This carefully-prepared paper was presented near the close of the session, too late to be read, much less to be discussed. Its suggestions cannot be too early or too carefully acted upon, and if the members of the association have not already given it careful consideration they should do so at an early date. The increase in the number of volumes of reports issued in this State alone is discouraging to the attorney engaged in an active practice, and who must keep about him all needed appliances to his profession. Mr. Fiero shows us that some thirty volumes of reports are annually issued in this State of cases decided by our State courts, and that the number of these reports is steadily increasing, entailing not only a heavy expense to the profession, but largely increasing the labors of its members in keeping track of the current decisions. Whether it is wise that so many cases should be reported, it is too late now to discuss. Private enterprise has seen fit to publish every decision, whatever may be its merits, and however frequently these reports are merely repetitions of decisions already rendered. The reports, in the haste to keep up with the decisions as rapidly as rendered, and to publish them ahead of the official reports, are often carelessly prepared, and with head-notes upon which little reliance can be placed, rendering the labor of examining them much more arduous than it would be if the syllabus could be safely relied upon. It is to be hoped that some means may be devised by which all the reports of the courts in the State may be promptly published in official form, at a moderate price, and that they may speedily do away with all unofficial reports. The advantages of the English system are clearly pointed out by Mr. Fiero, and it is believed that a scheme equally as effective may soon be devised and adopted in this State. The suggestions of the paper tend admirably to the desired result, and acting upon these suggestions, the committee on law reform has taken the matter in haud, and perhaps will be able to make some report at the present meeting of the association. PRINTING STATUTES. I would suggest to the association the advisability of taking into consideration the matter of printing the statutes of the State with a view to securing a more prompt publication. Nearly all enactments close with a section providing that the act shall take effect immediately, yet it is often weeks or months before members of the profession can have in shape for ready reference the enactments of any session of the Legislature. It is true that provisions are made for having these acts as passed sent to the clerks of the several counties, at least all general laws and those special laws affecting the county to which they are sent. But this hardly answers the purpose. A person by visiting the clerk's office each day may keep track of the laws as they are passed. This is an inconvenience and a burden that should not be cast upon the profession. Another provision of the statute is that all laws shall be published in certain newspapers in the various counties of the State. They are not published promptly, always printed in fine type, in out-of-the-way places in the papers, and anywhere from six to ten months after the laws take effect. The money expended by the various counties for these publications is practically thrown away, unless indeed it is deemed proper and wise that this patronage should be given to the newspapers for their support. If however by withholding these publications. many of our newspapers would be driven out of existence, it is not impossible more good would be done than by aiding to sustain them at the public expense. It occurs to me that some arrangement might be made by which the statutes should be published offi cially within twenty-four hours after their passage, and that as so published they should be sent to every attorney in the State desiring copies, either at a small subscription price or free. It would cost less money than the present method of publishing enactments, they would be more generally diffused throughout the State, and would sooner reach the persons most called upon to use them. Copies might also be sent to the county clerks and even to the clerks of the towns, although I imagine this would be of little practical use. Within a few days, or perhaps a few hours, after the close of the session all enactments would be in type, and bound volumes could be issued within a very short time thereafter. The advantages and convenience of some such arrangement may, I think, well demand the attention of the association. CURTAILMENT OF LEGISLATION. The attention of the association has several times been called to the large and growing increase of legislation in this State. Much of this is due to the enactment of what should be classed as special laws. A comparison of the legislation in this State with that in our sister State of Pennsylvania will be instructive. In population and business Pennsylvania is more nearly allied to our own State for comparison than any other State in the Union. In Pennsylvania a Constitution went into effect in 1874 which almost entirely abolished special legislation. Its sessions continued annual until 1879, and since then have been