desist from certain false and misleading representations concerning the therapeutic value of baby foods and health preparations sold in interstate commerce. As of June 30, 1940, the case awaited printing of the transcript.

Alle-Rhume Remedy Co., Jersey City, N. J.-This company filed a petition in the Third Circuit (Philadelphia) to set aside the Commission's order, which directed it to cease and desist from representing that "Allenru," or any similar preparation, will rid joints or muscles of all uric acid deposits, is compounded from a safe or scientific formula, is free from harmful drugs, or is a remedy or cure for, or has any substantial therapeutic value in the treatment of rheumatism, sciatica, neuritis, lumbago, or neuralgia, or other ailments. On stipulation of counsel, the appeal was dismissed.

Allen B. Wrisley Co. and others, Chicago.-These respondents filed a petition in the Seventh Circuit (Chicago) to review and set aside the Commission's order against the misrepresentation of the olive-oil content of soaps manufactured and distributed by them, which the Commission found contained only from 5 to 15 percent olive oil or olive-oil foots. The court's opinion was handed down June 12, 1940 (113 F. (2d) 437.)

A final decree was entered by the Seventh Circuit in this case on July 18, 1940.

While the Commission's order was modified in some particulars, the net result of the decree is an affirmance of the order in all essential respects. The order as affirmed, and which will be enforced by the Court, prohibits the respondents from: (1) Representing in any manner that a soap which does not contain olive oil to the exclusion of all other oils is an olive oil soap; (2) using the brand names or labels "Oliv-Ilo," "Royal Olive Oil Pure," "Purito Olive Castile," "OliveSkin Pure Toilet Soap," or "Del Gloria Castile Made With Pure Olive Oil," or other brand names or labels of similar import or meaning containing the word “Olive” or the letters "Oliv” or any equivalent term, to describe, designate or in any way refer to soap the oil content of which is not wholly olive oil. It permits the respondents to use brand names containing the word "Olive" or derivatives thereof, or other word or words of similar import or meaning, to describe or designate soaps containing olive oil combined with other oil or oils, only on the condition that the respondents shall clearly, conspicuously and truthfully designate that such soaps are not made wholly of olive oil, and providing also that olive oil must be present in such soaps in an amount sufficient substantially to affect its detergent or other qualities.

American College, American University, and Denton N. Higbe, Chicago. These two correspondence schools, and their president, Denton N. Higbe, filed a petition in the Seventh Circuit (Chicago)

to review and set aside the Commission's order prohibiting the use of the words "College" and "University" in their corporate names. The Commission found that neither institution was a college or university within the popular general conception of the words. The court, on motion of the Commission, dismissed the petition for review, for want of prosecution. Subsequently the petitioners filed with the Commission a report showing compliance with its order.

Automobile financing: Ford Motor Co., Dearborn, Mich.; General Motors Corporation, General Motors Sales Corporation, Detroit, and General Motors Acceptance Corporation, New York.-As a result of Commission cease and desist orders proscribing the use of the words "six per cent" or the symbol "6%" in connection with the installment payment plan of purchasing automobiles, petitions for review were filed by the Ford Motor Co. in the Sixth Circuit (Cincinnati) and by the General Motors Corporation and associated corporations with the Second Circuit (New York)

The Commission's findings were that the term "6%," when used in connection with monthly payments, was understood by the public to mean 6 percent simple interest per annum computed on the declining balance as reduced by the monthly payments; but that, as actually carried out, the purchaser paid 6 percent, 9 percent, or 12 percent, as the case might be, on the total amount originally owed, until the final payment was made, resulting in a charge of approximately 112 percent simple interest per annum on an original balance as reduced. by monthly payments.

The General Motors case awaited decision and the Ford case printing of the transcript, at the close of the fiscal year.1

California Lumbermen's Council and others, Fresno, Calif., including affiliated California lumber retailers' associations, having filed petition in the Ninth Circuit (San Francisco) to review the Commission's order against them prohibiting a combination to fix prices and restrain trade, the case, as of June 30, 1940, awaited decision of the Court on the merits. (See Annual Report of the Commission, 1939, pp. 94-95. For prior decisions, see 103 F. (2d) 304, and 104 F. (2d) 855.)

