matter ended in a laugh when the aforesaid Vulcan rose to his feet, and pointing a huge finger at his captious neighbor, cried out: "See here! you forge your side of the street and let me forge mine!"-Boston Herald. There are two reflections suggested by incidents connected with the case of Russell v. Russell. One is with regard to the practice of publication by the daily journals of the speech and evidence on one side of a case, involving grave imputations on character, without waiting for the speech and evidence on the other side. In Russell v. Russell the evidence of the petitioner and the opening speech of her counsel were of course published in hot haste and in great detail by the daily journals, and were sucked in with the greatest relish by that "greater jury" which tries cases outside the courts of justice. That jury, with its usual acuteness and rapidity of judgment, had made up its great mind before even the petitioner's case had been closed, with the result that the respondent, the successful party to the suit as he turned out to be, was surrounded by an angry mob as he left the court after the adjourment on the second day of the trial and was assailed with opprobrious epithets before he had had a chance of placing his version of the pitiful story before his censors. Moreover the report of the evidence in the daily papers showed the usual lack of discrimination as to what was material and what was not; the usual number of erroneous versions of what was said in the witness box were followed by the usual number of corrections in subsequent issues, and the usual numiber of angry letters from persons who (rightly or wrongly) believed themselves to have been injured by the reports. As to this last characteristic of certain journals, we had not long ago a letter from a valued correspondent drawing our attention to the fact that in a single issue of a certain newspaper there were reports of two cases, in one of which a charge of swindling, made in the open speech of counsel, was fully set out in the report, although the charge was subsequently withdrawn, such withdrawal being strongly supported by the judge, while in the other case all the sensational points in the defendants' witnesses' evidence were fully reported, although the judge found that there was no evidence against the plaintiff. Can no means be discovered of putting a stop to practices like these, which may result in the gravest injury to character.-London Law Times. EA THE THIRD LESSON. ACH member of the special class receives letters regularly from Professor Moran, the author of this course. These letters are found to be encouraging and helpful in various ways. Those who have not already become members would do well to join at once. Information furnished on application. If you meet with any difficulty, or if you do not find short-hand clear and easy at the start, do not for that reason throw down your pen. You can afford to be patient. Do not be overly anxious about the next les son. It will come soon enough. Meanwhile, learn this one still better. Study, write, read, practice; work away. The oftener you copy the characters the better you will understand the principles. Obstacles melt away before an earnest worker. Leave no lesson until you are certain that you have mastered it, and can say "yes" to these questions: Do you understand the principle? Can you write it in the required time? Can you read it afterward? Have you written it as it was read to you? Introduction cards will be issued with this lesson to all members of the special class. Vowels are written at the beginning, middle and end of the stems, in what are called the first, second and third places. The sound of a dot or dash depends on the place it occupies. A third place vowel, occurring between two stems, is put by the second, as ow, in cowed, line 9. There are likewise three consonant positions: 1st, above; 2d, upon; 3d, through, or beneath, the line. The circles should be made small as possible, and always be placed on either the upper or right-hand side of the stem. If s begins a word, it is pronounced first, although a vowel may be at the left of it. See side, line 6. Many of the commonest words are expressed by abbreviations, called word-signs. See lines 11 and 12. These should be copied a great many times, and committed well to memory. First-Copy Plate 3 ten times. Compare and cor 3 Bee tea key gee eke peak peep deep. 4 Joy toy coy Boyd bough chow out outch. 5 Days goes pays pose chose gaze buys joys. 6 Side seat soap seige sage soak sake sate. 7 Spice space seed sakes skies spokes spikes DeSoto. 8 Dow stow cows base chase scow beak cope. 10 Cages betakes beseech beseige beside decide outside 9 Beach cheek keep keyed cowed gouge coke bestow. decays. 11 Word-Signs - Common come give together which advantage is his as has. 12 I high how the a all two (or too) already before ought who. Trauslate lines 13, 14 and 15. The Albany Law Journal. ALBANY, JANUARY 9, 1892. CURRENT TOPICS. mere typographical accidents or clerical errors which were innocent of fraud, even on the part of the perpetrators, and which deprived no man of a vote on the other side. It is interesting to read the comments of the law journals about the decision in the Maybrick insurance case in England. The American Law Review states the case thus: "The facts were that James Maybrick insured his life for the benefit of his wife. He afterward died, and subsequently his wife was indicted, tried and convicted of murdering him. Prior to HE Court of Appeals of this State, by a vote of publicans, have held that some twelve hundred voters at the late election, in Onondaga county, must