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pos mentis at the time the deed was executed, and that its execution was procured in pursuance of a conspiracy entered into by the grantee and others. At the time the action was brought the land had passed into the hands of third persons, who had no notice either of the alleged conspiracy or of the mental incapacity of the grantor. Plaintiff did not allege that he had no adequate remedy at law without recourse to the innocent purchaser, and failed to explain his delay in bringing the action until more than three years after the grantor's death, nor did he object to the transfers to innocent purchasers, or make any claim at that time that the deed was void. Held, that though such circumstances would not bar a recovery against the innocent purchasers, they were of such a character that equity would require clear and conclusive proof of the mental incapacity of the grantor at the time the deed was given. (2) On an issue as to mental capacity of a grantor, a lay witness cannot testify whether in his opinion, based on conversations with the grantor, he was rational or irrational. (3) In such case the lay witness may state conversations had by him with the grantor and the acts of the grantor in the presence of the witness, and then say whether in his judgment such acts and conversations were "those of a rational or irrational man." (4) The refusal to postpone trial of issues in an action till other defendants have been served and their time to plead has expired is a matter in the discretion of the trial court, and is not reviewable on appeal. April 12, 1892. Paine v. Aldrich. Opinion by Maynard, J. 14 N. Y. Supp. 538, affirmed.

INSURANCE-CONDITIONS-NON-PAYMENT OF PREMIUMS-WAIVER.-(1) Where an insurance policy, conditioned to be void on non-payment of dues, provides that the assured may be reinstated on payment of delinquent dues and "satisfactory evidence of good health," the taking of delinquent dues by the insurer from an agent of the assured, on the day before the assured's death of fatty degeneration of the heart, and the giving of a receipt, providing that the payment and receipt shall be void unless the assured is in as good bealth as when originally received as a member, do not constitute a waiver of the breach of the policy, since no "satisfactory evidence of good health" could under the circumstances be furnished. (2) Where the assured's agent, on paying the delinquent dues, stated that the assured had a swollen foot, and had been on his annual spree, the fact that the representative of the insurer required proofs of death, and the certificate of the clergyman who officiated at the burial, and furnished blanks in each case, and gave instructions as to the filling thereof, and promised to pay the policy on approval of the board of directors, did not constitute a waiver. Second Division, April 19, 1892. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n. Opinion by Laudon, J. 10 N. Y. Supp. 632, affirmed.

LICENSE

Ronald v.

EQUITABLE RELIEF - WHEN GRANTEDRES ADJUDICATA.-(1) In an action to restrain defendant from prosecuting summary proceedings to remove plaintiffs from land occupied by them, plaintiffs alleged that P., the owner thereof, had given them liceuse to enter thereon and occupy it as long as they might desire, and that plaintiffs had taken possession of and made valuable improvements on the land. It was shown that P. was not the owner, but only the agent of the owners, and it did not appear that he had any authority to give plaintiffs such license, or that there was any ratification thereof by the owners. Held, that plaintiffs were not entitled to the relief asked. (2) Where in a prior action between plaintiffs and defendant's grantor the land was adjudged to be leased by plaintiffs, they are estopped to deny defendant's title. April 12, 1892. Bohn v. Hatch. Opinion by Gray, J. 15 N. Y. Supp. 550, affirmed.

LICENSE FROM STATE-REVOCATION-DAMAGES.-Claimant owned a dry dock, with its only ingress and egress through a basin on State land which opened into the Erie canal. The canal waters flowed out through claimant's land. An existing swing-bridge, part of the towpath, was built by claimant with the consent of the State. This bridge the State determined to remove, and offered claimant the privilege of erecting an elevated bridge in its place, which he refused. The State then erected a stationary bridge, too low for water traffic, which, owing to the time when it was built, prevented the prior removal of two caual boats belonging to claimant. Held, that the privilege claim. ant enjoyed was one revocable at will of the State, but the State was bound to afford him reasonable notice and opportunity to remove his two boats, and on failure to do so was liable for damages sustained by claim. Second Division, April 19, 1892. Putman v. State. Opinion by Brown, J.

ant.

