facts may be considered which in the judgment of the court tend to disclose the object of the patent and thereby lead to a correct construction of its terms.1 § 742. Second General Rule: Entire Patent Construed together as an Indivisible Instrument. Subordinate to the fundamental rule that a patent must be liberally interpreted in order to accomplish, if possible, the purpose for which it was issued, is the rule that in ascertaining this purpose the entire patent must be construed together, and effect given to all its parts as members of a single indivisible instrument. The vital force of a patent resides in spondence between them, see Pike v. Potter (1859), 3 Fisher, 55. That a patent is to be construed without reference to previous correspondence with the Office, or to rejected applications, see Piper v. Brown (1870), 4 Fisher, 175; Holmes, 20; Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Gardiner (1870), 4 Fisher, 224; 3 Clifford, 408. That a patent may be construed, if necessary, by the intention of the inventor in the use of words, and for ascertaining this the records of amendments in the specification, &c., in the Patent Office may be examined, see Trader v. Messmore (1875), 1 Bann. & A. 639; 7 O. G. 385. That where an application, being rejected, is amended by adding new features and the patent is then allowed, it cannot be construed as covering the invention described in the rejected application, see Milligan v. Lalance & Grosjean Mfg. Co. (1884), 21 Fed. Rep. 570; 29 O. G. 367. That where the patentee acquiesces in the limitation of his Claims by the Patent Office, the court cannot construe the patent to cover anything thus excluded, see Crawford v. Heysinger (1887), 123 U. S. 589; 42 O. G. 197; Phoenix Caster Co. v. Spiegel (1886), 26 Fed. Rep. 272; Otis Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Crane Bros. Mfg. Co. (1886), 27 Fed. Rep, 550. That a patentee acquiescing in the rejection of broad Claims must be restricted to those allowed, though the rejection was improper, see Blades v. Rand, McNally, & Co. (1886), 27 Fed. Rep. 93; 37 O. G. 99. That a patent in the hands of an assignee cannot be construed to cover matter excluded from the Claims by a wrongful rejection in the Patent Office, see Blades v. Rand, McNally, & Co. (1886), 27 Fed. Rep. 93; 37 O. G. 99. 4 That no construction of a patent by acquiescence can arise in one year only, see Johnston Ruffler Co. v. Avery Mach. Co. (1886), 28 Fed. Rep. 193. § 742. 1 In Carver v. Braintree Mfg. Co. (1843), 2 Story, 432, Story, J.: (446) "There is no magic in words; and above all, in patents, the court looks through the whole patent and specification, in order to ascertain what the thing claimed and patented is; whether it is for an entirety or for various distinct improvements, capable of a distinct operation and independent use in the same machine, or for both, or whether it is for a combination of two or more things in a particular machine, to produce a given result, or for a simple or single improvement in a particular its Claims. These measure the protection which the inventor seeks and the exclusive privilege which he obtains. Where they are clear, explicit, unmistakable, they need no aid, and are not aided, by reference to the other portions of the patent.2 But when they are obscure or capable of different interpretations, the whole Description, drawings, model, oath, and title are to be considered as exponents of the Claims, and as determining the meaning and application of their words. No one of these descriptive portions of the patent can control the others. The name given to the invention in the title or the machine; or whether it is for any one or more of them. There is no artificial or universal rule of interpretation of such instrument beyond that which cominon-sense furnishes, which is to construe the instrument as a whole, and to extract from the descriptive words and the Claim what the invention is which is intended to be patented, and how far it is capable of exact ascertainment, and how far it is maintainable in point of law, supposing it clear from all ambiguity." 