lose their votes, and the Senate thus be trans-her trial she assigned her interest under the policy ferred from Republican to Democratic control, because the county clerk sent out the official ballots indorsed with a wrong number of the election district. We regret the decision. We also regret that the court could not have had its attention called to the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri, that under the new Australian ballot law of that State the reception by election judges of votes at two polling places in a precinct instead of one, as prescribed by the law, did not invalidate the returns. The court says: "Undoubtedly some irregularities in the conduct of elections are of so grave a nature as to invalidate the whole return of the precinct at which they occur, as for example the omission of registratiou (Zeiler v. Chapman [1874], 54 Mo. 502), or of statutory notice. McPike v. Pen [1872], 51 id. 63. In determining which are of that kind, the courts aim merely to give full effect to the intent of the law-makers in that regard, aided by established rules of interpretation. If the law itself declares the specified irregularity to be fatal, the courts will follow that command, irrespective of their views as to the importance of the requirement. Ledbetter v. Hall (1876), 62 Mo. 422. In the absence of such declaration the judiciary endeavor, as best they may, to discern whether the deviation from the prescribed forms of law had or had not such a vital bearing on the proceedings as probably prevented a free and full expression of the popular will. If it had, the irregularity is deemed fatal; otherwise it is not. It has been sometimes said, in this connection, that certain provisions of election laws are mandatory and others directory. These terms may perhaps be convenient to distinguish one class of irregularities from the other. But strictly speaking all provisions of such laws are mandatory, in the sense that they impose the duty of obedience on those who come within their terms. But it does not therefore follow that every slight departure there from should taint the whole election. Judges justly consider the main purpose of such laws, namely, the obtaining of a fair election and an honest return, as paramount in importance to the minor requirements which prescribe the formal steps to reach that end, and in order not to defeat the general design, are frequently led to ignore such innocent irregularities of election officers as are free from fraud and have not interfered with a full and fair expression of the voters' choice." We are glad that the court did not hold that voters in Dutchess county were disfranchised by the accidental sticking up of the printer's "quads" on the ballots, and we regret that the State canvassers did not follow the court's direction in respect to that canvass. It is unfortunate that honest voters of any party should lose their votes by reason of VOL. 45- No. 2. to one of the plaintiffs. The assignee of the policy, joining with the executors of the deceased, sued the company to recover the amount due under the policy. It was held that they were not entitled to recover." The Review evidently considers the case well decided. The Review, speaking of the similar case of Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 506, says: "The fact that two judges dissented upon such a question affords a striking illustration of the fact that lawyers, in their technical methods of reasoning, often leave conscience out of view entirely; and that there is no new question, however obvious to the ordinary mind, however absurd, or however monstrous, upon which well-trained lawyers cannot take sides." The London Law Times says: "Substantial justice has been done in the case between the executor of the late Mr. Maybrick and the insurance companies. The guilty wife is to receive no benefit from the policy moneys, which however the insurance companies are to pay. They are to go into the estate of the late assured free from the trust in favor of the wife. We congratulate the Court of Appeal upon a most equitable solution of a somewhat difficult problem." The London Law Journal says: The Court of Appeal has reversed the judgment of the High Court in the Maybrick Insurance Case, but it has yet to be seen whether the House of Lords will not in its turn reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal. In commenting on the judgment of the High Court we expressed the opinion that it was substantially correct, but suggested that those entitled to a reversionary interest in the policy might claim the insurance money on the death of the convict. The Court of Appeal appears to have thought that the convict might be deemed to be dead already, and that the insurance money might be handed over at once to the executors of Mr. Maybrick for the benefit of his estate, the effect of which judgment we presume to be that the executors would hold the insurance money for the immediate benefit of those to whom the reversionary interest in it was bequeathed. And this appears to be just. For why should an insurance company be excused from paying insurance money, to secure which premiums have been paid to it, on the ground that one of two successive titles have turned out to be bad?" We suspect that the Review on the one hand, and the Times and Journal on the other, are speaking of different decisions of the case, for the Court of Appeal, as we understand, have reversed the decision below, and while denying the right of the plaintiffs to recover for Mrs. Maybrick, have affirmed her right to recover for the estate. We understand also that the executors were the