those who would thwart the selfassessment system could do so with impunity. Thank you, again, for permitting us to present the view of the Department of Justice on this matter. Drug-Law Enforcement: Should We Arrest Pushers or Users? Any society wishing to reduce the caption of an "undesirable" item, such as illegal drugs, has available two general strategies: reducing demand, by harassing buyers, or reducing supply, by harassing sellers. Law enforcement agencies in the United States, presumably with the approval of the voting public, seem to have opted largely for the latter strategy ("we're not really interested in users; we want the pushers"), and yet ex-addict William S. Burroughs (1966, p. xl) advises: “If we wish to annihilate the junk pyramid, we must start with the bottom of the pyramid: the Addict in the Street, and stop tilting quixotically for the 'higher ups' so called, all of whom are irunediately replaceable” (italics in original). This note will consider what is involved in choosing between these two strategies and will argue that the United States has chosen to emphasize the strategy which, for a given enforcement expenditure, (1) probably has the smaller effect upon drug consumption, (2) seems likely to increase crime rates by addicts, making enforcement of other laws more difficult, and (3) seems more likely to corrupt police. That something is wrong with our strategy wen's clear enough. The Government Accounting Office recently conclɩ ded from a year-long investigation that trassic in heroin is too big to stop at United States borders (New York Times, December 13, 1972, p. 31). In some ways even more disturbing, however, was the recent announcemen that about one-fifth of the heroin and cocaine seized in New York City over the past 12 years has been stolen from the police department (New York Times, February 1, 1973, p. 1). The economics of drug law enforcement is similar to that of sales taxes. As is well known, who "pays" such a tax and its effects upon price and quantity depend upon the slopes of demand-and-supply curves as well as upon the content of the law. The 'aw determines whether the buyer or the seller shall act as the state's "coction agent," in the case of sales taxes. Since punishment for violating ag laws is usually at least partly 210 agents foresee a year, or perhaps years, of litigation. In the meantime, the Title 18, U.S.C., offense has been referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is soon ready for the grand jury. The alternatives, then, are: (1) to proceed with the Title 18 offense without the Title 26 offense, or (2) to investigate the Title 26 offense by grand jury. The result of the first choice is to weaken the case and to divide offenses which should be joined; the second choice bypasses the careful review process which is essential to uniform enforcement of the revenue laws. Often it is not a simple process to determine whether an item is or is not on a return: considerable investigation and expertise in tax law may be required. In summary and in conclusion: This proposal would hamstring the investigative procedures of the Internal Revenue Service. It would require large manpower resources in the Internal Revenue Service, in the Tax Division, and in the Offices of the United States Attorneys. It would further over burden the Federal court system. And, most importantly, it would afford procedures whereby those who would thwart the selfassessment system could do so with impunity. Thank you, again, for permitting us to present the view of the Department of Justice on this matter. Drug-Law Enforcement: Should We Arrest Any society wishing to reduce the estruption of an “undesirable” The economics of drug law enforcen ent is similar to that of sales taxes. As is well known, who "pays" such a tax and its effects upon price and quantity depend upon the slopes of e demand-anc'-supply curves as well as upon the content of the law. The 'aw determines whether the buyer or the seller shall act as the state's "coton agent," in the case of sales taxes. Since punishment for violating : ag laws is usually at least partly 210 w.m MISCELLANY 211 nonpecuniary, taking the form of jail time, social disgrace, and other inconveniences, the content of drug laws, together with police enforcement decisions, determines upon whom these noupecuniary costs shall fall as well as upon whom the initial burden of pecuniary “taxes" (the expected value of fines, legal fees, etc.) shall fall. If sale is prohibited and purchase not (by law, or de facto, by police decisions within the constraints of limited enforcement resources), the tax will fali initially upon sellers, who will convert the resulting pecuniary and nonpecuniary costs into a pecuniary increase in supply price to buyers. Likewise, buyers will convert pecuniary and nonpecuniary inconveniences arising from police harassment into a pecuniary decline in demand price to sellers. As is true with sales taxes, a given shift in demand relative to supply will result in the same effect upon consumption, regardless of whether the shift is in demand or supply. Presumably, sales taxes are usually levied upon sellers because of lower enforcement and collection costs; a given amount of enforcement effort will produce more net revenue if directed at sellers. With sales taxes, we would wish to arrange collections so as to shift demand relative to supply as little as possible for a given tax rate. With drug laws, on the other hand, the goal is not to collect revenue but to discourage consumption, and we would wish to arrange laws and enforcement procedures so as to shift demand relative to supply as much as possible. Whether we would wish to impose the "tax" initially upon sellers or buyers depends upon which arrangement we would expect to result in a greater shift in demand relative to supply. This, in turn, would seem to depend mostly upon whether buyers or sellers are more efficient in converting the inconveniences of dealing with fines or nonpecuniary punishments such as jail sentences, social disgrace, etc., into pecuniary shifts in supply or demand. The more efficient the conversion, the smaller the shift a g ven amount of harassment will produce. It seems likely that sellers would have the advantage over buyers in making this conversion, since opportunities for specialization should attract to the drug-selling trade individuals who are peculiarly suited for it. If the law requires that sellers occasionally cope with fines, jail sentences, and resulting social disapproval, we should expect successful drug dealers to be those who have the lowest supply prices for these services or are most adept at avoiding them. Presumably, the successful practitioners of any trade are largely distinguished by their ability to convert pecuniary and nonpecuniary costs into small pecuniary prices; there is no obvious reason why drug dealers should be an exception. In addition, specialization by drug dealers makes investment in devices for reducing the impact of enforcement (knowledge of whom to bribe to avoid arrest, which lawyers to hire to avoid conviction, etc.) more remunerative. Finally, possibilities for entering the drug-selling trade will tend to inake seller harassinent less effective. A buyer jailed means one buyer less for the duration of the |