TRUE ALLEGIANCE.—PERSONS ENTITLED TO THE PROTECTION OF THE UNITED STATES.*

The leading cases under this head, involving the question of the right of aliens and persons residing in the insurgent States during the rebellion to recover in this court, are those of Williams against the United States; Rhind, executor, against the United States; Worth against the United States; and Schreiber & Meyer against the United States, reported below.

Joseph Levois, surviving partner of the firm of J. Levois & Co., vs. The United States, No. 158.

The firm of J. Levois & Co. was composed of the petitioner and Pierre Ferdinand Mathon, who died in 1869. The partnership was formed in 1862.

The petitioner, a Frenchman, did not reside in the United States during the rebellion; his business in New Orleans being conducted by Mathon, also a French subject. There was no averment in the petition that the complainant bore true allegiance during the rebellion to the United States, or was entitled to its protection at the time of his loss. The claim was for the value of certain merchandise shipped from New York to the firm in New Orleans, on the steamship Electric Spark, which was destroyed July 10, 1864.

The counsel on behalf of the United States demurred to the petition— 1. Because it does not state that the said petitioner did, at all times during the late rebellion, bear true allegiance to the United States.

2. Because it does not state that the said complainant was entitled, at the time of his pretended loss, to the protection of the United States. 3. Because the said complainant was, at the time of his alleged loss, and still is, an unnaturalized foreigner, and never resided within the United States.

After the demurrer was filed, complainant amended his petition, setting forth that "the firm was entitled, at the time of the loss, to the protection of the United States in the premises, under the terms of the treaty of February, 1855, and former treaties between France and the United States," and "that Levois and Mathon did, at all times during the late rebellion, conduct themselves as neutral foreigners; and that during such time neither of them committed any act detrimental to the Government of the United States, or in violation of their duties as such neutrals."

There was no argument on demurrer, all the questions of law and fact being considered at the final hearing, when it appeared from the testimony that up to the close of 1861, or the beginning of 1862, Levois had been in partnership with one Paul Vidal, also a French subject, residing in New Orleans; that Vidal was engaged in the liquidation of the business of the firm under a general power of attorney from Levois, from the beginning of 1862 to the occupation of the city by the United States troops, and that in the course of liquidation he purchased $10,000 of New Orleans City bonds, paying for them in confederate money.

The court entered judgment for the respondent. A motion for a rehearing was then filed and denied. Subsequently another motion for a rehearing, accompanied by additional testimony, was filed and granted. The additional testimony showed that the firm of J. Levois & Co., the complainants, was a different firm from that of which Vidal was a member; that the account between Vidal and Levois had never been closed;

* Section 12, act of June 23, 1874.

that Levois had never authorized or ratified the purchase of the bonds by Vidal, but considered it a personal affair of the latter; that the price of the bonds had not been placed on the books of the firm to the account of profit and loss.

After rehearing, judgment was entered for the complainant in the sum of $5,033.21, with the usual interest.

No opinion was delivered by the court in this case, and the reasons for its decision can only be inferred.

As the opinions in the cases of Worth vs. The United States, and Schreiber & Meyer vs. The United States, sustained the right of an unnaturalized foreigner, not a British subject, to sue in this court, it would seem that the judgment at first entered in favor of the respondent was not intended to sustain the third ground of demurrer by the counsel on behalf of the United States, but rather that the purchase of the New Orleans City bonds by Vidal, together with his possession and use of confederate money, was a breach of neutrality toward the United States which deprived him of his right to sue; that this breach of neutrality being committed in his capacity as a member of the firm, was imputed to the surviving partner; and that upon subsequent proof that the transaction of Vidal was not imputable to Levois, he having repudiated it as a firm transaction, the judgment was reversed. William Hutchinson vs. The United States, No. 1797.

The complainant, a native of Ireland, "sailed out of the United States, and lived on shore since 1849," and "resided between April 13, 1861, and April 9, 1865, both inclusive, at sea, sailing on vessels under the flag and register of the United States, and in the city of New York."

The claim was for personal effects and wages lost while on the Electric Spark, July 10, 1864.

It appeared that the complainant declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States in 1857, but was not in fact naturalized until 1865, after the loss was sustained for which he claimed indemnity. Mr. James Lowndes, for complainant, called the attention of the court to section 2174 of the Revised Statutes.

Counsel on behalf of the United States contended that this section of the Revised Statutes, taken from the act of June 7, 1870, not being in force at the time of the alleged loss, the complainant was at that time a subject of Great Britain, and, under the decision of the court in Worth vs. The United States, not entitled to recover.

Petition dismissed.