sole plaintiffs. The master of the rolls is reported to have said: "This unhappy woman by her crime had rendered the trust, so far as she was concerned, incapable of being performed. Therefore it was to be treated as if she were gone and out of the way. Mrs. May brick having forfeited her rights, the executors must deal with the money as part of the estate. If there were creditors it must go in favor of the creditors; if there was any thing left, and there were any children, it must go in favor of the children. To deprive them would be to commit a foul injustice, and that would not be a rule of law." And Lord Justice Fry is reported to have said: "It would be contrary to public policy that the money should go to a murderess, but in this case the contract was wholly with James Maybrick, and the trust which was created in favor of Florence Maybrick was destroyed, and a trust was created in favor of the deceased's children or of his estate. His lordship's opinion was that public policy required that a criminal should not benefit by a contract, but that the crime should not be allowed to interfere with the rights of third parties. Therefore, though the executors could not recover for Florence Maybrick they could for the estate of the deceased." The English judges, or some of them, have strenuously objected to stenographic reports of trials. Unlike "Rogue Riderhood," they do not wish to be "took down," and we do not much blame them. But Mr. Justice Denman, it seems, goes further and objects to being sketched by barristers. According to report, in a recent trial, he stood up excitedly and loudly protested against any one taking sketches in court, and said, "I won't have it. I will have any one turned out of court who takes such liberties with me;" and when Sir Charles Russell said he did not think any one was taking a sketch of his lordship, his lordship responded, "I know somebody is sketching me, and I won't have it. Besides they are sketching the witnesses and it disturbs them." We should not blame the judge for objecting to such villainous portraits as disfigure some of our principal daily newspapers, but why should he object to an artistic exhibit? Many of our judges would pay money for such an advertisement. This scene occurred while Mrs. Sanders, a dressmaker, was on the stand-not the lady of that name, who appeared on the trial of Bardell v. Pickwick, we understand. Now we do not believe that any dressmaker would or could reasonably object to such a portraiture. How can a court take judicial notice that a particular witness objects to being sketched? We think the judge should at least poll the witness on the subject. The Indian Jurist, remarking on the observations of our correspondent in respect to the English and Massachusetts practice of compelling witnesses to stand, says that it does not regard the practice as "silly;" thinks it may compel attention on the part of the witness, and asks if counsel are not compelled to stand while examining witnesses in this country. We should hardly characterize the practice as "silly," but we regard it as cruel in many cases, as for example when the witness is a woman, or when the witness is literally on the stand for several days. As for the matter of attention it might as well be applied to the jury, if there is any force in that claim. But we should think an aching body would be apt rather to distract than to concentrate the attention. And as for counsel, they take turns in standing, and both or all together only stand as long as the witness alone is forced to stand. Counsel formerly did not stand in this State, but the present rule was adopted on the theory that it would compel brevity because of the fatigue, This reason cannot apply to the witness, and there is no good reason for subjecting him to fatigue or dis comfort. The State Commission in Lunacy, consisting of Dr. Carlos F. MacDonald and Messrs. Goodwin Brown and Henry A. Reeves, have recently ordered that all persons committed to insane asylums shall be informed by the receiving medical officer, at the time of admission, of the character of the institution and cause of detention. Also that no voluntary patient shall be admitted to any such asylum whose mind is so impaired as to render him incapable of forming a rational judgment as to the disposition of his person or whose will is so weak as to render him incapable of resisting undue influence, nor unless an application for admission is made in the form prescribed by the commission." These are very wise precautions, and are consistently in line with many reforms which the commission have made in the administration of these matters. The London Law Journal says: "It is said that the Lord Chancellor does not intend in future to appoint men over seventy years of age to the office of County Court Judge. This is satisfactory as far as it goes, but we could wish that the limit had been' fixed at sixty, as that appears to us to be quite a maximum age for a man to commence a judicial career." This latter is a quite reasonable view, as it seems to Americans. Some judges are fit for their judicial duties after seventy, but not many, and none unless they begun judicial work a good deal younger. The Animal Kingdom in Court has not furnished us with a text in a long time until just now. In Craig v. Webster, Nebraska Supreme Court, November 25, 1891, the court held that there had been a sufficient compliance with a contract to exterminate the prairie dogs on a certain tract of land to warrant a recovery by the plaintiff. The contract was to break up a certain "dog town," inhabited by about seven thousand dog citizens. The plaintiff contracted to "kill, destroy, exterminate and banish" the dogs. If he really did all that, it would seem that he must have put all the dogs out of the way. NOTES OF CASES. 