biennial. The legislation of 1874 was necessarily somewhat extensive in order to carry into effect by proper enactments the provisions of the Constitution in reference to general In the above comparison I do not include in the laws of the State of New York for 1876 the chapter enacting the Code of Remedial Justice, nor in 1879 the amend. ments to the Code, nor in 1880, part 2 of the Code, nor in 1881, the Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure, nor in 1882 the Consolidated Act for the city of New York. An examination of the books will show that a large portion of the legislation is taken up with enactments in relation to cities. I do not see why a general law may not be made to provide for the management of cities as well an any other municipal corporation, except perhaps the cities of New York and Brooklyn. It may be well for our association to take this matter in band, and see if some means may not be taken to check the growing evil. COUNCIL OF REVISION. For several years past the governor has deemed it proper to employ a special assistant to aid him in the examination of laws passed by the Legislature and sent to him for approval. Although an able lawyer himself, he has found it necessary, owing to the pressure of other duties, which are more arduous during the sessions of the Legislature than at any other time, to seek this assistance in order to give these bills, often hastily and carelessly enacted, the consideration which they ought to have before receiving executive approval. The wisdom of the course can hardly be questioned, and it suggests whether some permanent arrangement should not be made to meet the difficulties. I submit to the association the propriety of our cil should not be left entirely to the governor or to the Legislature, and should be made so far as possible entirely uninfluenced by party politics. My suggestion would be a council of three members, one to be appointed by the governor, one by the judges of the Court of Appeals and one by this association, and I would have these councilmen hold office for three or six years, one retiring every year or two years, as their terms of office might be. I suggest that one of the members should be appointed by this association for the reason that such appointment would be little apt to be influenced by political considerations; and the same should be said with reference to the appointment by the judges of the Court of Appeals. Objection might be made to the recognition given to this association by devolving upon it such an authority. But the State has already, through its Legislature, recognized our existence by giving us greater dignity, not unworthily bestowed, and would add greatly to the importance of the association and the interest of the members of the bar generally in its prosperity, and would result beneficially to the public good. taking the matter in hand and considering the advisa-granting to us corporate powers, and it would be only bility of the appointment of a council of revision, with duties similar to those devolved upon such a council provided for by the first Constitution of the State. The provision in reference to this council will be found in the third article of the Constitution of 1777, which reads as follows: "And whereas, laws inconsistent with the spirit of this Constitution, or with the public good, may be hastily or unadvisedly passed: Be it Ordained, That the governor for the time being, the chancellor and the judges of the Supreme Court, or any two of them, together with the governor, shall be, and hereby are, constituted a council to revise all bills about to be passed into laws by the Legislature. And for that purpose shall assemble themselves, from time to time, when the Legislature shall be convened; for which nevertheless they shall not receive any salary or consideration under any pretense whatever. And that all bills which have passed the Senate and Assembly shall, before they become laws, be presented to the said council for their revisal and consideration, and if upon such revision and consideration it should appear improper to the said council, or a majority of them, that the said bill should become a law of this State, that they return the same, together with their objections thereto in writing, to the Senate or house of Assembly, in whichsoever the same shall have originated, who shall enter the objections sent down by the council at large in their minutes, and proceed to reconsider the said bill. But if after such reconsideration, two-thirds of the said Senate or house of Assembly shall, notwithstanding the said objections, agree to pass the same, it shall, together with the objections, be sent to the other branch of the Legislature, where it shall also be reconsidered, and if approved of by two-thirds of the members present shall be a law." This article continued in force until the adoption of the Constitution of 1821, when the provision giving the veto power to the governor was substituted in its place. It is true that at the enactment of this Constitution an untried experiment was being made in the government of the State and of the Nation. The war of the Revolution was pending, and many things had to be considered in the conduct of public affairs that were