limited way as they are viewed by the Courts of Common Law. In those Courts they are very properly considered as mere personal securities for the benefit of those parties to whom they are given. In Prize Courts they are subject to more enlarged considerations; they are there regarded as pledges or substitutes for the thing itself, in all points fairly in adjudication before the Court. If, therefore, a bond be given to the actual captors to answer the adjudication of the property, which should, from the locality of the capture, or from other circumstances, be condemned to the Government, the bail would, in such case, be answerable, in the Admiralty, to the Government (y). But if the property at the time of capture was neutral, and delivered on bail pending the proceedings, and hostilities subsequently intervene with the neutral country, and, in consequence thereof, the property is condemned to the Government, it seems that the Court is not in the habit of enforcing the bail bond in such cases; because the event was not originally in the contemplation of the parties, at the time they entered into the security (z). Whether this doctrine would be sustained in the North American United States, is, according to Story, a question upon which there is no decision to guide the judgment: but he is of opinion that certainly much argument may be used against the asserted exemption; for, the bail bond being a substitute for the property itself, there does not seem any very conclusive reason why it should not be subject to all the events which would have affected the property, if still in the custody of the Court (a). (y) The Nied Elwin, 1 Dodson's Adm. Rep. p. 50. (2) Ibid. (a) As to the jurisdiction of the Prize Court over, 1, The Distribution of Prize proceeds, the reader is referred to the following decisions in the English and North American United States Courts : ENGLISH. The Herkimer, Stewart's Rep. p. 128. Home v. Camden, 1 H. Blackstone's Rep. pp. 476, 521. S. C. 2 H. Blackstone's Rep. p. 633. 4 Durnford & East's Rep. p. 382. Duckworth v. Tucker, 2 Taunton's Rep. p. 7. Drury v. Gardiner, 2 Maule & Selwyn Rep. p. 150. Pill v. Taylor, 11 East's Rep. p. 414. Lumley v. Sutton, 8 Durnford & East's Rep. p. 224. The Nostra Signora del Carmen, 6 Rob. Adm. Rep. p. 302. Wemys v. Linzee, 1 Douglas' Rep. p. 324. The Alert, 1 Dodson's Adm. Rep. p. 236. Several Dutch Schuyts, 6 Rob. Adm. Rep. p. 48. L'Alerte, 6 ib. p. 238. The San Joseph, ib. p. 331. The Babilion, Edwards' Adm. Rep. p. 39. La Clorinde, 1 Dodson's Adm. Rep. p. 436. L'Elise, 1 Dodson's Adm. Rep. p. 442. The Matilda, ib. p. 367. The Frederick and Mary Ann, 6 Rob. Adm. Rep. p. 213. Bynkershoek, Q. J. P. l. i. c. xviii. Du Ponceau's ed. pp. 139, 141. AMERICAN. The St. Lawrence, 2 Gallison's (Amer.) Rep. p. 19. Kean v. The Brig Gloucester, 2 Dallas's (Amer.) Rep. p. 36. Penhallow v. Doane, 3 ib. p. 54. The Herkimer, 2 Hall's (Amer.) Law Journ. p. 133. Bingham v. Cabot, 3 Dallas's (Amer.) Rep. p. 19. As to Prize Agents, see the following decisions :— ENGLISH. Home v. Camden, 1 H. Blackstone's Rep. pp. 374, 524. Willis v. Commissioners, &c. 5 East's Rep. p. 22. The Noysomhed, 7 Vesey's Rep. p. 593. Smart v. Wolff, 3 Durnford & East's Rep. p. 323. The Pomona, 1 Dodson's Adm. Rep. p. 25. The Herkimer, Stewart's Rep. p. 128. The Louis, 5 Rob. Adm. Rep. p. 146. The Polly, ib. p. 147, note. The Printz Henrick von Preussen, 6 ib. p. 95. The Exeter, 1 ib. p. 173. The Princessa, 2 ib. p. 31. AMERICAN. The St. Lawrence, 2 Gallison's (Amer.) Rep. p. 