interest of creditors. Valuable as his property therein may be, it cannot be subjected to the payment of his debts by any of the ordinary methods of involuntary alienation. This is not due to any peculiar sanctity which the law attaches to this class of property, but to the fact that the statutes which create the monopoly provide no other mode of transferring it than through the voluntary act of its real owner. The ownership of a patented invention cannot be seized and sold on execution by a sheriff like a personal chattel, nor like other incorporeal rights does it vest in a receiver or a trustee in insolvency by virtue of the judicial decree of the court by which these various officials are appointed.1 Thus neither a bankrupt court, nor a court of equity, nor any person acting under their authority, can affect the ownership of a patented invention without the actual or presumed co-operation of the individual in whom such ownership is vested by the issue of § 766. 1 That a patent privilege cannot be seized and sold on execution, nor set off to a judgment creditor, see Carver v. Peck (1881), 131 Mass. 291; Pacific Bank v. Robinson (1881), 57 Cal. 520; Stevens v. Gladding (1854), 17 How. 447; Stephens v. Cady (1852), 14 How. 528. That the patent privilege does not vest in a receiver merely by virtue of his appointment, see Dick v. Struthers (1885), 25 Fed. Rep. 103; 34 O. G. 131. That a receiver, as such, has no power to convey the legal title to a patent, see Adams v. Howard (1884), 23 Blatch. 27; 22 Fed. Rep. 656; Gordon v. Anthony (1879), 16 O. G. 1135; 16 Blatch. 234; 4 Bann. & A. 248. That a receiver, as such, may convey the equitable title, see Adams v. Howard (1884), 23 Blatch. 27; 22 Fed. Rep. 656. That a trustee in insolvency does not acquire the patents of the insolvent by virtue of his appointment as trustee, see Campbell v. James (1880), 2 Fed. Rep. 338; 18 Blatch. 92; 18 O. G. 1111; Gordon v. Anthony (1879), 16 Blatch. 234; 16 O. G. 1135; 4 Bann. & A. 248; Ashcroft v. Walworth (1872), 5 Fisher, 528; 2 O. G. 546; Holmes, 152. That a State has power to enact a statute by virtue of which an assignee in insolvency will become entitled to the patents of the insolvent, and a court of equity will be empowered to compel the insolvent to transfer them to the assignee, see Barton v. White (1887), 144 Mass. 281. That under § 5046, Rev. Stat., a right to the patents of the bankrupt vested in the trustee by virtue of his appointment, see Carver v. Peck (1881), 131 Mass. 291; Prime v. Brandon Mfg. Co. (1879), 16 Blatch. 453; 4 Bann. & A. 379. That under § 5046, Rev. Stat., the rights of the trustee were superior to those of an assignee of record whose assignment was made by the bankrupt after the bankruptcy, see Prime v. Brandon Mfg. Co. (1879), 16 Blatch. 453; 4 Bann. & A. 379. the patent or by assignment from the patentee. Either of these courts may have the power to compel the owner to transfer the ownership by an assignment to the receiver or trustee, and a court of equity, on his refusal, may treat the equitable rights as vested in the creditors and appoint a trustee for the owner to convey the legal title, in his name and behalf, to the officer in charge of his bankrupt estate, but the title in all such cases is still derived from him on whom it was originally conferred.2 That Congress has the power at any time to meet this difficulty, by creating methods of involuntary alienation, there can be no doubt, but in the absence of such statutes and judicial orders, the patented invention remains entirely and exclusively under the control of its owner, and may be retained or conveyed by him at his pleasure without reference to any existing condition of insolvency.3 §767. Assignment, to whom Made. An assignment of a patented invention may be made to any person without regard to age, capacity, or citizenship.1 A corporation may become the owner both of the invention and monopoly without receiving special charter-powers for that purpose, although such powers might be required in order to enable it to practise the invention.2 Every assignee, of whatever degree of removal from the original patentee, occupies the same position and enjoys the same rights as any of his predecessors or co-owners, and is entitled to all the privileges 2 That an insolvent court or court of equity may compel the insolvent to assign his patents to the trustee or receiver, see In re Keach (1884), 14 R. I. 571; Pacific Bank v. Robinson (1881), 57 Cal. 520; 20 O. G. 1314 ; Murray v. Ager 1881), 1 Mackey, 87; 20 O. G. 1311; Barnes v. Morgan (1875), 3 Hun, 703; 6 Thomp. & C. 105; Ashcroft v. Walworth (1872), 2 O. G. 546; 5 Fisher, 528; Holmes, 152. That if the insolvent refuses to convey when ordered by the court, it may appoint a trustee to make the assign ment, see Murray v. Ager (1881), 1 Mackey, 87; 20 O. G. 1311. See further on this subject, §§ 803805 and notes, post. 3 That an assignment of all the assignor's property except such as is exempt by law does not carry a patentright, see Campbell v. James (1880), 18 O. G. 1111; 2 Fed. Rep. 338; 18 Blatch. 