210 U. S. HARLAN, J., FULLER, CH. J., WHITE and MCKENNA, JJ., dissenting.

provided such tax does not interfere with the exercise of some power belonging to the United States.

But it is said that the tax in question, even if regarded as an occupation tax, is invalid, as constituting a direct burden on interstate commerce, the regulation of which belongs to Congress. It is not, in my opinion, to be taken as a tax on interstate commerce in the sense of the Constitution; for its operation on interstate commerce is only incidental, not direct. A State, in the regulation of its internal affairs, often prescribes rules which in their operation, remotely or incidentally, affect interstate commerce. But such rules have never been held as in themselves imposing direct burdens upon such commerce, and on that ground invalid. The State in the present case ascertains the extent of business done by the corporation in the State, and requires an annual occupation tax "equal" to a named per centum of the amount of such business. It does not lay any tax directly upon the gross receipts as such, as was the case in Philadelphia & Southern Mail Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326. In that case the court said: "The tax was levied directly upon the receipts derived by the company from its fares and freights, for the transportation of persons and goods between different States, and between the States and foreign countries, and from the charter of its vessels, which was for the same purpose. This transportation was an act of interstate and foreign commerce. It was the carrying on of such commerce. Here there is no levying upon receipts as such from interstate commerce. The State only measures the occupation tax by looking at the entire amount of the business done within its limits without reference to the source from which the business comes. It does not tax any part of the business because of its being interstate. It has reference equally to all kinds of business done by the corporation in the State. Suppose the State as, under its constitution it might do, should impose an income tax upon railroad corporations of its own creation, doing business within the State, equal to a given per cent of all income received by the corporation from its business, would

the corporation be entitled to have excluded from computation such of its income as was derived from interstate commerce? Such would be its right under the principles announced in the present case. In the case supposed the income tax would, under the principles or rules now announced, be regarded as a direct burden upon interstate commerce. I cannot assent to this view. If it did not delay an announcement of the court's decision longer, perhaps, than is desirable, I should be glad to go into this subject at large and present such a review of the adjudged cases as would show that the views expressed by me are in harmony with previous cases in this court. The present des cision, I fear, will seriously affect the taxing laws of many States, and so impair the powers of the several States, in matters of taxation, that they cannot compel its own corporations to bear their just proportion of such public burdens as can be met only by taxation. I dissent from the opinion and judgment of the court.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, MR. JUSTICE WHITE and MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA concur in this dissent.

FAUNTLEROY v. LUM..

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI.

No. 215. Argued April 27, 28, 1908.-Decided May 18, 1908.

A judgment is conclusive as to all the media concludendi, and it cannot be impeached either in or out of the State, by showing that it was based on a mistake of law.

A judgment of a court of a State in which the cause of action did not arise, but based on an award of arbitration had in the State in which the cause did arise, is conclusive, and, under the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution, must be given effect in the latter State, notwithstanding the award was for a claim which could not, under the laws of that State, have been enforced in any of its courts.

80 Mississippi, 757, reversed.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

210 U.S.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

Mr. Shepard Barclay, with whom Mr. Robert L. McLaurin, Mr. Amos A. Armistead, Mr. E. L. Brien, Mr. Garner Wynn Green and Mr. Marcellus Green were on the brief, for plaintiff in error:

By allowing a plea to be interposed in the Mississippi courts in an action upon a Missouri judgment, which was not allowable in the courts of Missouri, both the Federal Constitution (Art. IV, § 1), and § 905, Revised Statutes of the United States were violated, in that full faith and credit to it were denied, and the faith and credit to which it was entitled in Missouri were not given to it in Mississippi. Hampton v. McConnel, 3 Wheat. 235; McElroy v. Wagner, 13 Pet. 324; Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 301, and cases there cited; Harding v. Harding, 198 U. S. 317; Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 567, and cases cited; Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co., 127 U. S. 265, and Provision Co. v. Davis, 191 U. S. 374, discussed as not in conflict with the cases above cited.

