« iepriekšējāTurpināt »
in carrying out any of his functions under the provi
sions of this subsection the Chairman shall be governed by gen
eral policies of the Tribunal and by such regulatory decisions,
findings and determinations as the Tribunal may by law be
There has been soine discussion as to requiring that Commissioners be attorneys. This chart (taken from CAO report) may prove helpful. See last two columna .
Gol). (6 v.concle.)
7 ol )
und lleolt lovlov Cumulon
dent for full tern
Only the Chairperson le lull time.
Other cowlo.lower Herve on on s.-needed belo,
You have asked what are the usual arrangements in agencies headed by a collegium of advice-and-consent appointees for the allocation of responsibilities between the chairman and the members of the agency. You point out that although the statute establishing the Copyright Royalty Tribunal, P.L. 94-553, 5101, 17 U.S.C. $802, provides for a rotating one-year chairmanship, nothing is said regarding the powers and responsibilities of the chairman vis-a-vis the other members of the Tribunal
While the arrangements vary somewhat among the agencies, it is almost the universal practice to delegate by law the principal administrative responsibilities to the chairman, subject to the right of the members to set general policy. Fairly typical is the Arrangement in the Federal Trade Commission, as prescribed by Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1950, 15 U.S.C. S41 note:
$1. Transfer of Functions to the Chairman
(a) Subject to the provisions of subsection (b) of this section,
(b)(1) In carrying out any of his functions under the provisions
(2) The appointment by the Chairman of the heads of major administrative units under the Commission shall be subject to the approval of the Commission.
(3) Personnel employed regularly and full time in the immediate offices of members of the Commission other than the Chairman shall not be affected by the provisions of this reorganization plan.
(4) There are her eby reserved to the Commission its functions with respect to revising budget estimates and with respect to determining upon the distribution of appropriated funds according to major programs and purposes.
This reorganization plan was adopted in response to the recommendations of the First Hoover Commission. Very similar provisions have been adopted for other major independent regulatory commissions, either by reorganization plan, see 15 U.S.C. $78d note (SEC); or by statute, see 49 U.S.C. $10301(1) (ICC). Furthermore, recent statutes establishing new commissions, while deviating somewhat from the 1950 model, have specifically vested administrative responsibilities in the chairman. See 15 U.S.C. S2053 (CPSC); 7 U.S.C. S4a (CFTC); 49 U.S.C. App. $1902(b) (Natl Transportation Safety Board).
The only collegial agency I know of where the chairman is not delegated broad administrative powers is the Federal Election Commission, 2 U.S.C. S437c. The FEC also has a one-year rotating chairmanship. However, to provide for continuity in administration the Federal Election Campaign Act provides for a staff director and a general counsel who perform most of the administrative functions.
In 1980 hearings were held by the Committee on House Administration of the House of Representatives to consider certain questions relating to the structure and operation of the Federal Election Commission. At this hearing i testified, as did Professor David Welborn, who had done a study for the Conference on chairman/member relations at the major regulatory commissions. I enclose copies of our testimony. (The last page of my testimony deals with Commission structure.) You will note that in arguing for a "strong chairmanship" Professor Welbom pointed to the following advantages:
(1) (The time of members for important substantive matters and
chairmen tend to perform important functions in policy planning
As you know, I am not sufficiently familiar with the work of the Copyright Royalty Tribunal to judge to what extent the foregoing discussion is relevant to the experience in your agency. However, there seems to be sufficient similarity to the problems addressed in the 1980 hearing to warrant my bringing the enclosed materials to your attention.
Richard K. Berg