92. § 767. That married women or infants may be made assignees, see Fetter v. Newhall (1883), 21 Blatch. 445; 25 O. G. 502; 17 Fed. Rep. 841. 1 2 That a corporation may take the assignment of a patent without special charter powers for that purpose, see Dorsey Harvester Rake Co. v. Marsh (1873), 6 Fisher, 387. and is subject to all the obligations conferred or imposed by the statutes upon the patentee and his assignees.3 §768. Form of Assignment: General Requisites. No particular form for an assignment is prescribed.1 It So In Selden v. Stockwell Self-Lighting Gas Burner Co. (1881), 19 Blatch. 544, Blatchford, J.: (552) "The assignee' means the assignee in any degree and however remote. By § 4884 the grant is directed to be made to 'the patentee, his heirs, or assigns.' This is not limited to the first assignee. § 4898, in declaring that 'every patent, or any interest therein, shall be assignable,' and that the patentee or his assigus' may convey an exclusive right under the patent, for the whole or any specified part of the United States, clearly means that an assignee in any degree is an assignee for all purposes. All parts of the statute are to be construed harmoniously in this respect, as there appears to be no good reason for a contrary construction. It is true that §4 of the Patent Act of February 21st, 1793 (1 U. S. Stat. at Large, 322), used the words 'assignees of assigns, to any degree;' but the absence of the words 'to any degree' cannot, in view of all the provisions of the present statute, be regarded as restricting the meaning of the word 'assignee.'" 20 O. G. 1377 (1378); 9 Fed. Rep. 390 (396). § 768. That assignments are gov. erned wholly by statute, see Suydam v. Day (1846), 2 Blatch. 20. That an assignment is not valid unless it complies with the laws of the United States, see Higgins v. Strong (1836), 4 Black f. (Ind.) 182. That an assignment requires no special form, see Siebert Cylinder Oil Cup Co. v. Beggs (1887), 32 Fed. Rep. 790; Campbell v. James (1880), 18 0. G. 1111; 18 Blatch. 92; 2 Fed. Rep. 338. That an assignor, having only a residuary interest, may convey that by assigning "all his right, title, and interest," whether his prior assignment is recorded or not, see Turnbull v. Weir Plow Co. (1874), 7 O. G. 173, 1 Bann. & A. 544; 6 Bissell, 225. That a certificate of the patentee that another person owns part of the patent is not an assignment, unless so intended, see Kearney v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co. (1886), 27 Fed. Rep. 699. That a certificate that the holder is the owner of of the patent and property of the M. T. Co., and "will receive shares of stock to that amount when the company is formed" is not an assignment, see Hope Iron Works v. Holden (1870), 58 Me. 146. That if the description of the patent in the assignment be intelligible it is sufficient, see Myers v. Turner (1855), 17 Ill. 179. That the deed need not set out the specification of the invention, if it is otherwise clearly shown, see Hill v. Thuermer (1859), 13 Ind. 351. That the vendee of a patent must exercise ordinary care in inspecting the specification and Claims to see what the invention is, see Edmunds v. Myers (1854), 16 Ill. 207; Edmunds v. Hildreth (1854), 16 Ill. 214. That circumstantial variance between the patent and its description in the assignment does not show fraud or prevent the title from passing, see Case v. Morey (1818), 1 N. H. 347; Holden v. Curtis (1819), 2 N. H. 61. That the sale of an improvement is valid if the patent referred to in the conveyance so describes the improve must be made in writing and be signed by the assignors.2 It must also contain operative words unequivocally indicating an intention to convey an interest both in the invention and in ment that a person skilled in the art could make it, though it does not describe the original machine, see Harmon v. Bird (1839), 22 Wend. 113. 2 That an assignment must be in writing, see Gottfried v. Miller (1882), 104 U. S. 521; 21 O. G. 711; Blakeney v. Goode (1876), 30 Ohio St. 350; Ashcroft v. Walworth (1872), 2 O. G. 546; Holmes, 152; 5 Fisher, 528; Jordan v. Dobson (1870), 4 Fisher, 232; 2 Abbott, 398; 7 Phila. 