4. Mining locations; right of subsequent locator to test lawfulness of prior
location.
Lavignino v. Uhlig, 198 U. S. 443, qualified so as not to exclude the right of
a subsequent locator on an adverse claim to test the lawfulness of a
prior location of the same ground upon the contention that at the
time such prior location was made the ground embraced therein was
covered by a valid and subsisting mining claim. Ib.
5. Mining locations; burden of proving invalidity of former location.
Where three mining locations cover the same ground and the senior locator
after forfeiture does not adverse, the burden of proof is on the third
locator to establish the invalidity of the second location. Ib.
One procuring removal to Circuit Court precluded from disputing propriety
thereof on certificate of jurisdiction to Supreme Court.
Where the ground on which the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court was denied
did not go to its jurisdiction as a Federal court as such, but its jurisdic-
tion was denied on the ground that the state court where the proceed-
ings started had no jurisdiction, a direct appeal on the jurisdictional
question will not lie to this court under § 5 of the Judiciary Act of 1891.
Kansas City N. W. R. R. Co. v. Zimmerman, 336.
Ex parte proceeding construing statute as.
An ex parte and uncontested proceeding construing a statute and directing
payments in accordance with such construction cannot be pleaded as
res judicata in a subsequent contested proceeding. Keaoha v. Castle,
149.
See COURTS;
TITLE;
TREATIES.
RULES OF COURT.
See APPENDIX, pp. 441-602;
SPECIAL INDEX, p. 443.
1. Draw bars; variation of.
Under the Safety Appliance Act of 1893, 27 Stat. 531, the center of the draw
bars of freight cars used on standard gauges shall be, when the cars are
empty, thirty-four and a half inches above the rails, and the statute
permits when a car is loaded or partly loaded a maximum variation
in the height downwards of three inches. The statute does not require
that the variation shall be proportioned to the load or that a fully
loaded car shall exhaust the entire variation. St. Louis & Iron Moun-
tain Ry. v. Taylor, 281.
An instruction that under the statute the draw bars of fully loaded freight
cars must be of a uniform height of thirty-one and a half inches and
that a variation between two loaded cars constitutes negligence un-
der the statute, is prejudicial error. Ib.
3. Effect to supplant common-law rule as to duty of master to furnish safe
appliances.
The Safety Appliance Act of March 2, 1893, 27 Stat. 531, supplants the
common-law rule of reasonable care on the part of the employer as to
providing the appliances defined and specified therein, and imposes
upon interstate carriers an absolute duty; and the common-law rule
of reasonable care is not a defense where in point of fact the cars used
were not equipped with appliances complying with the standards
established by the act.
Sce CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 13.
SERVICE OF PROCESS.
See PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 5.
SIOUX INDIANS.
See INDIANS.
SPANISH LAW.
See COURTS, 3.
SPECIAL LAWS.
See STATUTES, A 2;
TERRITORIES, 4.
1. Power to create special taxing districts and classify property-owners for
purposes of taxation.
It is within the legislative power of a State to create special taxing districts
and to charge the cost of local improvements, in whole or in part, upon
the property in said district either according to valuation or area, and
the legislature may also classify the owners of property abutting on
the improvement made and those whose property lies a certain dis-
tance back of it, and if all property-owners have an equal opportunity
to be heard when the assessment is made the owners of the "back
lying" property are not deprived of their property without due process
of law or denied the equal protection of the laws. Cleveland & St.
Louis Ry. v. Porter, 177.
2. Power to regulate railroads of own creation.
The creation of a board of railroad commissioners and the extent of its
powers; what the route of railroad companies created by the State may
be; and whether parallel and competing lines may consolidate, are all
matters which a State may regulate by its statutes and the state courts
are the absolute interpreters of such statutes. Mobile, Jackson &c.
R. R. Co. v. Mississippi, 187.
3. Power to contract away power; exemption from taxation.
While a State, or a municipal corporation acting under the authority of the
State, may deprive itself by contract of its lawful power to impose
certain taxes or license fees, such deprivation only follows the use of
clear and unambiguous terms; any doubt in the interpretation of the
alleged contract is fatal to the exemption. St. Louis v. United Rail-
ways Co.. 266.
4. Jurisdiction over property within borders.
Every State has exclusive jurisdiction over property within its borders,
and where testator has property in more than one State each State has
jurisdiction over the property within its limits and can, in its own
courts, provide for the disposition thereof in conformity with its laws.
Brown v. Fletcher's Estate, 82.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5, 6, 7;
COURTS;
1. Uniformity of construction of Federal statutes.
It is only by reviewing in, this court the construction given by the state
courts to Federal statutes that a uniform construction of such statutes
throughout all the States can be secured. St. Louis & Iron Mountain
Ry. v. Taylor, 281.
2. Special laws; what constitute.
Because it gives a certain corporation a right to maintain an action, a law
cannot be regarded as a special law granting an exclusive privilege where
it confers equal rights upon the people and the municipalities affected
by the right and interested in matters affected. Ponce v. Roman
Catholic Church, 296.
3. Effect on construction of statute of Territory of interpretation given by local
While in different jurisdictions statutes legitimatizing children born out of
wedlock by the subsequent marriage of the parents have been differ-
ently construed as to the application thereof to the offspring of adul-
terous intercourse, in construing such a statute of a Territory this court
will lean towards the interpretation of the local court. Keaoha v.
Castle, 149.
4. Construction as part of law.
The construction of a statute affixed thereto for many years before territory
is acquired by the United States should be considered as written into
the law itself.
SUBSIDIES.
See ADMIRALTY, 8.
TAXES AND TAXATION.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5;
LOCAL LAW (IND.);
STATES, 1.
1. Porto Rico; power of legislative assembly to legislate as to jurisdiction and
procedure of courts.
Under the organic act of Porto Rico, March 2, 1901, 31 Stat. 77, the legis-
lative assembly has express authority to legislate regarding the juris-
diction and procedure of its courts, and it has been usual for Congress
to give such power to the legislatures of the Territories. Ponce v.
Roman Catholic Church, 296.
2. Constitutionality of delegation of such power by Congress.
Such legislation was not contrary to the Constitution and was in conformity
with the power conferred by Congress upon the legislative assembly to
regulate the jurisdiction of the courts. Ib.
3. Porto Rico; status as American territory.
Since April 11, 1899, Porto Rico has been de facto and de jure American
territory, and its history and its legal and political institutions up to
the time of its annexation will be recognized by this court. Ib.
4. Application of prohibition against enactment of special laws.
The general prohibition in the act of July 30, 1886, 24 Stat. 170, against
territorial legislatures passing special laws does not apply where specific
permission is granted by the organic act of a particular Territory. Ib.
Effect on title of Roman Catholic Church in Porto Rico to church property,
of donations by municipality.
The fact that a municipality in Porto Rico furnished some of the funds
for building or repairing the churches cannot affect the title of the
Roman Catholic Church, to whom such funds were thus irrevocably
donated and by whom these temples were erected and dedicated to
religious uses. Ponce v. Roman Catholic Church, 296.
Treaty of Paris with Spain of 1898; effect on church property in Porto Rico.
The Roman Catholic Church has been recognized as possessing legal per-
sonality by the treaty of Paris with Spain of 1898 and its property
rights solemnly safeguarded. In so doing the treaty followed the
recognized rule of international law which would have protected the
property of the church in Porto Rico subsequent to the cession. The
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