Candy Lottery Cases-New York, Chicago, St. Louis, Salt Lake City, and Ogden, Utah.-Ten cases involving lottery methods in the sale of candy and candy products were litigated in the Federal courts during the fiscal year, as follows:

Petition for rehearing filed by Bunte Brothers, Inc., Chicago, was denied by the Seventh Circuit (Chicago). That Court had unanimously affirmed the Commission's order. (See Annual Report of the Commission, 1939, p. 99. For prior decision, see 104 F. (2d) 996.)

1 Commission's order in General Motors case affirmed Aug. 12, 1940.

2 Commission's order affirmed Oct. 1, 1940.

In another case involving Bunte Brothers, Inc., Chicago, a decision adverse to the Commission was handed down by the Seventh Circuit (Chicago) (110 F. (2d) 412). The Commission order had prohibited the use of lottery methods in intrastate commerce which injuriously affect interstate commerce. In the course of its opinion, the court, after condemning the practice on moral grounds, said:

Our conclusion (which is not free from doubt) is that the phase of petitioner's business wherein its practices are unfair is wholly intrastate. It is the phase of the petitioner's business which is conducted wholly in Illinois, by an Illinois corporation, which makes and sells its product in Illinois. It is not within the purview of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. If an extension of the Federal Trade Commission's jurisdiction be advisable so as to include practices affecting interstate commerce, it is for Congress, not. the court to make the change.

A petition for writ of certiorari, on behalf of the Commission, was filed in the Supreme Court of the United States. Three grounds for issuance of the writ were advanced: (1) The public importance of the question involved; (2) the conflict between the decision of the Seventh Circuit and decisions of other circuits which have construed the Federal Trade Commission Act as applying to intrastate transactions which affect interstate commerce or which occur in the current of interstate commerce, and (3) the inconsistency of the decision with decisions construing other statutory provisions designed to protect interstate commerce from unfair and discriminatory practices.

Petitions for rehearing filed by the National Candy Co., St. Louis, and the March of Time Candies, Inc. and the Dietz Gum Co., both of Chicago, were denied by the Seventh Circuit (Chicago). (For prior decision unanimously affirming the Commission's orders in these cases, see Annual Report of the Commission, 1939, pp. 97-98; reported in 104 F. (2d) 999.) Petitions for writs of certiorari, on behalf of these companies, were filed with the Supreme Court and were denied (308 U. S. 610).

The cases involving the Ostler Candy Co. and Glade Candy Co., both of Salt Lake City, and the Shupe-Williams Candy Co. of Ogden, Utah, were decided unanimously in favor of the Commission (106 F. (2d) 962). Commenting upon the challenge to the constitutionality of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended by the Wheeler-Lea Act, the Court said:

The change relates solely to the remedy of the Government for its enforcement; it does not transform the order into the equivalent of a legislative act or a judgment or decree of a court; and the provision for judicial review meets the requirements of due process.

3 Petition granted.

Petitions for rehearing were denied. Petitions for writs of certiorari were filed in the Supreme Court and denied (309 U. S. 675).

The case involving the Sweet Candy Co., Salt Lake City, was dismissed on motion of the petitioner by the Tenth Circuit (Denver) (112 F. (2d) 168). The proceeding had been held in abeyance pending final adjudication of the Ostler Candy Co., Glade Candy Co., and Shupe-Williams Candy Co. cases.