MASTER AND SERVANT-DEFECTIVE APPLIANCES.In an action for personal injuries sustained by a laborer in defendant's employ by the breaking of an iron hook, to which was attached a heavy iron girder, it appeared that in purchasing the iron from which the hook was made, defendant's superintendent ordered the very best of refined iron, without limitation of price. It was shown that defendant knew it to be a custom of all well-established mills to test such iron in its manufacture. On its arrival the iron was delivered to defendant's blacksmith, against whom there was no charge of unskillfulness, and he made a number of hooks from it, among which was the one that broke. There was nothing to manifest any weakness, flaw or imperfection either in the iron or in the hook. Held, that the complaint was properly dismissed, as defendant was bound to exercise only reasonable and ordinary care, and was not negligent in failing to make additional tests after receiving the iron. Marsh v. Chickering, 101 N. Y. 390; Shear. & R. Neg., § 195. A master who puts a tool or implement into his servant's hand may procure it in several ways-he may buy it ready-made of a dealer, procure it to be manufactured or purchase the materials and manufacture it himself. Liability for an injury resulting from a defect in the materials of a tool will be determined by the same rule in each case. If a hook like the one used in the present case had been procured ready-made in the market. or manufactured at a foundry, the defendant would necessarily have been compelled to rely upon the dealer and manufacturer for the quality of materials used. A completed hook ready for use could neither be cut into with a chisel or beat over an anvil without impairing its strength, or perhaps destroying it altogether. A test of that character applied to one of a lot would be no guaranty of the quality of the others. To apply such a test therefore to tools procured in that way is impracticable, and such articles are not usually tested before they are put in use. The modern industrial system rests upon confidence in others. A rail. road corporation cannot well apply such tests to the materials of which its cars and engines are made, or to the rails which form its tracks. Reasonable inspection is necessary and required. But when articles are manufactured by a process approved by use and experience, and apparently properly finished and stamped, it is not usual for them to be tested again in quality. and such examinations are not generally required by law. If materials of the best quality are purchased, and tools constructed from them by competent and skillful workmen, and if there is nothing in the appearance of the material to indicate inefficiency, men in the ordinary affairs of life use them, and place them in the hands of their servants, and there were no circumstances surrounding the man

ufacture of the hook in question to induce a prudent man to depart from the usual course, or to adopt extraordinary care and precaution. All the best iron and steel is made in a few large establishments. The evidence shows that all practicable tests are used dur ing the process of manufacture, and the completed product represents the best article that can be produced. It passes into the hands of dealers, and so reaches the consumer. If the best refined iron is required, the purchaser may assume that the tests necessary to produce that article have been properly made, and the work properly done. He must see that the work he undertakes to do is properly performed, but if the tool breaks from an internal defect in the material, not apparent from an external examination of the iron, or in the process of making the tool, the master is no more responsible than he would be if he had purchased it ready-made in the market, or if it had broken from an external, apparent defect, produced by use, of which he was not chargeable with knowledge. Second Division, March 25, 1892. Carlson v. Phenix Bridge Co. Opinion by Brown, J.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-GRADING CONTRACT-INTERPRETATION EVIDENCE OF PERFORMANCE-DI

