These include decisions to grant formal or informal immunity," postponing sentencing until defendants have delivered on their promise to cooperate, making cooperation a condition of probation, explicitly recognizing cooperation as a factor in parole decisions, and maintaining adequate protection of cooperating individuals by the U.S. Marshals Service. The third way we can improve our capability to conduct conspiracy investigations is by developing long-term approaches to investigation. Since productive leads and cooperating individuals are scarce commodities, they must be preserved, if possible, by keeping these individuals out of court. This can be done by developing other evidence, or by using the border search authority of the Customs Service to arrest a known drug smuggler. In maintaining long-term sources of information, great care must be taken to avoid putting the cooperating individual in a position in which he is forced to actually participate in an illegal act. IMMOBILIZING DRUG TRAFFICKERS Gathering sufficient evidence to prosecute a trafficker does not guarantee his immobilization. He may be operating in a foreign country, out of reach of effective prosecution and sentencing. Even in the United States, indictment and arrest do not guarantee immobilization; these events merely begin a long criminal justice process during most of which the trafficker may be free to continue operating. At the end of this process, incarceration may be relatively short. This failure to immobilize traffickers against whom a substantial case has been developed is very costly-costly in terms of wasted investigative resources, weakened deterrent, and reduced public trust in the criminal justice system. Consequently, the task force believes that efforts to more effectively immobilize indicated traffickers are vitally important. The United States has two broad options for denying traffickers safe havens in foreign countries. First, U.S. enforcement officials can cooperate with foreign law enforcement officials in developing cases to be tried in foreign countries." In some countries-for example, France and Mexico-laws permit evidence gathered in the United States for violations committed here to be used in prosecuting a trafficker in the foreign country's courts. Second, we can indicate the foreign trafficker and then seek jurisdiction through extradition or expulsion. Both of these devices should be used to the maximum extent possible and the task force recommends that a permanent DEA-Justice-State committee be established under the CCINC to coordinate the extradition and expulsion program. For traffickers operating within the United States, simply arresting them has not proven to be an effective means of immobilization. Traffickers usually raise bail quickly and often immediately resume trafficking when released. Thus, attention should be paid to ways to keep traffickers from operating before conviction or while on appeal, and we should of course seek ways to increase the rate of conviction, and the period of incarceration which follows. The task force's major recommendations regarding sentencing and parole of drug traffickers include: Requiring minimum mandatory sentences for persons convicted of highlevel trafficking in narcotics and "dangerous drugs." Requiring mandatory consecutive sentencing rather than concurrent sentencing for persons who are arrested and convicted for narcotics trafficking while on bail from another trafficking offense. This kind of selective deterrent aimed at offenses committed while on bail should help reduce the high rate of continued drug trafficking. 8 5 As tools to secure cooperation, grants of immunity can be effective. Yet they should be used sparingly. The Justice Department has recently reviewed the process of granting immunity with an eye toward tightening procedures. It is worth noting that our success in encouraging other countries to deny safe havens depends significantly on our willingness to deal severely with people we arrest in the United States. Foreign governments have noticed and complained about our lenient treatment of couriers from their countries arrested in the United States. They have also noticed the short prison terms for major domestic violators. Consequently, some doubt our determination to control drug abuse. Thus there is an important interdependence between the program to deny safe havens to overseas traffickers, and the program to effectively control traffickers arrested in the United States. 7 In this regard, the task force specifically endorses the President's proposal for mandatory minimum sentences for persons trafficking in hard drugs and suggests that consideration be given to expanding the proposal to include major traffickers in barbiturates and amphetamines. A recent DEA study showed that 45 percent of a group of traffickers on bail were implicated in post-arrest trafficking. Undertaking major efforts to educate judges regarding the likelihood of repeated trafficking offenses, and encouraging them to carefully weigh the danger to the community a trafficker represents if released. Submitting written recommendations from prosecutors to the parole board regarding parole decisions on high-level violators. At minimum, prosecutors should submit written requests to keep high-level traffickers incarcerated. This policy should ultimately result in explicit