The Second Circuit (New York), (109 F. (2d) 296), modified, and affirmed as modified, the Commission's order directed against the Sweets Company of America, Inc., New York. The Court, preferring the decisions of the First and Ninth Circuits in F. T. C. v. Miller Co. (97 F. (2d) 563), and Helen Ardelle, Inc., et al. v. F. T. C. (101 F. (2d) 718), respectively, to those of the Seventh and Tenth Circuits in National Candy Co. et al. v. F. T. C. (104 F. (2d) 999), and Ostler Candy Co. et al. v. F. T. C. (106 F. (2d) 962), respectively, modified the Commission's order, to preclude sales where a lottery system was known to be practiced or where the packing of the candy carried an unfair appeal to purchasers, and not to preclude a manufacturer from selling its candies when so packed that a lottery was neither reasonably anticipated, nor suggested, nor likely to occur.

A dissenting opinion by Circuit Judge Clark favored affirmance of the Commission's order without modification.

Capon Water Co., Philadelphia, and Capon Springs Mineral Water, Inc., Capon Springs, W. Va.-The Third Circuit (Philadelphia) unanimously affirmed the Commission's order in this case (107 F. (2d) 516) of false advertisement concerning the therapeutic value of a mineral water.

Carter Carburetor Corporation, St. Louis, one of the largest manufacturers of automobile carburetors, filed a petition in the Eighth Circuit (St. Louis) to review and set aside the Commission's order requiring it to cease and desist from making or renewing contracts with service stations or other retail dealers, on the condition that they should not use or deal in the products of its competitors; from fixing prices to be charged or discounts to be allowed such purchasers on the same condition; from notifying them that if they dealt in competing products they would be required to pay a higher price for Carter products, or their service-station contracts would be terminated, and from other practices.

The Commission filed its crosspetition asking for affirmance and enforcement of its order, and the case was decided unanimously in its favor (112 F. (2d) 722). The decision is important as establishing that the company's practices were not only in violation of Section

3 of the Clayton Act, but also of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. In decreeing enforcement, the court said:

Here the public has an interest in the continued independence of the service stations and in fair competition in the carburetor industry, and it is the duty of the Court to protect such interest by enforcing the lawful order of the Commission.

Century Metalcraft Corporation, Chicago, filed a petition in the Seventh Circuit (Chicago) to review and set aside the Commission's order prohibiting certain misrepresentations concerning kitchen utensils distributed by it. (See Annual Report of the Commission, 1939, p. 100.) The court, in a unanimous opinion, slightly modified two of the seven paragraphs of the Commission's order, and affirmed it as so modified (112 F. (2d) 443).

Dr. W. B. Caldwell, Inc., Monticello, Ill., manufacturer and distributor of "Dr. Caldwell's Syrup Pepsin," "Syrup Pepsin," and "Syrup of Pepsin," filed a petition in the Seventh Circuit (Chicago), to set aside the Commission's order prohibiting misleading representations concerning the therapeutic effect of "Syrup Pepsin” and use of the word "pepsin" to designate or refer to a preparation which did not contain sufficient quantity of pepsin as an active ingredient to possess substantial therapeutic value. As to the products" principal ingredients, senna and cascara sagrada, the respondent was ordered to cease using any term or name, in referring to or desig nating a preparation containing these two drugs as its active ingredients, which conceals or minimizes their presence. The case was decided unanimously in favor of the Commission (111 F. (2d) 889). A petition for rehearing was denied.

Educators Association, Inc., and others, New York.-Petition for review of the Commission's order was docketed in the Second Circuit (New York).

Petitioners sell and distribute a school reference book designated "The Volume Library," employing as many as 1,500 agents and canvassers a year. The principal practice prohibited by the order is: Representing, through the use of the term "Educators Association." that petitioners constitute a group of educators or teachers formed into an association, or that the business operated by them is anything other than a private business enterprise for profit.

The court modified the Commission's order so as to provide that the petitioners might use their corporate and trade names "if coupled with other words which do away with their tendency to create a false impression by revealing the true character of the business conducted," and affirmed it as modified (108 F. (2d) 470).

El Moro Cigar Co., Greensboro, N. C.-Petition for review was filed in the Fourth Circuit (Richmond, Va.). The Commission's order directed the company to stop employing the word "Havana"