unusual and required great consideration, and it was deemed advisable not only not to trust this management entirely to the discretion of the Legislature, but also not to leave the propriety of approving an enactment entirely to one man. The provision of the Constitution virtually gave the veto power to the council of revision, which the Legislature might overcome by a sufficient vote. I would neither do away with the veto power of the governor as it now exists, nor would I give the council of revision more than an advisory power which should be in aid of both executive and Legislature. I would suggest that the appointment of such coun The old council of revision performed its duties without any extra expense to the State. Such a council as I have suggested should receive adequate compensation. It cannot be expected that any body of men or any committee of this association should devote the needed time to this work uurewarded pecuniarily. My brethren of the association, in all the varied walks and relations of life, inexorable experience teaches us that we can never consider ourselves exempt from afflictions. We meet to-day under the shadow of a great sorrow, from which we cannot free ourselves, and which must greatly affect our feelings and our actions. Many of us well remember the gathering in this city on that November day, fifteen years ago, when a representative body of lawyers of this State met to take the preliminary steps toward the organization of this association. Prominent in that gathering was the one who presided over our deliberations, and who afterward honored us by serving as president of our association. He was a man of profound learning, of dignified presence, of kindly nature, of stainless reputation. In our deliberations at this annual gathering let us pause to pay our tribute to the memory of Chief Judge Ruger, who has so recently terminated a life of unusual usefulness and honor, to express to his former associates in the Court of Appeals our appreciation of the great family our sympathy in their sad bereavement. To us loss they have sustained, and to convey to his afflicted he presents in his career a signal example of devotion devotion. In the light of such examples we are furto his profession, and of the success which crowns such ther stimulated to the performance of the work to which we have pledged ourselves in our charter, cultivate the science of jurisprudence, to promote reform in the law, to facilitate the administration of justice, to elevate the standard of integrity, honor and courtesy in the legal profession, and to cherish the spirit of brotherhood among the members thereof." "to CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - TITLES OF ACTSPOOLS. MISSOURI SUPREME COURT, NOV. 16, 1891. STATE V. Burgdoerfer. Act of April 1, 1891 (Sess. Acts, p. 122), entitled "An act to prohibit book-making and pool-selling," provides that every one shall be guilty of a misdemeanor who keeps rooms for book-making or pool-selling upon the results of any trial or contest of skill, speed or power of endurance, The prohibition of book-making and pool-selling is within the ERRO RROR to St. Louis Criminal Court. Indictment of Frederick C. Burgdoerfer for book-making and pool-selling. On motion of defendant the indictment was quashed, on the ground that the law under which it was drawn was unconstitutional, and the State assigns error. John M. Wood, Atty.-Gen., Bernard Dierkes, Pros. Atty., Charles P. & John D. Johnson, Thomas B. Harvey, Valle Reyburn and Charles T. Noland, for State. Chester H. Krum, for defendant in error. THOMAS, J. [omitting a point of practice]. 1. The first contention of defendant is that the title of the act under which this information was drawn, in its relation to the body of the enactment itself, fails to conform to section 28, article 4, of the Constitution of Missouri, which provides that "no bill * * * shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title," and the act is therefore inoperative and void. The title of the act is "An act to prohibit book-making and pool-selling." The act itself provides that every one shall be guilty of a misdemeanor who keeps rooms for book-making or pool-selling upon the result of any trial or contest of skill, speed or power of endurance of man or beast, which is to take place beyond the limits of this State, or who makes books or sells pools on such events, or who makes books or sells pools on the result of any political nomination, appointment or election, wherever made or held, or who makes books with or sells pools to minors on such events. It is claimed that the title of this act, in its relation to the act itself, fails to come up to the constitutional requirement quoted, in that the title does not express the subject of the act at all, but if it should be held that the subject is expressed, it is not clearly expressed. The contention is that the title of the act is to "prohibit," while the body of the act regulates, book-making and pool-selling, and therefore the title does not contain the subject, within the meaning of this constitutional inhibition. It is settled in this State that this provision of the Constitution is mandatory, and it is equally well settled that it should be