533; Davy v. Morgan (1868), 56 Barb. 218. That an agreement based on a parol assignment is void for want of consideration, see Davy v. Morgan (1868), 56 Barb. 218. That a patent is personal property, and but for the statute could be conveyed by parol, see Springfield v. Drake (1876), 58 N. H. 19. That an oral agreement for the sale of an invention before patent, is not a contract for goods under the Statute of Frauds, see Somerby v. Buntin (1875), 118 Mass. 279. That an agreement to hold a patent in trust for another may be by parol, see Blakeney v. Goode (1876), 30 Ohio St. 350. That a parol contract to assign will pass an equitable title which a court of equity will enforce, see Burr v. De La Vergne (1886), 102 N. Y. 415; Whitney v. Burr (1885), 115 Ill. 289. That equitable interests and rights to the proceeds of the sales of patents may be created by parol, see Blakeney v. Goode (1876), 30 Ohio St. 350. That a verbal assignment vests in the assignee an equitable right to grant licenses, and notes given for such licenses are upon sufficient consideration, see Burke v. Partridge (1878), 58 N. H. 349. That a parol agreement to assign and to allow the assignee to take out the patent in his own name, is valid, see Lockwood v. Lockwood (1871), 33 Iowa, 509. That a parol agreement by the inventor to permit another to receive the patent in his own name for value, if carried out, can be shown and the value recovered, see Lockwood v. Lockwood (1871), 33 Iowa, 509. That the legal title to a patent can be transferred only by a written instrument, signed by the owner of the patent, see Ashcroft v. Walworth (1872), 2 O. G. 546; Holmes, 152; 5 Fisher, 528. That a contract binds the parties who participate in it, though signed only by one party representing the rest, see Bean v. Clark (1887), 40 O. G. 1454. That an assignment executed by attorney must be signed with name of the principal and sealed with his seal, see Machesney v. Brown (1886), 38 O. G. 1130; 29 Fed. Rep. 145; 24 Blatch. 168. That an assignment by an attorney in his own name is invalid, the signa. ture of the owner being essential, see Pryor v. Coulter (1830), 1 Bailey (S. C.), 517. That where the owner of a patent consents in writing to its transfer by another, it is as good as if the transfer were made directly by himself, see Sherman v. Champlain Transportation Co. (1858), 31 Vt. 162. That a conveyance by a corporation with its seal, and by its president with his seal, is good as to both, see Campbell v. James (1879), 18 O. G. 979; 17 Blatch. 42; 4 Bann. & A. 456. That a corporation may assign letters-patent although some shares of its the monopoly. A contract to sell the patented invention, therefore, is not an assignment, though it may be enforced in equity, and meanwhile operate by estoppel as a license. But an irrevocable power of attorney, giving full control over the patented invention, may vest the entire ownership at once in the attorney named, and however widely differing in form from a conveyance may be a true assignment. Whether a given instrument is or is not an assignment must be determined from its subject-matter, as described in the instrument itself. Parol evidence is not admissible to vary its terms except in cases of mutual mistake. The motive for an assignment is immaterial. A seal is not required.8 $769. Assignment before Patent: Its Form and Effect. An assignment of a completed invention may be made either before or after the issue of the patent. An inventor has, by Kempton v. Bray (1868), 99 Mass. 350. capital stock may be under attachment in a suit against a stockholder, see Gottfried v. Miller (1881), 104 U. S. 521; 21 O. G. 711. That a forged assignment may be ratified in pais, see Campbell v. James (1879), 17 Blatch. 42; 18 O. G. 979; 4 Bann. & A. 456. In Campbell v. James (1880), 18 Blatch. 92, Wheeler, J. (101) "All interests in patents are assignable by instrument in writing. No particular form is required; but still there must be some operative words expressing at least an intention to assign, in order to constitute an assignment." 18 O. G. 1111 (1114); 2 Fed. Rep. 338 (347). 4 That a contract for the purchase of part of a patent-right may be good as a license, see Sanford v. Messer (1872), 5 Fisher, 411; 2 O. G. 470; Holmes, 149. That an irrevocable power of attorney may be an assignment, see Hartshorn v. Day (1856), 19 How. 211. That an irrevocable and exclusive power to act as "sole agent" for mak ing and selling an article, and to pay the proceeds to the principal less the commission is not an assignment, see That where the owners of a patent assign to a third party in trust to exercise certain powers on their behalf, the assignee possesses an authority coupled with an interest, see Ladd v. Mills (1884), 22 Blatch. 242; 20 Fed. Rep. 792. That parol evidence cannot vary the terms of an assignment, except in mutual mistake, see Knowlton Platform & Car Coupling Co. v. Cook (1879), 70 Me. 143; Hammond v. Pratt (1879), 16 O. G. 1235; Ruggles v. Eddy (1872), 5 Fisher, 581; 10 Blatch. 52. 7 That the motive for an assignment is immaterial, see Siebert Cylinder Oil Cup Co. v. Phillips Lubricator Co. (1882), 10 Fed. Rep. 677. That a conveyance made to deceive the Patent Office is inoperative, ses Prime v. Brandon Mfg. Co. (1879), 16 Blatch. 453; 4 Bann. & A. 379. 8 That it is not required that an assignment of a patent be under seal, see Gottfried v. Miller (1882), 104 U. S. 521; 21 O. G. 711; Van Ostrand v. Reed (1828), 1 Wend. 424. § 769. 1 That an assignment of an |