'N Hill v. Bain, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, estoppel, as well as by and for the parties of record. The Supreme Court of Maine, in Atkinson v. White, supra, express an inclination to go even further, and In July. it was held that where a person to hold broadly that when at party has once tried a injured by collision with teams left on a highway sues the persons so leaving them, and a verdict is found for defendants, the judgment rendered on the verdict can be pleaded in bar by the town in an action against it for the same injuries. The court said: "Undoubtedly the rule, as generally laid down, is that judgments avail as estoppels only for or against parties and privies; but nevertheless the courts allow themselves a good deal of latitude in applying the rule, observing the spirit of it rather than the letter. Thus it has been held that a judgment in favor of a deputy sheriff, in an action against him for official misfeasance or default, is available by way of estoppel in an action against the sheriff for the same misfeasance or default. King v. Chase, 15 N. H. 9. So it has been held that a judgment in favor of a master in an action against him for the act of his servant, rendered in a trial of the case on its merits, is a bar to a suit against the servant for the same act. Emery v. Fowler, 39 Me. 326. So it has been held that a judgment on the ground of payment against one of two joint and several makers of a promissory note is a bar to recovery against the other, whether as between the makers the other signed as principal or surety. Spencer v. Dearth, 43 Vt. 98. In Bates v. Stanton, 1 Duer, 79, 88, the plaintiff, claiming to be the owner of certain goods, delivered them to the defendant by way of bailment. The defendant afterward surrendered them to the true owner, taking from him an indemnity bond. Thereupon the plaintiff sued him in trover for their conversion, and it was held that a judgment recovered by the true owner, in an action against the plaintiff involving the right to the goods, was conclusive against the plaintiff in his action against the defendant, inasmuch as the parties, though nominally different, were virtually the same on account of the interest which the true owner had in the defense of the later action by reason of the indemnity bond which he had given to the defendant of record. In Atkinson v. White, 60 Me. 396, the owner of a lot of logs mortgaged them to A. and then sold them to B. A. afterward sold a portion of them to C., warranting their title. B. sued C. in trover for a conversion of the logs bought by him, and recovered judgment, C. setting up his title under A. In a later suit by C. against A., involving the same title, it was held that the judgment recovered by B. was a bar to recovery. See also Durham v. Giles, 52 Me. 206, and Freer v. Stotenbur, 2 Abb. Dec. 189. In these cases the defendants were permitted to avail themselves by way of estoppel of judgments to which they were neither parties nor privies. The ground on which this was permitted seems to have been that the defendants, though not parties to the judgments, were so connected in interest or liability with the parties that the judgments when recovered could be regarded as virtually recovered for them, for the purposes of question in one suit he shall not, without regard to mutual estoppel, again try the same question, involving the same testimony, in another suit.' We think, on the authority of these cases, it is competent for the defendant town to set up, by way of estoppel in the case at bar, the judgment recovered by the Budlongs. Certainly, if the town had notified the Budlongs of the pendency of this action, and the Budlongs had, in consequence of the notice, assumed the defense, it would be competent for them, on the authority of these cases, to plead the former judgment in bar; for they would then be the real defendants, though defending in the name of the town, and ought not to be required to try over a question which they have already tried, with the result of a final judgment against the plaintiff in their favor. But the Budlongs, if they assumed the defense, would have to make it in the name of the town, and we see no good reason why the town should not be permitted to make, without calling upon them, any defense which they could make, if called upon, in the name of the town." In English v. Progress Electric Light & Motor Co., Supreme Court of Alabama, November 5, 1891, a suit to enjoin defendant from maintaining a nuisance by operating an electric light plant adjoining complainant's dwelling-house, the evidence showed that the plant was of great public utility, and the machinery of the best quality; that the officers and agents were skillful; and that the annoyances from smoke, soot, noise and vibrations had been materially lessened during defendant's ownership, one witness testifying that they were not one-hundredth part as great as formerly. The evidence in regard to the vibrations of the house, caused by the engine, was conflicting; and one witness testified that they were not greater than those usually caused by a passing dray. Held, that the evidence did not prove more annoyance than is usually incident to a residence in a city, or such annoyances as could not be prevented by labor and money, for which there was redress at law. The court said: "It is difficult, if not impracticable, to formulate a rule accurately defining the acts or facts which will constitute a