Rep. 609, in a very learned opinion, citing a great number of authorities, ancient and modern, reaches a like conclusion. Blackstone speaks of conviction as accruing in "two ways: either by his confessing the offense and pleading guilty, or by his being found so by the verdict of his country."

"In common parlance no doubt it is taken to mean the verdict at the time of trial; but in strict legal sense it is used to denote the judgment of the court.” By Tindall, C. J., in Burgess v. Bactefeur, 7 M. & G. 481. (This is contrary to Folger, J.'s, view, which is that it is the verdict, and not the judgment.) In U. S. v. Watkins, 6 Fed. Rep. 152, it is held that under the Oregon Constitution, providing that “the privileges of an elector shall be forfeited by a conviction of any crime which is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary," the word "conviction " does not include "sentence," and is used in its ordinary sense of verdict or plea of guilty. To the same effect is Blair's Case, 25 Gratt. 850. In Keithler v. State, 10 Sm. & Marsh. 192, it was held that "conviction" includes judgment. But it must be borne in mind that these utterances concern the meaning of the word as distinguished from judgment. In Re Mullee, 7 Blatch. 23, the court held that it would not relieve the prisoner from imprisonment for contempt in disobeying an injunction, until the president should disclaim the power to pardon him, and that such pardon was within the president's "power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States," citing Ex parte Kearney, 7 Whart. 38, in which the Supreme Court say: When a court commits a party for a contempt, their adjudication is a conviction, and their commitment in consequence is execution." But in the latter case the question was not of pardon, but only of habeas corpus, which it was held would not lie in such a case. Bishop, citing this case, says: "Contempts of court are public offenses, pardonable like any other." Wharton says: "In our American practice the right of executive pardon has been asserted," citing the case of Mullee, but he also says that there is "a strong reason" to the contrary "in the fact that if the executive could discharge from imprisonment witnesses imprisoned for contempt, no trial, legislative or judicial, could proceed without executive consent." Webster defines conviction as "the act of proving, finding or determining to be guilty of an offense charged against a person before a legal tribunal; as by confession, by the verdict of a jury, or by the sentence of other tribunal, as in the summary convictions before commissioners of the revenue." The Century Dictionary defines it as "the act of proving or finding guilty of an offense charged; especially the finding by a jury or other legal tribunal, that the person on trial is guilty of the offense charged; sometimes used as implying judgment or sentence;" and defines summary conviction as "a conviction had without trial by jury, as in cases of contempt of court, of attempt to corrupt or withhold evidence," etc. We have thus given, impartially, we believe, the various meanings and expres

sions on this subject. The precise case under con sideration never before arose, but it seems to us that the peculiar language of our Constitution means "after verdict." This is strengthened by the associated words, "reprieves" and "commutations." Judged by the rule, a sociis, the word "conviction "is used only in respect to offenses to which the words "reprieves" and "commutations" are applicable. It seems that only one class of offenses is contemplated - the ordinary class indictable and triable by a jury, in respect to which the governor may reprieve or commute after sentence or pardon after verdict.

It is very difficult to write so as not to be misunderstood. We have rather prided ourselves on having at least the virtue of writing clearly, but our pride has received a shock from the American Law Review's inability to understand one of our preachments. In its current number, the Review, speaking of our recent comments on the Georgia decision that a negro's house is his castle, says: "Our contemporary seems to think it remarkable that such a decision should emanate from a southern court." Not at all. We neither said, nor implied, nor thought any thing of the sort. On the contrary we should have thought it remarkable if such a decision had not so "emanated." We simply advised the southern people to respect it. The only southern court in which there is any lack of justice to the negro is the court of Judge Lynch, and his court is not confined to the south, but sits in the west, and occasionally in the north. We heartily concur with the Review when it says: "We cannot recall a case where we have discovered the faintest disposition on the part of a southern appellate court to discriminate against a defendant" (party?) "because of his color." So, good Mr. Reviewer, when you do us the compliment to read us please read us more carefully, and make us not the text for a page of implied fault-finding.

The Review says it has not learned the result in the case of the Democratic State committeeman in this State, who being nominated for Supreme Court judge would not "quit the ticket nor quit the machine." We can tell him. He was elected, but has not yet "quit." It is hoped and believed now that on New Year's day, the usual time for forming good resolutions, he will let go his hold on the machine. Nobody wants him to give up his office, for he is eminently fit. The Reviewer tells one startling piece of news, "The American Law Review, for instance, is a corporation; but nearly all its stock is held by a talented Harvard law student, who, being at once ambitious and wealthy, devotes himself to his law studies and the care of his investments. He will no doubt be heard from in the editorial department of this publication in the fullness of time." But don't let him conduct the Review on the Harvard law school "method!" The Review has a capital portrait of Judge Dillon, with a good memoir of the accomplished lawyer, judge and author. Its lead

ing articles are of interest, especially "Liberty of Contract under the Police Power," by Frederick N. Judson, the "History of the First Georgia Code," by Richard H. Clark, and "A Lawyer's Commentary upon the famous case of Shylock v. Antonio," by the late Judge Love, of Iowa. The last is the best of the kind that we have ever seen. The following in regard to "relative dramatic probability," affords us especial delight:

