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species will depend on the circumstances of each
case. In general, however, the trade or taking
must be serious enough to warrant the finding
that the effectiveness of the international
program in question has been diminished. An
isolated, individual violation of a convention
provision will not ordinarily warrant certifica-
tion under this section. Id.

This definition of "diminishing the effectiveness" of a conservation program was fashioned only a year before passage of the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment, in which the identical standard appears. Nowhere in the legislative history of Packwood-Magnuson does a repudiation of this explanation of the phrase appear.

Thus, under this definition of "diminishing the effectiveness", the Secretary may conclude, as he has done in the past, that although a nation may not be complying in every detail with IWC regulations, it is demonstrating commitment to the overall whale conservation program in other ways. Το punish a nation which is making good faith efforts to bring itself into line with major conservation decisions is a foolish elevation of form over substance which Congress did not intend and which it explicitly rejected in the only definition of the statutory standard which was offered in the legislative process of either amendment. 7/

7/ If this Court were to ignore this definition and adopt the district court's view, such a decision would cast a shadow over application of the Pelly Amendment to all international conservation programs as well. For example, the 1978 Amendment to the Pelly Amendment, 22 U.S.C. 1978(a)(2), applies to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild

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The district court notes (Opinion at 14) that the

Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments were enacted by Congress to enforce compliance with international conservation agreements which lacked any enforcement teeth of their own. We fully agree with this statement of the amendments' purpose. Concluding the analysis there, however, as the court does, begs the question and dodges our arguments. The crucial issue is whether any and every transgression of an IWC quota must automatically and

1/ (footnote continued)

Fauna and Flora (CITES). Unlike the Whaling Convention, which addresses activities engaged in by a small number of nations concerning relatively few species, CITES is a broad conservation program. CITES controls international trade in over 1,000 species from marine, freshwater, and terrestrial environments, includes both plants and animals, and with 82 signatories, affects virtually every country on earth.

Absent the requisite documentation and findings, no trade in listed species is permissible under CITES. For species listed on Appendix I, what is in essence a zero quota applies to commercial transactions. Accordingly, the district court's interpretation of the term "diminishes the effectiveness" would produce an extreme result when applied to CITES. Under the district court's ruling, an argument could be made that any trade in listed species other than in accordance with CITES necessarily diminishes the effectiveness of its conservation program, irrespective of formal reservations by the parties. Such an interpretation of the Pelly Amendment would take away the discretion that Congress meant to give to the Secretaries to determine which activities "diminish the effectiveness" of treaties. It would require certification of a nation in each instance in which it was in violation of CITES or had lodged a reservation to provisions of the Appendices to CITES, regardless of the impact of the violation on the species or on the effectiveness of the treaty. While there are certainly instances where trade or taking inconsistent with CITES would diminish its effectiveness, not each transgression has that impact, nor should the Secretaries be required to certify to the President that it does. Yet the district court's ruling, which applied by its terms to determinations under the Pelly Amendment, would have precisely that absurd result.

inevitably trigger certification when, as here, the totality of the circumstances are such that those responsible for the nation's international conservation commitments believe that the effectiveness of the Convention will not be diminished. Indeed, in the current situation, permitting the Japanese to continue whaling for a few more years at reduced levels will secure an assurance of their cessation of whaling by early 1988 and thus an enhancement of the effectiveness of the Convention. No other United States action not certification or anything

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can achieve such a guarantee, a fact which the Secretary properly considered in making his decision on what action will best serve the cause of whale conservation.

The court holds that any and all whaling inconsistent with the Schedule triggers certification irrespective of the circumstances, of ongoing negotiations, and of tangible commitments to the Convention which the United States has been able to induce by the threat of certification. The basis for this narrowly defined view of Secretarial discretion is unclear. The legislative history indicates that Congress was certainly impatient with the pace at which the Executive Branch had moved in making certification decisions under the Pelly Amendment. Representative Murphy explained the purpose of the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment as follows:

Mr. Speaker, the reason for the amendment is
that in the past the Secretary of Commerce
and the Secretary of the Interior have been
taking entirely too much time, as much as a
year or more in some cases, to make a decision
on whether to certify whether the nationals

of a foreign country are in violation of
the Pelly Amendment, as amended. I want to
strongly emphasize that it is the intent of
this amendment to make it clear that the
Congress expects these Secretaries to act
swiftly and promptly in making such investi-
gations and decisions in the future. [125
Cong. Rec. 22083 (1979) (Statement of Rep.
Murphy).]

The necessity for some Secretarial discretion was, however, clearly recognized. The district court's opinion ignores the legislative history discussing Secretarial discretion as if it were non-existent. It makes no attempt even to explain it away. In hearings before the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives, Chairman Breaux described the two amendments as follows:

Mr. Breaux: I understand under the
Pelly Amendment, as it exists, there
are really two areas in which there are
optional actions that can be taken by
the administration.

First, in certifying that a country is in
violation of some international agreement,
and there is a lot of flexibility in that
certification and second, after a nation
is certified, there is still discretion in
determining whether a ban on imports of that
country's products will be in fact imposed
against that country. Therefore, under Pelly
we have two discretionary features, whereas
in the Packwood amendment, you are really
taking all of the discretionary features and
putting them into their first category which
is the certification of a nation being in
violation of an international agreement.
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Fisheries
and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment
of the Committee on Merchant Marine and

Fisheries, House of Representatives, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 314-315 (1979).]
added.]

[Emphasis

In an exchange during the same hearing with John Negroponte,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, who was concerned about
the flexibility provided by the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment,
the following colloquy occurred:

Mr. Breaux: ***What is wrong with telling
a nation which flagrantly diminishes the
effectiveness of a treaty, saying to that
nation that they cannot have the right or
privilege of fishing within our 200 mile zone?

Mr. Negroponte: Well, I think that it is
in part a question of degree, Mr. Chairman.
Does the punishment fit the crime?

Mr. Breaux: The Secretary has the discretion
in making a certification decision. Id. at
317 (emphasis added)].

President Carter took a similar approach when he signed the

Packwood-Magnuson Amendment into law on August 15, 1979. Stress-
ing the desirability of using the amendment as both leverage
and a weapon of last resort when persuasion fails, he said:

With regard to both the Packwood-Magnuson
and Pelly Amendment, the Secretaries of
Commerce and the Interior should work with
the Secretary of State to take prompt action
to ensure that all avenues of negotiation
are fully exhausted before certification is
made against any foreign nation. However,
in those negotiations all nations will be
informed of these two amendments and the
determination of this Government to use
them if remedial action is not undertaken.
[Administration of Jimmy Carter, 1979,
p. 1435 (emphasis added).]

The signing statement underscores the degree to which foreign policy concerns are entangled in the cause of international

whale conservation. This Court clearly recognized such

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