from new nations with certain constitutions, such a plan would justify others who thought differently in refusing to regard the former any longer as legitimate states.

All history is full of examples of such recognitions. Holland and Switzerland, long after their independence was acknowledged in the diplomacy of most European states, were formally admitted into the brotherhood of nations at the era of the peace of Westphalia. The United States, the Spanish states of South America, the two French empires, the kingdom of Greece, all arose from revolutions, and have been acknowledged to possess the full functions of states. Such, too, has been the case in regard to states which have changed the succession, as England in 1688, Sweden in 1818, and also where a disruption has taken place, as that between Holland and Belgium in 1830; nay, such iniquities as the partitions of Poland have become facts of history, into which the law of nations claims no right to look.

It is almost needless to say that this rule cannot have its application, as long as there is evident doubt whether a government is a fact. If the question is still one of armed strife, as between a colony and a mother country, or between a state and a revolted portion of it, to take the part of the colony or of the revolted territory by recognition is an injury, and may be a ground of war; but every nation must decide for itself whether an iudependent state be really established, and needs not to wait until the party opposing the revolutionary effort has accepted the new order of things. It is a safe rule in contests involving the violent separation of a state into parts, that when the mother country, in the case of a colony, or the leading portion of the state, in the case of disruption, gives up active efforts to restore the old order of things by war, other states may regard the revolution as perfected, and a new state as having come into the world. (Note 1.)

§ 41.

No state is authorised to render assistance to provinces or colonies which are in revolt against the established Assistance to government. For if the existence and sovereignty provinces, &c. in of a state is once acknowledged, nothing can be done revolt.

to impair them; and if the right of interference-in favour of liberty, for instance-be once admitted, the door is open for taking a part in every quarrel.

On the other hand, there is nothing in the law of nations which forbids one nation to render assistance to the established government in such case of revolt, if its assistance is invoked. This aid is no interference, and is given to keep up the present order of things, which international law takes under its protection. It may be said that this rule, together with the unlawful

ness of taking the side of a revolutionary party in another state, must prevent wholesome reforms, that the partisans of despotism may thus use their power against free institutions, while the partisans of the latter may not oppose despotism. That this

effect may follow is quite possible; still the rule is an impartial one, as it applies to any existing state, whether free or absolute, to attempts against existing liberty as well as against existing tyranny. The only other conceivable rules of action for states are, that in internal quarrels every foreign state may take which side it pleases, or that no state may assist either party. The former course of action will find no advocates; the other, which the law of nations cannot be expected-for the present at least— to recognise, must indeed prevent some revolutions from being undertaken, but cannot prevent a change of government when demanded by a nation's united voice.

Exceptions to rule of non-interference.

§ 42.

The rule of non-interference in the affairs of other states is then an established principle. But the exceptions to it which are admitted, or which are claimed to exist, are of great importance, and there is considerable difficulty in determining what is lawful interference and what is unlawful. For, first, there may be interference without a show or pretence of justice. In the second place, a nation which has or pretends to have causes of war with another, aids its revolted provinces in the exercise of the war-right of crippling its enemy. In the third place, there are instances of interference which can be explained neither on the ground of injustice, nor of a state of war, and which the usage of Christian or of many Christian states tolerates.

Whatever be the interference, it can be justified only as an Interference, extreme measure, and on one of the two following when justified. grounds. (1.) That it is demanded by self-preservation; (2.) That some extraordinary state of things is brought about by the crime of a government against its subjects. And upon these grounds we must judge, not only of the lawfulness of interference at any time pro re nata, but also of the lawfulness of treaties contemplating such interference in the future. From the nature of these grounds it appears that they are more or less vague and under the influence of subjective opinion.

1 If the principles of intervention cannot stand, treaties of guaranty, which contemplate such intervention, must be condemned also; for they have in view a resistance, at some future time, to the endeavours of third parties to conquer or in some way control the guaranteed states in question. An agreement, if it involve an unlawful act, or the prevention of lawful acts on the part of others, is plainly unlawful.

The danger to a state's existence from the designs of another, or of others, evidently cannot be measured. While, on the one hand, mere suspicion, or calculation of remote probabilities, can be no justifying cause of action, on the other, it is hard to say, just as in cases of individual morality, how much evidence is sufficient to sanction that procedure which in ordinary times is unlawful. Thus much may be laid down, that a danger resulting from the healthy and prudent growth of another state is no reason for interference whatever, and that good evidence of unjust designs, drawn from conduct, ought to be obtained before any measures may be taken to prevent them.

The extreme case of extraordinary crimes, committed by a government against its subjects, is still less capable of exact definition. Here, however, the danger of erring is less than in the other instance, because interference here is more disinterested; and the evil results of a mistake are less, because such cases are comparatively rare.

§ 43.

Having premised thus much in regard to justifying pretexts for interference, let us look now at the actual cases in which international law gives, or is claimed to give to it a sanction. We shall consider first the balance of power.

any Euro

1. Interference

of power.

