tion, laws and treaties of the United States, and to controversies in which the United States shall be a party, and confers upon this court original jurisdiction"in all cases "in which a State shall be a party," that is, in all cases mentioned in the preceding clause in which a State may of right be made a party defendant, as well as in all cases in which a State may of right institute a suit in a court of the United States. The present case is of the former class. We cannot assume that the framers of the Constitution, while extending the judicial powers of the United States to controversies between two or more States of the Union, and between a State of the Union and foreign States, intended to exempt a State altogether from suit by the general government. They could not have overlooked the possibility that controversies, capable of judicial solution, might arise between the United States and some of the States, and that the permanence of the Union might be endangered if to some tribunal was not intrusted the power to determine them according to the recognized principles of law. And to what tribunal could a trust so momentous be more appropriately committed than to that which the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice and insure domestic tranquillity, have constituted with authority to speak for all the people and all the States upon questions before it to which the judicial power of the nation extends? It would be difficult to suggest any reason why this court should have jurisdiction to determiue questions of boundary between two or more States but not jurisdiction of controversies of like character between the United States and a State.

Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for the court in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1, 13, 15, referred to what had been said by certain statesmen at the time the Constitution was under submission to the people, and said: “The letter is appealed to now, as it was then, as a ground for sustaining a suit brought by an individual against a State. * * *The truth is that the cognizance of suits and actions unknown to the law, and forbidden by the law, was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the United States. Some things undoubtedly were made justiciable which were not known as such at the common law, such for example as controversies between States as to boundary lines and other questions admitting of judicial solution. And yet the case of Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. Sen. 144, shows that some of these unusual subjects of litigation were not unknown to the courts even in colonial times, and several cases of the same general character arose under the articles of confederation, and were brought before the tribunal provided for that purpose in those articles. 131 U. S. App. 1. The establishment of this new branch of jurisdiction seemed to be necessary from the extinguishment of diplomatic relations between the States." That case, and others in this court relating to the suability of States, proceeded upon the broad ground that "it is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent."

The question as to the suability of one government by another government rests upon wholly different grounds. Texas is not called to the bar of this court at the suit of an individual, but at the suit of the government established for the common and equal benefit of the people of all the States. The submission to judicial solution of controversies arising between these two governments "each sovereign with respect to the objects committed to it, and neithe. sovereign with respect to the objects committed to the other (McCulloch v. State of Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 400, 410), but both subject to the supreme law of the land, does no violence to the inherent nature of sovereignty. The

States of the Union have agreed, in the Constitution, that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to all cases arising under the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States, without regard to the character of the parties (excluding of course suits against a State by its own citizens, or by citizens of other States, or by citizens or subjects of foreign States), and equally to controversies to which the United States shall be a party, without regard to the subject of such controversies, and that this court may exercise original jurisdiction in all such cases "in which a State shall be party," without excluding those in which the United States may be the opposite party. The exercise therefore by this court of such original jurisdiction in a suit brought by one State against another to determine the boundary line between them, or in a suit brought by the United States against a State to determine the boundary between a Territory of the United States and that State, so far from infringing in either case upon the sovereignty, is with the consent of the State sued. Such consent was given by Texas when admitted into the Union upon an equal footing in all respects with the other States.

We are of opinion that this court has jurisdiction to determine the disputed question of boundary between the United States and Texas.