RECTING VERDICT.- (1) Where in an action against a city on a contract which required plaintiff to grade a street to the satisfaction of the commissioner of public works, and according to certain plans and specifications, the answer admits that the rock excavation required by the contract has been completed, and the work accepted by the commissioner, evidence that the rock has not been excavated as required is inadmissible, and though received, will not be considered on review, to reverse a verdict for plaintiff by direction. (2) Conceding that the evidence was admissible under the pleadings, a verdict for plaintiff was properly directed. (3) The contract empowered the commissioner to designate when the work should commence, suspend work, order it to be begun again, consent to its being sublet or assigned or declare the contract null, and re-award it. Plaintiff covenanted to com. plete the work to the satisfaction of the commissioner and in substantial accordance with the specifications and plan. Held, that a literal compliance with the specifications and plan was not required. (4) Where, in accordance with the contract, the surveyor, inspector and superintendent of street improvement certified that the work was completed, and the commissioner of public works accepted it, the city was bound by their decisiou in the absence of fraud or mistake. Second Division, April 26, 1892. Brady v. Mayor, etc., of the City of New York. Opinion by Parker, J. 9 N. Y. Supp. 893, affirmed.

POWERS-EXECUTION BY WILL-Testator conveyed all his property to plaintiff, in trust to rent the realty and invest the personalty, and pay the proceeds to testator (the grantor) during his life, and at his death to transfer to such persons, and in such shares, as he should appoint by will, all the property then in plaintiff's hands. Afterward testator devised and bequeathed to defendant "all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and personal property, * * * which I may own or be in any manner entitled to at the time of my death." Held, that the will was a good execution, as to both personalty and realty, of the power of appointment reserved in the deed from testator to plaintiff; 1 Revised Statutes, page 737, section, 126, which provides that "lands embraced in a power to devise shall pass by a will purporting to convey all the real property of the testator, unless the intent that the will shall not operate as an execution of the power shall appear expressly or by necessary implication," being held (Hutton v. Bankard, 92 N. Y. 295) to apply to personal property as well as to real es

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JURY TO PASSENGER-EXPERT EVIDENCE.- (1) Defendant's street-car driver approached and crossed the track of another company at the rate of six miles an hour, and collided with a car on the other track, injuring plaintiff, a passenger. At a distauce of sixtyfive feet from the crossing the car on the other track could be seen when seventy-four feet therefrom. Held, that a verdict for plaintiff would not be disturbed. (2) The other company was joined as a party defendant. There was a latent flaw in the brake-rod of its car. The rod was made of good material, and in a skillful manner, and had been in use a comparatively short time. On the morning of the accident it had been inspected by a man who went underneath the car and looked at it, and the brake was tried several times, and found to work properly. A witness testified that striking the iron with a hammer would have revealed the defect. Held, that it was error to permit him to state his opinion that the inspection was insufficient. April 26, 1892. Schneider v. Second Ave. R. Co. Opinion by Peckham, J. 15 N. Y. Supp. 556, modified.

SALE-WARRANTY-EXAMINATION BY PURCHASER. -Where plaintiff sold wine to defendant, "to be delivered in merchantable order," and to be approved by defendant" within three days after the delivery," there was no warranty of the quality of the wine. The principle of this conclusion, I think, is deducible from the authorities, several of which I cite without further reference: Parkinson v. Lee, 2 East, 314; Sprague v. Blake, 20 Wend. 61; Reed v. Randall, 29 N. Y. 358; Dounce v. Dow, 64 id. 411. April 12, 1892. Gentilli v. Starace. Opinion by Gray, J. 14 N. Y. Supp. 764,

affirmed.

NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS.
ELLIOTT'S APPELLATE Procedure.

A Treatise on Appellate Procedure and Trial Practice incident to Appeals. By Byron K. Elliott and William F. Elliott. Bowen-Merrill Co., Indianapolis. Pp. cxxxi,

870.

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This treatise, the senior author of which is Judge Elliott, favorably known to all American legal scholars, is a worthy successor to "The Work of the Advocate and "Roads and Streets." The authors have struck an entirely new vein, we believe, and certainly have exhausted it, and have unearthed a good deal of precious ore and converted it into current value. We have found the second part, on "error in judicial proceedings," especially interesting, and have especially relished the chapter on invited error. We note with pleasure that Judge Elliott throws the weight of his authority into the upper scale on the topic of compulsory examination of the person of parties plaintiff in actions for damages. That scale is fast gaining weighty if not numerous adjudications against the compulsory examination. The work must commend itself to practitioners as one of novel interest and decidedly superior quality.