revisions of parole guidelines in order to defer parole for high-level traffickers. Revoking parole and cancellation of all "good time" already served, in the event that a paroled offender is re-arrested on narcotics trafficking charges. Indirect pressures can also be used to supplement direct prosecution attacks on drug traffickers. Efforts can be aimed at confiscating contraband drugs, damaging the trafficking network's capacity to finance its operations, and seizing vehicles, passports, and licenses (e.g., pilots') necessary to remain in the drug trade. Targeting on the seizure of contraband by itself would not be an effective supply reduction strategy. The amounts seized are too small and the drugs themselves too easily replaced. Nonetheless, increased seizures of drugs in quantity could have a substantial impact on trafficking organizations. Toward this end, the development of improved technical equipment to detect drugs, especially easily concealed narcotic drugs, should be given high priority. Further, the detection of drugs will always remain useful for the leads and evidence that detection produces. By focusing on the trafficker's fiscal resources the government can reduce the flow of drugs in two ways. First, high-level operators, usually well insulated from narcotics charges, can often be convicted for tax evasion. Second, since trafficking organizations require large sums of money to conduct their business, they are vulnerable to any action that reduces their working capital. The IRS has conducted an extremely successful program that identifies suspected narcotics traffickers susceptible to criminal and civil tax enforcement ations. Recently, the program has been assigned a low priority because of IRS concern about possible abuses. The task force is confident that safeguards against abuse can be developed, and strongly recommends re-emphasizing this program. The IRS should give special attention to enforcement of income tax laws involving suspected or convicted narcotics traffickers. Drug enforcement agents should be further encouraged to recognize promising leads for tax investigation purposes, and to refer them to the IRS. Even when tax cases cannot be made, information regarding financial transactions may be valuable in proving other violations by drug dealers. For example, the Customs Service enforces a law requiring reports of international transportation of currency; drug dealers have to violate this law regularly. International agreements to increase investigative access to information in financial institutions should also be pursued. All of these indirect methods of immobilizing trafficking networks can be very powerful tools in the overall supply reduction strategy. However, the great discretion these tools provide law enforcement officials requires that extreme care be devoted to developing appropriate guidelines and procedures for their use, to ensure that constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties and fundamental rights of privacy are not impinged upon. RECOMMENDATION SUMMARY SUPPLY REDUCTION: CHAPTER 3 1. The task force recommends that a continuous process of identifying the most vulnerable segments of the illicit distribution system be launched, and that resources be continually reallocated to focus on the most vulnerable portion of the system. ENFORCEMENT 1. The task force, while endorsing the concept of a lead agency in drug law enforcement recommends that the law enforcement strategy be designed to fully utilize the resource of all organizations involved in law enforcement. meeting and working together. The demand we W operating under the Office of Management and trulyar Management in anticipation of the creation of 16 14bung pyn Abuse Prevention, recommended by the White Paper These temporary but effective coordinative michaut me by, any clu qa arms of two new Cabinet committees createst du the Prystbeut me Apsat plyw sure the coordination of all government 19s which he the problem of drug abuse. The President charged the newly formed abunE LASE *The President announced the establishment of those two men t dingt comm for drug law enforcement and the other for de atube porno gry habilitation-in his Special Message to Congo De An if Apof de 80-321 O 77 - 22 gether with the existing Cabinet Committee for International Narcotics Control. with integrating the efforts of seven Cabinet departments and seventeen agencies into an effective overall program directed against drug abuse. Specifically, he charged the new Cabinet committees with the following responsibilities: (1) To develop and implement the Federal strategy with respect to drug law enforcement (or drug treatment, rehabilitation, prevention and research); (2) To assure proper coordination among Federal drug law enforcement (or treatment and rehabilitation) programs, including the collection, analysis and dissemination of information (or enforcement intelligence data); (3) To assure that Federal enforcement resources (or prevention, treatment and rehabilitation) are effectively utilized; (4) a. To assure proper coordination between the investigative and prosecutorial arms of the government. b. To develop and monitor a plan for improving job opportunities for former addicts; (5) To provide liaison between the Executive Branch Congress, State and local governments and the public; (6) To assure implementation