WILLS-CONSTRUCTION--SEPARABLE TRUSTS-PERPETUITIES.—(1) Testator gave the residue of his estate to a trustee, and directed him to pay the testator's widow and daughter each a third of the income thereof, and the other third to testator's son after be should reach the age of twenty-five years. On the death of the widow, the two children surviving her, the trustee was directed to pay to the daughter onehalf of the income for life, and the other half to the son if he should by that time have attained the age of twenty-five, and when the son should reach thirty years, if the widow were dead, and if not at her death thereafter, half the trust estate was to pass to him absolutely. If the son should die before the widow, she and the daughter were each to receive a half of the income for the widow's life, and at her death the daughter was to have the whole income for life. Held, that a trust was created for the widow's life, the income of which was to be divided between the persons entitled to it, and at her death the whole was to be divided into two independent trusts, one for the son's benefit, the other for the daughter's, so that each trust was limited by only two lives. (2) The trust is not rendered void by the fact that, if the son should die before the widow, the trust term would be limited by the lives of the widow and daughter, while if the widow should die before the son, the trust in half of the estate would be limited by the lives of the widow and son, or by the life of the widow and the attainment by the son of thirty years of age, since but one of these contingencies could happen, and in either case the trust is limited by but two lives. Everitt v. Everitt, 29 N. Y. 40; Stevenson v. Lesley, 70 id. 512-516; Monarque v. Monarque, 80 id. 324; Vanderpoel v. Loew, 112 id. 167. Jan. 26, 1892. Schermerhorn v. Cotting. Opinion by Peckham, J. 12 N. Y. Supp. 450, re versed. CORRESPONDENCE. HIGHWAY ACTS OF 1890. Editor of the Albany Law Journal: Is not such an obscurity to be found in article 2, sections 10 and 11, of the said Town Law, with respect to the fixing of place of annual town meeting? Section 10 seems to allow or require the exercise of that power of appointment annually, though the place of meeting may thereby be changed, while section 11 may be considered as prescribing the only course to be taken to effect such change. If the former construction be correct, the said appointment must be by resolution or by vote otherwise than by ballot as by section 32, while section 34 may favor the latter construction. Will some legal luminary please shed a little light on PRATTSVILLE, N. Y., March 22, 1892. J.B.DALY. Chairman of the Judiciary Committees of the Senate and My attention has been called to Senate bill number 387. The object of the bill necessarily involves an attempt to restrict the publicity which is naturally given to the work of the courts, a publicity which is both wholesome and universally desired. In this respect the bill is unconstitutional in my opinion. It is for the public interest that every decision which the courts may make should be accessible to the public. The profession know very well the mischiefs which would be involved by inaugurating a system under which the FAILURE OF BEQUEST IN TRUST-GIFT TO EXECUTOR.-A bequest to an executor, for certain uses and purposes which cannot be carried out, is an attempt to create a trust, and cannot operate as aŭ unconditional gift to the executor. Feb. 9, 1892. Ingersoll's Will. Opinion per Curiam. 14 N. Y. Supp. courts would be expected to decide upon rights of per22, reversed, and 12 id. 103, affirmed. sou and property and prohibit any of their decisions from being made public. REVOCATION OF PROBATE REVIEW In re OF FINDINGS BY SURROGATE.—(1) On proceedings for the revocation of the probate of a will, questions as to its construction, not raised by the petition or proofs or by requests for findings by the surrogate, and not passed The profession have not unfrequently had experience formerly of the unjust disadvantage which an attorney interested in a particular class of causes can obtain by having an unpublished decision which he could occasionally bring to light as an authority in a particular case, to the surprise of those engaged on the other side, who in common with the rest of the profession had been kept in ignorance of its existence. In order to prevent any legal sanction being given to the suppression of any decision whatever, whether regarded by writer or reporter as important or not, the Constitution contains this clause: "All laws and judicial decisions shall be free for publication by any person." upon by him, cannot be considered upon appeal from his decision. (2) The finding of a surrogate that a will was legally executed by a testator of mental capacity, and not unduly influenced, affirmed by the General Term, will not be reviewed by the Court of Appeals, where there was sufficient and competent evidence to support the conclusions. (3) On proceedings for the revocation of the probate of a will, objections to the probate, not made in the probate proceeding, where all parties interested were before the court, cannot be considered. Feb. 12, 1892. In re Watson's Will. Opinion per Curiam. 12 N. Y. Supp. 115; 14 id. 465, light that can be given from whatever direction it affirmed. WITNESS - PRIVILEGE - PHYSICIANS.-A physician who has attended a person professionally, and has also seen her at various other times when not in attendance on her professionally, may testify to her mental condition from knowledge and information acquired by him when not treating her professionally. Edington v. Insurance Co., 77 N. Y. 564; People v. Schuyler, 106 id. 304; Hoyt v. Hoyt, 112 id. 515. Jan. 20, 1892. Fisher v. Fisher. Opinion by Earl, J. 9 N. Y. Supp. 4, affirmed. The courts in the exercise of their constitutionallysecured jurisdiction are entitled to receive all the might come, and the Legislature caunot forbid suitors nor courts from citing or noticing in any way necessary or convenient any of the laws or decisions which control the public and govern rights. The courts have a right to receive and counsel have a right to bring to their notice whatever evidence of the law exists, and this power on the part of the courts is inherent in the very nature of judicial power and can neither be taken away nor renounced. The striking out of