HARRIS' DAMAGES BY CORPORATIONS.

A Treatise on the Law of Damages by Corporations, including cases damnum absque injuria, in two volumes. An appendix to volume 2 contains the several statutes relating to injuries resulting in death. By George E. Harris. Lawyers' Co-op. Pub. Co., Rochester. Pp. cxxx, 1350. This title is misleading in one respect, and rather inexpressive in another. It is not a "treatise" in any respect, and it is in relation to injuries rather thau

damages, as the author explains in the preface. It consists in statements (generally unnecessarily full) of recent cases on the law of eminent domain, municipal corporations, highways, nuisance, railroads, parent and child, infancy, master and servant, carriers in general, telegraphs, mining, banking and gas-lighting, so far as these topics concern corporations. The chief value of the work is that it gives information of the most recent adjudications on these topics in one convenient publication. The table of cases covers one hundred doublecolumned pages, and the index covers one hundred and ten pages. The work embraces a great quantity of case-law and "is wery fillin' at the price."

AMERICAN STATE REPORTS. VOL. 23. This volume contains the cases selected from sixteen volumes containing the latest official reports of decisions. The cases are well selected and the annotations are on timely topics, covering points which are frequently presented for adjudication. Among the more important notes are the following: Whether deed binding on one not named as grantor, page 82; collateral attack on judgments, page 104; necessity, waiver and sufficiency of certificate of loss by fire, page 258; promise of master to repair defective machinery, page 385; power of municipalities to establish and regulate markets, page 581, and power of carrier to limit his liability for loss, page 593.

NOTES.

N the recent case in Texas of Tolkin v. Anderson,

Marr vaxt quite merry and satirical on a question

of obscure boundary: "After stopping a moment to catch our breath, and to look for the stake in the prairie for the south-east corner,' we locate that corner at this point as the true south-east corner of that half of lot No. 49' which is referred to in the deeds. So sure are we that we have thus far followed the directions of the grantor as he intended them to be understood, that we have but little doubt that we would have found the stake in the prairie' at this point had it not already been an unfortunate victim of the corroding tooth of time, or of the vandal hands of man. Two of the lines of a survey, which we know from its dimensions to be rectangular, having been 'run' and established, the other two are self-evident. Any one can 'run' them as well if not better than we, and as we are somewhat fatigued we prefer that he shall do so if deemed necessary."

There was a dramatic scene at the funeral of Richard S. Jenkins, ex-prosecutor of the Pleas of Camden county, N. J., last Sunday. As friends and acquaintauces gathered around to take a last look at the great lawyer's face, an elderly man, soberly dressed, passed and repassed the coffin several times, each time exclaiming in a tone loud enough to be heard by those who stood near: "I can never forgive him." This was repeated until the coffin was closed and the remains were removed. Inquiry brought to light the fact that the man was the brother of Benjamin Hunter, who was hauged in Camden in 1879 for the murder of John Armstrong. The crime was one of the most oruel in the annals of murder, the guilty man even tearing away the bandages from his victim's wounds while pretending to nurse him as a friend. Hunter had been associated with Armstrong in business, and the murder was for gain. Hunter was an active and conspicuous leader in church and Sunday-school work, and his high character shielded him from suspicion for a time. Jenkins however hunted him down, effected his conviction and he was hanged. Before his death he confessed his crime..

