It ents, having acquired the fee of the street in front of their property subject to a perpetual public easement therein, acquired only the naked legal title to the fee, and therefore should be entitled to nominal damages only. This position the counsel for the city seeks to fortify by a reference to many authorities, in this State and elsewhere, the most weighty of which seems to be the cases arising in street-opening proceedings in New York city. In re Seventeenth St., 1 Wend. 261; In re Lewis St., 2 id. 472; Livingston v. Mayor, 8 id. 85; Champlin v. Layton, 18 id. 411; In re Thirty-second St., 19 id. 128; In re Twenty-ninth St., 1 Hill, 189. may be well to consider the nature of these New York city cases. They were decisions by the old Supreme Court and the Court of Errors, and were made in proceedings taken on behalf of the city of New York for the opening up of streets, and upon application to set aside or to confirm the commissioners' reports as to damages. The question was whether the city should pay the full value of the lands taken for the street, and it was held that only nominal damages should be awarded. The decisions proceeded however upon the theory that the right to claim damages upon the opening of the streets by the city was in the original grantor or former proprietor of the lands, who had made sales of parcels or lots bounded upon streets as projected upon the city surveys and upon maps. It was held that their grantees had acquired no title to the land occupied by the street, but had only acquired, by a conveyance on or bounded by streets, an easement or right of way in the street. As to the former proprietor of the land, he was considered to be entitled only to nominal damages, because he must be deemed to have engaged to give the ground for the street whenever the city required it, or to have adopted the street as it had been previously laid out by public authority. It should be observed, in considering these cases, that Manhattan island had been surveyed under acts passed very early by the Legislature of the State of New York. This Legislature provided for and regulated the future opening by the city of streets and avenues as surveyed and laid out in anticipation of the growth of that municipality, and it was also provided that, as the result of street-opening proceedings, the fee should at once vest in the city. The compensation for the land the court decided to be due to the former proprietor, who had granted the lots upon the streets, and not to the purchasers from him, but this compensation should only be nominal, and as for the naked fee, because an easement or right of way was vested in the purchasers under a dedication of the land in the street, and because there was an implied agreement on the part of the former owner to give the land for the street when the city, by instituting proceedings to open it, thereby adopted it as proposed. He was deemed to have granted with reference to existing legislation, and in anticipation of the future opening of the streets by the city. He was deemed to have received an enhanced value from his grantee by reason thereof, and from his having dedicated the land to street purposes. The purchasers were held to have taken no interest in the street other than that of an easement or right of way. Apparently the principle which the decisions undertook to work out was that of protecting the abutting owners against being charged for the value of the fee taken by the city, and the court was concerned with the relative situations of the original grantors and these abutters. In Bissell v. Railroad Co., 23 N. Y. 61, the question upon the case was whether certain conveyances between the years 1828 and 1845, conveying lots in the city of Rochester, on either side of Erie street, carried lands to the center of that street. It was held that, where a conveyauce was bounded upon or by a street, it carried the fee to the center of the street as part of the grant, notwithstand ing the authority of the New York City Street Cases, which were there and are here referred to. It is a question how far the Bissell Case impairs the force of the authority of the decisions in the New York City Street Cases, for they went upon the theory that the grantee acquired no title to the land in the street at all. But however that may be, and independently of such con siderations, I think that the New York City Cases were influenced by an existing state of facts which are not paralleled here. The proceedings here have no reference to any original dedication which coutemplated the future adoption of the street by the city authorities, and the vesting of the fee in the city as a consequence of the institution by them of legal proceedings, nor do they rest upon any legislation existing at the time of the grants by the former proprietors or in view of and subject to which sales might be deemed to have been made. The record is barren of evidence as to the authority by which the street in the present