2 Robb, 141 (155). See also American Wood-Paper Co. v. Heft (1867), 3 Fisher, 316; Morris v. Barrett (1859), 1 Bond, 254; 1 Fisher, 461; Day v. Cary (1859), 1 Fisher, 424; Pitts v. Wemple (1855), 2 Fisher, 10; 1 Bissell, 87; Pitts v. Whitman (1843), 2 Story, 609; 2 Robb, 189. 2 That the specification and drawings are useful only to construe the Claim, see Pitts v. Wemple (1855), 1 Bissell, 87; 2 Fisher, 10. That where a Claim is clear and explicit its language controls its meaning, without referring to the specification, see Rich v. Close (1870), 4 Fisher, 279; 8 Blatch. 41. 3 In Francis v. Mellor (1871), 10. G. 48, McKennan, J.: (50) "Patents are to be construed liberally, so as to sustain and not destroy the right of the inventor. Hence the whole of the specification may and should be looked at, to learn from the description of the invention not only how to make it, but to ascertain what it really is. By the requirements of the statute the description must be in full, clear, and exact terms, and it is, therefore, an authorized guide to an accurate comprehension of what the patentee meant to claim as his invention. It is not only where the specification is expressly referred to that the Claim is to be construed in connection with it; but, as a general rule, the explanations contained in it are to be taken as the inventor's own interpreter of the meaning of his Claim, and of the essential qualities of the invention protected by his patent. Turrill v. R. R. Co., 1 Wall. 511; Curtis on Patents, Secs. 453 and 454." 5 Fisher, 153 (157); 8 Phila. 157 (158). In Ransom v. Mayor of New York (1856), 1 Fisher, 252, Hall, J.: (260) “In order to determine what the plaintiffs claim as their invention, we are to look to the specification annexed to their patent, which specification is in the language of the alleged inventors themselves, is made by law a portion of the patent, and must be referred to for the purpose of determining what the patentees claimed as their invention, and what the Government have agreed to secure to them as their exclusive privilege. In determining the construction of these Claims (and their construction is a question of law exclusively for the court, and not for the determination of the oath should be consistent with its character as set forth in the specification; the drawings and the model should in jury, unless, indeed, there may be technical terms, or terms which need explanation by the evidence given before the jury), it is proper that the court should refer to the whole specification, and consider the whole of it in connection." In Pettibone v. Derringer (1818), 4 Wash. 215, Washington, J.: (217) "But there can be no doubt that where the construction of the patent and specification, as to the subject of the grant, is doubtful, the affidavit, if more precise, may be resorted to to explain the ambiguity. It would seem to be particularly proper to do so for restraining general expressions in the specification; as the oath required to be taken by the act of Congress is, that the inventor does verily believe that he is the true inventor of the art, machine, or improvement for which he solicits a patent." 1 Robb, 152 (155). Further, that the entire specification, with the drawings, model, oath, and title are to be considered as interpreting the Claims, see Matthews v. Iron Clad Mfg. Co. (1888), 124 U. S. 347; 42 O. G. 827; Ex parte Holt (1884), 29 O. G. 171; Bruce v. Marder (1882), 20 Blatch. 355; 22 O. G. 1039; 10 Fed. Rep. 750; Brainard v. Cramme (1882), 20 Blatch. 530; 22 O. G. 769; 12 Fed. Rep. 621; Holly v. Vergennes Mach. Co. (1880), 4 Fed. Rep. 74; 18 O. G. 1177; 18 Blatch. 327; Matthews v. Schoneberger (1880), 18 O. G. 1464; 4 Fed. Rep. 635; 18 Blatch. 