the case of functional Claims, the courts construe them, if possible, as Claims for the art or instrument by which the effect is accomplished. Thus a Claim for so forming an object that a certain result is attained, or for the production of an effect by arranging certain devices in the manner described, is regarded as a Claim for the object so formed, or the devices so arranged.* § 520. The Claim must not be Alternative. A Claim stated in the alternative is invalid when the language of the Claim either covers nothing positively, or leaves it uncertain which of several things the inventor intends to claim. The use of the disjunctive conjunction does not, of itself, render a Claim uncertain. Where the essential characteristics of the invention are properly set forth, and some of its connections or modes of use are described in the alternative, the Claim is good, since the matters described in the alternative form no part of the invention, and may be eliminated from the Claim without impairing the completeness of its statement of the real invention. Or where in setting forth the invention itself the disjunctive conjunction is employed in its enumerative sense, and the Claim thus becomes the equiva Wyeth v. Stone (1840), 1 Story, 273; (1877), 12 O. G. 4; 2 Bann. & A. 604; 2 Robb, 23. That a Claim for the use of a natural force for a special purpose is too broad, being equivalent to a Claim for the purpose thereby effected, see O'Reilly v. Morse (1853), 15 How. 62. That where a structure produces results the Claim must be for the structure, not the result, see Ex parte Roloson (1879), 15 O. G. 471. 8 That where a Claim in terms is for a result it will be construed, if possible, to cover the means by which the result is effected, see Coes v. Collins Co. (1882), 22 O. G. 417; 20 Blatch. 221; 9 Fed. Rep. 905; Palmer v. Gatling Gun Co (1881), 19 Blatch. 392; 20 O. G. 815; 8 Fed. Rep. 513; Henderson v. Cleveland Co-operative Stove Co. Fuller v. Yentzer (1876), 94 U. S. 299 ; 11 O. G. 597; Corn Planter Patent (1874), 23 Wall. 181; 6 O. G. 392; Evarts v. Ford (1873), 5 O. G. 58; 6 Fisher, 587. ... 4 That a Claim for the " so forming that a given result is attained is a Claim for the means, not the result, see Lull v. Clark (1882), 22 O. G. 1535; 13 Fed. Rep. 456; 21 Blatch. 95. § 520. That alternative Claims are not allowable, see Ex parte Holt (1884), 29 O. G. 171; Ex parte McDougall (1880), 18 O. G. 130; Ex parte Reid (1879), 15 O. G. 882; Union Paper Bag Mach. Co. v. Nixon (1873), 4 O. G. 31; 6 Fisher, 402; Carr v. Rice (1858), 1 Fisher, 325. lent for as many separate Claims as it contains enumerative clauses, the Claim, although irregular in form, is still allowable. Thus to claim both of two alternatives, or to claim different arrangements of the same elements in a combination where each arrangement is an operative means, has been permitted. But the danger of ambiguity in all uses of the disjunctive, and the ease and security with which each of several devices or arrangements may be stated in separate Claims, causes alternative Claims to be disfavored by the Patent Office, although the courts may manifest a disposition to sustain them where the language is capable of an intelligible construction. § 521. The Claims must not be Unnecessarily Multiplied. The law prescribes no limit to the number of Claims which may be inserted in a single specification. But a repetition of the same Claim, or the multiplication of Claims for the same invention, is not allowed except in cases where the nature of the invention renders it necessary to describe it in different methods, in order to make it clear or to state all that can rightfully be claimed. Claims are not like counts in a declaration, varied in terms to meet the possible phases of evidence or legal interpretation; they are conclusions from the specification, and must neither be fictitious, nor redundant, nor appear to cover more than fairly can be claimed.1 The need 2 That a Claim to both of two alternatives is valid, see Union Paper Bag Mach. Co. v. Nixon (1873), 4 O. G. 31; 6 Fisher, 402. That an alternative Claim is good only when it is the equivalent of two Claims, one for each alternative, see Tuck v. Bramhill (1868), 3 Fisher, 400; 6 Blatch. 