case came as such into the public use, or as to whether and how it was ever dedicated by the owner of the land. What we do know is that these respondents acquired the fee of the land in the street opposite their premises, and that the right of the city to take it was conferred by subsequent and recent legislation with respect to the municipal charter. The mere abutter, with no ownership in the bed of the street, is entitled to protection against an interference with cer tain easements in the street. They constitute property of which neither Legislature nor municipality can deprive him without compensation. Kane v. Railroad Co., 125 N. Y. 164. It is unquestionable however that the ownership of the fee of the land in a street has a substantial value to the abutting property-holder in the degree of control it gives to him over the uses to which the street may be put. It vests him with the right to defend against and to enjoin a use of or an encroachment upon the street, under legislative or municipal authority, for purposes inconsistent with those uses to which streets should be or have been ordinarily subjected, uniess just compensation is provided to be made. His ownership of the land in the street was subject only to the public easement therein as a highway. In the absence of such a provision for compensation, the taking of the street for some new or additional and inconsistent use would be illegal. But if the abutting property-owner does not own the fee in the land of this street, he has no such right to compensation, and is remediless against a taking of the street under legislative or municipal sanction for other uses, except such other uses be unreasonable and in their nature so improper as to obstruct a free passage upon the street, or to amount to a nuisance, or to deprive him of the enjoyment of easements of light, air and access. As to any such improper or unreasonable use of a street, the abutting property-owner would un doubtedly have the right to come into a court of equity and to claim its intervention to protect his general rights. In this case no reason appears or suggests itself to show that the public good and advantage will be better promoted by a change of title from the present owner to the municipal government. For all govern mental purposes the existing easement and public right of passage in the street are sufficient, and will be in the future, unless there shall be some purpose to impose an additional burden upon the street, in which case the substantial nature of the respondents' interest in opposing the award of merely nominal damages becomes very clear indeed. The fee of the land has a value to him: it seems valuable to the municipality He has possible interests at stake to protect: the mu nicipality may have other interests to advance. It is authorized by law to take from him his titie, and he cannot defeat the proceedings, but the law requires just compensation to be made to him. What is there in the law or in reason which disentitles him to the re- HIGHWAYS-DEFECTIVE-NEGLIGENCE EVIDENCE. -In an action against a town for personal injuries it to demand it or to institute some proper proceeding to compel its payment to him, and it is not shown that the commissioner was guilty of any negligence in that respect. (2) In an action against a town for personal injuries caused by a defective highway, where it was shown that the commissioner of highways had no funds in his hands with which to defray the expense of repairs to the roads or bridges, and that the supervisor held funds applicable to such purpose, but had not paid them over to the commissioner, though the latter had demanded them, it was a question for the jury whether, under all the circumstances, the commissioner performed his full duty in obtaining funds for the repair of roads or bridges by requesting the supervisor to pay over to him the highway fund in his hands. Now the action is against the town, and it is difficult to see how the acts of the commissioner subsequent to the accident can be admitted in such an action as proof to bind the town for any purpose. It has appeared that while plaintiff was driving along a high-frequently been held that the declarations or admis way her horse became frightened and backed down an embankment into a pond. The place of accident was on a country road which had been used for nearly fifty years, during which time no similar accident had ever happened, and the break in the woods skirting the boundary between the pond and the highway, through which plaintiff's horse backed, was only from eight to twelve feet long. Held, that failure to guard such a short distance, under the circumstances, was not suf ficient evidence of negligence to submit the case to a jury. Hubbell v. City of Yonkers, 104 N. Y. 434. March 1, 1892. Glasier v. Town of Herron. Opinion by Peckham, J. 16 N. Y. Supp. 503, reversed. EVI DEFECTIVE LIABILITIES OF TOWNS DENCE-LACK OF FUNDS.