EXHIBIT No. 1413 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE A Radio Discussion by LEEDS GULICK, PAUL HUTCHINSON and OWEN LATTIMORE 592d Broadcast in Cooperation With the National Broadcasting Company NUMBER 381 JULY 8, 1945 The University of Chicago ROUND TABLE, Published Weekly, 10 cents a copy; full-year subscription, 52 issues, two dollars. Published by the University of Chicago. Chicago, Illinois. Entered as second-class matter January 3, 1939, at the post office at Chicago, Illinois, under the Act of March 3, 1879 BECKER, CARL, The Declaration of Independence, New York; Harcourt, Brace & The Young Jefferson, Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1915. BROGAN, D. W. The American Character. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1944. BROWN, STUART GERRY (ed). "We Hold These Truths." New York: Harper & Bros, 1941. A collection of documents of American history. CURTI, MERLE. Growth of American Thought. New York: Harper & Bros., 1943. GABRIEL, RALPH H. The Course of American Democratic Thought. New York: Ronald Press, 1940. An excellent survey and interpretation of American democratic thought since 1815. MACLEISH, ARCHIBALD, "Cultural Relations," Vital Speeches, February 1, 1945. "Humanism and the Belief in Man." Atlantic, November, 1944. MEIKLEJOHN, ALEXANDER. What Does America Mean? New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1935. MERRIAM, CHARLES E. A History of American Political Theories. New York: Macmillan Co., 1924. A review of American political thought. What Is Democracy? Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941. A discussion of contemporary democracy and an explanation of its relationship to liberty and equality. MILLER, JOHN C. Origins of the American Revolution. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1943. A study of the forces leading to the Revolution. NEVINS, ALLAN. America in World Affairs. New York: Oxford Press, 1942. NEVINS, ALLAN, and COMMAGER, H. S. America: The Story of a Free People. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1942. NIEBUHR, REINHOLD. Moral Man and Immoral Society. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932. PARRINGTON, VERNON L. Main Currents in American Thought. New ed. 3 vols. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1935. A well-written survey of the chief types of American thought and its interrelations in our history. SHOTWELL, JAMES T. "Bridges to the Future," Survey Graphic, February, 1915. SMITH, T. V. The Democratic Tradition in America. New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1941. A statement of faith in the democratic way of life. Around the Round Table ... LEEDS GULICK, visiting professor of Japanese at the University of Chicago, was born in Osaka, Japan, and has lived in the Orient for a number of years. He is, at the University of Chicago, at the present time the director of the A.S.T.P. Japanese Area and Language instruction. Professor Gulick received his B.A. and M. A. degrees at George Williams College and has studied at the University of Chicago. From 1924 until 1937 he served as a superintendent of schools. He has written numerous magazine articles and is the author of Christian Camp Conference Leaders' Manual (1934); Nihonga (1945); and Selected Japanese Vocabulary (1945). PAUL HUTCHINSON, managing editor of the Christian Century magazine, was editor of the China Christian Advocate in Shanghai China, from 1916 to 1921. He also was, for a time, executive secretary of the China Centenary Movement for the Methodist Episcopal church in China and was the secretary of the Epworth League in China. He studied at Lafayette College, where he received his Ph.B. degree, and Garrett Bible Institute, where he received his B.D. degree. Mr. Hutchinson has been managing editor of the Christian Century since 1924. He is a regular magazine contributor and the author of Guide to Mission Stations in Eastern China (1919); The Next Step (1921); The Spread of Christianity (1922; China's Real Revolution (1924); What and Why in China (1927); The United States of Europe (1929); Men Who Made the Churches (1930); World Revolution and Religion (1931); Storm over Asia (1932); The Ordeal of Western Religion (1933); From Victory to Peace (1943); and joint author of The Story of Methodism (with H. E. Luccock) (1926). OWEN LATTIMORE, director of the Page School of International Relations of John Hopkins University, studied at St. Bees School in England and at Harvard University. From 1920 to 1926 he was engaged in business in China, and since that time he has traveled widely, working on various research projects in China for the Social Science Research Council, the Guggenheim Foundation, the Institute of Pacific Relations, and Harvard-Yenching Institute. He was editor of Pacific Affairs from 1934 to 1941. Professor Lattimore served as political adviser to Chiang Kai-shek (1941-42), and he has been associated with the Office of War Information on Pacific operations. He has been a regular contributor to many magazines and is the author of The Desert Road to Turke stan (1929); High Tartary (1930) Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict (1932); The Mongols of Manchuria (1934); Inner Asian Frontiers of China (1940); Mongol Journeys (1941); The Making of Modern China (with Eleanor Lattimore) (1944); and Solution in Asia (1945). magazine you reprinted a recent petition to the President.1 son, as managing editor of the Christian Century, in a recent issue in your They may determine the early termination or long duration of the war. HutchinMr. GULICK. The policies which we adopt in the next few months are crucial. TERMS OR UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER FOR JAPAN? petition on page 762 of the same issue of Christian Century. 