357; Evans v. Kelly (1880), 9 Bissell, 251; 5 Bann. & A. 71; 23 O. G. 192; 13 Fed. Rep. 903; Robinson v. Sutter (1880), 10 Bissell, 100; 19 O. G. 127; 8 Fed. Rep. 828; Day v. Combination Rubber Co. (1880), 17 O. G. 1347; 5 Bann. & A. 385; 2 Fed. Rep. 570; National Car Brake Shoe Co. v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern R. R. Co. (1880), 4 Fed. Rep. 219; 18 O. G. 1179; 9 Bissell, 503; Burke v. Partridge (1878), 58 N. H. 349; Bruff v. Ives (1877), 11 O. G. 924; 14 Blatch. 198; Fuller v. Yentzer (1876), 94 U. S. 288; 11 O. G. 551; Estabrook v. Dunbar (1876), 2 Bann. & A. 427; 10 O. G. 909; Metropolitan Wringing Mach. Co. v. Young (1876), 14 Blatch. 46; Westinghouse v. Gardner & Ranson Air Brake Co. (1875), 2 Bann. & A. 55; 9 0. G. 538; Wells v. Jacques (1874), 1 Bann. & A. 60; 5 O. G. 364; Ex parte Marsh (1872), 2 O. G. 197; Roberts v. Dickey (1872), 10. G. 4; 4 Fisher, 532; 4 Brews. (Pa.) 260; Carew v. Boston Elastic Fabric Co. (1871), 3 Clifford, 356; 5 Fisher, 90; 1 O. G. 91; Francis v. Mellor (1871), 5 Fisher, 153; 1 O. G. 48; 8 Phila. 157; Seymour v. Osborne (1870), 11 Wall. 516; Coffin v. Ogden (1869), 7 Blatch. 61; 3 Fisher, 640; Turrill v. Railroad Co. (1863), 1 Wall. 491 ; Hayden v. Suffolk Mfg. Co. (1862), 4 Fisher, 86; Whipple v. Middlesex Co. (1859), 4 Fisher, 41; Bell v. Daniels (1858), 1 Fisher, 372; 1 Bond, 212; Ransom v. Mayor of N. Y. (1856), 1 Fisher, 252; Kittle v. Merriam (1855), 2 Curtis, 475; Winans v. Denmead (1853), 15 How. 330; Corning v. Burden (1853), 15 How. 252; Hogg v. Emerson (1850), 11 How. 587; Hogg v. Emerson (1848), 6 How. 437; 2 Robb, 655; Davoll v. Brown (1845), 1 W. & M. 53; 2 Robb, 303; Ryan v. Goodwin (1839), 3 Sumner, 514; 1 Robb, 725. That the Claims of a patent must be construed by the specification, and if the latter describes an entire article, the separable parts of the article are not regarded as inventions unless so claimed, see Evans v. Kelly (1880), 23 O. G. 192; 13 Fed. Rep. 903; 9 Bissell, 251; 5 Bann. & A. 71. That an element limited to a peculiar their respective modes disclose the precise features which are presented by the language of the Description; but variations between these are not to be regarded, provided their examination as a whole reveals the essential attributes of the inThis rule applies equally to cases where As these must be mu vention claimed. the patent covers several inventions. tually dependent and co-operative in order to be capable of joinder, the Claim for each may be, so far as necessary, elucidated and defined by the descriptions of the others." construction in one Claim will be limited in the same way in construing other Claims, see Railway Register Mfg. Co. v. Third Avenue R. R. Co. (1887), 42 O. G. 379., That a doubtful specification may be aided by the drawing, see Tinker v. Wilber Eureka Mower & Reaper Mfg. Co. (1880), 1 Fed. Rep. 138; 5 Bann. & A. 92; Banker v. Bostwick (1880), 18 O. G. 61; 3 Fed. Rep. 517; 5 Bann. & A. 463; Ingels v. Mast (1873), 6 Fisher, 415; Foss v. Herbert (1856), 1 Bissell, 121; 2 Fisher, 31; Hogg v. Emerson (1850), 11 How. 587; Burrall v. Jewett (1830), 2 Paige (N. Y.), 133. That drawings are to be construed by the specifications, see Hamilton v. Ives (1873), 6 Fisher, 244; 3 O. G. 30. That drawings cannot be so used as to change the character of the invention described in the specification, see Hailes v. Albany Stove Co. (1887), 123 U. S. 582; 42 O. G. 95. That the drawing may show that the machine claimed under the patent is not the one for which it issued, see Burrall v. Jewett (1830), 2 Paige (N.Y.), 133. That the drawings may be interpreted by the model, see Aiken v. Dolan (1867), 3 Fisher, 197. That Claims will be construed by the drawings and model, see Hancock Inspirator Co. v. Jenks (1884), 21 Fed. Rep. 911. That a clause in the application im. mediately connected with the Claim, and evidently stating what the inventor intended to secure, will be construed as part of the Claim, see La Rue v. Western Electric Co. (1886), 28 Fed. Rep. 85; 36 O. G. 453; 24 Blatch. 