The "uncontrollable criminal impulse theory, which played such an amusing part in Lord Esher's judgment in Hanbury v. Hanbury, has had a curious history and stands at the present moment in a somewhat equivocal position in English law. Little more than a century ago M. Philippe Pinel, who held the of fice of chief physician to the Bicetre asylum in Paris, announced his discovery of a type of insanity in which the moral faculties of the victim were alone involved. He called it manie sans délire. After having acquired no inconsiderable reputation on the Continent, this disease began to figure in the writings of English and American medico-legal experts. Dr. Ray in particular, the author of the well-known American treatise on the "Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity," strenuously asserted its existence, and supported his assertion by a number of cases in which he alleged that not only was there marked disorder of the moral faculties without any lesion of the understanding, but the patient labored under an "irresistible" or "uncontrollable" impulse to commit acts of criminal violence. A few years after the publication of Dr. Ray's book Dan iel Macnaghten was tried before Chief Justice Tindal and a jury for the murder of Mr. Drummond, private secretary to Sir Robert Peel. He was defended with consummate ability by the late Sir Alexander Cockburn, and was justly but illegally acquitted. In the course of his address to the jury, Cockburn referred in very laudatory terms to Dr. Ray's treatise and the doctrines which it promulgated, and induced the judge and the jury unconsciously to set aside the criterion of responsibility in mental disease laid down by Lord Mansfield on the trial of Bellingham. Macnaghten's acquittal aroused a tempest of public indignation. One honorable member prepared a bill for the practial abolition of the plea of partial insanity in capital cases, and although this measure was fortunately defeated, a general desire was evinced that the rigor of the criminal law as to the test of lunacy should be increased. Accordingly the House of Lords, with the assistance of the common-law judges, declared ex cathedra that only that degree of insanity which prevented a prisoner from knowing the nature and qual ity of his act would suffice to exempt him from respon sibility to the law. Now the victim of moral insanity or uncontrollable impulse does "know the nature and quality of his act," according to the superficial meaning of the phrase, and it seemed therefore as if the rules in Macnaghten's Case had definitely shut the gates of mercy against the victims of this disease. Nominally they have done so no doubt, but the heresy created by Pinel, and propagated by Dr. Ray, has made very decided progress in England notwithstanding. In the first place the brotherhood of "mad doctors" has made some concessions to common sense. It is not now contended that the intellect of the moral lunatic is perfectly sound. Nor is the ægis of moral insanity thrown with the same persistence as before in front of every scoundrel in whose defense ingenuity can devise or urge no other plea. In the second place the law no longer stands where it did. The old judicial pleasantries on the subject of "uncontrollable impulse" are now so rare that it is quite refreshing to hear them so happily revived by the master of the rolls. of the judges readily admit that the rules in Macnaghten's Case require "manipulation," and manipulate them at nisi prius with the full sympathy of juries of assize. The plea of irresistible impulse is tacitly allowed, constantly in cases of infanticide, and occasionally even in cases of theft, and there can be little doubt that, if the criminal law of England were codified, leg islative sanction would be given to the glosses which Sir James Stephen has added to the words of Mr. Jus tice Maule (cf. Dig. Cr. L., art. 27).—London Law

Times.

Many

IN

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, JUNE 18, 1892.

CURRENT TOPICS.

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pers constituted in part at least the contract, and for the complete proof of it they would seem to have been essential. * * * Those papers had however been delivered up at the place and time of the receipt of the property, and it may be assumed that they were accessible to the defendant. * ** Inasmuch as no conditions were mentioned in connection with the information given by the freight agent of the through rates for which the defendant would transport the property, it may be that Shanley & Co. supposed that the common-law duty would be assumed by the defendant as such carrier, and that would have been the situation if no special terms had been provided for when the property was delivered to the defendant. And although Shanley & Co. had not undertaken to furnish the property for shipment, they had the right to assume, uuless advised to the contrary, that when delivered for that purpose it was received pursuant to the arrangement before then made so fur as related to the rates and the true transportation. And consistently only with such previous understanding or agreement, the defendant was permitted to treat it as within the authority of the person who delivered the potatoes to make or accept stipulations or conditions for the reception and carriage of the property by it, and beyond that the owners were not necessarily bound by any thing contained in the shipping bills so far as it was dependent merely upon the presumption of authority in the persons executing them. ** *And to that extent, and that only, the terms and conditions of the shipping bills, so far as reasonable and applicable to through transportation of the property by the defend