—(1) Prior to the passage of the Laws of 1881, chapter 700, the commissioner of highways of a town was liable for injuries caused by defective roads or bridges, where it could be shown that at the time the injuries were sustained he had the necessary funds to make repairs, or the power to raise such funds, and such statute made the town liable for such damages in those cases in which the commissioner was liable at the time of its passage. Held, that in an action against a town for personal injuries caused by a defective highway, evidence that the commissioner of highways repaired the place where the accident occurred several days thereafter was not competent to prove that the commissioner had funds in his hands at the time of the accident. It was always a defense to an action for damages against a commissioner of highways for injuries sustained in consequence of a defective highway to show that he was without the necessary funds to make the repairs, and without the power to raise such funds. Barker v. Loomis, 6 Hill, 463; People v. Board, 93 N. Y. 397; Hover v. Barnk hoof, 44 id. 113; Hines v. City of Lockport, 50 id. 236; Monk v. Town of New Utrecht, 104 id. 552. The act of 1881 has not changed the powers or duties of the commissioner of high ways. He still has charge of the roads and bridges in the town, and it is his duty to keep them in repair. The town is liable only when negligence on the part of the commissioner is shown, and he is not guilty of negligence in omitting to make repairs when he has no funds in his hands. shown in this case that the commissioner had no funds in his hands with which to defray the expense of any repairs to roads or bridges. It was shown that the supervisor had funds in his hands applicable to such purpose, but had not paid them over to the commissioner of highways, though the latter had demanded them. The commissioner could no doubt have required the supervisor to pay over the fund raised by the town to him for the repair of highways and oridges, but until the money was paid to the commissioner the only neglect that he could be charged with would be a failure It was sions of a public officer cannot be given in evidence to bind a municipal corporation of which he is the agent unless they are part of the res gesta (Cortland Co. v. Herkimer Co., 44 N, Y. 22; Luby v. Railroad Co., 17 id. 131: Hamilton v. Railroad Co., 51 id. 100, 105), and if his declarations cannot be admitted, the same principle would exclude his acts subsequent to the event in controversy. Moreover there was no question in the case as to the control or authority of the commissioner over the whole highway between the fences. The only question in this respect was whether he exercised proper diligence and care, and proof that the commissioner was seen repairing this walk a week or more after the accident did not teud to prove that he had funds in his hands with which to make the repairs before the plaintiff was injured. Upon whatever pretense such evidence is put into the case it is generally used to mislead the jury. It is sometimes accepted by them as an admission of negligence, and its natural tendency is undoubtedly to influence them in that direction. Whether the defendant was negligent was a question to be decided upon the facts as they existed at the time of the injury, and any thing that was done by the commissioner afterward could have no legitimate bearing on that question, and since the action now lies against the town such testimony should be excluded. Corcoran v. Village of Peekskill, 108 N. Y. 151. March 1, 1892. Clapper v. Town of Waterford. Opinion by O'Brien, J. 16 N. Y. Supp. 640, re versed. MASTER AND SERVANT-NEGLIGENCE-DANGEROUS MACHINERY-ASSUMPTION OF RISK.-(1) The absence of the safeguards with which the Laws of 1886, chapter 409, as amended by the Laws of 1887, chapter 462, requires all machinery, gearing and belting to be provided, imposes upon the owner no liability for injury to an employee who, knowing their absence, voluntarily meddles with the machine. (2) Where an em. ployee knew by experience or observation the nature of the machine by which he was injured, and the dangers to be apprehended therefrom, the omission of the employer to instruct him in its use imposes no liability on the latter. Hickey v. Taaffe, 105 N. Y. 26. March 1, 1892. White v. Witteman Lithographic Co. Opinion by Earl, C. J. 12 N. Y. Supp. 188, affirmed. MORTGAGES-TRANSFER OF PREMISES. COSTS-NEW TRIAL IN EJECTMENT-EXTRA ALLOWANCE.-(1) Where a mortgagee executes a power authorizing a person to foreclose the mortgage without notice to him, a person who goes into possession of the mortgaged premises without proving any title, and relying merely on an equity in favor of a third person, with which he does not connect himself, is not entitled to notice relative to proceedings in the foreclosure. Cagger v. Lansing, 64 N. Y. 417, followed; Jackson v. Miukler, 10 Johns. 