95. That a patent cannot claim alternative forms of a combination unless each is an operative machine, see Brown v. Whittemore (1872), 5 Fisher, 524; 2 O. G. 248. That Claims cannot be for independent alternative constructions or for mere modifications of the construction set up in other Claims, see Ex parte Holt (1884), 29 O. G. 171. § 521.1 In Ex parte Woodruff (1880), 17 O. G. 453, Doolittle, Act. Com. : (453) "The general doctrine heretofore in vogue in the Office that it is admissible, under proper restrictions, for parties to put their Claims in different forms to prevent misconstruction of them by the public or the courts must be construed, as the Examiner contends, to have reference, not to unnecessary repetition of Claims for the same thing, but to those cases which are difficult of definition, and where one set or form of words would be inadequate to clearly cover the invention less repetition of the same matter in different Claims tends to mislead by conveying the idea that some substantial difference exists between the subjects of the several Claims; and if this is carried to such an extent as to create ambiguity, or cover more than is really invented, the entire patent may be rendered void. Where one Claim will be sufficient no others should be made; and where two or more are inserted, without necessity, the one which best protects the invention will be retained and the others will be rejected. But several and prevent misconstruction. Another difficulty arises from the inability of an applicant to set forth in a single Claim the device broadly, so that it will cover all other devices which are the same in principle of operation, and therefore equivalents, and, at the same time, the specific device he has invented and described to carry out the improvement in the art of manufacture. But where the invention is simple in nature and can be clearly stated in simple language and in one Claim, there is no justification for setting out the invention in a series of Claims which all mean the same thing. Claims are not like counts in pleadings, which are often repetitions of the same cause of action in different forms of language to provide against the hazard of the proofs varying materially from the statement of the cause of action, but they are the conclusion of the specification, and their object is to set forth distinctly and concisely just what the invention is which the applicant asks to be secured to him by his patent, and they should not consist of fictitious, redundant, or amplified allegations of matters by which it is hoped to secure protection for something more than the applicant has actually invented or contemplated. Where the terms or a Claim in a patent are clear and distinet, as they always should be, no necessity arises for repeating such Claim in different forms of language, and subjecting the Office and the courts to great labor in scrutinizing them, and to doubt and annoyance as to their limitations and construction." That the duplication of Claims does not necessarily avoid a patent, see Tompkins v. Gage (1865), 5 Blatch. 268; 2 Fisher, 577. That divided and multiplied Claims are disapproved, see Bostock v. Goodrich (1884), 21 Fed. Rep. 316; 29 O. G. 278. That Claims for the same thing may be repeated in different language in order to prevent misunderstanding, see Ex parte Hahn (1875), 8 O. G. 597; Ex parte Shippen (1875), 8 O. G. 727. 2 In Carlton v. Bokee (1873), 17 Wall. 463, Bradley, J.: (471) "We think it proper to reiterate our disapprobation of these ingenious attempts to expand a simple invention of a distinct device into an all-embracing Claim, calculated by its wide generalizations and ambiguous language to discourage further invention in the same department of industry and to cover antecedent inventions. Without deciding that a repetition of substantially the same Claim in different words will vitiate a patent, we hold that where a specification by ambiguity and a needless multiplication of nebulous Claims is calculated to deceive and mislead the public, the patent is void." 2 O. G. 520 (523); 6 Fisher, 40 (48). 