to the cities in search of work. Unless they find it, they are forced to live in shacks and slums, adding to the potential for revolutionary agitation. Even if the displaced peasant finds work, housing shortages may compel him to live in appalling conditions. The consequences of involuntary urbanization are a major problem for many of the developing countries. The toppling of the Ayub Khan government in Pakistan by urban riots was an example doubtless lost neither on other LDC governments nor on would-be revolutionaries. Obviously the governments of the LDCs face the need to find constructive ways of dealing with this problem.

Although the outlook seems gloomy, it also contains elements of hope. There is some evidence that the growing urbanization of the LDCs is not as destabilizing as has commonly been assumed." Also, if mechanization is employed selectively it can actually create jobs rather than terminate them. Taiwan has been singled out as a good example of how selective mechanization, combined with intensive land use, creates jobs. (However, selective mechanization must be carried out as part of a wide range of economic policies which permit industrialization and agricultural modernization to go forward together, if it is to result in a rise in agricultural employment. Even then, it is difficult to see agriculture as providing employment for a vastly increased population.)

Perhaps the most important action the governments of the LDCs can take to sustain the momentum of the Green Revolution is to move promptly and effectively either to pass land reform legislation or to implement legislation already enacted. The peasant farming his own land is more likely to have the incentive to maximize production than if he is merely a tenant on a large estate. Indeed, countries where land is widely distributed can be shown to maintain a better agricultural performance than those where land is concentrated in a few hands.78 However, there is a dilemma facing the LDCs which want to press forward with land reform. Large estates, if efficiently run, may prove better suited to putting the new techniques into practice on a large scale, just as they are better adapted to take initial advantage of these techniques. It is Lester Brown's view, however, that farm size is not as important as Western analysts often rate it in evaluating agricultural efficiency.79 Japan and Taiwan, each with farms averaging less than three acres, are among the leaders in agricultural development. Selective mechanization, combined with the essentially free input of family labor, can render the small farms as as efficient as the large ones.

Actually, the choice need not lie between large and small farms. Alternative measures have already been adopted in some LDCs. One such measure is joint or consolidated farming, where farmers voluntarily band together to get both the advantages of intensive family farming and the economies of larger scale operations. In Malaysia, for example, this type of farming is practiced because water management is effective only on a multifarm basis. Barbara

See Joan M. Nelson, "Migrants, Urban Poverty, and Instability in Developing Nations." Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No. 22, Center for International Affairs. (Cambridge, Harvard University, 1969), 83 pages. 78 Brown, "Seeds of Change," op. cit., page 111.

7 Ibid., page 113.

Ward Jackson has suggested rural agricultural centers where peasants forced off the land by the Green Revolution could be employed in "agro-industries" such as warehouses and fertilizer plants. Other measures are doubtless being contemplated, as the LDCs seek to reconcile the need for maximum food production with a much wider pattern of land ownership. Again, the United States has a vital stake in the methods chosen by the LDCs to redistribute land ownership.

AGRICULTURAL AND SOCIAL REVOLUTION

In short, the consequences of genetic developments that produced the new grains are likely to be revolutionary, not only in the technological sense, but politically and socially as well. Vu Van Thai, in a paper presented to the Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group, June, 1969, identified a number of forms of tensions that he could foresee:

*** Modernization causes instability by shifting the relative importance and status of the various classes, thus generating social stresses.

*** The emergence of a political force in the rural areas undergoing the "Green Revolution" is all but ineluctable. The questions are only whether the political institutions of the country will evolve fast enough to allow for the peaceful emergence of this force into the national political fabric, and whether governments would be able to design and implement policies which would solve or at least keep under control the problems generated *

*** The richer farmers will become richer. *** Such a development could well lead to a net reduction in the income of the smaller, poorer, and less venturesome farmers. This raises massive problems of welfare and equity. If only a small fraction of the rural population moves into the modern century while the bulk remains behind, or perhaps even goes backward, the situation will be highly explosive.

*** One might foresee that the issue of giving priority to developing one area over another will become increasingly a politically loaded matter.

Unless countries revise drastically their economic development strategies and policies, to give first priority to the objective of creation of employment; and unless they take measures to reduce income disparities and to further extend incomes to the poorer classes, many people will still go hungry or remain underfed. *** Thus, if internal demand is not enlarged, measures to restrict production will have to be adopted.