480, distinguished. (2) Where a new trial has been granted, after final judgment in favor of plaintiff in ejectment, on payment by defendant of the costs awarded by such judgment, as provided by the Code of Civil Procedure, section 1525, an extra allowance may be made to plaintiff on recovery by him of judgment on the second trial, though he was granted an extra allowance on the first trial. March 1, 1892. Wing v. De la Rionda. Opinion by Peckham, J. 15 N. Y. Supp 533, affirmed. ABSTRACTS OF VARIOUS RECENT DECISIONS. re So ac CRIMINAL LAW-FALSE PRETENSES-DELIVERY OF PROPERTY.-A banker, who after collecting money for a customer, induces him, while it is still in his possession, to lend it to the bank, by pretending that the bank is solvent, when he knows or has reason to believe that it is not, is guilty of "obtaining" money under false pretenses. It is contended that as the appellee, at the time he obtained the loan of the money, had it in his possession, the statutory offense of obtaining money by false pretenses was not made out, because under the statute the offense is not made out unless both possession and title are obtained by the false pretense, and as the appelles did not obtain the possession by the false pretense, the offense was not made out. The counsel for the appellee fer to many cases that sustain that proposition, and we concur with the general principle therein announced. But we think that principle does not apply to this case, for that principle only applies where it takes the delivery of the possession to complete the transfer of the title to the property. The statute reads, "obtain from another money or property." cording to all the authorities, if it takes the delivery of the property to deprive the owner of dominion over it, the defendant must have obtained the delivery, as well as the title, before he can be made liable under the statute. Mr. Wharton, in the second volume of his work on Criminal Law (9th ed., § 1227), correctly sums up the meaning of all the cases on the subject in the following language: "A delivery of the property must be averred as the result of false pretenses in all cases in which the prosecution rests upon such delivery." Of course, as said, if the delivery is necessary to complete the transfer of the property, the prosecution in that case rests upon such delivery. To illustrate the rule, suppose A., by false pretenses, buys a horse from B., but B. does not deliver the horse to A. In such case it cannot be said that A. has, in the sense of the statute, obtained B.'s property by false pretenses, because as yet B. has the property. He has not parted with it, and by reason of the fraud he is not bound to part with it. It is, in legal contemplation, still his. Hence he has not parted with his property by the false pretenses of A. But if the property is so situated that B., by transferring it, deprives himself of dominion over it without a delivery, which completes the transfer to A., and such transfer is obtained by false pretenses, there is an offense against the statute. The rule is illustrated by the following authorities: Bishop (2 Crim. Law [7th ed.], § 465) says: If after goods are delivered, the vendor becomes suspicious of the solvency of the purchaser, and expresses his intention to retain them, whereupon the latter, by false pretenses, induces him to relinquish his purpose, there is no offense against the statute, the sale having been completed before the false pretenses were made, and though the right of stoppage in transitu may remain, the rule appears to be the same, the relinquishment of right not being deemed a parting with the goods. But where the sale is on condition subsequent, and a delivery there upon, and afterward the vendor is induced by false pretenses to give up his property in the goods, this is probably within the statute." In People v. Haynes, 11 Wend. 557, it was held by the Supreme Court that where goods were delivered to a person, but the title did not pass to him except upon condition, and after the delivery the purchaser obtained the title by false pretenses, he was guilty of obtaining the goods by false pretenses. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals that court approved of the principle announced, but reversed the case on the ground that the sale was absolute. In the case of Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 114 Mass. 327, it was held, under a statute that provided if any person obtained by false pretenses the signature of another to a writing that would be forgery at common law, he should be punished, etc.; that if it was necessary that the writing should be delivered in order to complete the crime of forgery, and it was not delivered, an offense against the statute was not made out, but if the instrument was obligatory upon the signer without delivery, the offense against the statute was made out. In Com. v. Deviin, 141 Mass. 423, it was held that on the delivery of sheep to a purchaser, the title not passing until the sheep were paid for, where the purchaser obtained the title by false pretenses, he was guilty, etc. These