It is contended that, even if this court has jurisdiction, the dispute as to boundary must be determined in an action at law, and that the act of Congress requiring the institution of this suit in equity is unconstitutional and void, as in effect declaring that legal rights shall be tried and determined as if they were equitable rights. This is not a new question in this court. It was suggested in argument, though not decided, in Fowler v. Lindsey, 3 Dall. 411, 413. Mr. Justice Washington in that case said: "I will not say that a State could sue at law for such an incorporeal right as that of sovereignty and jurisdiction, but even if a court of law would not afford a remedy I can see no reason why a remedy should not be obtained in a court of equity. The State of New York might, I think, file a bill against the State of Connecticut, praying to be quieted as to the boundaries of the disputed territory, and this court, in order to effectuate justice, might appoint commissioners to ascertain and report those boundaries." But the question arose directly in Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 734, which was a suit in equity in this court involving the boundary line between two States. The court said: "No court acts differently in deciding on boundary between States than on lines between separate tracts of land; if there is uncertainty where the line is, if there is a confusion of boundaries by the nature of interlocking grants, the obliteration of marks, the intermixing of possession under different proprietors, the effects of accident, fraud or time, or other kindred causes, it is a case appropriate to equity. An issue at law is directed, a commission of boundary awarded, or if the court are satisfied without either they decree what and where the boundary of a farm, a manor, province or State is and shall be." When that case was before the court, at a subsequent term, Chief Justice Taney, after stating that the case was of peculiar character, involving a question of boundary between two sovereign States, litigated in a court of justice, and that there were no precedents as to forms and modes of proceedings, said: "The subject was however fully considered at January Term, 1838, when a motion was made by the defendant to dismiss this bill. Upon that occasion the court determined to frame their proceeding according to those which had been adopted in the English courts in cases most analogous to this, where the boundaries of great political bodies had been brought into question. And acting upon this principle it was then decided that the rules and practice of

the Court of Chancery should govern in conducting this suit to a final issue. The reasoning upon which that decision was founded is fully stated in the opinion then delivered, and upon re-examining the subject we are quite satisfied as to the correctuess of this decision." 14 Pet. 210, 256.

The above cases, New Jersey v. New York, Missouri v. Iowa, Florida v. Georgia, Alabama v. Georgia, Virginia v. West Virginia, Missouri v. Kentucky, Indiana v. Kentucky and Nebraska v. lowa, were all original suits in equity in this court involving the boundary of States. In view of these precedents it is scarcely necessary for the court to examine this question anew. Of course if a suit in equity is appropriate for determining the boundary between two States, there can be no objection to the present suit as being in equity and not in law. It is not a suit simply to determine the legal title to and the ownership of the lands constituting Greer county. It involves the larger question of governmental authority and jurisdiction over that territory. The United States in effect asks the specific execution of the terms of the treaty of 1819, to the end that the disorder and public mischiefs that will ensue from a continuance of the present condition of things may be prevented. The agreement, embodied in the treaty, to fix the lines with precision, and to place landmarks to designate the limits of the two contracting nations, could not well be enforced by an action at law. The bill and amended bill make a case for the interposition of a court of equity. Demurrer overruled.

FULLER, C. J. (dissenting). Mr. Justice Lamar and myself are unable to concur in the decision just aunounced.

This court has original jurisdiction of two classes of cases only, those affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party.

The judicial power extends to "controversies between two or more States," "between a State and citizens of another State," and "between a State and the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens or subjects." Our original jurisdiction, which depends solely upon the character of the parties, is confined to the cases enumerated in which a State may be a party, and this is not one of them.

The judicial power also extends to controversies to which the United States shall be a party, but such controversies are not included in the grant of original jurisdiction. To the controversy here the United States is a party.

We are of opinion therefore that this case is not within the original jurisdiction of the court.

PUBLIC RECORDS-TAX-TITLE PUR-
CHASERS.

MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT, MARCH 18, 1892. AITCHESON v. WAYNE COUNTY TREASURER. Buying tax-titles is legitimate, and lists of lands bid in by the State for delinquent taxes are public records which the buyer of tax-titles has a right to examine and copy from, under a law which throws open the public records to all persons.

applied retourer for

leave to see the State land tax-book, a record deposited in the latter's office by the auditor-general, and containing the descriptions of lands which had been bid in by the State for delinquent taxes, and which the county treasurer was now authorized to sell to "any person" for the amount of the State's bid, with a cer

tain per centum added. The treasurer refused to let the applicant copy from the book such descriptions as he considered desirable. And although he received and made change for the money which Aitcheson offered for certain descriptions, he presently handed it back and refused to keep it, and Aitcheson, after some hesitation, took the money away with him. He afterward applied to the Supreme Court for the writ of mandamus to compel the treasurer to give him access to the book, and also for the issue to him of deeds for the lands for which he had made a tender. Upon the first branch of his application he relied on act 205 of 1889, which provides that "the officers having the custody of any county, city or town records in this State shall furnish proper and reasonable facilities for the inspection and examination of the records and files in their respective offices, and for making memoranda or transcripts therefrom, during the usual business hours, to all persons having occasion to make examination of them for any lawful purpose." The lands were in fact sold to the delinquent tax payers themselves, who had meanwhile been notified.

