not true. Although the Claims must follow the description, it is not necessary that they cover all the patentable matter there described. The inventor may abandon portions of it to the public, or reserve them for the protection of a future patent. Whatever of such matter the legitimate meaning of his Claims, in their widest sense, embraces, they must be construed to hold, but beyond this meaning they cannot be enlarged by general terms in the description, or by its statement of other and distinct inventions.

§ 744. Third General Rule: Words and Phrases Interpreted, if possible, in their Ordinary Sense.

Subject to the preceding rules are those which govern the signification of the individual words and phrases employed by the inventor in his Description and Claims of the invention, and by the Patent Office in framing the letters-patent. Unless the contrary appears, a word has its ordinary meaning. If commonly applied in different senses, it may be used in one part of the patent to denote a certain object, and in another to denote a different object,-its sense in each connection being determined by the object to which it relates. If it has varied in its meaning since the date of the invention, it must be taken as including only the acts or things to which it then re

cation, see Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Gardiner (1871), 3 Clifford, 408; 4 Fisher, 224.

That clear and distinct Claims will govern where the specification is ambiguous, see McKesson v. Carnrick (1881), 9 Fed. Rep. 44; 21 O. G. 137; 19 Blatch. 158.

That a process cannot be inferred by the court from a description of its product, see Western Electric Co. v. AnBonia Co. (1885), 114 U. S. 447; 31 O. G. 1305.

§ 744. 1 That words used in a specification have their usual meaning unless the contrary appears, see Root v. Lamb (1881), 7 Fed. Rep. 222; 19 O. G. 937; Day v. Cary (1859), 1 Fisher, 424; Goodyear v. Cary (1859), 4 Blatch. 271.

That terms known in the art are

construed as there used, see Day v. Stellman (1859), 1 Fisher, 487.

That under Sec. 4888, Rev. Stat., the specification must point out the exact invention, and the patent must be taken as it reads, in the light of common knowledge, until the contrary appears, see McCloskey v. Dubois (1881), 19 O. G. 1286; 20 O. G. 371; 8 Fed. Rep. 710; 19 Blatch. 205.

That where a specification misuses words, their ordinary meaning will still have weight, see Root v. Lamb (1881), 19 O. G. 937; 7 Fed. Rep. 222.

2 That the meaning of words in a specification is dependent on the context, and the same words may mean different things in different connections, see Drummond v. Greenough (1879), 16 O. G. 959.

ferred and not those which it has more recently embraced.3 Words also are interpreted according to the intent of the inventor, as indicated by their use in the specification, or in the art to which the invention appertains, or in his correspondence with the Patent Office.4 Ambiguous words, if capable of no intelligible construction and the object of the patent can be made clearly known without them, may be rejected as surplusage.5 General words may be limited in meaning, and special words extended, as the interpretation of the entire instrument requires. The arrangement of words in a sentence is of little moment, if its purport can be accurately discovered.6

§ 745. Practical Application of the Foregoing Rules.

In construing a patent in accordance with these rules the first object of attention is the Claim. If this requires no explanation, the court expounds it by the ordinary meaning of its words and defines the invention which it covers.1

That the language of a patent will be construed by its meaning at the date of the patent, not by that subsequently acquired, see McDougal v. Eames (1872), 2 O. G. 87.

That names are interpreted by evidence of their meaning at the time when they were used, not afterward, see Florence Sewing Mach. Co. v. Grover & Baker Sewing Mach. Co. (1872), 110 Mass. 70.

• That the language of a specification is to be interpreted according to the evident intention of the inventor, see Union Paper Bag Co. v. Nixon (1873), 6 Fisher, 402; 4 O. G. 31.

That general terms and special words are construed to cover the real invention if it can be done without violence to the language of the Claim, see Fitch v. Bragg (1881), 20 O. G. 1589; 8 Fed. Rep. 588; Estabrook v. Dunbar (1876), 10 O. G. 909; 2 Bann. & A. 427.

6 That ambiguous words will be construed to suit the real nature of the invention, see White v. Allen (1863), 2 Clifford, 224; 2 Fisher, 440.

If

That ambiguous words in the specification will be controlled by the Claim or treated as superfluous, see McKesson v. Carnrick (1881), 9 Fed. Rep. 44; 19 Blatch. 158; 21 O. G. 137.

That phrases in a specification have no fixed meaning, but are to be interpreted by the courts, see Union Paper Bag Co. v. Nixon (1873), 6 Fisher, 402; 4 0. G. 31.

6 That the specification is construed rather by the true import of the words used than by any arrangement of words, see Allen v. Hunter (1855), 6 McLean, 303.

§ 745. In Rich v. Close (1870), 4 Fisher, 279, Woodruff, J.: (283) “It is quite true that in the construction of a Claim reference is to be had to the descriptive portion of the specification, or to any other portion of it, to ascertain the true interpretation of the Claim. But where the Claim is such as to leave no room for construction, where it is clear and explicit, and especially where there is nothing in the specification which shows that the patentee did not

explanation is required, the entire field of inquiry is open. The nature of the actual invention is sought in the history of the art, in the formal statements of the inventor before his patent issued, and in other facts which indicate its character. To this invention the entire description of the patent is applied, and whatever has been properly described and might, therefore, lawfully be claimed, is taken as the true interpretation of the Claim so far as the legitimate use of language will allow. By this method of construction the rights of the inventor are secured to the fullest extent which is compatible with the preservation of the public right. Whenever he fails of complete protection it is through his own faults of statement, which he may correct by a re-issue.