the restriction clause in the amended section 216, lines 159 to 164, does not cure the vice of this bill. On page 4, line 87, it is declared that "decisions which shall be contained in any of said reports shall be cited to the court from such official report, and it shall be the duty of the courts to make rules to enforce this provision." The only method of enforcing such a provision would be either by refusing to receive a brief which contained the citation from any other report when the official report had appeared, or by punishing for contempt. Of course the latter would not be done, and it follows that to enforce this rule would require the court to refuse to receive a brief of the attorney on one side if the attorney ou the other side called the attention of the court to the fact that a case cited from the ALBANY LAW JOURNAL, or the New York Law Journal, or the State Reporter, or the New York Supplement, had been mean while officially reported in any volume appearing before the submission of the brief. There is no provision in the bill requiring promptness in the publication of the reports, and it is well known that the unofficial publications are, and always have been, as a general thing earlier than the official; hence under this bill counsel wishing to use the most recent authorities will be compelled to take the unofficial to get them, and to take also the official so as to examine their brief before going into court to see whether the case has appeared up to the last moment in the official report. Amended section 248, page 7, line 9, practically prevents the opinions, which are really part of the records of the court, from being put on file as they ought to be with the clerk where the profession could have access to them. The opinions are part of the record required by rule of court to be printed on appeal, and they ought to be filed and to remain on file where the public could have access to them. Asking your careful attention to these considerations, I am Yours truly, NEW YORK, March 23, 1892. AUSTIN ABBOTT. NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS. THROOP ON PUBLIC OFFICERS. Mr. Montgomery H. Throop, of this city, has prepared a "Treatise on the Law Relating to Public Officers and the Sureties in Official Bonds," which is well worthy the attention of all lawyers. The author is well known to the bar of this State as one of a former commission to revise the statutes, and to us as a gentleman of wide professional learning and general scholarship, of indefatigable industry and painstaking and conscientious habits of work. The treatise now at hand will not disappoint those who know Mr. Throop's capacity and characteristics, and must command the respectful examination of all practitioners interested in this important branch of the law. From our examination we feel satisfied that it is quite what would be expected of the author, and a very creditable, intelligent and useful piece of professional writing. The duties of officers under the reformed Ballot Laws and the Civil Service Law are minutely discussed, and we regret that the late election cases in this State were announced too late for Mr. Throop to give any thing more than a brief postscript. Mr. Throop does not hesitate to state his own opinions and criticisms, and always does it in a candid and judicious manner. As we have not found ourselves able to praise Mr. Throop's work at all points as a reviser and codifier of the statutes, it gives us especial pleasure to be able to give this treatise unhesitating and unqualified commendation. The publishers plume themselves, with a good deal of reason, on the typographical arrangement and beauty of this volume. Outside and inside it is one of the handsomest law books that we have ever seen, except the title page, neither the spacing nor the size of the type in which commends itself to the esthetic sense of a refined printer. Besides we discover in section 227 a hyphen instead of an fin of. The exterior of the book is unique in its simplicity and elegance. Especially admirable is the arrangement of the foot-references, in double columns, each case having a separate line or two for itself. This is much better than the usual confused arrangement. But why not arrange the cases in alphabetical order? This would be a further improvement. Published by the J. Y. Johnston Company, 23 Murray street, New York. NOTES. PROFESSOR CHARLES K. MILLS, of the Univer sity of Pennsylvania, sends us a very learned and readable treatise on "Aphasia and Other Affections of Speech in Some of Their Medico-Legal Relations." It is more scientific thau legal, but speaks of the marriage and the last wills of the deaf and dumb, and of some of the relations of the subject to criminal law. The public and the profession have every reason to be glad that the punishment of Mrs. Osborne was administered by a judge so little open to emotional and sensational influences as Mr. Justice Smith. The occasion might have been made the opportunity for rebuking the recent deplorable "gush" on the part of a section of the press, or for a lecture on the apportionment of punishment with reference to the social standing of the criminal. All this has been spared us, and a criminal trial has been got through without reference to extrinsic conditions.-London Law Times. We had the impression that the only sympathy to which the woman is entitled arises from intrinsic conditions. We are very glad to see that the attorney-general has, with his wonted care for the welfare of the rising generation, introduced an act respecting the use of tobacco by minors. The evil is a growing one and should be met at once. It has during recent years received the attention of many of the States of the American Union. One scarcely desires to criticise so commendable a measure, but there are three words in the second clause which might we think be left out (even if they are taken from some similar enactment) without doing any harm. The section provides that "any per son actually or apparently under eighteen years of age who has in his possession, or smokes, or in any way uses in a public street, or other public place, cigarettes, etc., shall be subject to a certain penalty. If eighteen is intended as the age of infancy as to smoking in public places, why subject one over that age to the penalty simply because he has a fatal appearance of juvenility? We are delighted, for example, at the youthful appearance of the veteran premier of this province -long may he live!