The effect of this judgment in Missouri differs from that under the law in Mississippi, for while under the Missouri decisions in determining the effect of this transaction the Mississippi statutes would be looked to and would control, Gaylord v. Duryee, 95 Mo. Appeals (1902), 579, the effect of the Missouri judgment when rendered may be appealed from, and reversed, and what its effect is when suit is brought thereon in Missouri, and what pleas are sufficient answer thereto, are to be determined by the statutes and decisions of that State. Wilkerson v. Whitney, 7 Missouri, 296, and Rev. Stat. Mo., 1889, 1262, § 52, enacting that only judgments by confession shall be void when based on a gambling transaction, and that when rendered by default, or upon issue joined, there can be no second trial of that which was interposed in the first trial and decided adversely.

Under the Federal Constitution and § 905, Rev. Stat., as uniformly interpreted, the same effect as was shown to exist in Missouri under the laws and decisions thereof, the domicile of the rendition of the judgment, must, under the supreme law of the land, be given to it in Mississippi.

Argument for Defendant in Error.

210 U.S.

In Missouri the merits of the controversy, the nature of the consideration are forever concluded by the judgment herein there rendered. Under the rule in this court announced by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, reiterated by Mr. Justice Story, and since integrated as a funadmental principle into constitutional law, the test of the effect vouchsafed to this judgment in Mississippi is its effect under the laws of Missouri. There is no qualification or exception. See Draper v. Gorman, 8 Leigh, 628.

Mr. T. C. Catchings and Mr. O. W. Catchings, for defendant in error, submitted:

No matter what may have been held, at one time, at present the essential nature and real foundation of a cause of action are not changed by recovering judgment upon it, and the technical rules which regard the original claim as merged in the judgment, and the judgment as implying a promise by the defendant to pay, do not preclude a court to which a judgment is presented for affirmative action (while it cannot go behind the judgment for the purpose of examining into the validity of the claim) from ascertaining whether the claim is really one of such a nature that the court is authorized to enforce it. Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co., 127 U. S. 286. The grant of judicial power was not intended to confer upon the courts of the United States jurisdiction over a suit or prosecution by one State of such a nature that it could not, on the settled principles of public and international law, be entertained by the judiciary of the other State at all. The provisions of § 1, Art. IV, of the Constitution establish a rule of evidence rather than of jurisdiction, and while they make a record of a judgment rendered after due notice, in a State, conclusive evidence in the courts of another State or of the United States, of the matter adjudged they do not affect the jurisdiction either of the court in which the judgment is rendered, or of the court in which it is offered in evidence. Louisiana v. Mayor of New Orleans, 109 U. S. 286; See also Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 62 N. E. Rep. 587; affirmed in this court, 191 U. S. 373.

The Constitution does not require a State to give jurisdiction against its will; it does not require a State to provide a court in which all causes of action may be tried; and it is only where the plaintiff can find a court in which he has a right to come that the effect of the judgment is fixed by the Constitution, and the act in pursuance of it, which Congress passed.

Where a State does provide a court to which its own citizens may resort in a certain class of cases, the right which citizens of other States would have to resort to it in cases of the same class would depend not upon § 1 of Art. IV (which is the only clause of the Constitution invoked and relied upon in this case by the plaintiff in error), but upon §2, which entitles the citizens of each State to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States. Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 191 U. S. 373.

Not only from the language of § 2117, Mississippi Code of 1892, but from the opinion of the Supreme Court of Mississippi, delivered in the present case, and from its opinion in the case in 71 Mississippi Reports arising under the statute of 1882, the contract involved was one which the courts of the State are expressly prohibited from enforcing. The present case, therefore, is controlled by Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., supra, and see Lemonius v. Mayer, 71 Mississippi, 514. See also Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14; DeVaughn v. Hutchinson, 165 U. S. 566; Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U. S. 186; Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814; Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 470.

MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an action upon a Missouri judgment brought in a court of Mississippi. The declaration set forth the record of the judgment. The defendant pleaded that the original cause of action arose in Mississippi out of a gambling transaction in cotton futures; that he declined to pay the loss; that the controversy was submitted to arbitration, the question as to the ille