liberally construed. State v. County Court, 102 Mo. 531. The main question argued, and the main question in our view involved in the case is, does this act prohibit or regulate book-making and pool-selling? If it is one of prohibition, and this is clearly expressed in the title, the act is valid. On the other band, if it is one of regulation, it is invalid. The provision of the nature of the one under review was first introduced in this State in the Constitution of 1865, as follows: "No law enacted by the General Assembly shall relate to more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title; but if any subject embraced in an act be not expressed in the title, such act shall be void as to so much thereof as is not expressed." Four apparently important changes were made by the Constitution of 1875: (1) The word "bill" is substituted for "law enacted by the General Assembly;" (2) the words in the Constitution of 1865 we have italicized are omitted; (3) the word is inserted before the word "expressed; clearly "contain" is substituted for the words "relate to." (4) the word 66 There is of course a marked difference between bill" and "a law enacted by the General Assembly." We do not deem it necessary in this case to enter into a discussion of the object of this change. It may or may not have been intended to affect the general intent of the provision, but whether it did or not we leave for future consideration, when a more doubtful case than the one in hand arises. The omission of the words we have italicized was intended probably to emphasize the general object of the provision, that a bill shall contain but one subject. The word "clearly" may have been intended to require greater precision in the title than was indicated by the use of the word "expressed" without a qualifying term. We do not deem it necessary however to elaborately discuss the effect these changes were intended to have upon the meaning and scope of this provision, and we will proceed at once to determine whether the act in question, entitled as it is, conforms to the inhibition as it exists in the present Constitution. This court has the undoubted right and authority to declare an act of the General Assembly void on the ground that it fails to conform to or is in conflict with the Constitution. The constitutional provision under review has two distinct aspects in its relation to the power of the court to nullify an act for non-conformity to it: (1) If the title of an act clearly fails to contain the subject, or the act clearly contains two incongruous subjects, whether expressed in the title or not, the act is void per se, without regard to whether legislators or people were misled or not. In such case the only question for the courts to determine is, does the title clearly fail to contain the subject, or does the act contain two or more incongruous subjects? If the courts can answer this question in the affirmative, the act will be declared unconstitutional; if in the negative, it will be held valid. Here the courts can find some solid ground on which to stand. The main object of this inhibition was to require the title to contain the subject of the act, and to prevent the insertion in the same bill of two or more incongruous subjects, not because legislators and people might be misled, but to prevent log-rolling and cross-lifting, by which different interests might combine and succeed in enacting an omnibus statute that could never be passed if each subject had to stand or fall on its own merits or demerits. This principle finds many illustrations in the adjudged cases of this and other States. State v. County Court, 102 Mọ. 531; Cooley Coust. Lim. 170, et seq., and cases cited in notes. In the case at bar it is claimed that the subject of the act as contained in its title is the prohibition, while the subject of the act itself is the regulation, of bookmaking and pool-selling, and hence that the title does not contain the subject of the act. that a law which probibits certain acts of a given class The argument is inferentially permits the other acts of that class, and is therefore a law to regulate the whole class. The attorney for defendant cites in support of this contention the cases of People v. Gadway, 61 Mich. 285; Town of Cantril v. Sainer, 59 Iowa, 26: In re Hauck (Mich.), 38 N. W. Rep. 272; State v. Northampton (N. J. Sup.), 14 Atl. Rep. 587, and Miller v. Jones, 80 Ala. 89. Before examining these authorities we will advert to a fundamental error counsel has fallen into in the discussion of the question. In order that we may present the position taken fairly, we quote from the brief and argument of defendant's attorney as follows: "The court has before it an act to prohibit book-making and pool-selling. The title is clear, positive and unequivocal. It declares that the subject of the act is the prohibition of book-making and pool-selling. It does not suggest that pool-selling or book-making of any description may be carried on at any place within this State. It declares that the subject of the act is absolute prohibition of book-making and pool-selling of every description. We We It does not advise the legislator who reads the act by its title that pool-selling and book-making upon events which