-but who knows but that some near-sighted "bobby" might "run in" even him should be recklessly use the fatal weed in public, and what would save him from punishment if "Brother Baxter " were to consider that he was apparently under the designated age? The words being in the alternative, a conviction might be held good if the defendant was apparently under eighteen. This is all the prosecution is called upon to prove, and the case might be proceeded with under that branch of the statute without reference to the actual age. What would be the result if the offense was proved under the word "apparently," and it was shown that actually the defendant was over the prescribed age? This ought to be considered. Then how is the apparent age to be determined? By witnesses speaking from mere observation, or by the exercise of the perceptive faculties of the justice?-Canada Law Journal. BIOGRAPHICAL DEPARTMENT. JAMES H. REMINGTON. BY L. B. PROCTOR. T has been said that "there is no section of the world's hopes and struggles so replete with keen competition and rivalry, varied by generosity and darkened by envy, so replete with such frequent recurrence of triumphs, defeats and incidents where truth is stranger than fiction, and where human nature is shown in such devious forms of many-colored life, as is seen and experienced in the career of a practicing lawyer." This is not confined to the career of the great leaders of the bar, whose eloquence "shakes the arsenal,” but it is the experience of every lawyer who has been at the bar a series of years, occupying a fairly eminent position there. How many events, incidents and stories of the heart has the practice of such lawyers brought before them, which, if drawn out and related in fervid, but truthful language, would rival the imagery of imagination and form a plot for a novelist. Recently a lawyer who has had twenty years' practice, and who occupies a highly respectable position at the bar, related an incident in his practice which, fairly and truly written, without exaggeration or embellishment, would arouse emotions of deep and genuine sympathy. Indeed, it needs but little poetic fancy, little of the glow of imagination, and few artistic touches of pathos, to give it a place in the literary world with those splendid works, the productions of the genius of Bulwer, Scott and Dickens. Again, events occur in the lives of lawyers affording amusement rivalling the incidents of a farce and the refined merriment of one of Coleman's comedies. All this is varied by exhibitions of learning, subtle logic, keen argument and happy illustration. There is a class of lawyers never seen in the courtroom who occupy a silent but commanding influence in the profession, who, when they pass into the street, "walk on under the shadow of great houses, edifices where merchants and bankers' do most congregate;' mansions, the domain of elegant society and brilliant social pleasures, whose secrets, difficulties, mortgages, delicate affairs, are treasured in their. minds ready on call." How often the reputation of envied leaders in business or fashion tremble in their grasp. Who will say that the lives of such lawyers are uneventful? We trust that these views of the profession will be fully illustrated in this, our department devoted to legal biography. We take pleasure in giving our readers this week a sketch of the life of JAMES H. REMINGTON, member of the New York city bar, who won honorable distinction as a soldier in hard-fought battles in the war for the Union, and who, with the return of peace, entered the legal profession to win an honorable position at the bar. From that time until the present his reputation was and still is that of a lawyer. It borrows nothing from conspicuous political position or official authority. He has fought bravely for it and fairly won it in an arena where learning and skill alone could secure the prize, and diligence and fidelity alone retain it. James H. Remington was born at Warwick, R. I., November 9, 1838, at the old historical Remington homestead, which has been continuously in the Remington family since it was purchased from the Narragansett Indians. Mr. Remington's father, Benjamin F. Remington, was a member of the Rhode Island Legislature at the time Dorr interrupted the peace of that State for a period with his insurrection. Mr. Remington left the Legislature, joined the forces that crushed out Dorr's rebellion and restored peace to the State. He was a leader of the now historical Whig party, and when that organization was dismembered he became one of the founders of the Republican party. Young Remington prepared for college at Greenwich Academy, East Greenwich, R. I. He was graduated at Brown University, standing at the head of the class of 1862, and valedictorian. His graduation took place when "grim visaged" war was stirring the north to enthusiastic action, and young Remington, who intended to commence preparing for the bar, imbued with the patriotism of his ancestry, promptly enlisted in the 7th Rhode Island Volunteers, and was very soon commissioned as a captain in that gallant regiment. He thus entered the service of his country determined to shrink from no duty, danger or privation. He became an actor in those mighty military movements on which depended the fate of the nation. By ardent study of the science of war, and the observance of all things that tended to the discipline of a soldier, he became one of the most accomplished officers in his regiment, enjoying the confidence and esteem of his superior officers, of his equals and inferiors in rank. On December 13, 1062, the memorable battle of Fredericksburgh opened. On the third day of the fight his regiment took a prominent and bloody part. In one of its desperate charges, Captain Remington was dangerously, and it was believed fatally, wounded. He was removed with great difficulty from the field to the hospital, and the surgeons, after careful examination, held out hopes of his ultimate recovery. Their predictions proved true, and as soon as he was able he returned home, where he ultimately recovered. While at his home, he was in 1863 elected a member of the Rhode Island House of Representatives. He was able to attend the spring session of that body. As he de |