cases establish the doctrine that it is only in case the delivery of the property is necessary in order to completely deprive the owner of it that the false pretense must relate to such delivery, but if the delivery is not necessary to a complete transfer the false pretenses need not relate to the delivery in order to make out the offense against the statute; and if the possession has been delivered to the party, but not the right of property, and he, after such delivery, obtains the title by false pretenses, he is guilty, under the statute, of obtaining goods, etc., by false pretenses. In this case the appellee had collected the woman's money, as her collecting agent, and had the possession of it as such agent, and when she demanded it, he, recognizing her right and the character of his possession, induced her to part with her title to him. In such case it is clear that the prosecution does not rest upon delivery, as there was a complete transfer of property without the delivery. Ct. App. Ky., March 3, 1892. Commonwealth v. Schwartz. Opinion by Bennett, J. NOTES. R. JAMES PAYN, in English Notes " in the Independent, says: "A lady attended the other day, in place of her husband, to answer a charge of selling oleomargarine instead of butter. Her defense was that the summons alleged that the misdemeanor was committed in 1800 (the 92 having been left out by mistake), when the act had not been passed, oleomargarine was unknown and her husband not in existence. He was fined (a shilling and two shillings costs) all the same. This seems contrary to what one would have expected of the British law. What has come of all its 'quips and quiddities" of which one has read so much? In old times if a gentleman's name in an indictment for murder was spelled with an additional letter (Paine for Payu, for example, a very common mistake), or if he was called Heury William instead of William Henry (an error in a particular case Disraeli confesses to have constantly committed) it was equiva lent to an acquittal. Were all these stories of the niceties of the law exaggerated, or has the law itself discarded them in favor of common sense? And if so when did it happen?" Let not Mr. Payn flatter him. self that he could get off by any such misspelling of his name. Even Pane would not save him. He should know that when the name is idem sonans it is sufficient, no matter how incorrect in spelling. It was not differ ent in "old times." A The Albany Law Journal. ALBANY, MAY 7, 1892. CURRENT TOPICS. JUDGE of the First Division of the Court of Appeals told us very recently that his branch of the court had decided five hundred and fifty cases in twelve months. It strikes us that although this is an evidence of great industry and fidelity, the court are deciding their cases too hurriedly. It is our belief, and it seems the general impression among the legal profession, that no appellate court can properly decide two cases a day. No one man can do it, and seven ought to act as one. The result is that the one man who writes the opinion practically decides the case in the great majority of instances, and that the consultation simply serves as a vehicle of dissent or modification in cases of striking or glaring lack of harmony with the common sense of the other six. The judges do not and cannot even recollect their own precedents. Within a few weeks two cases of their unintentional departure from their own decisions reported in very recent volumes of their reports have been pointed out to us. On one of these we have particularly commented. Festina lente is a good motto for appellate courts. Write less and search more is another. There is no use in the en deavor of these very able and devoted gentlemen, most of them also very experienced, to persuade the bar that they do not need and can get along without help, or with the aid of an occasional commission. Perhaps they can keep up with the calendar" at this rate we do not believe they can- but the bar do not desire that they should kill themselves in the struggle, and they do especially desire that when a precedent is published they can rely on it for a reasonable number of years. Especially they do not desire that six judges should hand over their intellects to the exclusive guidance of one, however intelligent and candid. Let us trust that the court will not regard us as too saucy. What we have said is abject servility in comparison with what the London law journals say of their judges. It is true that the court have carried on the business of deciding causes for many years, and we never have, but we have for many years watched them much more closely and impartially than they have observed themselves. The Law Quarterly Review, speaking of the impropriety of a judge's nonsuiting a plaintiff on his counsel's opening speech, observes: "The business of a judge is not to do justice but to administer law." Is not this a rather hard saying? Does it not imply that law is not justice? This is the common belief, to be sure, but it seems rather cruel for lawyers to admit it. Rather, let us say, it is the business of a judge to do justice and administer law. Liberty and union," said Daniel Webster. Of course we know what the reviewer means, and we hope lawVOL. 