Henry A. Chaney, for relator.

William J. Gray, for respondent.

PER CURIAM. Relator asks the writ of mandamus to compel respondent:

1. To permit him to inspect, examine and copy from the State land-tax book in respondent's office.

2. To issue tax-deeds to him for certain lands for which, on January 15, 1892, he made payment to said respondent.

Relator claims his right to the writ by reason of sections 73, 74 and 80 of act No. 200 of the Public Acts of 1891.

These sections are as follows:

"Sec. 73. The auditor-general shall furnish to each county treasurer, in the month of February prior to the month of May in the year in which such tax-sales are held, as provided in this act, a full and complete statement of all lands in his county that may have been bid in for the State, remaining unredeemed or not otherwise discharged; and the county treasurer, with the list so furnished, shall prepare a complete statement of all land bid off for taxes.

"Sec. 80. Any person may purchase any State taxlands of such county treasurer by paying therefor the amount for which the same was bid off to the State, with interest on the same at the rate of one per cent per month from date of sale."

Under the first two sections above quoted relator contends that the State tax-land book is a public record, and upon section 80 he bases his right to his deeds.

The return of the respondent shows that before the application to this court for a writ, the money paid for these deeds January 15, 1892, was tendered back to relator the same day, and accepted by him. He is therefore not entitled to the deeds, as it appears that at the date he again tendered the money to the respondent, January 20, 1892, the interest of the State in the lands had been conveyed to other persons.

It is claimed by respondent that the book which relator wishes to examine is a State book, "prepared for State purposes, used by the treasurer for State pur

poses, and the treasurer was merely auctioneer for the State and not for the county."

It is also contended that the relator's business is disreputable; that he is a "tax-title sharp," and is therefore not entitled to the examination of this book for a "lawful purpose."

These contentions are not tenable. The book is a public record in the treasurer's office, and comes within the statute. Act No. 205, Pub. Acts 1889; Burton v. Tuite, 78 Mich. 363; Burton v. Tuite, 80 id. 218.

The relator's business is lawful, and recognized and encouraged by the tax laws; and while the business of dealing in tax-titles may not be in good repute with some of our people, it yet has its uses in stimulating the prompt payment of taxes, and does the State some service in this respect.

The writ must issue commanding the respondent to furnish to relator, under the statute of 1889, proper and reasonable facilities for the inspection and examination of this book, and from making memoranda therefrom, as he is entitled to.the same right as any other citizen, under act 205, Public Acts 1889.

The relator will be entitled to the costs of this motion.

PEOPLE, EX REL. AHRENS, V. ENGLISH.

Laws of 1891, page 135, give to women the right to vote at school elections. Article 7, section 1, of the Constitution provides that every person having resided in the State one year, in the county ninety days, and in the election district thirty days next preceding "any election" therein, who was an elector in this State on April 1, 1848, or obtained a certificate of naturalization prior to January 1, 1870, or who shall be a "male" citizen of the United States, above the age of twenty-one years, shall be entitled to vote at such election. Held, that in order to effect the manifest intention to confer upon women the right to vote at school elections, the word "male," read into the statute from the Constitution, would be rejected as surplusage.

Since the Constitution provides (art. 8, § 5) for the election" of a superintendent of schools, and (art. 7, § 1) requires voters at any election" to be males, and no intent appears to allow different qualifications for voters for such officer (Laws 1891, p. 135), so far as it endeavors to enable women to vote for such officer, is unconstitutional. The provision of article 8, section 5, of the Constitution, creating a county superintendent of schools, that the “manner of election" of such officer shall be "prescribed by law," gives the Legislature no power to prescribe special qualifications for voters for school officers.

The fact that article 8 of the Constitution, entitled "Education," requires the Legislature to provide "a system of free schools," gives the Legislature no power to prescribe special qualifications for voters for school officers.

