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granted. Held, that defendants were not injured by the court granting the request. April 12, 1892. Dexter v. Ivens. Opinion by O'Brien, J. 15 N. Y. Supp. 495, affirmed.

RAILROADS-STREET-REGULATIONS AS TO TIME OF RUNNING CARS-REASONABLENESS OF ORDINANCE

EVIDENCE.—(1) Laws of 1860, chapter 512, section 2 (defendant street railroad company's (charter), provide that "said railroad

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may

* shall be run as often as the convenience of passengers may require, and shall be subject to such reasonable rules and regulations in respect thereto as the common council * * * prescribe." The common council passed an ordinance requiring the street surface railroad companies to operate their roads "as frequently as public convenience may require, and not less than one car every twenty minutes between the hours of 12 midnight and 6 o'clock A. M. each and every day both ways, for the transportation of passengers." Held, in an action to recover a penalty for a violation of the ordinance, that evidence of such facts as would tend to establish that the convenience of passengers or the public did not require the running of defendant's cars during the ordinance hours specified, was relevant on the question of the reasonableness of the ordinance in defendant's case. (2) It is not a ground for objection that such evidence related to a period of time subsequent to the date when the ordinance went into effect. (3) The question of the reasonableness of the ordinance is not controlled by considerations of expense to defendant. March 12, 1892. Mayor, etc., of City of New York v. Dry Dock, E. B. & B. R. Co. Opinion by Gray, J. 15 N. Y. Supp. 297, reversed.

ACCOUNTS

REFERENCE-EXAMINATION OF LONG SERVICE OF ATTORNEY.- -Where a complaint alleges an indebtedness to plaintiff in a certain sum, on an account for services rendered as an attorney between certain dates, in defending a certain action for defendant, and the answer put in issue both the indebtedness and the alleged value of the services, the trial does not "require the examination of a long account," within section 1013 of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing that in such cases a compulsory reference may be ordered. March 25, 1892. Randall v. Sherman. Opinion by Gray, J. 17 N. Y. Supp. 957, mem., reversed.

TRUSTS -INVALID LIABILITY OF TRUSTEE.- (1) Land was conveyed to defendant, who orally agreed to hold it in trust for the use and benefit of plaintiff, and subject to his direction respecting the sale of it, or any part of it, and to pay him the proceeds of such sales. Held, that though the trust was invalid under the statutes of frauds and of uses and trusts (2 Rev. Stat., p. 134, §6; 1 id., p. 728, § 51), yet it was lawful for defendant to perform it, and that having fully performed the trust as far as it required him to dispose of the land, he could not then refuse to deliver the proceeds to plaintiff. (2) In such case defendant refused to deliver the deeds to part of the land sold unless the purchase-money was paid to him; and plaintiff, in order to obtain the deeds for the purchasers, advanced the purchase-money, and on defendant's direction, delivered it to defendant's wife. Held, that by so doing, plaintiff simply recognized defendant's right as agent to demand payment on delivery of the deeds, and did not concede defendant's claim of title to the purchaseSecond Division, March 25, 1892. money. Martin. Opinion by Landon, J. 11 N. Y. Supp. 569, affirmed.

Bork v.