"Thus if the scene were laid in Wall street, it would be absurd to exhibit the ghost of a dead stock-jobber prowling upon the street. For in the first place, every spectator would be apt to say in his own heart that there never was a stock-jobber with soul enough left in him to make a respectable ghost; and in the second place, such an exhibition would not inspire awe, since very likely the impression would prevail that it was an evil spirit sent by the devil to bull or bear the stock market. A money panic might be the consequence, but certainly not the tragic emotions of pity and terror."

The writer also gives a vigorous vindication of the Jewish race. We do not see that Mr. Judson comments on the adjudications holding that a master may not contract beforehand with his servant for exemption from liability for injury by his own or his employee's neglect, which seems to us the very acme of injustice and absurdity. There is a very readable and admirable London letter on the

present English bench and bar, the best thing of the kind that we have seen in many years. From this we learn that Lord Chancellor Halsbury is an expert Hebrew scholar, that Lord Hannen is a vegetarian, and that Mr. Justice Hawkins loves horseracing. Judge Dillon, in a touching memoir of Judge Love, "weighing his words" pronounces him "the best nisi prius judge I have ever seen." The Review declares the Federal Supreme Court to be the greatest judicial tribunal in the world." Careful, careful! For saying exactly that It of Manitoba took us severely to task.

NOTES OF CASES.

IN Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Wilson, Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, October, 1891, it was held that in an action against a railroad company, brought under the Revised Statutes of Missouri, § 4425, et seq., by a widow for the death of her husband while in its employ, the loss of companionship or society of the husband is not an element of damages and it is error to instruct that the jury may consider such loss in estimating the damages. The court said: "Error is also assigned on the charge of the court that the jury might consider the loss which defendant in error sustained in consequence of being deprived of her husband's society. In two cases reported from the Supreme Court of Missouri before this action was tried, it was held that such damages were properly allowed in an action by a husband for an injury to his wife. Blair v. Railroad Co., 89 Mo. 335; Furnish v. Railway Co., 102 id. 669. In the absence of other expression from that court, it might well be assumed that the same rule

would obtain in an action on the statute by husband or wife. Since this case was tried however an opinion of that court has been published which distinctly declares that, in an action on the statute by a wife for the death of her husband, nothing shall be allowed for loss of society. Schaub v. Railway Co. (Mo. Sup.), 16 S. W. Rep. 924. As already pointed out, the earlier cases were common-law actions for injuries to the wife, and it is not to be assumed that the last case is in conflict with the others. On the authority of the Schaub Case, and because it seems to be in accord with the current of authority elsewhere, we feel bound to declare that the law of Missouri is and has been that in an action on the statute of that State by a wife for the death of her husband, the loss of companionship or society of the husband is not an element of damages, and therefore there was error in the instruction mentioned."

In People v. Cahoon, Michigan Supreme Court, November 20, 1891, the court said: "Zeal in a prosecuting attorney is entitled to the highest commendation, but that zeal must be exercised within proper limits. In civil cases counsel often take too much latitude in the cross-examination of witnesses. Witnesses are entitled to respectful consideration, and it is the duty of courts to see that they are protected from the insinuations and attacks of counsel whether the insinuation or attack is direct or is in the form of a suggestive question. In criminal cases the prosecuting attorney is a public officer, acting in a quasi judicial capacity. Juries very properly regard him as unprejudiced, impartial and non-partisan; and insinuations thrown out by him regarding the credibility of witnesses for the defense are calculated to prejudice the defendant. Here the prosecution depended upon one witness. The defendant and his wife were the only persons at the affray. The questions put to Mrs. Cahoon, viz.: 'Is it not a fact that you were not there at all? Has this been written out? Is it not a fact that you and your husband have concocted this whole story?

You have been a witness for your husband in every lawsuit he has had, have you not?'- reflected upon the character of the witness, and bring the case within the rule laid down in Sullivan v. Deiter (Mich.), 49 N. W. Rep. 261. See also Leahy v. State (Neb.), 48 id. 390; People v. Montague, 71 Mich. 447; People v. Quick, 58 id. 321; People v. Dane, 59 id. 550. The witness does not appear to have attempted to evade any questions. When asked if she and her husband had not talked the matter over, she replied promptly that they had. The prosecuting attorney had an undoubted right to follow up this answer, and bring out that talk; but clearly he had no right to discredit the witness by innuendo. He could not have expected the witness to have answered that what she had sworn to was written out for her, or that she and her husband had concocted the story. The questions as to her husband's lawsuits, and as to whether she had not been a witness in all of them, were manifestly improper.