8 That two Claims for the same thing are improper, and that which Claims for the same art or instrument as serving different purposes, or as employed in different modes, or as accomplishing different results, may be properly made, since such a separation tends to prevent confusion and to preserve the essential characteristics of the invention distinct from those of its objects and its uses.1 § 522. The Claim: Joinder of Claims for Different Inventions. The joinder of several Claims for different inventions in the same specification is governed by the rules heretofore considered in reference to the joinder of inventions. The Claims, being the life of the patent, the central point to which all the other parts converge and from which they derive their value to the inventor, may embrace every invention for whose protection he may lawfully apply; and must embrace all those which his patent is destined to secure. A Claim may, therefore, be inserted in the specification for each of the described inventions whose nature and dependence on the principal invention is such as to permit its joinder in the same application. The Claims for each of these inventions must possess all the characteristics, and fulfil all the requirements which would be necessary to their validity were it the sole invention claimed. § 523. The Claim Interpreted by other Parts of the Application. While the rules governing the scope and language of the Claim are thus numerous and rigid, the attitude of the courts toward the inventor, in its interpretation, is just and liberal. best protects the invention will be retained, the other rejected, see Dederick v. Cassell (1881), 20 O. G. 1233; 9 Fed. Rep. 306; 14 Phila. 503. That a Claim embracing only a feature or quality which is covered by another Claim, as inseparable from its particular subject-matter, is void, see Combined Patents Can Co. v. Lloyd (1882), 15 Phila. 485; 11 Fed. Rep. 153. That a Claim cannot be so changed by construction as to make it the same as another Claim of the same patent, see Filley v. Littlefield Stove Co. (1887), 39 O. G. 1203; 30 Fed. Rep. 434. 4 That several Claims for the same device as accomplishing several results may be inserted, see Ex parte Smith (1880), 17 O. G. 271. § 522. That Claims for separate but dependent inventions may be joined, see Ex parte Smith (1872), 2 O. G. 117. That a second Claim for an inseparable feature of the invention previously claimed is not proper, see Combined Patents Can Co. v. Lloyd (1882), 11 Fed. Rep. 153; 15 Phila. 485. See also §§ 468-479 and notes, ante. In construing the Claim the whole specification is taken together, and if the terms in which the Claim is stated are consistent with those of the Description, the latter with its accompanying drawings is treated as an amplification and explanation of the former, illustrating and applying its more concise and definite expressions. Thus, though the Claim is distinct from the Description and as such must be complete in itself and not merely refer to the Description for a statement of the invention claimed, yet every feature of the invention which the Description has declared to be essential, and all the modes of using it therein prescribed, are covered by the Claim, whether or not they are particularly mentioned.1 Without departing from the rule that the Claim must clearly limit and define the exact invention for which a patent is desired, or assuming the power to alter or enlarge a Claim, the courts sustain it whenever in connection with its proper exponent, the Description, and in view of the state of the art, it renders the nature of the claimed invention evident to those to whom the specification is addressed.2 § 523. 1 That the Claims are interpreted and limited by the Description, see Snow v. Lake Shore & Mich. Southern R. R. Co. (1887), 121 U. S. 617; 39 O. G. 1081; Ex parte Holt (1884), 29 O. G. 171; Fuller v. Yentzer (1874), 6 Bissell, 203; Ex parte Marsh (1872), 2 O. G. 197. That parts shown in the Description to be essential to the invention must be understood, though not mentioned in the Claim, see Ex parte Richardson (1875), 7 O. G. 1053. That a Claim may be limited by the drawings, where it describes the device only by letters referring to them, see Ex parte Marsh (1872), 2 O. G. 197. That drawings cannot so far supply the place of a written Description that a Claim can be construed to cover matter shown only in the drawings, see Gunn v. Savage (1887), 30 Fed. Rep. 366. That the Claim cannot be enlarged by the Description, see Yale Lock Co. v. Greenleaf (1886), 117 U. S. 554; 35 That where the Description and 2 That whenever the nature of the invention can be ascertained by construing the specification in view of the state of the art, the Claim will be construed to cover it, if its language will permit, see Andrews v. Carman (1876), 9 O. G. 1011; 13 Blatch. 307; 2 Bann. & A. 277; Turrill v. R. R. Co. (1863), 1 Wall. 491; Whipple v. Middlesex Co. (1859), 4 Fisher, 41; Le Roy v. Tatham (1852), 14 How. 156; Haworth v. Hardcastle (1854), 1 Web. 480; 2 Abb. P. C. 19. That a Claim for a device which is useless in itself, but is useful in connec tion with other things mentioned in |