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ameliorating the condition of the Jews in Jerusalem, Palestine, * * * by promoting among them education, arts and sciences, and by learning them mechan ical and agricultural vocations," does not pass to a corporation whose object, as shown by its charter, is to contribute to the relief of the indigent Jews in Jerusalem, Palestine," of which testator, a lawyer, was an incorporator, and president at the time of executing the will, and which the will does not mention, though there is no other corporation in existence at the precedent legatee's death which can take the legacy. The argument that the words "relief of indigent Jews," used in the certificate of incorporation, comprehend the apparently wider purpose of benevolence manifested in the scheme of the testator in his will, rests upon evidence given upon the last trial by learned divines of the Jewish church, explaining the conception of charity as taught in the Talmud and accepted by orthodox Jews. It is unnecessary to state in detail the very interesting testimony upon this subject. It is sufficient to say that it was shown that from early times it has been the doctrine of the Jewish teachers that the true way of administering charity is by furnishing opportunities to the poor and dependent to become self-supporting, and by aiding and encouraging them to fit themselves for some handicraft, or to engage in agricultural or other business, or to do any labor, however humble, to gain their bread. The giving of alms is discouraged, except in cases of actual necessity, and is deemed the lowest form of charity. It is probable that this same view of charity exists among Christian communities, but with the Jews it seems to a greater extent to have the explicit sanction of the law of the Jewish church. It is therefore claimed that the words in the certificate of incorporation of the North American Relief Society, "relief of indigent Jews," means relief according to the Jewish method, by means of education, provision for the instruction of the poor of their race in some self-supporting trade or vocation, and that in a subordinate sense only do they refer to their temporary relief by the giving of alms. The words in the will are, it is insisted, a paraphrase merely of the words of the certificate, and the identity of the corporation claiming the legacy with the one described in the will is by the evidence referred to claimed to be established. The words in the certificate of incorporation of the society to express the corporate object of the association, viz., the "relief of the indigent Jews in Jerusalem, Palestine," in their ordinary interpretation, import the bestowal of charity upon the poor by ministering to their personal and temporary distresses, and do not describe those benevolent schemes for the permanent elevation of that class through education and instruction and employment in vocations, and thereby convert them from a condition of dependence into self-supporting men and women. It does not seem to be seriously contested that the words of the certificate of incorporation do not, in their usual acceptation, embrace those wider purposes of benevolence. The contention is that they are to be construed according to the special and peculiar meaning attached to them by the Jewish teachers, and in the light of the Jewish conception of charitable relief. We are aware of no authority justifying a construction of corporate powers by or in view of the tenets of any sect, or which authorizes a limit or broad construction depending upon the personal belief of the incorporators, or their understanding of the words used in the statute creating the incorporation, or in a certificate of incorporation under a general law, where the words used in defining the powers of the corpora tion have a common and well-understood significance, and are free from ambiguity and doubt. The common and accepted meaning of words is that which is to be followed. Any other rule of construction would be

attended with great danger. Corporate powers would be asserted which were never intended to be granted, and if the special understanding of the incorporators of the meaning of the words should be admitted to qualify or enlarge their ordinary and natural meaning, it might often be found that powers which were never thought of by the Legislature would be hidden away under words which never suggested them. But passing this consideration, we are not satisfied that the incorporators of the North American Relief Society intended to use the words "relief of the indigent Jews' in any other than their natural and ordinary sense. The record is filled with evidence that in 1853, when the society was incorporated, the Jews inhabiting Jerusalem were in a condition of abject poverty, and hunger and nakedness was the condition of nearly the entire Jewish population of that ancient city, consisting of six or seven thousand souls. Many of them had gone there to die in the holy city. To the Jews it was the place of the holiest associations. Though the belief of the restoration of the race to the land of their fathers has perhaps with many weakened "into a hope," the race throughout the world turned to Judea, with longing for the re-establishment there of the kingdom of Israel. In 1853 there was pressing need, and the Jews of the western world were constantly appealed to to relieve the distress and poverty of their brethren in the East. Their civil rights were curtailed, they were cut off from the ordinary avenues of industry, and starvation was their inevitable doom, unless they were assisted by the charity of the outside world. In the condition of this population at that time there was therefore abundant reason for a movement which resulted in the organization of the North American Relief Society for the purpose of furnishing means for relieving indigence and want. The men who organized this corporation were educated, intelligent Jews, versed in the principles, traditions and literature of Judaism, and prominent in all movements of benevolence and charity looking to the relief and elevation of their race. The claim that the incorporators of the North American Relief Society had something other in view in organizing it than the furnishing of temporary relief against poverty and destitution is based to a great extent upon the fact that in 1852 a movement was commenced by Sir Moses Montefiore and others to establish schools and industrial vocations and to promote agriculture in Palestine as a means of accomplishing permanent relief of the Jewish inhabitants. This movement was strongly supported by the Occident, the leading Jewish periodical in this country, to which Sampson Simpson was a subscriber. It was argued that this plan was much preferable to that which had prevailed for many years-of giving alms for the temporary relief of the destitute Jews in the East. The inference we are asked to draw from the facts connected with this movement and shown in the evidence is that Sampson Simpson and his associates, in organizing the North American Relief Society, intended thereby to aid this movement, and that they could not have designed to organize a charity to administer relief according to the old method. But it is to be observed that the new movement had in 1853 hardly taken root. There is no direct evidence that Sampson Simpson or his associates in the society had taken any part in it. There was a wide and pressing demand for the relief of immediate want and destitution among the Jews in Jerusalem, and relief of this kind would always be required for the poor, sick, decrepit and aged people, however much might be accomplished in the direction of permanent relief of the community at large by bettering their educational and industrial condition. We think, on considering the whole evidence, it would be too much to say that the incorporators in the North American Relief Society