19. The Brutus, ib. p. 526. Bingham v. Cabot, 3 Dallas's (Amer.) Rep. p. 19. Kean v. Brig Gloucester, 2 ib. p. 36. The Herkimer, 2 Hall's (Amer.) Law Journ. p. 133. Hill v. Ross, 3 Dallas's (Amer.) Rep. p. 331. Penhallow v. Doane, ib. p. 54. PART THE TWELFTH CHAPTER I. OF THE MANNER OF ENDING WAR, AND OF RE-ESTABLISHING PEACE. DIX. "IN totâ Belli administratione non potest se"curus et Deo fidens animus retineri, nisi semper in Pacem 66 prospectet ; " and again," Bellum pacis causa suscipitur,” the maxims of Christianity, justice, and reason, expressed by their noble expounder, the ever illustrious Grotius (a). are When, by use of the means of War, the invaded right has been obtained or secured, or the inflicted injury redressed, or the threatened danger averted,-post juris consecutionem (b)—the abnormal state of War must cease, the normal state of Peace must be re-established (c). (a) L. iii. c. xxv. s. 2. L. i. c. i. s. 1. (b) Vidè ante, vol. i. pp. 11, 12. (c) Albericus Gentilis, 1. iii. c. i. Grotius, 1. iii. c. vi. viii. ix. xv. xvi. xx. Zouch, pars ii. sect. ix. p. 25 ad finem. Wolff, cap. viii. De Pace et Pactione Pacis. Vattel, 1. iv. Du Rétablissement de la Paix, &c. ch. i. ii. iii. iv. Ompteda, i. 49, 62, 63, ii. 604, continuat. by Carl Albert von Kamptz, ss. 321, 331 (356, 360). Klüber, 2 Abschnitt, c. iii. Recht des Friedens, ss. 317, 329. Heffters, ii. B. 4, Abschnitt: "Die Beendigung des Krieges, die Usurpation und das Postliminium." This part of the work, as indeed the work generally, deserves careful study. We are, indeed, admonished by Grotius, that if a Peace sufficiently safe can be had, it is not ill obtained even by the condonation of injuries, damages, and expenses, especially among Christians (d),-for to them their Lord has bequeathed Peace as his peculiar legacy, to them the chosen interpreter of their Lord's Testament has made peace the theme of his most earnest exhortations (e). If this admirable doctrine be too excellent for the present condition of the Society of States, it may at least be propounded as an unquestionable proposition of International Jurisprudence that there is a legal as well as moral necessity that, with the ceasing of the causes which justified the inception of the War, the War itself should cease. Moreover, it is to be remembered that in this cessation every State is interested; because by the conflict between the Belligerents every State, neutral as well as belligerent, is to a certain extent injured; for War, as has been shown (f), necessarily disturbs the relations and affects the condition, in a greater or less degree, of all States. In the event, therefore, of a War unlawfully continued, though lawfully begun, it would be morally and legally competent to States who have taken no part in the conduct of the contest, to combine for the purpose of compelling the termination of War and the restoration of Peace (g). The State which continues the evils and horrors of War unrighteously, is but little, if at all less an offender against (d) Vide antè, vol. i. pp. 22-7. (e) See this noble passage, 1. iii. c. xxv. s. 3: "Pax ergo tuta satis haberi si potest, et malefactorum et damnorum et sumtuum condonatione non malè constat : præcipuè inter Christianos, quibus pacem suam Dominus legavit. Cujus optimus interpres nos vult, quantum fieri potest, quantum in nobis situm est, cum omnibus Pacem quærere.” (ƒ) P. 57. As to what are causæ belli justificæ. 1 (g) Vide antè, vol. i. pt. iv. ch. i. On Intervention. 1 St. Paul, Rom. xii. 18. |