1 See "A Petition to the President," Christian Century, June 27, 1945, and the text of the Source: Hugh Borton, The Administration and Structure of Japanese Government (Department of State Publication No. 2244 [Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945]). Mr. HUTCHINSON. That petition was an attempt to give expression to the feeling that there are many Americans who believe that the term "unconditional surrender" is still not understood by the Japanese and that it needs to be cleared up in their minds as well as in the minds of most Americans. Mr. LATTIMORE. Unconditional surrender, I believe, is the only stand which we can take against the Japanese at the present time. Unconditional surrender is something which has to be determined on the spot by the theater commanders; and, short of unconditional surrender, we should only get into a situation in which the Japanese were trying to play off one of the Allies against the other. Mr. HUTCHINSON. I can see that there is that grave difficulty, but is it not true that, while we have unconditional surrender as, you might say, a given element in this situation, something has to happen after unconditional surrender. It is time now that we were given an idea as to what that something is going to be. Mr. LATTIMORE. There are two things which before unconditional surrender we must make clear to the Japanese. First, we must make it clear that nothing will be satisfactory except their complete defeat. The second stage is something else again and concerns how we behave after victory. If the Japanese can get it into their heads that after our victory we are a people who will behave in a decent and humane manner and will not exterminate them like some inferior breed, why, so much the better. Mr. GULICK. But these points should be specifically stated, I believe, in something like Wilson's Fourteen Points, which seemed to hasten the end of the first World War. I do not know that we ought to issue generalities, because they will say, "There, again, they are jut putting something over on us." Mr. LATTIMORE. There is an incomplete parallel there. I do not think that the situation is the same as it was in Wilson's time. If we specifically the United States were to make a declaration of that kind at the present time, we should simply be acting on our own without the other United Nations. One essential condition of unconditiona! surrender is that the nations which demand it should be completely unified. Mr. HUTCHINSON. And that means, does it not, that the time is here when we should be seeking some clear-cut understanding among the United Nations which would really unite us on what we are after in Japan? Mr. GULICK. You see, the Japanese idea of unconditional surrender may be most anything, and, probably because of their propagandists, it has meant enslavement. They have watched the way that we have acted in Italy and said, "Well, that is fine. That is not enslavement." And then in Germany it seemed more harsh, so they do not know just what we might mean. Of course, our original idea of unconditional surrender was in order that we might have something to state before the world to prove that we are united. Mr. LATTIMORE. The Japanese, I believe, know very well what unconditional surrender would mean. It would mean complete military defeat, and they are trying to avoid that. Their propaganda on the radio right now is trying to balance America and Russia against each other, and they hope that the other United Nations will also be split from China. In other words, they want to squeeze out of the war without a complete military defeat. If we are to counteract that, we have to have complete understanding among all the United Nations about unconditional surrender and about the administration of the victory which is to follow it. Mr. GULICK. I think that you have misunderstood what I meant about that. I do not think that the United States should, just on its own authority, issue what the terms should be; but I believe that the United Nations should work that out. Mr. HUTCHINSON. Yes, but, as I understand Lattimore, what he means is that we have come to the point now at which in the coming Big Three conversations and perhaps following them, bringing China into the conversations-we should reach a clear understanding among ourselves as to how we are going to handle Japan after the military victory is complete. I agree with that. We are