had any other view in organizing it except to furnish relief to indigence in the ordinary way, and according to the common understanding of the phrase. When, in 1857, Sampson Simpson came to make his will, he had undoubtedly become interested in the new movement, which had been under discussion for five years, and which had taken shape in the establishmenl, under the guidance of Sir Moses Montefiore and many other philanthropic men, of schools and industrial enterprises in Palestine, for the benefit of the Jews. The will is drawu manifestly under its influence. The question has been asked-to which we have heard no satisfactory answer-why the testator did not designate this corporation as the beneficiary, if he supposed the powers of the society organized in 1853, of which he was president to his death, were adequate to carry out the purposes of his will, or if he intended the bequest to go to that society? The suggestion that he could not know that it would be in existence at the time of the death of his nephew, or if then in existence, be a responsible corporation, and that therefore he omitted to name it as the beneficiary, seems improbable. He could have given the legacy to the society, subject to the condition that it should be a responsible corporation at the time the gift was to vest in possession. The more natural conclusion is that the testator looked for the creation of a new corporation to take the legacy with the purpose he had in view. Opinion by Andrews, J. Maynard, JJ., dissent.

power to execute the broader April 12, 1892. Riker v. Leo. Earl, C. J., and Peckham and 15 N. Y. Supp. 966, affirmed.

CORRESPONDENCE.

THE NEW ZEALAND CRIMINAL CODE.
Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

Kindly permit me to refer to an article by one Charlton T. Lewis, Ph. D., on the "New Penal Code of Italy," which appeared in your issue of 14th November, 1891, copied from the Independent. My excuse for not sooner referring to it is (1) the distance and (2) other engagements when the mail day came round. My reason for calling attention to said article is the extraordinary exposition which he gives of what he terms "The Penal Code of New Zealand." Mr. Lewis on this subject is simply romancing. There is not a single word of truth in what he says about our penal laws, and I am utterly at a loss to discover the source from which he obtained his information. The only legislation we have bearing at all on the matter is "The First Offenders' Probation Act, 1886," which provides that when the court thinks there is in the prisoner (old or young) no established criminal intention, and it is his first offense, it may convict him and instead of at once passing sentence upon him direct that he shall be placed under probation for a specified time. The terms of probation are very stringent, and the offender is liable for any infringement of these terms to be called up for sentence. The offenses which come under the operation of the act are for the most part such as may be summarily dealt with, and the more serious crimes are excluded. The act upon the whole works fairly well, but there is not as alleged any desire to employ such offenders, much less any competition for their services, and the alleged public spirit evoked in the matter is imagination pure and simple.

Mr. Lewis gives us New Zealanders credit for striking originality and profound wisdom in criminal matters. Well, we form a mass of about six hundred thousand people-conceited enough in all conscience-the planting out ground of half the intellectual moral and social fads that afflict humanity, but so far as I know it has never yet been mooted among us that our modest act was destined to modify profoundly the penal

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I want to thank you for what you have said in the LAW JOURNAL in commendation of the work of the Rev. Dr. Parkhurst, in his recent crusade against vice and the non-execution of our penal laws touching certain forms of vice. Especially do I thank you for giving those who defended the case of the People v. Hattie Adams their proper names, i. e., disreputable ruffians." I don't think that a particle of evidence was introduced to show that the scenes sworn to were not enacted, but the entire energy of the " ruffians" above referred to was exerted to divert the minds of the jury from the real issue by denunciations of Dr. Parkhurst and the other witnesses for the prosecution, and by hypocritical assertions of disgust at the idea of a minister of the Gospel" seeking out crime and exposing it. Is it not about time that the latitude allowed counsel, especially in criminal cases, in crossexamination and in summing up be curtailed when personal abuse is resorted to and character ruthlessly assailed for no other purpose than to distort the issue and befog the mind?

Heretofore the claim has been that there must be particular instances alleged of the violation of a law before it can be fairly said that the law has been violated, and that the testimony of professional witnesses is not to be relied on.

Now that this claim has been met we are told that the instances would not have occurred unless they had been sought, and that the non-professional witnesses furnished have irreparably injured the community by seeking them and testifying to them.

Most people labor under the idea that it is the duty of a citizen to assist the authorities in ferreting out crime.