N another column of this issue is published a criticism of the decision of the Second Division of the Court of Appeals in Jennings v. Grand Trunk Railway (127 N. Y. 438), copied from the American Law Register and Review. If the decision of the court were correctly stated in it, it would be open to criticism, but it is not. The court did not decide, as therein stated, that the preliminary agreement on rates constituted the contract of carriage, rather than the shipping-bill issued on the receipt of the goods, stating the terms of the contract. The facts were there: On February 8, 1881, Shanley & Co. wrote to the defendants' agent at Toronto, asking their lowest rates for carrying potatoes from certain places in Canada to certain places in Illinois; on the 12th received an answer stating the rates, and on the 18th accepted the same, and the defendants' local freight agents were notified accordingly. On delivery of the potatoes at the stations by Shanley & Co.'s agents, those agents signed and delivered to defendants shipping-ant, must for that purpose be deemed within the con

bills in accordance with the custom of the defendants, in the form of requests to the defendants to carry the potatoes on the terms and conditions stated therein, and took receipts for the property. Shanley & Co. did not expressly authorize their agents to sign such requests, and knew nothing of them, but knew that such was the general custom of railroad companies. These requests contained conditions that the carrier would not be liable for delay in transit, and that no claim for loss or detention should be allowed unless written notice and particulars should be "given to station freight agent at or nearest to the place of delivery within thirty-six hours after the goods in respect to which said claim is made are delivered." The decision was that the owners were not bound by the act of their agents in signing and delivering the requests to any terms or conditions therein except so far as reasonable in view of the first negotiations, and that the particular condition in question was unreasonable in that view, and did not bind the There was no intimation that the preliminary agreement on rates constituted the entire contract. It was conceded by the court that the receipts might have constituted the contract, but it was held that the owners were not bound, on mere principles of agency, to an implied assent to any unreasonable limitation of the carrier's commonlaw liability imposed by the requests. The receipts were not put in evidence. The court said:

owners.

"The referee found that the defendants' receipts or bills of lading containing some terms and conditions for the transportation of the potatoes were so given, but that no evidence was offered to prove what those VOL. 45- No. 25.

tract."

It appeared and was found that the loss was occasioned by the defendants' own negligence, and against this the bill did not provide, and of course they were responsible therefor. So the decision was to the effect that although Shanley & Co. had themselves delivered the property and signed the bills they might be deemed to have assented to the terms and conditions of the bills, and to the limitation of the common-law liability implied in the negotiations about rates, yet that they were not bound by an assent of the persons whom they employed simply to deliver the goods to the carrier to any limitation of the carrier's liability beyond what was reasonable in view of the contract for throughtransportation, so long as it was not shown to have been a condition of the receipts given for the property. The court conclude by observing that this view rendered it unnecessary to consider the fact that "it does not appear that the condition was in the bill of lading," that is to say, in the receipt given This case therefore decides by the defendants. three things: first, that in the absence of any agreement or condition beyond those expressed or implied in the preliminary negotiation about rates, the common-law liability would have attached; second, that a limitation might have been lawfully provided for in the receipt issued by the carrier for the property; third, that the assent of the agent to the conditions in the request delivered to the carrier could not by implication bind the principal when it was inconsistent with the ordinary liability attaching to the acceptance of the property after the negotiation about rates. The court do not pass

because it was unnecessary to pass on the question which would have arisen if the condition had been shown to be in the receipt issued by the carrier, or the question which would have arisen if the shipper had himself signed the request containing the condition. This decision therefore seems very different from the "piece of folly" which Mr. McMurtree pronounces it.

Mr. Albert Bach of the New York bar, communicates to the Medico-Legal Journal for this month some interesting arguments in favor of the repeal of the law of this State which excludes the testimony of physicians and surgeons on the ground of privilege. He shows that at common law the privilege was extended to lawyers but not to clergymen nor physicians. He states that "the States and Territories of the United States which have

that Utopian condition where, as a rule, death or great physical suffering is submitted to in preference to dishonor, we are forced inevitably to the conclusion that not only is the assertion that this rule of privilege is based on public policy with very little foundation in fact, but, on the other hand, that its enforcement works much more harm than good."