Lord and Munn vs. The United States, No. 233: Complainants (copartners, doing business in New York during the war,) claimed the value of some wheat destroyed on the Lafayette.

The complainant, Lord, was born in the United States, but Munn was a native of Ireland, and arrived in the United States in 1860. He was naturalized in 1872.

The petition was demurred to on the ground that an unnaturalized foreigner could not claim indemnity before this court. The demurrer was argued in connection with Worth vs. The United States and several other similar claims.

The court delivered an opinion sustaining the demurrer, (see Worth vs. The United States.) The case was afterward submitted to the court on the evidence, when judgment was entered in favor of "William G. Lord, one of the said complainants," for a sum which seems to be onehalf the entire loss.

Rodocanochi Sons & Co. rs. The United States, No. 1833: The principal house of this firm was at Leghorn, with branches in London, Mar

seilles, and Odessa. The firm claimed for goods destroyed on the Brilliant and the Lamplighter. All the members of the firm were foreigners; two of them resided in London, and one of them, Mr. Michael Em. Rodocanochi, was a British naturalized subject at the time of the loss; the other was naturalized in Great Britain in 1868.

Mr. F. W. Hackett, counsel for complainants, contended that the firm was entitled to a judgment for the value of the goods as an entirety, and that the fact that a member of the firm was a British naturalized subject should not effect a diminution in the award of the court.

The property was Italian property, the domicile of the firm being in Italy. (The Cheshire, 3 Wall., 231; Ang. and Ames on Corp., § 108; Regina rs. Arnaud, 9 Q. B., 806.)

While the nationality of a corporation is that of the sovereignty which creates it, and that of a firm is the nationality of its individual partners, still, where a firm has a main house in one country with branches in other countries, the analogy between a corporation and a partnership is complete, and the country where the main house is situated gives the firm the impress of its nationality.

The requirement that a person must be entitled to the protection of the United States is satisfied by a firm's being so entitled, even though a partner might not be. (6 Court of Claims, 360.)

Mr. Michael Em. Rodocanochi is entitled to recover for, his certificate of naturalization excepted, "any rights and capacities of a natural-born British subject out of and beyond the dominions of the British Crown and the limits thereof." He had no right to the protection of the British government as to any property "out of and beyond the dominions of the British Crown," and in that is distinguished from a nativeborn British subject. He can fairly be considered as a foreigner of some other nation than Great Britain. (App. Rep. Brit. Comm. Natln., 1869, p. 76; Foreign Office Circular, 8 January, 1851; Cockburn on Nationality, pp. 115, 116; United States For. Rel., 1873, part 2, p. 1350; ibid., p. 1351; Schreiber & Meyer vs. The United States, post; 7 and 8 Vict., c. 66; 10 and 11 Vict., c. 83; Worth vs. The United States, post.) Judgment was entered in favor of the firm.

The decisions of the court show that aliens shipping goods on American vessels during the rebellion, or employed at that time as seamen on vessels owned and registered in the United States, (except subjects of Great Britain,) were held to be entitled to "the protection of the United States," and to indemnity for property destroyed by one of the so-called insurgent cruisers named in the act of June 23, 1874.

It seems also to have been held that the allegation required by the statute, that they had "during the late rebellion" borne "true allegiance to the United States," was in the nature of a negative declaration, setting forth that they had not in any manner aided or assisted the rebellion. Proof of the strict neutrality of aliens, resident in the United States, appears to have been held sufficient to sustain this allegation. Claims of subjects of Great Britain were excluded on special grounds; this exclusion does not seem, however, to have been extended to natu ralized subjects of Great Britain, apparently on account of the peculiar provisions of the British naturalization laws.

As to the right of an alien naturalized in a colony of Great Britain to indemnity under the act for merchandise destroyed on a vessel, in fact belonging to the United States but collusively sailing under the flag of Great Britain, see the case of Schrieber and Meyer vs. The United States, post; Pike, admx., vs. The United States, post.

S. Ex. 21-2

PROSPECTIVE PROFITS, FREIGHTS, GAINS, OR ADVANTAGES.

(See the following cases: Hubbell vs. The United States; Buck & Spofford et al. vs. The United States; Gannett, admx., vs. The United States, reported below.)

