COMMENTARIES

UPON

INTERNATIONAL LAW.

PART THE NINTH.

CHAPTER I.

INTERNATIONAL RIGHT OF ACTION (a).

I. WE have hitherto considered States in their normal, that is, their pacific relations to each other. We have inquired into the origin and character of their reciprocal Rights and Obligations. We have now to consider the abnormal state of things which ensues upon a disturbance of these normal relations, when these Rights have been invaded and these Obligations not fufilled.

In the case of individuals, a redress for this infringement of Right and neglect of Obligation is provided for in every system of National or Municipal Law. In these systems the individual is furnished with a Right of Action, and the regulation of this Right, in all its various shapes, forms the subject of a Code of Procedure; whether there be, as in the case of most Continental States, such a Code made by express enactment part of a general Code of Law, or whether, as in England, such a Code practically exists in

usage and judicial precedent amended and amplified by positive statute.

In the system of International Law, this Civil Right of Action becomes of necessity an appeal to arms (b), for war is the terrible litigation of States.

By what rules this International Right of Action (e) is governed, both with respect to the principals and to the bystanders, we shall presently consider at length.

II. But as we approach these awful confines, we must remember that it is the bounden and most sacred duty of every State, to exhaust every legal means of redress (d), before it has recourse to the dreadful necessity of war. These means are, as we have already seen (e), classed under two heads, viz.:

1. Measures taken viâ amicabili.

2. Measures taken viâ facti, which nevertheless fall short

of war.

III. Measures taken via amicabili, are, 1. Negotiation; 2. Arbitration (Arbitrage).

With respect to Negotiation-it is, of course, the principal object of Embassies (f), the nature and privileges of which have been so fully discussed, to adjust international differences before they ripen into war.

With respect to Arbitration (g), this mode of adjustment must be considered both with reference to the Parties and

(b) Vide ante, vol. i. p. 11.

(c) Heffters most correctly entitles the second book of his clever work "Das Volkerrecht im Zustande des Unfriedens, oder, die Actionenrechte der Staaten."

(d) Wolff, Jus Gentium, c. v., De Modo componendi Controversias Gentium.

Zouch, Pars ii. l. i. s. 3. p. 54.

(e) Vide ante, vol. i. p. 11.

(f) Vol. ii. pp. 134-234.

(g) See an excellent chapter upon the subject, considered as a question of general jurisprudence, in Voet, Ad Pandect. 1. iv. t. viii., De Receptis qui Arbitrium receperunt, ut Sententiam dicant, and the recent work of Calvo, I. 790-7; II. 368-371. Bluntschli, 488-498.

to the Arbitrator; as much with reference to the latter as to the former.

First, as to the Parties. It cannot be laid down as a general and unqualified proposition that it is the duty of States to adopt this mode of trial. There may, in the circumstances, be no third State willing, or qualified in all respects, for so arduous and invidious a task. Moreover, a State may feel that the contested Right is one of vital importance, and one which she is not justified in submitting to the decision of any Arbitrator or Arbitrators.

We know from history that Congresses of crowned heads have not always proved themselves to be impartial or competent tribunals of International Law, and the circumstances which justify the Intervention of Foreign States, both when invited and when uninvited by the contending parties, have been already under our consideration (h).

Secondly, with respect to the Arbitrator. It should be observed that if any arbitrator be appointed, the terms of the appointment will of course limit his authority, and if his award exceed or be inconsistent with those limits it will be altogether null (i).

Otherwise, the Jus inter gentes is well expressed in the opinion of Ulpian, as it stands incorporated in the Roman

(h) Vol. i. pt. iv. c. i., on Intervention.

(i) "Uti ex adverso cavendum quoque arbitro est, ne compromissi fines egrediatur, ac alia dirimat, quàm quæ ipsius arbitrio commissa sunt, aut alio modo quàm quo compromissum est. Generaliter enim sciendum, omnem de officio arbitri ac potestate tractatum ex ipso compromisso sumendum esse; nec aliud ei' licere, quàm quod ibi, ut efficere possit, cautum est. Non ergo quodlibet statuere poterit, nec in re quâlibet, sed de quâ re compromissum, et quatenus compromissum est, et, compromisso generaliter concepto, de his solis judicare rebus et rationibus et controversiis, quæ ab initio fuerunt inter eos, qui compromiserunt, non quæ postea supervenerunt."-Voet, ib. 1. iii. t. viii. For the powers and duties of the Recuperatores under the early Roman Law, see vol. i. Append. p. 542.

For the power of the Pope as International Arbitrator, see vol. i. Preface, p. xlvii. p. 82.; vol. ii. pp. 367-8.

As to the authority of General Councils in this matter, see vol. ii. p. 354. Of Universities, ib. p. 358.

Law:-" Si se subjiciant alicui jurisdictioni, et consentiant, "inter consentientes cujusvis judicis, qui tribunali præest, "vel aliam jurisdictionem habet, est jurisdictio" (k). The Arbitrator cannot be compelled, unless, indeed, a clause to this effect has been inserted in the International Covenant, to continue the exercise of his functions (). Nor can he alter his decision when it has once been formally delivered (m); for, when this has been done, he is functus officio. If there be an uneven number of Arbitrators, the opinion of the majority (n) would, according to the Reason of the Thing, and the Jus commune of Nations, be conclusive. If one of the Arbitrators were maliciously to absent himself, it might be competent for the others to proceed; but if one were dead, the Arbitration would be dissolved, unless provision had been made for the contingency in the original covenant (o). Nor, if there be two Arbitrators, and they differ in opinion, can they call in, without the consent of both parties, a third person as umpire (superarbitrum) (p).

(k) Dig. v. t. i. 1.

(1) "Prætereà cogendus non fuit arbiter, si pœna compromisso non fuisset inserta."-Voet, ib. 1. iv. t. viii.

(m) "Sententiæ secundùm requisita superiùs commemorata latæ effectus est, quod nec ab arbitris mutari possit, etsi errorem allegantibus; quippe quorum officium absolutione vel condemnatione finitum est."-Ibid.

(n) “Quod si plures arbitri electi dissentiant in ferendâ sententiâ, id quod majori parti placuerit, ratum erit."-Ibid.

"Quod major pars Curiæ effecit, id pro eo habetur ac si omnes egerint."-Dig. L. t. i. § 19.

(o) "Quia tamen illa absoluta arbitrorum omnium præsentiæ necessitas non raro malitiis atque calumniis posset ansam præbere, dùm aliquando unus aut gratiâ aut odio aut sordibus corruptus sui copiam non faceret; atque ità quæstiones malitiosâ absentiâ diutiùs protelarentur ac manerent indecisæ; commodè cautum fuit jure Canonico, ut, si legitimè omnes citati fuerint, nec justum allegaverint impedimentum quo minùs adessent, liceat duobus præsentibus, absente tertio, perindè ad negotii commissi examen accedere, illudque suâ dirimere sententiâ, ac si tertius legitimè vocatus ipsis præsens fuisset. Aliter quàm statuendum foret, si unus ex arbitris fato functus sit: morte enim tali compromissum dissolvi verius est; nisi superstitibus reliquis in casum mortalitatis tributum sit alterius in mortui locum cooptandi jus."-Voet, ib. 1. iv. t. viii.

(p) "Sed vix est, ut hæc aliter admiseris, quàm si compromittentes,