*** The "Green Revolution" is likely to increase tensions between landlords and tenants [and generate] pressure on the part of tenants for greater agrarian reform ***

*** We are facing a kind of vicious dilemma: in order to keep demand up to the level of increased agricultural production, a government must either accelerate considerably the rate of growth of the economy or else embark on large expenditures for welfare. To do either of these, it must mobilize more and more resources from the agricultural sector; by so doing it is slowing down the rate of increase of farmers' real income, thus triggering discontent. 80

An analysis by Richard Critchfield sees the situation as posing a new form of competition between communist and non-communist countries. He declares: "Virtually every FAO official I interviewed believes some form of social revolution will follow the agricultural revolution in all too many of the poor countries." Moreover, "The general feeling seemed to be that the allegiance of the poor countries is likely to go to whoever can devise a system that allows the fastest

80 "Agricultural Innovation and Its Implications for Domestic Political Patterns in Southeast Asia." In "The Green Revolution: Symposium on Science and Foreign Policy," op. cit., pages 188-95.

economic growth and that both the West and Communist bloc are starting with major handicaps." 81

Not all authorities are in agreement that the unemployment problem in the LDCs will be exacerbated by the Green Revolution. Lester R. Brown, as previously noted (page 21), suggests that it may result in an increase in agricultural labor requirements:

Where the new seeds are in use, two or three crops are becoming the norm where only one crop grew before. Cultivation of the new seeds, and the harvesting of bigger crops both require more labor. Higher yields encourage, even necessitate, more investment in land reclamation, irrigation, construction of storage facilities and warehouses, road building, marketing and transport. All these factors are leading to a sizable increase in the demand for labor, pushing wages up to higher levels, and providing employment throughout the year rather than only seasonally.

82

However, it seems a likely conclusion on the basis of experience in both the United States and in Europe, that "the great advances in agricultural technology have made the small-farm structure * obsolete for the production of most basic crops." 83

The Impact of Food Programs on U.S. Diplomacy

The food situation in the less developed countries impinges on U.S. diplomacy and the conduct of that diplomacy in countless ways. In their everyday relations with host countries, U.S. missions in underdeveloped countries may be called on to make recommendations as to whether U.S. food shipments are needed in that country, or whether, for example, improvements in local food processing might suffice to overcome specific food shortages. A U.S. mission in an underdeveloped country will need an agricultural capability that extends beyond the reportorial function. It may be asked for advice on broad problems of agricultural policy, or on technical methods of food fortification and similar problems of limited scope. If U.S. assistance is furnished, the mission will want to observe its distribution and use. In short, U.S. diplomatic activity in countries where food supplies are inadequate and malnutrition is common will probably be concerned to a considerable degree with the problems arising from this situation. The information garnered by U.S. agricultural attaches and other mission personnel may be useful in stimulating research on the solution of these problems, particularly if there are well developed relationships between the U.S. foreign affairs establishment and the U.S. scientific community. Conversely, U.S. missions may be able to stimulate research by scientists in the LDCs.

However, massive and complicated impacts on U.S. diplomacy will result from the concerted attack launched on hunger in the LDCs represented by the Green Revolution. Some of these changes are

81 "Can Politics Keep Up with Technology?-Feeding the Hungry." In ibid., page 187. Mr. Critchfield, author of "The Long Charade," is on leave from the Washington Star to write a book on world hunger. His article was reprinted in the hearing from The New Republic October 25, 1969.

82 "The Social Impact of the Green Revolution." International Conciliation (No. 581, January 1971), page 49.

83 Boerma, "Address to the Eighteenth General Conference of the International Federation of Agricultural Producers. op. cit., page 12. Although he was speaking of Europe, the same trend is observable in the United States. See part 3 of this series: U.S. Congress. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. "Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy: The Evolution of International Technology." Prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the. by the Science Policy Research and Foreign Affairs Divisions, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress. December 1970 (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), especially pages 31-33.

already evident; how they are managed will determine to a substantial degree the ultimate outcome of the Green Revolution. Managed with skill, the Green Revolution can do much to reduce malnutrition and hunger that is endemic in the underdeveloped countries. But if these changes are mismanaged, if the developing countries are not able to cope effectively and in timely fashion with the social implications of the Green Revolution, the promise of the massive agricultural transformation could be aborted and even turn into a disaster. One of the most important tasks for U.S. diplomacy, therefore, would seem to be that of lending encouragement and support to the efforts of the less developed countries to persuade their populations to adapt systematically to the changes necessitated by innovative agricultural technology. When prodding is called for, experience has shown that by and large the United States needs to exercise its influence as unobtrusively as possible, and preferably through indirect channels such as the FAO or the World Bank.