Henry P. Haven and Charles A. Williams, executors, et al., vs. The United States, 992: Complainants were the owners of the bark Alert, which was destroyed by the Alabama on the 9th September, while on a voyage to Kerguelan Land, otherwise called Desolation Island, to procure a cargo of sea-elephant oil. It appeared that this oil was imported almost exclusively from this and Hurd's Island, and the entire business was carried on by the complainants; that in prosecuting these voyages a large ship and one or more schooners were usually employed, and it was alleged that no ship or bark could procure a cargo of this oil without having a schooner to assist her. The schooner E. R. Sawyer was sent out as a companion to the Alert, and arrived in safety at her destination, where it was alleged large numbers of sea-elephants were found, and a cargo of oil could have been taken had the Alert arrived. soon as the owners heard of the destruction of the Alert, they fitted out the Arab, a smaller vessel, and sent her to Desolation Island, where she procured a cargo of oil. The Alert, before her destruction, had taken two sperm whales and had the oil on board.

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The complainants in this case claimed their share (7) of the bark, cargo, and outfits, and of the difference between the cargo brought home by the Arab and that which the Alert would have procured had she reached Desolation Island.

The court in entering judgment delivered no opinion; but by a comparison of amounts it appears that judgment was entered for the value of the vessel, and the oil actually on board at the time of destruction; and that no allowance was made for the probable catch of sea-elephants.

In calculating the value of the sperm oil on board, the market-rate on the day when it would have arrived home in the usual course of business seems to have been taken as the measure of damage.

Charles L. Colby vs. The United States, No. 1187, and sundry other claims: These claims were brought by the owners of the ship Commonwealth, destroyed by the Alabama, for the value of the vessel, outfits, and freight.

The Commonwealth sailed from New York for San Francisco on the 19th of March, 1863, laden with a general cargo. On the 17th of April following she was destroyed.

On the 15th of April, 1863, a charter-party was entered into between the owners of the vessel and the agents of the government of Peru, agreeing that the vessel should proceed from San Francisco to Callao, Peru; thence, on receipt of orders, to the Chincha Islands for a cargo of guano; thence to Hamburg or Rotterdam, calling at Cowes for orders. The complainants claimed net freight on this charter-party, which a comparison of the amount claimed with the amount awarded by the court shows was not allowed.

George B. Upton, jr., et al. vs. The United States, No. 960: The complainants were the owners of the ship Nora, her tackle, apparel, outfit, and freight.

The Nora sailed from Liverpool for Calcutta about February 14, 1863, and on the 27th March was destroyed by the Alabama. The value of the vessel was claimed as increased by her vicinity to a point where

vessels were in demand. A claim was also made for services and risk of money.

The judgment in the case was for $74,603.10, with the legal interest from the date of destruction.

No opinion was delivered in the case, but a comparison of amounts shows that the court did not allow the claim for enhanced value or for services or risk of money.

Sixty thousand dollars, gold, was stated by the complainants as the value of the Nora when new. This amount reduced to currency, with expenses at Liverpool and freight added, and insurance received subtracted, gives approximately the judgment rendered.

Lorenzo F. Fisler vs. The United States, No. 404: The complainant, a photographer, on his way to China in the ship Talisman, was cap tured by the Alabama, and his clothing, stock-in-trade, &c., was destroyed.

The complainant showed that, at the time of his capture, he had an agreement with a firm in China, the conditions of which were that, in return for his professional services, he was to receive a salary of one hundred Mexican dollars per month, and his expenses paid; or in lieu thereof, one-fourth share in the profits of their business; that, immediately upon his arrival at Shanghai, thirteen months after the date when the Talisman would have reached her destination, had she not been destroyed, he entered into the employment of that firm, with a compensation equal to one-fourth of the profits. It was alleged that on this basis, during the thirteen months he was delayed, his share of the profits would have been about $2,600 gold.

No opinion was delivered by the court. The complainant proved $1,180 gold as the value of his goods actually destroyed. Adding to this sum the premium on gold on the day when the Talisman was destroyed, we have $1,722.80, the amount for which the court entered judgment. It appears, therefore, that the claim for compensation for delay in fulfilling his contract was not allowed.

DAMAGES NOT "DIRECTLY RESULTING," &C.

(See Hynemann vs. The United States; Ann Eliza Gannett vs. The United States; Phillips vs. The United States, reported below.)

CASE OF THE LOUISIANA.

William Henry Haskins vs. The United States, No. 208. The complainant was master of the ship Louisiana, a whaling-vessel which was driven into Kotzebue Sound, in her attempt to escape from the Shenandoah, where she struck on a sand-bar, took fire, and was burned, with nearly all her contents. This complainant asked indemnity for loss of personal effects, wages, and share of oil, together with his expenses in returning home.

Counsel on behalf of the United States demurred to the petition.

3d. Because the claim of the said complainant is not admissible under the law creating this court.

4th. Because the said claim is not a claim directly resulting from damage caused by the so-called insurgent cruisers Alabama, Florida, and their tenders, or by either of them; nor is it a claim directly resulting from damage caused by the so-called insurgent cruiser Shenandoah after