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The actual area of Communist influence is greater than shown, because where regular forces have been withdrawn to avoid being pinned down, or to reinforce more important points, the local guerillas and their organization remain. An attempt has been made to show such an area in the cross-hatched red lines south of Shanghai and Nanking, where no regular New Fourth Army troops remain. Other such areas exist both north and south of Hankow along the Pinghan and Canton-Hankow lines, notably around Changsha. The long diagonal red pocket between Sian and Ichang represents the line of breakthrough of the formerly surrounded Hupeh-Anhwei-Honan border pocket, once closer to Hankow. This "floating kidney" will tend to move north, toward a junction with the Eighth Route Army in the region of Yenan, or perhaps that south of Taiyuan, depending upon where a KMT weak spot is found.

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CHINA, showing Kuomintang and Communist areas

WHERE ARE WE

HEADING?

BY

SUMNER WELLES

EXHIBIT No. 978

DISCUSSION ON COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC AND THE FAR EAST

May 6, 1943, 8:15 p. m., 700 Jackson Place, Washington

Carter, Chairman.

Present: Mrs. Alexander, Sir Gurj Bajpai, Hugh Borton, de Voogd, Farley, Greene, Hiss, Johnstone, Lockwood, Martin, Meisling, Pramoj, Shoemaker, Zafra. Mr. Carter stated that the purpose of these meetings was to stimulate thinking around the problems of collective security which appear to be different for the Pacific area and the Far East, compared with those that exist in Europe. These questions should be considered now because so much international political action has been Europe-centered or concerned with the American hemisphere that relatively little attention has been paid to the problems of collective security in the Far East. The Far East has tended to be ignored in most of the scholarly efforts on postwar organization. It is thought that the discussion might form a basis for an essay by one of the members.

It was decided that a few minutes should be spent on the statement on the first page of the agenda, to see whether there is general concensus that it is a reasonable forecast.

There was some discussion of paragraph 2 and the meaning of the word aggression as used in the last sentence. Mr. Carter suggested that for purposes of this discussion it should be limited to armed aggression or military occupation. Shoemaker suggested that one of the most likely dangers would be that trouble might arise between two sections of China, with Russia coming into the picture and making claims China would not want to recognize. Bajpai suggested that there ought to be someone at these meetings qualified to speak for Russia.

Shoemaker thought it was almost certain that Russia would desire a Pacific outlet and Dairen is a logical one. This would be a point of conflict with China, as would be Inner and Outer Mongolia and the Communist elements in China. Pramoj suggested border difficulties between Thailand and French Indo-China. Mr. Cordell Hull statement on restoring the French Empire was brought up at this point. Hiss said that the statement was made a long time ago and it was a statement of intention with reference to a particular action, not a promise having in mind action regarding Pacific colonies. As it was worded it had to do with the "integrity" of the French Empire.

Lockwood said that one general comment on the statement in the agenda is that if it is intended as an inclusive statement on security as a whole a little more attention should be given to general economic and social setting of postwar development. The problem of establishing the basis of security will be a matter of what machinery can be elaborated for dealing with these issues as well as what is going to be done about the economic future of Japan or economic rivalries in the Pacific or the future of the open door and access to the resources of Southeast Asia, or problems of economic and social reconstruction in China.

There was further discussion of the possibility of minor or major border disputes breaking out between Pacific countries, and the likelihood of American or Soviet forces interfering in these. It was more or less agreed that there would be no large-scale hostilities in the immediate years after the war. There was some discussion of what kind of a settlement or security system would be set up-emergency or short-term-carefully planned and long-term. Hiss said that we ought to distinguish between a perfect paper settlement and a more viable day to day arrangement that might grow out of developments during the war and the early stages of the peace. Good will will make possible the satisfactory handling of a good many problems that could not be met withqut it in spite of all careful preparations. In the Pan-American system this is a pertinent point. The Inter-American agreements mentioned in the agenda are important primarily because they stated something that had already largely been worked out and accepted as a basis of relationship.

Lockwood said the Pan-American agreements work because there is peace rather than there being peace because there are agreements.

There was inconclusive discussion of the applicability of the points on page two to the Far Eastern Situation.

Johnstone said that granted we want a collective security system in the Pacific, whether on a regional or world bases, what could be the basis for agreement among the nations interested in the Pacific for such a system? Is it just a

simple agreement that we are going to act to prevent aggression, or is something more necessary? One would assume that you can't have a system unless it is an agreement. It is quite possible that there will be a general agreement for the joint use of bases and employment of force in the Pacific, immediately after the war. When more normal conditions are restored and troops moved back within their own boundaries, many people will feel that it may not be necessary to continue joint use of bases. At that point when the period of large-scale use of occupation forces cames to an end more suitable arrangements will have to be made. Unless some machinery is set up fairly soon after hostilities end it may be very difficult to do so later.

Bajpai asked if there were any common interests among the Pacific countries. Hiss said it was a question of various periods of time. He hoped there would be an effort to secure an increasing community of interest; that present and developing military collaboration would bring an increasing marking out and finding of common interests. Every effort should be made toward reaching an agreement today. This ought to be supplemented or incorporated in further agreements.

Bajpai said that of course everyone recognizes that it is impossible at this stage to envisage all those points either of agreement or clash of interest, making for association or separation hereafter. Would it be correct to say that the United Nations are all interested in the maintenance of peace in the Far East to the extent that they would collaborate with one another to use force against aggression in the Far East?

Hiss said that you could not say at the present time that they are.

It was agreed that the United Nations would have to have a community of interest before they could maintain peace in the Far East and this question should be the first one explored at the next meeting.

EXHIBIT No. 979

MEXICO CITY, July 8, 1945.

Dr. EDWARD C. CARTER,

Russian War Relief, New York, N. Y.:

Will be delighted to see you here any day at your convenience. Am sure Russian War Relief leaders in Mexico would welcome opportunity discuss with you their problems and take advantage your great experience. Eye, too, will be glad to discuss same problems with you, since they come under my present jurisdiction, and to renew our personal contact. Warmest regards.

OUMANSKY.

EXHIBIT No. 980

CHARLES DOLLARD, Executive Associate

CARNEGIE CORPORATION OF NEW YORK,

522 FIFTH AVENUE, New York 18, N. Y., January 3, 1946.

(Handwritten :) M. C.: Do you know whether the Army did any testing later than the enclosed? EC, Jan. 24/46.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,

Institute of Pacific Relations,

1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

DEAR CARTER: I think these are the reports referred to in your note of December 27. If not, please try me again. While both of them are technically in the clear, I think it would be well to clear with Buck Lanham before using any of the data in anything that you may prepare for public consumption. You are welcome to keep these for your files.

Sincerely,

CD: RN

ENC.

ECC:

DOLLARD.

These “attitude" surveys appeared in a publication called "What the Soldier Thinks." I remember seeing that magazine in January 46 and I feel sure it

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