Mr. John A. Wright, of San Francisco, puts forth a little book, for general readers, entitled "How to get good judges; a study of the defects of the judicial system of the States, with a plan for a scientific judicial system." He starts out with the assertion that "a large class of people throughout the United States entertains a growing distrust of our judges and judicial systems," which "exists side by side with the utmost respect for the character and attainments of particular courts and particular judges." One indication of this is in the

extended the privilege to medical men and clergy-increasing prevalence of mob-law, and one ground

men are as follows: Arizona Territory, Arkansas, California, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Utah Territory, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming. The States and Territories which have not changed the common law on the subject are: Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Minnesota, North Carolina, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico Territory, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennesseee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia." Mr. Bach carefully reviews the leading adjudications in this State in the three classes of life insurance cases, will cases and damage or tort cases. In respect to one of the insurance cases, Grattan v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., 80 N. Y. 281, he makes the acute reductio ad absurdum : "Here then you have a case where an expert is not permitted to testify on account of the statutory provision, and a layman's evidence is excluded because he is not an expert. Mr. Bach concedes that his proposal will be viewed by most of the medical profession as "a revolutionary measure necessarily leading to calamitous results," but he sums up his reasons as follows:

Keeping in mind the definition of public policy to be a course of conduct that ultimately results in the greatest good and advantage to the majority of the people, and remembering that the safety of the citizen is the supreme law of the State; that the general system of law looks to the detection and punishment of crime; that justice is not a respecter of mere personalty; that individual reputation should not weigh a feather's weight in the scale as against the rights of the masses; that law should not hold out a premium to the perpetuation of fraud; that no one is at all likely to forego medical or surgical treatment through any fear of a divulgence of his condition, either mental or physical, but would seek such treatment notwithstanding all the publicity that might be given to his complaint, on the theory that self-preservation is the first law of nature; that there is no occasion for the revealing of the secret cause of the physical condition of the patient when applying to a physician for treatment; that confidences intrusted to a physician not necessary to enable him to act are not privileged; that the world has not yet attained, nor probably ever will attain, to

of it, as given by him, is the fact that in New York certain judges have been forced to confess that they had bought their nominations. The principal rea sons of the spreading of this notion, he says, is the newspaper press. But he thinks that the influence of great corporations and private interests, of corrupt politicians and their retainers and patrons is omnipotent in nominating and electing the judges, "and we have no adequate means of disciplining or vindicating our judges when their reputations are assailed." He also states that for forty years our courts have steadily become less capable of satisfactorily dispatching business." For "dispatching" read "Keeping up with," and we are with him. The remedies he proposes are to make the bench more attractive than the bar; to make elevation to it unattainable by any but the best men; to make dismissal certain to follow misconduct; and to elevate the character and capacity of the bar. The means he proposes are better salaries, tenure during good behavior, pensions, and "a scientific method of evolving the best men for the beuch." Our people probably would not object to the last means suggested if they could understand it, but to the other three they would certainly say no. They think the salaries are large enough, they are sure the tenure is long enough, and they are deadly opposed to judicial pensions. On the last two points argument to the people of this State would be wasted. Possibly but not probably they might consent to increase certain of the judicial salaries, but certainly they would never fall in with Mr. Wright's opinion that they ought to be paid as much as officers of great corporations. But the most curious part of Mr. Wright's scheme is what he calls the Council or Court of Juristic Discipline. This is to be composed of lawyers, elected by the lawyers upon the Australian ballot system, with exclusive power to admit to the bar, to discipline members of the bar, and from whose members the bench is to be exclusively supplied. He would have the ultimate law court composed of judges selected by the judges of the trial courts. We have not space to unfold this scheme in all its de

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