Illinois. The material question involved in the proceeding is whether or not the act of the General Assembly of this State, entitled "An act to entitle women to vote at any election held for the purpose of choosing any officer under the general or special school laws of this State," approved June 19, 1891 (Laws 1891, p. 135), confers upon the petitioner, Mary A. Ahrens, she being a citizen of the United States and a woman of the age of twenty-one years and upward, the right and privilege of voting at an election for county superintendent of schools. Section 1 of said act is as follows: "Any woman of the age of twenty-one years and upward, belonging to either of the classes mentioned in article 7 of the Constitution of the State of Illinois, who should have resided in this State one year, in the county ninety days, and in the election district thirty days, preceding any election held for the purpose of choosing any officer of schools under the general or special school laws of this State, shall be entitled to vote at such election in the school district of which she shall at the time have been for thirty days a resident; provided, any woman so desirous of voting at any such election shall have been registered in the same manner as is provided for the registration of male voters." Section 2 of the act is as follows: "Whenever the election of public school officers shall occur at the same election at which the other public officers are elected, the ballot offered by any woman entitled to vote under this act shall not contain the name of any person to be voted for at such election except such officers of public schools, and such ballots shall all be deposited in a separate ballot-box, but canvassed with other ballots cast for school officers at such election."

The words, "belonging to either of the classes mentioned in article 7 of the Constitution of the State of Illinois," found in section 1 of the act, manifestly refer to section 1 of article 7 of the State Constitution. That section of the Constitution reads thus: "Every person having resided in this State one year, in the county ninety days, and in the election district thirty days, next preceding any election therein, who was an elector in this State on the 1st day of April, in the year of our Lord 1848, or obtained a certificate of naturalization before any court of record in this State prior to the 1st day of January, in the year of our Lord 1870, or who shall be a male citizen of the United States above the age of twenty-one years, shall be entitled to vote at such election." There are three classes of persons mentioned" in said constitutional provision, i. e., those who were electors in the State on April 1, 1848; those who, prior to January 1, 1870, obtained certificates of naturalization from any court of record in this State, and male citizens of the United States above the age of twenty-one years. No averments are made in the petition that show, or even claim, that the petitioner belongs to either the first or the second of these classes. Indeed, it is plain, both as matter of law and matter of history, that there are no women who were electors in this State on the 1st day of April, 1848, and it is at least improbable that there are any women in the State who are included within the second of said designated classes. It may be suggested, parenthetically, that if it be that women born in this State and country, and of parents who are citizens here, are not invested with the right of suffrage, it would be probably placing an unreasonable interpretation upon this second specification of legal voters, and upon the statute under consideration, to hold that they confer the elective franchise upon women of alien birth who obtained certificates of naturalization in courts of this State prior to January 1, 1870. The qualifications prescribed for a voter of the third class are three - the voter must be a citizen of the United States, a male, and above the

no power to confer the elective franchise upon other classes than those to whom it is given by the Constitution, for the description of those entitled is regarded as excluding all others." But it is useless to multiply citations, for the books and the opinions in deciding cases are full of like statements of the law. We understand the law to be as is stated in the above quotations, and that such law is applicable, at least in all cases of an election held for an officer who is mentioned or provided for in the Constitution, unless it is indicated by that instrument that such officer may be otherwise elected or appointed, or that the Legislature or some other body may determine by whom such officer may be elected or appointed. It may be that it is competent for the Legislature to provide that women who are citizens of the United States, and over twenty-one years of age, may vote at elections held for school directors and other school officers who are not mentioned in the Constitution; but that question is not before us for decision, and we therefore express no opinion in regard to it. We think however, since the petitioner is not included within either the first or second classes of qualified voters mentioned in the Constitution, and being a woman, does not fall within the third class, i. e., of male citizens of the United States above the age of twenty-one years, that the Legislature had and has no power or authority to invest her with the right to vote at any election held for a county superintendent of schools.