very far from an understanding on that point as yet. Mr. LATTIMORE. We have to expect the development in the Far East to follow somewhat the course that it did in Europe. You will remember that at the time that Roosevelt launched the phrase "unconditional surrender," it was at a period when cooperation among America, Russia, and Britain in the war against Germany was only beginning to develop its full potentiality. Mr. LATTIMORE. And the phrase "unconditional surrender" was a signal that the United Nations were really getting together and that Germany would have to deal with all of them alike. We are getting to the same stage against Japan. and I think that it is reasonable to expect that the coming Big Three meeting will be followed up by other meetings which will really align the United Nations as a whole against Japan. Until that is done, any talk of modified terms for the Japanese is likely only to give them the hope that they can succeed in splitting us, and, therefore, such talk is more likely to prolong their resistance than to reduce it. Mr. GULICK. How about the terms which were drawn up aíter we had taken Germany, for instance, or Italy? Did they have any effect upon the surrender? Mr. HUTCHINSON. There was in that case complete collapse, and it was not a case of negotiating at all, except that there may have been some sort of secret negotiations which went on for the preservation of the House of Savoy in Italy, about which we know nothing; but we are dealing now with a nation which still has an army of four million men on its front lines. What we are feeling after, I take it, is whether or not it is possible to introduce psychological elements which will put those four million men out of action more quickly than simply by blasting them out of action. Mr. LATTIMORE. The biggest psychological element is the feeling that the united lineup against them is something which is much greater than their four million men and that they cannot possibly split us. Mr. HUTCHINSON. That is true, and I, therefore, say that I feel that we need to understand each other quite as much as we need to have the Japanese understand us. Mr. GULICK. I see that the three of us do not agree exactly upon what terms should be stated or how much, so that we cannot argue this out. Let us go on to the matter of what might be done, however, in administration following the collapse of Japan-whether it is early or late. We might divide the discussion into three parts: the military, the political, and the economic. Mr. HUTCHINSON. There is no great question as to what has to be done on the military question. Japan has to be demilitarized. That is what it amounts to. We have to wipe out the whole setup-the Japanese army and the navy, the shipbuilding and the airplane-building industries. Everything which has contributed to make Japan a military state headed toward aggression in the Pacific has to be wiped out. Mr. LATTIMORE. That includes a lot of economic and political action as well, because we cannot forget that the civilian warmakers-that is, the big industrialists and financiers of Japan-are really primarily even more responsible for Japan's going to war than the military and the navy, since the army and the navy are only the striking instruments and the tools. Mr. HUTCHINSON. I quite gree with that, but that is the economic side which Gulick was saying that we would lead to after we talked about the military. That really goes to show that we cannot divide the categories in any such clear-cut way as he was suggesting, because they are all mixed up together. Behind the army cl'que which we are forever talking about in Tokyo there does stand this oligarchy of big business. Mr. LATTIMORE. And they are not in opposition to each other; they are in partnership with each other. Mr. HUTCHINSON. Exactly Mr. GULICK. You are quite right, but what I was saying was that our listeners would like to know what specific points we are making on this issue. Then we can let it go at that, I believe, without further discussion. They would include; (1) the evacuation of whole territories outside the home islands of Japan; (2) the complete demobilization of the army and the navy and the air force; (3) the dismantling of the factories which manufacture armaments and the dismantling of the navy yards; and (4) the delivery to the United Nations for trial and punishment of all the war criminals. Mr. HUTCHINSON. And at that point, including, as Lattimore was saying, the people who have been responsible for the policy which has produced this aggressive Japan. They are the big-business elements. Mr. LATTIMORE. The Zaibatsu people-the same people who a lot of Americans unfortunately think are the crowd with whom we should deal in Japan after the war, because they stand for law and order. So far as we stand for any Japanese, we have to stand, not for that bunch, but for the Japanese people. Only when the power of that bunch is crushed, can the Japanese people rise up, and only then can we find anyone else to deal with. And we will not find that until we have imposed unconditional surrender. |