45 No. 19. yers will not see his words. The reviewer chronicles an amusing and ingenious evasion of law, in Re Tyler, '91, 3 Ch. 252, in which a gift for keeping a tomb in repair was effectuated by the simple device of giving a handsome legacy to a charity, with a gift over to another charity if the tomb was not kept in repair." "For the Defence," is the title of a novel by Mr. Farjeon, evidently designed to appeal to the legal profession. Great part of it is cast in middle class for the murder of her illegitimate inthe form of a trial of a young woman of the upper of the government's witnesses by the prosecuting fant by throwing it into the sea. The examination attorney smacks rather too much of hearsay and calling for thoughts and impressions to be quite credible. But the novelist makes one grave mistake. He furnishes no sufficient proof of the corpus delicti. He furnishes us with a mother and an infant and the sea, and shows that although the mother and sea remain the infant has disappeared. But that is about all. Although the infant is a trifling delictus he gives us no evidence that it has ever been made way with. To be sure he shows that it disappeared near the ocean, and that two or three fragments of an infant's dress were found on the rocks, and that the mother went out with the child on the last occasion when certain people saw it, yet there is nothing to show that it is dead. There is nothing to indicate, for example, that it has not been kidnapped, as indeed turns out to be the fact. We labor under the impression that this would hardly do. It seems to be putting the burden of accounting for the disappearance on the mother. To add to our perplexity, when the child is found safe and sound, and the news is telegraphed to court, and the jury announce to the judge that they are ready to bring in a verdict of acquittal, the judge instructs them that they cannot do this, but must sit and wait until the live body of the infant is produced in court. So we have the unique holding that the accused may be convicted of murder withont proof of the dead body, and that when the body is discovered alive and well, the jury may not acquit until it is produced in court. This seems to be laying the task of production on the wrong party and putting it at the wrong end of the case. Judge Taft of the Vermont Supreme Court may find confirmation of his recent opinion that tobacco is victuals or drink, in Sir Walter Scott's "Legend of Montrose." in which Sir Duncan Campbell's serving man, Lorimer, proffers to our excellent old friend, Capt. Dugald Dalgetty, "pipes and tobacco, sir, if you please to drink a whiff of smoke.” The Green Bag for April has an excellent full-page portrait of the late Mr. Justice Bradley, accompanied by a remarkably entertaining biographical sketch of him, by Mr. Frank W. Hackett, of Washington, in which the writer discourses much more of the great judge as a man than as a lawyer, which is as it should be. We quite agree with the writer that' Bradley "had that rarest of gifts, genuine humor,' but we do not agree with him that genuine humor is" the rarest of gifts." On the contrary, it seems to us quite common among Americans. We are glad to hear that the judge "was a reader of novels and extremely fond of poetry," and can easily believe that he found ample scope for his interpretative faculty in Browning's puzzles. Mr. Charles B. Elliott continues his sketch of the Supreme Court of Minnesota. There is also a curious chapter of “Appeals against Human Injustice," containing a great number of apocryphical instances of the death of bad doers in exact accordance with the cursing and dooming of their victims. Our animal instincts are touched by the announcement that "a New Jersey court has rendered a decision that a rooster that leaves the jurisdiction of its owner does not thereby become a wild beast subject to capture." This is a sensible decision, applicable to turkeys, which are well known to be in the habit of going a visiting their neighbors. Let us whisper to our friend Fuller, who holds the strings of the G. B., that in the advertisement of a well-known work on slander and libel, he should not "drop the h" from the author's name, Townshend. We happen to know that the author does not trace his genealogy from those obscure people who lived at the end of the town - the Townsend's but from those who owned the town the Townshend's, or town-holders. We always read all the ads, and we take great pleasure in those portraits of old judges and reporters published in the ad. pages by the Bancroft-Whitney Co. The lawyer may well cut them out and insert them in his Wallace "Reporters." We may as well record that we do not believe all those Missouri Yarns" reported by