This must be erroneous. If not erroneous, was not Dr. Parkhurst merely doing his duty as a citizen? But he also acted, and I claim primarily acted, as the president of the "Society for the Prevention of Crime." Would he not violate his duty as such if he failed to exert his every effort and to use every means in his power to successfully prosecute the work of that society?

It is a favorite argument with some that disorderly houses are a necessary adjunct to society, and that without them our women could not walk the streets in safety.

As to the first, if it is founded upon any thing except the diseased imaginings of depraved and disordered minds, why not establish such places in our prisons and armies? and as to the second, such an assertion equally discredits our police force and maligns our society.

How long would it be after the discovery that the police were powerless in this regard before such assaults would meet condign punishment at the bands of any citizen who witnessed them?

I am inclined to the belief that the sale of deadly weapons would materially increase if it were generally thought that such inefficiency existed, and that the streets would be kept tolerably free of gentlemen of uncontrollable proclivities.

I also want to indorse what you say in regard to those newspapers in this city which most loudly protest against the pollution of our people by giving them the knowledge of the existence of places where such orgies take place. Such newspapers do more to disseminate such knowledge in one issue than the trial of a thousand such cases would.

The court-room holds but few people - why do these papers publish what occurs there if it is pernicious? Their object of course is quite unselfish. No motive actuates them of a mercenary character. It is not to pander to the lowest passions of man that they publish these proceedings.

Then why do they do it? Either they want to corrupt the community and lie when they say that they want to elevate it, or they are indifferent to its welfare and lie when they deny their indifference.

As to some fools who hamper such work as Dr. Park. hurst's, by criticising his methods, but who really desire the welfare of their fellow creatures. I would say that it is easier to destroy than to build, and before such people find fault with the work of others they had better show us a better way of their own and prove by a little personal work that they believe in it. Very respectfully, NEW YORK, May 16, 1892.

NOTES.

M.

OUR American cousins are apparently by no means

dissatisfied with the results of what they term, with horrible barbarity, "electrocution," and the sec tions in the act of 1889 prohibiting the publication of the details of capital execution by electricity have now been repealed. In spite of the rumors to the contrary so freely circulated at the time, there seems to be no doubt that in the Sing Sing case death was both instantaneous and painless. The success of electrical execution in America has given rise to a movement in the French Senate for the introduction of the same mode of inflicting the death penalty in France.-Law Journal.

The Supreme Court last Tuesday decided without report the case of Quigley v. State, affirming the decis ion of the Cirenit Court of Lucas county. See 5 Circ. Ct. Rep. 639, affirming the decision of Judge Pugsley of the Lucas County Common Pleas, published in 26 Week. L. Bul. 129. The case involves the question of the constitutionality of the Compulsory Education Law, and it is held to be valid. Father Quigley was in charge of the parish school of St. Francis de Sales in Toledo, and declined to comply with the request of the board of education of that city for the names, ages and places of residence of the pupils in his school. This information is provided for in the law, as it is necessary for the school authorities to know what children are in school, that the truant officer may be able to secure the truants. Blanks were furnished to Father Quigley, but he refused to fill them out, claiming the law to be unconstitutional on the ground that it interfered with the rights of parents to educate their children as they deemed best and according to the dictates of their own conscience. The school authorities caused the arrest of Father Quigley, and he was convicted in the Common Pleas Court as a preliminary step to testing the validity of the Compulsory Educa tion Act. The decision of the Supreme Court ends all doubt as to the right of the State to compel the attendance of children between the ages of eight and fourteen years at a school for twenty weeks in city and sixteen weeks in other districts. Father Quigley was represented by Hon. Frank H. Hurd and Judge Ritchie of Toledo, and Mr. Dunn, an eminent lawyer of New York. Attorney-General Richards and Prosecuting Attorney Barber, of Lucas county, who had fought the case successfully through the lower courts, represented the State. In their brief they quoted from such eminent Catholic authorities and prelates as Professor Thomas Bouquillon, of the University at Washington, and Archbishop Ireland, in favor of compulsory education.-Weekly Law Bulletin (Ohio).

The Albany Law Journal.

W

ALBANY, JUNE 4, 1892.

CURRENT TOPICS.