occur within this State is made a lawful occupation by the subject-matter of the act." There is in this extract an erroneous assumption of fact, aud a false conclusion of law upon the fact assumed. The title does not declare "that the subject of the act is the absolute prohibition of book-making and pool-selling of every description." If it did there would be much plausibility in the argument that the title does not contain the subject. must construe the title and the act as written. have no right to interpolate words into the title or act or both, unless such words are necessarily understood, and we do not think the words "absolute" and "every description" are necessarily understood in the title of the act before us. The most serious error however in the quoted extract is the legal deduction the attorney makes. The assumption is that the act makes pool-selling and book-making on events to occur in Missouri a lawful occupation. If that assumption were true there would be some force in the argument than an act which prohibits some things and affirmatively sanctions others of the same class, is a regulative and not prohibitive act. But does this act do that? It is not pretended that it does in terms, but it is insisted it does inferentially. The contention is that, when the State prohibits some things of a given class, it sanctions others of the same general class. There is a far-reaching fallacy underlying this contention. The State does not, in fact or in contemplation of law, sanction all acts it does not prohibit, or for which it provides no punishment. It may seem proper to leave some wrongful acts of its citizens to be regulated by the usages of society, by public opinion and by the social and natural forces inherent in man's nature. There is a radical and fundamental distinction between a failure to provide punishment for an act and the sanction of it. Many illustrations of this distinction can be drawn from the civil and criminal laws not only of our State but all States and countries. One will suffice for our present purpose. It is made a capital crime for a man to have illicit sexual intercourse once with a female under fourteen years old, whether with or without her consent, but if the female be one day over the age of fourteen years, one single act of such intercourse with her, with her consent, is no crime at all. State v. Gordon, 56 Mo. 147; State v. West, 84 id. 440. Can it be said the State, by not providing a punishment for the latter act, sanctious it? The statement of the question contains its own answer. This phase of the subject is well illustrated by the agitation that grew out of the ordinances of the city of St. Louis a few years ago authorizing the licensing of bawdy-houses. The distinction between the State failing to punish an act, and its sanction of the act by granting a license to do it, was sharply made in that controversy, and the ordinances in question soon went down under the indignation of an outraged people. When the mothers and fathers, husbands and wives, brothers and sisters of the State came to realize that they, in law, gave affirmative sanction to prostitution, by authorizing its existence for a consideration by way of a license fee, they withdrew such sanction emphatically and irrevocably. The Louisiana lottery is another forcible illustration. This gigantic organization has become a National evil, intensified by State sanction, authority and license. Octopus-like, it has laid its blighting hands upon every city and hamlet from ocean to ocean, corrupting the morals of the nation and drawing money from the people by the million. National sentiment, which this great wrong outrages, will no doubt ultimately compel the withdrawal from it of State authority to carry on its nefarious business. The State it is said can do no wrong, but whether this be true or false it cannot be affirmed that the State in any case sanctions a wrong, in law or fact, for which it provides no punishment. On the other hand, we believe we can safely affirm that the State sanctions nothing by implication. Our Bill of Rights guarautees life, liberty and the fruits of industry. Personal and property rights find their sanction in the common law of our State and of all States. These are imbedded in the fundamental laws of the land. They form a part of the affirmative jurisprudence of the State, sanctified by time and experience. But when the State provides a punishment for a part of a class of evils, it does not inferentially sanction the remainder of such class, for which it does not see proper to provide a punishment. It does not by prohibiting one wrong sanction another. No positive law exists for the protection of transactions growing out of and founded upon bets and wagers. Book-making and Fool-selling on "the result of any trial or contest of skill, speed or power of endurance of man or beast," on events to occur anywhere, are not within the protection of the laws of Missouri. They are contra bonos mores, and the courts will refuse to enforce contracts growing out of them. Hayden v. Little, 35 Mo. 418. Prize-fighting, which is a contest of skill and power of endurance of man, is positively prohibited as criminal in this State. § 3757. Betting on the result of elections