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admonitions of a discreet and respected friend would probably tend to overthrow his determination. On the other hand, the counsel of an unprincipled wretch, stating the heroism and courage the self-murderer displays, might induce, encourage, and fix the intention, and ultimately procure the perpetration of the dreadful deed; and if other men would be influenced by such advice, the presumption is that Jewett was so influenced. He might have been influenced by many powerful motives to destroy himself. Still the inducements might have been insufficient to procure the actual commission of the act, and one word of additional advice might have turned the scale.

When applied, as this ruling seems to have been here applied, to a case in which the advice was nearly connected in point of time, with the criminal act, it is, in my opinion, correct. If the advice was intended by the giver, to stir or incite to a crime, if it was of such a nature as to be adapted to have this effect, and the persons incited immediately afterwards committed that crime, it is a just presumption that they were influenced by the advice or incitement to commit it. The circumstances or direct proof may, or may not, be sufficient to control this presumption; and whether they are so, can duly be determined in each case, upon all its evidence.

One other rule of law on this subject is necessary to be borne in mind. The substantive offence to which the advice or incitement applied must have been committed; and it is for that alone the adviser or procurer is legally accountable. Thus if one should counsel another to rescue one prisoner, and he should rescue another, unless by mistake; or if the incitement was to rescue a prisoner, and he commit a larceny, the inciter is not responsible. But it need not appear that the precise time, or place, or means advised, were used. Thus if one incite A. to murder B., but advise him to wait until B. shall be at a certain place at noon, and A. murders B. at a different place in the morning, the adviser is guilty. So if the incitement be to poison, and the murderer shoots, or stabs.

So if the counsel be to beat another, and he is beaten to death, the adviser is a murderer; for having incited another to commit an unlawful act, he is responsible for all that ensues upon its execution. These illustrations are drawn from cases of felonies, because they are the most common in the books and the most striking in themselves; but the principles on which they depend are equally applicable to cases of misdemeanor. In all such cases, the real question is, whether the accused did procure, counsel, command, or abet the substantive offence committed. If he did, it is of no importance that his advice or directions were departed from in respect to the time, or place, or precise mode or means of committing it.

Gentlemen, the events which have recently occurred in this city, have rendered it my duty to call your attention to these rules of law, and to direct you to inquire whether in point of fact the offence of obstructing process of the United States has been committed; if it has, you will present for tríal, all such persons as have so participated therein as to be guilty of that offence. And you will allow me to say to you that if you or I were to begin to make discriminations between one law and another, and say this we will enforce and that we will not enforce, we should not only violate our oaths, but so far as in us lies, we should destroy the liberties of our country, which rest for their basis upon the great principle that our country is governed by laws constitutionally enacted, and not by men.

In one part of our country the extradition of fugitives from labor is odious; in another, if we may judge from some transactions, the law concerning the extradition of fugitives from justice has been deemed not binding; in another still, the tariff laws of the United States were considered oppressive, and not fit to be enforced.

Who can fail to see that the government would cease to be a government if it were to yield obedience to these local opinions? While it stands, all its laws must be faithfully executed, or it becomes the mere tool of the strongest faction of

the place and the hour. If forcible resistance to one law should be permitted practically to repeal it, the power of the mob would inevitably become one of the constituted authorities of the State, to be used against any law or any man obnoxious to the interests and passions of the worst or most excited part of the community; and the peaceful and the weak .would be at the mercy of the violent.

It is the imperative duty of all of us concerned in the administration of the laws, to see to it that they are firmly, impartially, and certainly applied to every offence, whether a particular law be by us individually approved or disapproved. And it becomes all to remember, that forcible and concerted resistance to any law is civil war, which can make no progress but through bloodshed, and can have no termination but the destruction of the government of our country, or the ruin of those engaged in such resistance. It is not my province to comment on events which have recently happened. They are matters of fact, which, so far as they are connected with the criminal laws of the United States, are for your consideration. I feel no doubt that, as good citizens and lovers of our country, and as conscientious men, you will well and truly observe and keep the oath you have taken, diligently to inquire and true presentment make of all crimes and offences against the laws of the United States given you in charge.

INDEX.

ABANDONMENT.

If the underwriter, after an abandonment, takes possession of and repairs
the vessel, this amounts to an acceptance of the abandonment. Gloucester
Ins. Co. v. Younger, 322.

ABATEMENT.

Lis pendens in a foreign country is not a good plea in abatement. Lyman v.
Brown, 559.

INDICTMENT, 2.

ACCEPTANCE..

ABANDONMENT.

ACCOUNT.

1. An account of profits may be decreed to the owner of a copy-right, as
incidental to the relief by injunction, but it must be prayed for in the bill.
Stevens v. Cady, 200.

2. Such an account cannot embrace penalties. Ib.

COPY-RIGHT; JURISDICTION, 5; LIEN, 6; TRUST.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT AND REGISTRATION.
ESTOPPEL, 2.

ACQUIESCENCE.

PATENT, 14, 15.

ADJOURNMENT.

COMMISSIONER, 2.

ADMIRALTY.

The admiralty has jurisdiction over petitory suits. The Friendship, 426.
DECREE; EVIDENCE, 7, 8; JURISDICTION, 4-7; LIEN, 1-6; Variance.

ADMISSION.
ESTOPPEL, 1.

ADOPTION OF STATE LAWS.

Whether Congress can adopt prospectively, laws subsequently to be passed
by a State upon a particular subject, quære; but the Act of January 14,
1841, (5 Stat. at Large, 410,) does not adopt subsequent State laws, im-
posing restrictions and conditions on imprisonment for debt. In the Matter
of Watson Freeman, 491.

ADVANCES.
LIEN, 4-6.

AGENT.

FISHING, 3, 4; INSURANCE, 2–4.

AGREEMENT.

COMPROMISE.

ANSWER.

COMPROMISE, 2; DEED, 1; ESTOPPEL, 1; INSURANCE, 7.

APPEAL.

1. In a cause of subtraction of wages, in rem, one of the owners having
claimed and answered, the District Court decreed in favor of the wages
amounting to more than fifty dollars; the vessel having been sold, pro-
duced less than fifty dollars, after paying charges. The claimant was
denied an appeal by the District Court. Held, that as the decree would
conclude the owner in a suit in personam, the wages were the matter in
dispute, and the appeal should be allowed. The Enterprise, 317.

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