Much reliance is apparently placed by petitioner upon the cases of Belles v. Burr, 76 Mich. 1; Wheeler v. Brady, 15 Kaus. 26, and State v. Cones, 15 Neb. 444. We do not consider said cases as here in point, or that the decisions which were rendered in them are in conflict with the conclusions which we have reached in the present controversy. In the Michigan case the question at issue was in regard to the right of the plaintiff to vote, under a statute of that State, at an election of school trustees of a school district, and the court, speaking of the Constitution of the State, said: "But no officer of the school district is mentioned or recognized by that instrument. The reason is that the whole primary school system was confided to the Legislature, and it cannot be said that the officers of school districts, chosen pursuant to the system adopted by the Legislature, are constitutional officers. * * * While it must be conceded that no person can vote for the election of any officer mentioned in the Constitution, unless he possesses the qualifications of an elector prescribed by that instrument, it does not follow that none but such electors can vote for officers which the Legislature has the right to provide for, to carry out the educational purpose declared in that instrument." This is a plain intimation that if the Constitution of Michigan had provided for or mentioned school trustees of school districts, then the decision in that case would have been otherwise.

In the Kansas case the controversy was as to the right of women, under a statute of the State, to vote at a school-district meeting for school-district treasurer. The court, referring to the State Constitution, said: "And it does not any where even mention schooldistrict elections or meetings. It provides for, or at least recognizes, the election of various officers; but it does not any where even mention the election of any school-district officer." The question involved in the Nebraska case was substantially the same as that in the Kausas case-- certain women having voted at a district school meeting for school trustees of the district and the court held that the provisions in the State Constitution in regard to elections did not apply to school districts, and that the act allowing women to vote at school meetings was valid, and cited the Kansas case as an authority.

It is ordered that the demurrer to the petition for mandamus be sustained, that the writ of mandamus be denied, and that the petition be dismissed. Writ denied.

CARRIER-RAILROAD-INJURIES TO PASSENGERS-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE -RIDING ON PLATFORM.

VERMONT SUPREME COURT, JAN. 8, 1892. WORTHINGTON V. CENTRAL VERMONT R. Co. Where a passenger on defendant's excursion train secured a seat for himself, but afterward resigned it to a lady, and after remaining in the aisle of the car for a time, went out on the platform, intending to enter another car, but finding that full, remained on the platform, from which he fell or was thrown off, he was guilty of contributory negligence. Where there was nothing in the record to show that the train was improperly operated, on account of a lack of brakemen, it was error for the court to submit to the jury, on the question of negligence in operating the train, the fact that there were but two brakemen on it.

THE head-note shows the facts.

George E. Lawrence, for plaintiff.
C. A. Prouty, for defendant.

ROWELL, J. If as matter of law it was prima facie negligence for the plaintiff to be riding on the platform or the steps, as shown by the case, and if his riding there contributed to his injury, then the burden was on him to show that he was riding there for a reason that freed him from the imputation of negligence, and if the testimony did not tend to show such reason he had no case for the jury, and the court should have directed a verdict against him. It is sometimes said that when the facts are conceded or undisputed, the question of negligence is for the court, and not for the jury. But this must not be taken in its broadest sense, and as universally true, but with limitation. When the law prescribes what shall constitute uegligence, or when the act relied upon to show negligence is isolated, then negligence becomes a question of law. But when the standard of negligence is not prescribed, and there is a combination of facts and circumstances relied upon to show negligence, the question becomes one of law only, when those facts and circumstances are so decisive one way or the other as to leave no reasonable doubt about it -no room for opposing inferences. This is clearly shown by the adjudged cases. Thus in Briggs v. Taylor, 28 Vt. 180, it was regarded as so certain that carriages and sleds would be injured by standing out-doors all winter that the court ruled, as matter of law, that thus leaving them was negligence. But in Vincent v. Schwab, 32 Vt. 612, it is said that although there is no conflict in the testimony in respect of negligence, yet if it still rests upon discretion, judgment and experience, it is a matter of law, and not of fact; and in Whitcomb v. Denio, 52 Vt. 382, it is said that whatever the rule may be in other States when the facts are undisputed in this State, when the question is whether a thing has been done within a reasonable time or with reasonable care, or when any other fact is to be determined that involves the judgment of the trier upon an existing state of facts and circumstances, the almost universal practice has been to submit the question to the jury. In Hunter v. Railroad Co., 112 N. Y. 371, it was held that the plaintiff, who was sui juris and in the full possession of his faculties, with nothing to disturb his judgment, was guilty of negligence, as matter of law, in attempting to board a