is made a misdemeanor by section 5215. Betting on horse races, while not made criminal, is not recognized by our courts as a lawful business. A contract growing out of it will not be enforced. But this argument on our part is a work of supererogation. The attorney for defendant supports our views of the law on this subject in the following language in his brief: "As horse-racing is a game, it may safely be assumed that any trial of speed or endurance between man and man, or beast and beast, or between man and beast, is likewise a game. A foot-race has been held to fall within the category of games (Swaggard v. Hancock, 25 Mo. App. 605), and dog fights, prize-fights, chicken fights, base-ball contests, foot-races, regattas and all trials of skill, speed and endurance of the kind, must necessarily fall within the same category. It * ** has always been the policy of the law to discourage bets and wagers as being contra bonos mores." Some of the events mentioned in the act being criminal, and bets on some being also criminal, and bets on the others being unlawful, not in the sense of being criminal, but being unlawful because contrary to good morals, and hence contracts growing out of them being non-enforceable, the State in failing to provide a punishment for book-making and pool-selling, or events to occur in the State, does not thereby sanction or regulate them. Especially does it seem clear to us that it should not be held that the State sanctions an evil by implication or inference. If it has power to sanction and regulate evil at all, it would require an unequivocal, affirmative declaration by the State to that effect to accomplish it. It appearing that the State in the act before the court has not sanctioned and regulated any thing, that ought to be the end of the discussion, but defendant's attorney claims to have the support of the courts of other States in the cases cited, supra, for the position he assumes. We will examine them and see if they do give countenance to the doctrine contended for. In People v. Gadway, 61 Mich. 285, the situation was that in 1881 the Legislature passed an act, entitled "An act to regulate the sale of spirituous, malt, brewed, fermented and vinous liquors; to prohibit the sale of such liquors to minors, intoxicated persons and to persons in the habit of getting intoxicated; to provide a remedy against persons selling liquors to husbands or children in certain cases." In 1883 this law was amended by adding a new section as follows: "It shall not be lawful for any person, including druggists, by himself, his clerk, agent or servant, directly or indirectly, to sell or offer for sale, furnish or give away, any spirituous, malt, brewed, fermented or vinous liquors, or any beverage, liquors or liquids containing any spirituous, malt, brewed, fermented or vinous liquors, or suffer the same to be done at any time, within a radius of two miles from the grounds or premises of the Michigan Military Academy, an institution of learning located near Orchard Lake. in the county of Oakland, in this State." The Supreme Court of Michigan held this amendment unconstitutional, because not germane to the original law, which was one of regulation of the liquor traffic. The court says: "The peculiar characteristic of the section added by the amendment is the restricted and local application of the prohibition. It segregates from the general territory over which the body of the act extends a certain circle around the premises of the military academy, and in that circle entirely prohibits the traffic. In all other points of the State it regulates, here it prohibits." The italics are ours. In Miller v. Jones, 80 Ala. 89, the title of the act assailed was "An act to regulate the sale, giving away or otherwise disposing of spirituous, vinous or malt liquors, or intoxicating bitters, or patent medicines having alcohol as a base, in Talladega county." The body of the act provided for a vote on the question in the county named, and if a majority of those entitled to vote were in favor of prohibition, then it should be illegal to sell liquor, etc. The Supreme Court of Alabama says: "But one subject is expressed in the title, the regulation of the sale, giving away or otherwise disposing of liquors, and the inquiry is, does the title express the subject contained in the enactment? In other words, are regulation and prohibition the same or distinct subjects? Regulate' and 'prohibit' have different and distinct meanings. * # * To regulate the sale of liquors implies, ex vi termini, that the business may be enjoyed in or carried on subject to established rules or methods. Prohibition is to prevent the business being engaged in or carried on entirely or partially." And the act was held unconstitutional because the subject was not expressed in the title. The enactment was held to be prohibitory though the prohibition was conditional. If a majority was against the sale of liquor no liquor could be sold, if a majority were not against such sale then liquor might be sold. Hence the prohibition provided by the law was conditional, and not absolute, and yet it was held to be a law to prohibit the sale of liquor. In Re Hauck this question came again before the Supreme Court of Michigan, and was decided May 18, 1888. 