E have received in pamphlet the "Remarks of Ovid F. Johnson, president of the Pennsylvania Board of Commissioners for the promotion of Uniformity of Legislation in the United States, delivered before that body, May 3, 1892." The example of New York in this movement has been followed by Pennsylvania, Delaware, Massachusetts, New Jersey and Michigan. Mr. Johnson's remarks are interesting. As branches of law in regard to which uniform legislation is desirable he mentions Insolvency, Construction and Probate of Wills, Marriage, Divorce, Interest and Usury, Notarial Certificates, Fugitives from Justice, Incorporation of Corporations, Changing of Names, and Adoption. To which we would suggest the addition of Negotiable Paper. He says "it would be the babble of a dreamer to assert that the clashing legislation of the States upon one-half the here enumerated subjects can be brought into a state of harmony before a long time," but he regards that result probable in respect to Wills, Marriage, Divorce and Insolvency. In our judgment it is chimerical to look for it in respect to Marriage and Divorce in half a century, if ever. One of the most disheartening and demoralizing utterances on the subject comes lately from a judge of South Dakota, who defends the abominable system of that State, and welcomes thither residents of other States, sick of the matrimonial chain, he says, just as he would welcome invalids from other States to breathe the recuperative air of that healthful region. This is really the most shameful and shameless utterance on the subject that we have ever heard. judgment the subjects most susceptible of assimilative legislation are Wills and Negotiable Paper. In regard to these there is no special prejudice nor pride of opinion nor room for appeal to interest, and a compromise and agreement may reasonably be hoped. The Legislature of this State have extended the term of the commissioners two years, and it is expected that some conference may soon be held between them and those of the other States mentioned above.

In our

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a "hayseed" who would be certain to fall a victim to the first bunco-man. He sat on the bench thirty-six years, but his chief fame comes from his reports which have made his name familiar at Westminster Hall, as Washington Irving said. Mr. Thornton says of his labor as a reporter: "He did not hesitate to correct the opinions of his associates, or even to remodel them. He studied the art of punctuation, and read the best books for style. In his opinion a misplaced comma was as inexcusable as a grammatical blunder; and on one occasion an entire signature (sixteen pages) was printed four times before the punctuation suited him. In the printing of the eighth volume the entire printing establishment was delayed three days, at the cost of $125, until the author had determined the correct spelling of jenny,' a female ass. He had spelled it with a 'g,' but finding it spelled differently, he was not content to let it pass until he had examined every book in his library." We learn from this sketch that it is comparatively easy to be a lawyer or a judge in Indiana. Mr. Thornton informs us: "Neither the Constitution nor the statute requires of a judge any qualifications for the high office he holds. In this we have the reflex of the absurd clause of the Constitution, that 'every person of good moral character, being a voter, shall be entitled to admission to practice law in all courts of justice.' Indeed, more is required of an attorney than of a judge of the Supreme Court; for the latter is not required to have a 'moral character,' if he behave well,' or even to have been admitted to practice law." But he says that no one who was not a practicing lawyer has ever been made a judge, and he adds: "The poorest judges, in ability and learning, have been the appointees of the governors to fill vacancies caused by deaths and resignations. This is strong testimony and argument in favor of the popular election of the judiciary." Some of the Green Bag's "Facetiæ " is amusing, and some of the tales therein told would prove themselves in court like ancient deeds, and have acquired a prescriptive right. It is really very difficult to find a new legal story. But this department of the Green Bag is lively in comparison with the fruit of the ancient chestnut-gatherer of Harper's “Drawer."

So determined are young men to break into the legal profession that law schools have to run day and night to accommodate them. Just now we receive a catalogue of the new "Metropolis Law School," of the city of New York, the dean of which is Mr. Abner C. Thomas, the well-known author of a treatise on Mortgages. This schoo! began its work a little more than two months ago, and already has one hundred and three students. Its sessions are held in the evening, from eight till ten o'clock, thus affording an excellent opportunity for busy law clerks and others who cannot well attend in the day-time. The school is incorporated by the Regents. The term of study contemplated. is three years. The lecturers, in addition to Mr. Thomas, are Messrs. Clarence D. Ashley, Henry T.

Terry, George A. Miller and Stewart Chaplin. The New York Law School, not to be outdone, announces a summer session.

