can use. For sieges, which by their long-drawn cruelty drive to a miserable end so many innocent lives, the ravage of fields, the poisoning of wells, which destroy, as in a lightning flash, such wealth of earth's produce, and send irrevocably to death so many beasts and hapless folk whose lives were free from blame, the sack of cities, and their surrender to the soldiers' license, wherein they commit such unspeakable atrocities, the sowing of revolution, and the disturbance of governments on the pretext of religion,-all these, I say, are actions far more vicious and detestable than those which any possible conspiracy could bring to birth. For, pressed to its last issue, a conspiracy only results in the slaughter of one man who, as principal or ally, has had a share in the origin or in the progress of the war; while the mass of persons who perish in the incidents of a campaign are for the most part entirely innocent.

'If the argument be advanced that an assassination is an action taken in cold blood, while all the other actions enumerated above are committed in the heat of battle, this consideration alone shall serve to prove the error of the argument, the consideration that while the war endures neither the blood nor the indignation of either party can ever be said to have run cold.

'I conclude therefore that for reasons of state and reasons of war it is the prince's duty to aim ever at the enfeeblement and annihilation of his foe by stripping him, even treacherously, of his allies, as of those who form an essential part of his forces.

'And I affirm the second clause of my thesis, that if Duke Ercole complained so bitterly of the plot organised against him by the Marquis of Pescara, he was complaining really not of the conspiracy but of the man who organised it. For the conspiracy, as a wise and intelligent prince would know quite well, was both possible and legal for reasons of State. But the organiser, as an Italian lord, and also as a relation to the duke, ought to have behaved more chivalrously towards him, and so the duke condemned accidentally in the person of the marquis the iniquity of the attempt; though he approved, on the grounds of custom of war and political expediency, the steps taken to carry it into execution.'

6

Such is the doctrine of political assassination, stated with absolute frankness by the anonymous author. It is not necessary for us to point out how, in this view, all action. is governed by expediency; how justification is sought in rules of State, not rules of good." Nor need we pause to analyse the arguments adduced in favour of political assassination-the argument of clemency to subjects, of a merciful expeditiousness by the destruction of the very source and fountain-head of the war-all these are set out with perfect clearness and so speciously supported that they might well have induced statesmen to adopt them. How thoroughly they were adopted by Italian princes the story of Bayard and the Duke of Ferrara will serve to show. The duke

informed the chevalier that he intended to poison the Pope. Bayard declared that he would never consent to the murder of God's lieutenant on earth. Thereupon the duke shrugged his shoulders, and, stamping on the ground, exclaimed, By 'the body of God, Monsieur de Bayard, I should like to kill 'all my enemies just in this way. However, as you do not ' approve, we will leave the matter alone; but unless God 'finds some remedy, both you and I will live to repent it." We only wish to point out now two general considerations upon the whole sentiment with regard to political assassination as displayed in the treatise of the anonymous author. First, that the attitude of mind which attempted to legitimise assassination indicates a revolt of what was held to be common sense against the Christian idea; the common sense that takes the cash and lets the credit go,' that cannot grasp the profounder doctrine that the whole world is nothing to a man in comparison with his own soul. And in this aspect it raises a question which is essentially a modern question, a question that is still waiting for its answer: How far may the ethical standards in the individual and in the State differ from one another? is there one rule of conduct for nations and another for persons; or is the ethical canon absolute at all times and in all places? And the second consideration-which also has bearings on some open questions of to-day-is this, that here we see a rudimentary international law growing up side by side with the new conditions of the States of Europe. Political assassination is discussed as a weapon of war, in precisely the same spirit that the Geneva Convention discussed the use of explosive bullets, Greek fire, or the immunity of ambulance

wagons.

Our readers may possibly feel that we have insisted too much on the existence of the doctrine of political assassination as a formulated, discussable proposition in the ethics of nations. Though we admit a tendency in those who handle this subject to become preoccupied by it, to see assassination in every sudden death, and poison in every unaccountable illness, yet we maintain that such documents as the one we have just quoted prove that the question of political assassination was matter for study, for discussion, for possible acceptance as a maxim of government; and the voluminous pages of M. Lamansky prove how frequently political assassination was attempted, not only in Italy, but also throughout Europe; that is to say, they prove how far the acceptance of these doctrines had gone.

The students who turned their attention to this point in statecraft, who argued and formulated the legitimacy of political assassination, seem to us to have fallen into an error similar to that which vitiated the speculations of the earlier political economists. They isolated their phenomenon for purposes of study, and then predicated its qualities and its action in isolation as its qualities and action when free in its proper place in the body politic. Political assassination, kept within bounds, used as philosophers and students desired to see it used, might possibly commend itself to men with whom the sense of interest was paramount to the sense of duty. But assassination let loose upon the State is quite another matter. And this con