SECTION II.

OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF LETTERS-PATENT: SPECIAL RULES.

§ 746. Special Rules: Pioneer Patents: Re-issued Patents: Patents Granted by Act of Congress.

In addition to the foregoing general rules, certain special rules of construction have arisen from the application of these

mean just what the plain language of the Claim imports, we are not aided by and have no need of aid from such specification." 8 Blatch. 41 (44).

That a Claim must be construed by its terms when they are clear, and cannot be enlarged by the context, see White v. Dunbar (1886), 119 U. S. 47; 37 O. G. 1002.

That where the import of a Claim is clear it cannot be enlarged by the Description, see Railway Register Mfg. Co. v. Third Avenue R. R. Co. (1887), 42 O. G. 379.

2 In Johnson v. Root (1858), 1 Fisher, 351, Sprague, J.: (355) "In determining what it is that the plaintiff has secured to him by his patent from the Government, the court looks, in the first place, at what is called, technically, the

Claim, which is the summing up, at the close of the patent, or specification preceding, the Claim being in the terms: 'What I claim to have invented, and wish to secure by letters-patent, is

-,' and then a condensed statement of what he wishes to have secured to him by his patent. But in construing that we take into view the whole of what precedes it in the specification, and also such extraneous facts presented by the evidence as may aid in giving the true construction to the patent, particularly the documents from the Patent Office which have preceded the granting of the patent itself." See also Woodman v. Stimpson (1866), 3 Fisher, 98; Whipple v. Baldwin Mfg. Co. (1858), 4 Fisher, 29; and § 739 and notes, ante.

general rules to particular cases. A pioneer patent, introducing to the public some art or instrument entirely new, must be interpreted as liberally as its language will permit in order to protect the original conception in its widest form, notwithstanding any Description or Claim for specific details which the patent may contain.1 A re-issued patent, if ambiguous and uncertain in itself, may be aided by referring to the specifications, drawings, and model of the original.2 patent granted by special act of Congress, upon representations made by the inventor as to the real nature of his invention, must be limited to the invention as thus represented, whatever else the terms of the patent might otherwise include.3

§ 746. That the Claims of a pioneer patent are to be construed broadly, see Kirk v. DuBois (1887), 42 O. G. 297; Hammerschlag Mfg. Co. v. Bancroft (1887), 40 O. G. 1339; 32 Fed. Rep. 585; May v. County of Fond du Lac (1886), 27 Fed. Rep. 691; Thayer v. Spaulding (1886), 27 Fed. Rep. 66; 36 O. G. 1044; Worswick Mfg. Co. v. City of Buffalo (1884), 22 Blatch. 157; 27 O. G. 1239; 20 Fed. Rep. 126; Pickhardt v. Packard, (1884), 23 Blatch. 23; 30 O. G. 179; 22 Fed. Rep. 530.

That a pioneer patent is not to be limited to specific details if it is fairly open to a liberal construction, see Hammerschlag v. Scamoni (1881), 7 Fed. Rep. 584; 20 O. G. 75.

That when a new art is discovered and patented the Claims of the patent are broadly construed so as to cover all means of practising it, see Standard Measuring Machine Co. v. Teague (1883), 15 Fed. Rep. 390; Kimball v. Hess (1883), 15 Fed. Rep. 393; 26 O. G. 107.

That on a question of joinder the rule of construction is most liberal, see Ex parte Herr (1887), 41 O. G. 463.

Α

2 That the Claims of a re-issue, if obscure, may be interpreted by the original specifications and drawings, see Bussey v. Wager (1875), 9 O. G. 300.

That an original patent can be referred to in order to construe the reissue, see Reedy v. Scott (1874), 23 Wall. 352; 7 O. G. 463.

That in construing a re-issued patent the new matter claimed may be referred to as interpreting the good Claims, but only so far as it could properly have appeared in the original specification, see Schillinger v. Cranford (1885), 4 Mackey, 450; 37 O. G. 1349.

That a patent granted by special act of Congress will be limited by representations made by the patentee to Congress in order to obtain the patent, see Union Mfg. Co. v. Lounsbury (1863), 2 Fisher, 389.

That a patent, having been irregularly granted and afterwards confirmed by special act of Congress, is to be governed and construed by the law in force when it was originally granted, see New American File Co. v. Nicholson File Co. (1881), 20 O. G. 524; 8 Fed. Rep. 816.

§ 747. Special Rules: Claims for Combinations: Improvements:

A Claim for a combination is to be construed liberally in order to support the combination, although another Claim is made for a special arrangement of the same elements.1 Where a combination apparently claimed is shown to be old, the Claim may be interpreted to cover the particular elements employed, if the language of the Claim is capable of that construction.2 The use of the word "combination" in some Claims, and not in others, indicates an intention to exclude the combination from the latter.3 A patent for an improvement will be read in the light of the original invention and its own relations thereto. A patent for a joint invention,