The meaning of the balance of power is this: that pean state may be restrained from pursuing plans of acquisition, or making preparations looking towards for the balance future acquisitions, which are judged to be hazardous to the independence and national existence of its To prevent acneighbours. In further explanation of the system quisitions. we may say, (1.) That it matters not whether the actual ratio of power between states is in danger of being disturbed by unjust or by just means, provided only the means are political, not economical and strictly internal. If, for instance, the sovereign of a powerful state should in a just way seat one of his family on the throne of a neighbouring state, the justice of the transaction would not be a sufficient protection against the interference of other powers. (2.) That acquisitions outside of Europe have not hitherto been drawn into this policy. England has by degrees become a predominant power in several quarters of the world without provoking the interference of the Continent. The reason is, that foreign acquisitions affect the political balance only in an indirect way. (3.) The system has been applied to power on the land, and not much to power on the sea. England has acquired, undisturbed, a great predominance on the sea, while the balance of power has been in full exercise. The reason is obvious. Power on the sea cannot directly control the political relations of Europe, nor destroy the independence of states. (4.)

D

The system has not yet been carried out beyond the borders of the European states, Turkey included. The reason is, that the Transatlantic states have not only come at a recent period into the European international system, but can, as yet, have no appreciable influence in European affairs.

The balance of power is a maxim of self-preservation, which must naturally arise among states which are so contiguous to one another as to be liable to sudden invasions. Suppose a confederacy of states, having free power of war and peace, and that the terms of union guaranteed to each state an independent existence. In such a league, if one strong member threatened the existence of weaker ones, it would be the duty of all to interfere. Europe resembles such a confederacy, and the balance of power is the guaranty of national existence against the designs of states of the first rank. Let the members of such a loose union be removed many thousand miles from one another by tracts of ocean. The self-preserving principle now apprehends no danger, and a system of balances is useless.

trations.

§ 44.

The maintenance of a certain balance of power, as a fact, if Historical illus- not as a right, characterised the politics of Greece. The Peloponnesian war was really owing, says Thucydides (i. 23), to the alarm which the growth of Athens excited in the confederates, at the head of whom was Sparta. When at the end of that war Athens was subdued, Thebes and Corinth desired its destruction; but the Spartans justly regarded its existence as necessary in the politics of Greece. Subsequently, Athens, when Thebes was beginning to be too powerful, went over to the side of Sparta, her old enemy.

In the middle ages a system of equipoise in Italy was put into motion by the Popes, as soon as the German emperors became strong in the Peninsula. The Popes' policy was to have two Italian interests which could be set against one another, at the pleasure of the Roman See, which thus secured its own. safety and influence. But a nearer approach to the modern balance of power is seen in the Italian affairs consequent upon the claims of the French kings, Charles VIII. and Louis XII., to Naples and Milan, from 1494 onward. The dangers from the French invasion under Charles, led Spain, the Pope and Venice to combine against him. Then, in 1508, the league of Cambray united all the powers involved in the Italian quarrels against Venice for her destruction. Then, in 1510, the Pope, fearing that the ruin of Venice would leave Italy exposed to France, formed the Holy League to drive this latter power out of the Peninsula. It must be confessed, however, that the league of

Cambray against Venice was dictated by motives much more unworthy than those of self-preservation, and had less to do with maintaining the integrity of Italy than with rapacity and revenge.

was

Not long after this the Austrian family, in two lines, held Spain and the German empire with other important territorial possessions, and the great resources of these allied houses seemed to be dangerous to the European system. France now the weight in the opposite scale. The unaccomplished schemes of King Henry IV. were carried out by Richelieu, when he aided the German Protestants and Sweden against Austria; and the peace of Westphalia in 1648 prevented thenceforward, this state, holding as it did the office of Emperor in its hands, from becoming formidable either to Europe or to Germany.

It was now the turn of France to feel the force of the balance of power. The ambition of Louis XIV. was thought to endanger the existence of other European states, and a universal monarchy seemed to be at hand. The coalitions of nearly all Europe, which resisted and finally humbled the Grand Monarch, are among the most righteous examples of measures for preserving the balance of power which history records. Some of the measures, however, which were adopted for the preservation of the balance at this time, were of doubtful justice and policy. It was right to set bounds to the ambition of Louis XIV.; it was right, when his intrigues procured the nomination of his grandson to a throne which had been solemnly renounced for his posterity, to endeavour to prevent, by force of arms, this accumulation of power in the Bourbon line; but what justice was there in the two partition treaties of 1698 and 1700, which disposed of territories appertaining to the Spanish crown, without asking leave of the king or nation; and was not this high-handed measure a failure in policy, as calculated to offend the pride of Spain? Since the time when the balance of power played such a part in the days of Louis and William of Orange, it has been repeatedly acted on, and may be said to be an established part of the international law of Europe. The most memorable instances of its application in recent times have been the interposition of the four powers, in 1840, which forced Mehemet Ali to renounce the provinces of the Turkish empire, of which he held possession, and that of France and England in 1854, to preserve the integrity of the same empire against the designs of Russia.

§ 45.

We have already seen that where one nation's aid is invoked by the government of another for the purpose of 2. Interference putting down a revolt, such assistance is not opposed to prevent revoby the law of nations. Should it be given in the lutions.