sideration leads us to observe one or two points of weakness inherent in the doctrine, and, in part at least, accounting for its failure to take a permanent place among the maxims of government. And first, the whole proposition was lawless and immoral; lawless and immoral because it was not in the main current of developement, in the destined order of growth; because it was a violation of conscience. The conscience of Europe had been Christianised; a step had been made towards the perfect knowledge that love, not hatred, is the higher law of life. Retreat from that position was henceforth impossible for the conscience of mankind, however frequently the actions of men might contravene the rule that it implied. The idea of political assassination and all its many kindred ideas belong to a transient period of developement, one of the backward sweeps in the spiral of human progress, the mood of negation, the epoch of revolt against the unpractical Christian idea-a revolt which was destined to fortify, consolidate, and permanently enthrone that idea in the mind of man. This is, of course, judgement after the event. The men who formulated political assassination doubtless believed that they were assisting the developement of human intelligence, that they were placing in the hands of princes a weapon which would permanently enrich the armoury of states. If they had succeeded in establishing the maxims of political assassination, we should have had nothing to say. But they did not succeed. No doubt to practical politicians these unlawful and immoral means appeared to be a short and easy method for cutting the knot of many a difficult situation, provided always that they could be kept under control and applied only to that purpose which seemed to justify their adoption, the welfare of the State. But that was a proviso which could never be

observed. It is impossible to ring-fence, to hermetically seal up the unlawful and immoral element in a State. The most successful attempt to do so was made by Venice when she constructed the Council of Ten, endowed it with unlimited powers, and secured its irresponsibility by enveloping it in secrecy. But the virus cannot be confined to one part of the social structure. If it is present anywhere, it will inevitably spread, and sooner or later it will infect the whole body politic. The conscious and deliberate introduction of those false doctrines of statecraft is the first step towards anarchy, beginning with the corruption of the prince. The sovereign who has learned that all is lawful to him, a guardian of the public weal, as sovereign, will soon slip into the easy and consolatory belief that all is lawful to him as man. The people will argue that what is lawful to one man as man is lawful to all men as men. Hence a collision between prince and people. The prince arrives at the maxim, L'Etat c'est moi; ' he expands himself to the absorption of his State in his own personal and private individuality; the people arrive at the maxim of their own sovereignty; they expand the idea of themselves till it absorbs the governing powers; there is a confusion between the ruler and the ruled; the outlines of the State are broken down, and revolution ensues.

So far we have dealt with the question of political assassination in its abstract form, considering it generally in its widest applications. We may turn now to the special cases before us. Venice has furnished us with the material for the foregoing remarks, and the archives of the republic are peculiarly fitted to do this. Venice, as a State, enjoyed a singularly long life, free from internal revolutions which have so often wrought havoc among the State records of other nations. The rigidity of her constitution gave continuity to her policy; her State papers were carefully preserved, as indicating the lines upon which that policy must Finally the republic is dead; the Doge does not 'figure in the Almanach de Gotha;' the archives are open to us, there is no State susceptibility to wound. As M. de Mas Latrie says, 'C'est Venise elle-même qui parle et qui 'dépose dans sa propre cause.' M. de Mas Latrie and M. Lamansky are for the plaintiffs, and Signor Fulin for the defence. The indictment is portentous, and if judgement is to be given in accordance with the maxims of to-day, the case must go against Venice. It is too late to plead denial of the facts; the mass of facts is overwhelming; that

plea has been killed by Daru's sinister epigram, ' Quand on 'ne veut pas être accusé d'empoisonnement, il est fâcheux 'd'être aussi bien servi par la fortune.' Justification might rather be pleaded on the ground of custom of the time and on the ground of necessity. It is abundantly evident from these documents that Venice never had any great belief in the weapon of political assassination. She adopted it only when hard pressed and under stringent necessity, and as a concurrent means of escape from her difficulties, not as the sole means. The adoption of these means at all is, indeed, the result and the proof of her weakness. Wherever we find them discussed by the Ten we shall find, if we look abroad, that the republic was at that moment in grave danger from her foreign enemies. The documents in question belong to the archives of the Council of Ten, or of its commission, the Three Inquisitors of State. It was natural that such delicate matters should pass through the hands of the most powerful body in Venice, especially as secrecy was essential, and absolute secrecy could be obtained only in the Secreta Secretissima of the Ten.

The revelations contained in these papers are most startling. The first section alone of M. Lamansky's book cites ninety-one different proposals to make use of assassination. His papers range from the year 1415 to 1768, and show us attempts on the lives of the following among other distinguished persons:-The Emperor Sigismund, Matthias Corvinus, Marsilio Carrara, Filippo Maria Visconti, Francesco Sforza, the Sultan, Charles VIII. of France, Pope Pius IV., and Etienne le Petit, the false Czar Peter III. It would be impossible and unprofitable for us to analyse all the cases collected by M. Lamansky and Signor Fulin. We shall content ourselves with taking four or five typical cases, which will sufficiently demonstrate the method and the action of the Republic in the whole of this matter.

Although the Council of Ten had been in the habit of using poisons, and even of keeping a professional poisoner in their employ for many years previously, the first general order on the subject is dated October 17, 1509, and runs thus:

'By the authority of this Council be it decreed that the chiefs of the Council be charged to inform themselves in the most cautious and secret manner possible as to the ways and means by which we can put to death, through poison or otherwise, certain bitter and implacable enemies of our State.'

But earlier than this date we find the Council of Ten