18. 4 That the names and terms used by the patentee are to be construed in view of the entire specification and drawings, see Foye v. Nichols (1882), 8 Sawyer, 201; 13 Fed. Rep. 125; 22 O. G. 2243. That the title of the invention should agree with the specification, see Good. year v. Railroad (1853), 1 Fisher, 626; 2 Wall. Jr. 356. That the title of the invention in the patent does not control, but is to be taken in connection with the specification and drawings, and a liberal construction given to all, see Bell v. Daniels (1858), 1 Bond, 212; 1 Fisher, 372; Sickels v. Gloucester Mfg. Co. (1856), 1 Fisher, 222. 5 That a construction making two Claims cover the same thing will be avoided if possible, see Tondeur v. Stewart (1886), 28 Fed. Rep. 561; 37 O. G. 672. That one Claim cannot be so con strued as to render another Claim of the same patent meaningless, see Cohansey Glass Mfg. Co. v. Wharton (1886), 28 Fed. Rep. 189; 36 O. G. 343. § 742 § 743. Second General Rule Authorizes the Restriction of the Claims by the Other Portions of the Patent, but not their Enlargement. In thus construing the Claims of a patent by its descriptive portions, the scope of the Claims may often be restricted, but can never be enlarged.1 The Claims are based on the description, the invention secured to the patentee being always identical with or contained in that communicated to the public; and therefore the interpretation given to the Claims must limit them to the invention previously described, however wide and comprehensive they might otherwise appear.2 To meet extended Claims the rule of liberal construction requires all other members of the patent to be interpreted as broadly as the legitimate use of language, drawings, or models will permit, but when the Claims exceed such an interpretation of the descriptive matter they must be restricted by it or must wholly fail.3 The converse of this proposition, however, is § 743. That the Claim may be illustrated, not enlarged, by the other parts of the specification, see Yale Lock Co. v. Greenleaf (1886), 117 U. S. 554; 35 O. G. 386. 2 That a general Claim will be limited to the invention described in the specification, see Ex parte Hahn (1875), 8 O. G. 597; U. S. Steam Gauge Co. v. American Steam Gauge Co. (1874), 5 O. G. 208; Holmes, 309; Cammeyer v. Newton (1874), 5 O. G. 753; 12 Blatch. 122; 1 Bann. & A. 294; Mitchell v. Tilghman (1873), 19 Wall. 287; 5 O. G. 299; Forsyth v. Clapp (1873), 4 O. G. 527; Holmes, 278; 6 Fisher, 528; Smith v. O'Connor (1873), 4 O. G. 633; 2 Sawyer, 461; 6 Fisher, 469; Roberts v. Dickey (1872), 4 Fisher, 532; 1 O. G. 4; 4 Brews. (Pa.) 260. That general words in a Claim are limited by particular words in the specification, see Knox v. Murtha (1871), 9 Blatch. 205; 5 Fisher, 174. That a Claim cannot receive a construction broader than the invention as shown in the specification, see Anders v. Gilliland (1880), 19 O. G. 177. That general words in a Description or Claim are to be limited by the real nature of the invention, see Fischer v. Hayes (1881), 6 Fed. Rep. 76; 20 O. G. 239; 19 Blatch. 26. That Claims are not limited by draw ings when the specification shows that the real invention was broader, see Hamilton v. Ives (1873), 6 Fisher, 244; 3 O. G. 30. 8 That general description at the beginning of the specification will be construed by the subsequent specific directions for making the invention, and the description of its peculiar proper ties, see Holt v. Kendall (1885), 26 Fed. Rep. 622; 35 O. G. 874. That a Claim is to be construed by the specification, and if the specification describes only the entire article the Claims do not cover each separate part of it, see Evans v. Kelly (1880), 13 Fed. Rep. 903; 9 Bissell, 251; 5 Bann. & A. 71; 23 O. G. 192. That the Claims of a patent cannot be enlarged by the correspondence of the inventor with the Patent Office, nor by the proceedings pending the appli |