38 N. W. Rep. 269. In 1887 the Legislature passed an act entitled "An act to regulate the manufacture and sale of malt, brewed or fermented, spirituous or vinous liquors in the several counties of this State." The body of the act provided that the question of the sale of liquors might be submitted to a vote of the people of the respective counties and if a majority of those entitled to vote were against the manufacture and sale of liquor in any county, then it should be unlawful to manufacture or sell liquor in such county, and the general law on the subject should be suspended therein. The court says: "When it [the law] was enacted, there was a general law in force regulating the sale of spirituous, malt, brewed, fermented and vinous liquors, under certain restrictions and limitations, upon complying with which and paying the taxes prescribed by another general law, it was lawful for any person to engage in the manufacture and sale of such liquors in any county in this State. These general laws were not repealed by the passage of the act in question. In reviewing these various sections it is apparent that the object of the act is to prohibit the manufacture and sale of liquors to be used as a bever age. There is no attempt by the Legislature to disguise this object in the body of the act," and the court held that the act was unconstitutional because its title was to regulate, and the enactment itself was to prohibit, the liquor traffic on certain conditions. Here again, as in the Alabama case, this act was construed to be one of prohibition, though such prohibition was partial and conditional. The case of Town of Cantril v. Sainer, 59 Iowa, 26, is to the same effect. The Supreme Court of Now Jersey in State v. Northampton, 14 Atl. Rep. 587, held that partial prohibition of the liquor traffic was regulation of that traffic, in support of the constitutionality of an act. This ruling is in direct conflict with the Iowa, Michigan and Alabama cases cited. But the New Jersey court proceeded upon the theory that a general law made the traffic lawful and regulated it, and the act assailed was upon the same subject, and provided for further regulation ou certain conditions. The principle of the Iowa, Michigan and Alabama cases is that where there is a general law providing for the licensing of the liquor traffic, the conditional prohibition of it in a prescribed territory is prohibition and not regulation, within that territory. That principle has no application to the act in the case at bar. In the case of the liquor traffic a positive law sanctioned it. In the case of book-making and pool-selling there is no positive law sanctioning them. In the former casc it is held that it is not the use but the abuse of liquor that is hurtful, and that the sale of it for legitimate purposes is not immoral. In the latter case book-making and pool-selling are held to be contrary to good morals, and the courts refuse to enforce contracts growing out of them. But the act before the court is prohibitory in its entire scope and purpose. It does not prohibit all book-making and pool-selling on the events named, but as far as it attempts to deal with the subject, it prohibits them. The act is not it is true as broad as the title, but it is germane to and included in it. Logically some prohibition is included in all prohibition. Logically the title does contain the subject of the act. The title does not give notice how the prohibition is to be effected, or to what extent, whether partially or wholly, whether by making the act prohibited a felony or a misdemeanor, but it does give the information that the act is for the prohibition of book-making and pool-selling. In Re Burris, 66 Mo. 446, this court, speaking of an act entitled "An act in relation to county clerks," used this language: "It is not intended that the substance of the act shall be embraced in the title, but that the subject should be stated in general terms and not specifically. For instance, an act was passed by the General Assembly in 1877, entitled 'An act for the protection of married women.' The title does not indicate in what that protection was to consist. By the title alone one would not know whether it was to protect married women in their rights of property. or in their persons, or in what manner the protection was to be afforded, whether by conferring upon them rights of suffrage, etc.. * but it does apprise one that it is a law for their protection." This reference to the Married Woman's Act well illustrates the principle that the title of an act may contain a generic term, and the body of the enactment be specific, and the act be upheld provided the enactment itself is germane to and included in the subject of the title. Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, pages 172, 173, says: "The generality of a title is therefore no objection to it, so long as it is not made a cover to legislation incongruous in itself, and which by no fair intendment can be considered as having a necessary or proper connection." In Luther v. Saylor, 8 Mo. App. 424, the act in question was an act entitled "An act to better secure the wages of laborers and operatives." The enactment itself provided that all em * * |