A recent correspondent of The Nation, who believes, with Mr. Justice Brewer, that "the paternal theory of government is odious," tells some plain truths about the foolish oleomargarine law of Pennsylvania, which makes it a misdemeanor for anybody to manufacture or sell a cheap substitute for butter, no matter how wholesome it may be, and how fair and open the sale. The writer says: "The oleomargarine law in this State had its origin in the desire of the 'honest farmer' for protection against the 'poor man's butter.' The farmers boldly asserted that the iron kings' were so protected that they are obliged to pay tribute for their clothing and farm machinery, and that that was not 'American fair play.' So the iron kings, out of the kindness of their hearts, decided that the honest farmer should be allowed to get even by plucking some other poor devil. In this instance it happens to be the poor laboring man. On this highly moral platform of 'you tickle me, I'll tickle you, the iron king and honest farmer joined hands and worked together for favorable legislation. * * * When principles of law are laid down in a case, they should be followed out to their logical results as relentlessly as the decrees of fate. Otherwise lawyers can never know what the law should be in any given case. If they cannot be so followed they are not applicable to the case, and should never had been laid down at all. Prof. Langdell, of Harvard,has pointed out that the principles of law are few, but their application may be infinite. They are like the laws of nature and of the spheres, and when properly grasped, can be applied to the rapidly changing business methods for all time. If the principle laid down in Powell v. Pennsylvania is applied and carried out to its logical results, our Legislature can prevent the making of bread, the manufacture of clothing or any other commodity, and indeed take away from the minority of our citizens every vestige of property right against their will, and even in the very teeth of all constitutional guaranties. The most charitable explanation of this decision is that the air was saturated with the grievances of the farmer, and the court made the decision under the late tendency of all courts to disregard form and do equity.'

refusing to support her old, feeble and poor husband, he must go to the almshouse unless the Ohio lawyers can spell out some remedy. That old braggart, the common law, whose mouldy boast it is that whenever it gives a right it affords a remedy for its enforcement, seems to have a theoretical advantage over its great rival, the statute law, in this respect, and as this particular statute flies audaciously in the face of the common law of baron and feme, the old system will not be disposed to help the interloper out of the scrape.

"It seems

The leading article in the current number of the American Law Review is Judge Thompson's address before the Kansas Bar Association, on "Abuses of Corporate Privileges," a remarkably vigorous out burst, with much of which we find ourselves in sympathy, especially in the trenchant criticism on that log-rolled and unsound decision in the Dartmouth College case. Mr. Schouler furnishes an excellent article on "" Injuries to Free Passengers," in which he disagrees with the New York doctrine that a traveller on a free pass has no rights which the carrier is bound to respect; and here we agree with him. In the "notes" the editor speaks rather freely of the recent Nebraska gubernatorial case in the United States Supreme Court, observing, "the decision * * * would deserve ridicule if its consequences were not so serious." We content ourselves with saying that we are inclined to agree with Mr. Justice Field in his dissent. Of capital executions in this State the editors say: that the movement to do away with execution by electricity and to substitute the old-fashioned ‘hanging,' where all the rabble, including the editors, can be present, is the lowest species of demagoguery." The Review informs us that the Texas Bar Association are endeavoring to procure the enactment of a statute providing "that in all suits for unliquidated damages the trial judge may require such remittitur from the amount ascertained by the verdict as will reduce the amount to such sum as may be just and reasonable under the evidence in the cause, and if such requirement shall not be complied with, it shall be the duty of the judge to grant a new trial. And in like manner the appellate courts may, in their discretion, require such remittitur, and if the same be not made the judgment shall be reversed and the cause remanded." The Reviewers ask: "Is not the corporation lurking in the rear of it?" Likely enough; but the provision would seem to be harmless for non compliance is to result only in a new trial, and the jury will in the end wear out the court. Our friends, the Reviewers, evidently hold an editorial brief against all corporations, and it must be confessed Ohio. As we learn from the Weekly Law Bulletin, that their encroachment upon individual rights is the Williams law of 1887 provided that the husband unwarrantable and dangerous. After all, it may be must support himself, his wife and his minor chil that the jury is a healthy counter-irritant. At all dren out of his property, or by his labor. If he is un-events, we are unwilling to give it up for this one able to do so, the wife must assist him so far as she is reason, if for no other, and we believe that limitaBut the statute provides no way of effectuat- tions upon its powers should be jealously scrutining this purpose. So now an inhuman Ohio wife

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The writer winds up with a reference to the famous case of the Pennsylvania jackass, which fell a victim to its own negligence in refusing to "stop and listen" on the railway track. We would not call hard names, but it seems to us that our Legislatures, in their tendency to protect favorite classes under the pretense of police regulation, are acting unwisely and unjustly, and should "stop and listen" to the complaints of those who are depressed by these legislative attempts to elevate others.

It seems rather difficult to compel a woman by law to support her husband. At least they find it so in

able.

ized.

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