the Hon. William A. Wood. The following quoted from the St. James Gazette is decidedly good: "The following resolutions were submitted to the English council of judges by one of the junior judges with a view to facilitating the progress of judicial business: That judges shall commence business at the time appointed for the sitting of the court, or at least not more than fifteen minutes after such time. That a judge of the Court of Appeal shall not interrupt counsel more than six times in the space of five minutes; other judges not more than three times in the same space of time. That judges, when they adjourn in the middle of the day for a quarter of an hour, shall return into court at the end of the quarter of an hour, or at least not more than half an hour after that time. That judges shall not sleep when on the bench for more than half an hour int he course of the day; and when two judges are sitting together, they shall not both sleep at the same time." A different method of legal education from that recommended by Prof. Tiedeman is published in connection with it, in the Yale Law Journal from the adorning pen of Prof. Edward J. Phelps of the Yale Law School. (We almost shrink from calling so ac complished and experienced a lawyer, such a wise statesman, and such an adroit diplomat and man of affairs by the narrow name of "professor," which is vulgarly applied to jugglers, barbers and boxers, but he has condescended to the humble but useful office of teaching callow youth the law, and must suffer the nominal consequence of his condescension.) Nothing more admirable on this vexed topic has been published than the following from Mr. Phelps' article: * "If I were to venture upon any criticism of the system of instruction that is now, so far as I know, universally in vogue in these institutions, because universally demanded, I should say that they attempt too much for the time at their disposal, and the capacity of their average students. In establishing their standard they fix their eyes rather upon what should be accomplished at the end of a lawyer's career than at its beginning. They cover too much ground; they burden the student with too much reading, too much instruction, too many topics. They cram him with more than he can digest; they load him with more than he can carry. * The unhappy tendency of our time, not merely in schools but to a considerable degree in the profession and in the courts, is to encumber the law with much that is called learning, sought to be deduced from millions of heterogeneous, often irreconcilable, and sometimes incomprehensible cases, each of which, instead of being a decision upon the point involved, is a dissertation upon the general law of the subject. The terse, clear and logical judgments that are found in the earlier English and American reports, in which conclusions are deduced from principles instead of from other conclusions, are not now much in fashion. It is easy to find single opinions in which more authorities are cited than were mentioned by Marshall in the whole thirty years of his unexampled judicial life, and briefs that contain more cases than Webster referred to in all the arguments he ever delivered. To plunge a student into this chaos, with of principles incomplete, to grope his way through it his powers untried and imperfect, and his knowledge as best he may, and to triangulate from case to case, supposing that he is getting forward when he is only going astray, is not to educate him, but tends rather to make him proof against education. If the time comes is born only of a lucid conception of legal principles, he may be more safely trusted in a great law library when he can encounter it with the discrimination that without danger of being conducted by learned reasons to absurd decrees.' * * If I were to frame a law school upon my own old-fashioned idea of what it It would be should be it would attract no students. like the common school by the side of the academy. The slenderness of its library-small but well selected, rich principally in what it did not contain, and jealous of new accessions-the simplicity of its curriculum, the moderation of its speed, the apparent modesty of its extent of attainment, would be likely to excite derision. Such was the school which I had the advantage of attending in the happy days of my youth. Out of such schools and from the same system of instruction outside of them, have come a large proportion of the greatest lawyers I have ever seen or ever expect to see. What was taught there was only fundamental, but it was taught effectually. It sank into the student's mind and wrought itself into his ideas and his modes of thought. The habit of reasoning from principles to conclusions gave him, if he was capable of attaining it, the large comprehension and strong logical power which are the characteristics of the sound lawyer, and the true weapons of the advocate. On the foundation thus formed the superstructure can be rapidly built in |