of relevant recommendations contained in the Domestic Council's White Paper on Drug Abuse; (7) To evaluate and make recommendations to improve Federal drug law enforcement (or treatment and rehabilitation) programs; and (8) To report their progress to the President on October 1, 1976, and periodically thereafter. In addition to the above ongoing responsibilities, the Chairmen of the Cabinet committees were directed to work closely to develop plans for improving the coordination between law enforcement and drug abuse prevention, treatment and rehabilitation programs. The new Cabinet committees are now quite active, both at the Cabinet committee level and in their working groups and functional subcommittees (see chart below for the structure of the two committees). This Federal Strategy 1976 is evidence of the work of those Cabinet committees since most of it is drawn from their respective October 1 progress reports to the President. Important progress in improving interagency coordination and cooperation has been made between individual agencies, as well. For example, at the time the White Paper was released. the greatest need for improved interagency cooperation involved the Drug Enforcement Administration and the U.S. Customs Service. Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973 drew a distinction between investigative and interdiction functions with respect to narcotics enforcement. The investigative function was given to DEA and the interdiction function left with the Customs Service. Unfortunately, the distinction between interdiction and investigation was not made clear in the Reorganization Plan. This ambiguity led to jurisdictional disputes between the agencies. The most valuable contribution the White Paper made toward the resolution of these disputes was to focus the debate on a relatively narrow set of issues, and to point out the considerable areas of agreement which existed, but which were often overlooked. Since the White Paper's release, the working relationship be tween DEA and the Customs Service has improved markedly. Among other things: Last December, the U.S. Customs Service and DEA signed and implemented a Memorandum of Understanding which outlines operating guidelines for improving coordination between those agencies, thus signalling an end to the rivalry which had hindered Federal drug law enforcement efforts for more than ten years. These guidelines were discussed by top DEA and Customs officials in joint session in February 1976 to ensure clear understanding of them. To respond to Customs' complaint that DEA was not providing useable tactical intelligence in sufficient quantity, DEA established a capability within its intelligence branch to work specifically on Customs requirements. In addition. Customs has made provisions for assigning three intelligence analysts to DEA headquarters to ensure that DEA personnel are sensitive to Customs' intelligence requirements, and that all relevant information is relayed to them. Customs has also assigned personnel to the interagency El Paso Intelligence Center and to DEA's Detroit office. The resulting flow of information from DEA to Customs has increased sharply since the Memorandum of Understanding was signed. from a few hundred specific items per month to over one thousand per month. Finally, in June 1976 DEA and Customs agreed on a procedure which permits Customs to debrief persons arrested for drug smuggling at the border if DEA declines to do so. A similar Memorandum of Understanding between Customs and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was signed in April 1975 and the U.S. Coast Guard will soon be executing Memoranda of Understanding with Customs and DEA The Immigration and Naturalization Service, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), as well as DEA and Customs, are working together at the El Paso Intelligence Center. An Interagency Drug Intelligence Group with representatives of several of these agencies has been meeting since mid-June to monitor the movement of brown heroin. Further, DEA. in coordination with the Cabinet Committee on Drug Law Enforcement, has established two pilot Field Intelligence Exchange Groups in Chicago and Miami. The objective of these groups is to maximize prosections against key high-level traffickers and flangers by coordinating the local intelligence resources of Federal agencies and State and city law enforcement organizations. IMPROVING THE USE AND DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMATION The collection and sharing of information regarding all aspects of the drug abuse program are crucial to 238 verest. For example, information on the efters of drug use is central to any poze edvation process. Data on the extent of drug use, the availability of ist grugs and the resitant wedal com are critical in making broad resgorres aliceaties, dedklone and in evaluating the overall effec tiveness of our programa. Praege late genre on trends to drug anke jetels of price and availability, wires of drug and spen · er zoter to control drugs are ential for some quam, rewire alleating dedeCAL Data on the effect of different types of treatment in at wwers of different drug both during and after treat** 21 1.12, to determining what type of treatment works best for abom. In or formation would were as the foundation for both short- and long-term program matat |