The Green Revolution will not solve the food/population problem. Rather, it extends the margin of time in which programs of family planning can be brought to a peak of effectiveness. Leaders in the underdeveloped countries are beginning to perceive the problems accompanying the Green Revolution, such as the forcing of the poorest peasants off the land, the huge capital investments required for irrigation, the need to modernize now inadequate marketing systems, the requirement for educating the farmers to new skills, and the need for institutional reforms.84 In addition, as the Second World Food Congress recently demonstrated, these leaders attribute world hunger to more than the inadequacy of foodstuffs. They see such shortages as caused by a lack of purchasing power, both internal and external, which can be overcome by liberalized trade policies on the part of the advanced countries, coupled with a broad attack on the root causes of world poverty.

Trade Demands of the LDC's

Breaking down barriers to their exports has now become the focus of trade policy by the underdeveloped countries. Through the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) they have demanded preferential treatment by the developed countries. Their demand has been accepted in principle by the developed countries, including the United States, but little visible progress has been made toward this goal. The Latin American countries, in the so-called Consensus of Vina del Mar in May 1969, unanimously arrived at a list of demands for U.S. action to correct what they saw as inequities existing in the economic relations between this country and its neighbors to the south. Despite these demands, it seems questionable to suppose that the LDCs will succeed in becoming substantial grain exporters in the near future. The FAO, working on the assumption that the developed countries would continue their present production and trade policies, foresees a growth in agricultural exports from the LDCs to the developed countries of only 1.8 percent per annum, from 1962 to 1975.

84 Wharton, "The Green Revolution: Cornucopia or Pandora's Box?" Op. cit., pages 464476.

Future growth rates might be even lower.85 When these possibilities are balanced against the demand for imports by the LDCs, it is difficult to see any gain in the latters' trading position. It is more likely, in the short run at any rate, that the developing countries will be thrown back on themselves. This is not necessarily a bad thing, again considering the short run. For the developing countries would be compelled to look to their own internal commercial markets as a force for growth. They could explore the possibilities which do exist for expanding agricultural trade among themselves. In addition, a number of the developing countries have the potential to substitute locally produced agricultural items-besides cereals-for commodities which they now import. If the shortage of foreign exchange helps in the realization of these possibilities, the result could actually be helpful to the LDCs involved.

In the long run, however, a collaborative attempt will have to be made by the developed and the developing countries to solve the latters' foreign exchange problems, lest the process of development grind to a halt. The United States would seem to have stake in the success of any such collaborative effort for two reasons. First, this country has been committed to international development as a cornerstone of its foreign policy for two decades. If development stagnates for lack of foreign exchange, U.S. policy will have received a stunning setback and will have to search for a new direction, a task which can be accomplished neither quickly nor easily. Second, if the developed countries of the West refuse to let the LDCs earn their way in world markets, the developing countries might well conclude that it is the desire of the richer countries to keep the LDCs in a perpetual state of dependency. If such an idea is given any credence it could be most damaging to U.S. relations with these countries. The poorer countries have a better bargaining position since the advent of the Green Revolution. They will also have a greater incentive to press their position forcefully, assuming that the new agriculture will have created new jobs.

The Necessity for Balanced Development

Finding a solution to the food/population dilemma is the central problem of international development. It is interwoven with every other aspect of development. Thus it will not be solved in isolation. If population growth is checked effectively, and the growth and diversification of agriculture goes forward as hoped, the entire development process will benefit immensely. On the other hand, for the new agricultural revolution to make its most forceful impact, there must be enormous developments outside agriculture. Asian peasantry has demonstrated that it is not as resistant to change as it was so often thought to be. It has responded to the economic incentives offered by the Green Revolution; these incentives would scarcely be present, however, without the development of a market economy. Either the LDCs must be able to earn the foreign exchange to purchase the inputs necessary for agricultural progress, or these imports will have to be produced domestically, usually with foreign aid funds. Such domestic production helps establish sufficient purchasing power in the domestic market so that

85 Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations. "Provisional Indicative World Food Plan for Agricultural Development." Vol. 1, op cit., page 21.