nuisance under any and all circumstances. We shall not make the attempt. As a general proposition, it may be said that any establishment erected on the premises of one, though for the purposes of trade or business, lawful in itself, which, from the situation, the inherent qualities of the business, or the manner in which it is conducted, directly causes substantial injury to the property of another, or produces material annoyance and inconvenience to the occupants of adjacent dwellings, rendering them physically uncomfortable, is a nuisance. In applying this principle, it has been repeatedly held that smoke, offensive odors, noise or vibrations, * * * * * * * * * * * feet high and the other seventy, forty or fifty feet higher than the roof of complainants' residence, and sufficiently high to discharge the smoke in the air, so as not to incommode complainants unless in abnormal conditions of the atmosphere, which occur only occasionally. Though the locality in which the plant is situated may not be of such nature as to defeat its abatement, if its operations cause substantial injury to neighboring dwellings or material annoyance to the occupants, yet when, by the application of scientific appliances, or by the expenditure of a reasonable amount of labor and money, the evils can be obviated or diminished, so as to amount to no more than are ordinarily incident to a the infliction of heavy loss prevented, and the pub- Ray v. Lynes, 10 when of such degree or extent as to materially interfere with the ordinary comfort of human existence, will constitute a nuisance. Rouse v. Martin, 75 Ala. 510. This principle has been applied to various kinds of factories and industries located in a city, including gas-works, and the production of light by the operation of a steam-engine and dynamos. Cleveland v. Gas-Light Co., 20 N. J. Eq. 201; Yocum v. Hotel St. George Co., 18 Abb. N. C. 340. The real and important question is, does the manner in which defendant operates the plant, since the alterations and improvements were made, interfere with the comfortable use and enjoyment of their residence by complainants to such extent as to create a nuisance, which, when the locality and the circum-city life, the rights of the parties will be preserved, stances are considered, it becomes the duty of the court to enjoin? * The evidence further shows that by a comparatively small expense complainants could avoid the inconveniences and annoyances arising from the vibratory motions. When such is the case, a perpetual injunction will not be granted, full compensation being obtainable at law. Rosser v. Randolph, 7 Port. (Ala.) 238. Kingsbury v. Flowers, 65 Ala. 479. We do not think the evidence shows that the locality in which the plant was situated is so exclusively devoted to industrial enterprises, or business purposes, or so remote, as to afford defendant immunity on this account. The dwellings of complainants and others in the vicinity were erected long before the plant was established. However, a person cannot expect to possess in a city, the peace, quiet, enjoyment and freedom from annoyances of the country, and must submit to the ordinarily incidental annoyances of living in a city. It has been aptly said: A person who resides in a large city must not expect to be surrounded by the stillness that prevails in rural districts. He must necessarily hear some of the noise, and occasionally feel slight vibrations, produced by the movements and labor of its people, and by the hum of its mechanical industries. The aid of a court may be invoked to keep annoying sounds within reasonable limits. Every noise however is not a nuisance; nor when produced in the exercise of lawful occupation should the strong arm of a chancellor be extended to suppress it.' McCaffrey's Appeal, 105 Penn. St. 253; Coffin Co. v. Warren, 78 Ky. 400. Whether or not the transcendent power of the court should be exercised under such circumstances must be determined in view of the relative rights of the parties and the public welfare. Gilbert v. Showerman, 23 Mich. 448. Unquestionably the electric plant is of great public utility, and its abatement by injunction would entail heavy loss upon its owners, and according to the testimony increased cost of light to the citizens of Mobile. The machinery is of the best quality employed for electrical purposes. Its officers and agents are shown to be skillful, and acting in good faith. Efforts have been made with considerable success, and are still being made, to prevent injury and annoyance to the occupants of adjoining dwellings. One of the chimneys is eighty | In Bonnard v. Perryman, Court of Appeal, 65 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 506, after holding that the High Court of Justice has jurisdiction, in an action of libel against the publisher of a newspaper, to grant an interlocutory injunction at any stage of the cause restraining the defendant from publishing the libel, held, as expressed in the following language of Lord Coleridge, C. J.: "But it is obvious that the subject-matter of an action for defamation is so special as to require exceptional caution in exercising the jurisdiction to interfere by injunction before the trial of an action to prevent an anticipated wrong. The right of free speech is one which it is for the public interest that individuals should possess, and, indeed, that they should exercise without impediment, so long as no wrongful act is done; and unless an alleged libel is untrue, there is no wrong committed; but, on the contrary, often a very wholesome act is performed in the publication and repetition of an alleged libel. Until it is clear |